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School and Workplace Violence
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Four years ago, in September 2004, a violent, inhumane hostage crisis claimed the lives of 334 individuals, including 186 students of a school in a small southern city of Beslan, Russia. It was the most tragic terrorist act in the recent Russian history of fighting extremism and crime.

American soil has not seen such extreme attacks against children, but violence in the schools of the nation is a daily occurrence. Although school violence as phenomena has been decreasing in frequency since the 1970s, the severity of it has dramatically increased and the numbers are astounding for concerned parents, school authorities, and police. According to the National School Safety Center, almost three million crimes are committed on or near a school campus each year, accounting for 11% of all reported crimes in the United States.

When juvenile violence attracted national attention more than a decade ago following the most horrific homicides behind the school walls, law enforcement and school administration responded with an array of safety training, drills, and technological measures. Currently, there are hardly any schools where administration has not launched more visible security and preventative programs targeting bullying and other problems that can lead to violence. Law enforcement agencies are typically the main agencies contacted by school authorities for advice and assistance with school crisis prevention programs, and they are almost always the first to be called when violence erupts. An important result of this focus on resisting school violence is the increased coordinated involvement of school districts, law enforcement, parents, and students in keeping schools safe.

Today, the scale, diversity, and highly dynamic trends in the nation’s schools, with multiple cultures, languages, and often negative perspectives on police presence raises new, critical, and complex challenges for law enforcement. As the recent history of these violent accidents has proven, they do happen—and can happen anywhere, in any type of schools.

This issue of the Forum focuses on school violence and the related problems confronting local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies within the United States and many nations throughout the world. The collection of articles provides an overview of the topics surrounding school violence and security, presents valuable information on the current resources available to law enforcement, and examines the concerns and obstacles that currently surround the discussion over school cooperation with the law enforcement community. It is our hope that this collection of articles will prove to be a useful tool for all readers.

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School Safety Drills as a Means to Improve School Safety Plans

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Introduction

We want our schools to be safe places where our children can learn. At the same time, we are aware that serious violent incidents have occurred and continue to occur in our schools with unsettling regularity (Associated Press, 2007; CNN.com, 1999, 2001; Crews & Counts, 1997; Infoplease, 2008; McGee & DeBernardo, 2001; Milicia, 2007; “Newsbriefs,” 2002; School Violence Resource Center, 2007; U.S. Department of Justice & U.S. Department of Education, 2007; U.S. Secret Service & U.S. Department of Education, 2002; Watson & Watson, 2002). The development of a school safety plan is one way to prepare for the worst case scenario and save lives (Kelley, 2008).

The Need to Develop Effective Safety Drills

Fire drills are a common part of school life. The periodic drills help onsite school administrators, teachers, staff, and students learn how to exit the school building in a quick and orderly fashion. The danger, the fire, is in the building, and so everyone needs to exit the building and move to a safe place.

In a school violence scenario, the location of the danger is often uncertain. There are many possible scenarios that could occur, and in each scenario, the danger will be in a different location (Dwyer, Osher, & Warger, 1998). It may not be safe to quickly exit the building during a school violence incident (Infoplease, 2008; McGee & DeBernardo, 2001; School Violence Resource Center, 2007). Therefore, all teachers and staff in the school must know how to respond in a variety of crisis situations, making the development of safety plans much more complex than the traditional fire evacuation plan (Boyd, 2000; Canter & Garrison, 1994; Kelley, 2008; Watson, 2003). One set plan, such as a fire drill evacuation plan, may not be effective in saving lives during a school violence incident. The teachers and staff need to know how to quickly decide which means will best protect the lives of people in the school building until emergency responders are able to intervene (Kelley, 2008). Due to the breakdown in normal means of communication that may occur during a violent incident, onsite school administrators will often not be able to direct how teachers, staff, and students respond in school violence situations, underlining the need for each teacher and staff member to be able to decide which steps to take to protect lives (Boyd, 2000; Kelley, 2008). Teachers, staff, and students can learn how to respond effectively to a variety of crisis situations by practicing a variety of school safety drills.

By practicing the school safety plan together, onsite school administrators and emergency responders learn the strengths and weaknesses of the plan and are, thus, able to make adjustments to the plan. Teachers and staff members learn how to identify different types of situations and how to respond to these situations in ways that will keep people safe (Boyd, 2000; Canter & Garrison, 1994; Dwyer...
et al., 1998; Vestermark, 1996; Watson, 2003). Teachers and staff members can also provide valuable information to onsite school administrators based on their experience of how the plan was executed and what they observed. A meeting of faculty and staff with onsite school administrators following the crisis drill can be an effective means to improve the school safety plan.

Students also need to know what to do in a crisis. Students know that when the fire alarm sounds, they are to exit the building. When a violent incident occurs at a school, however, exiting the building may not lead to safety, but to harm (Infoplease, 2008; McGee & DeBernardo, 2001; School Violence Resource Center, 2007). By involving students in crisis planning and response, school personnel will enhance student safety and formulate more effective school safety plans (Kozaczek, 2000).

Developing the Study

The review of the literature demonstrates that improving school safety plans through ongoing practice and evaluation is a necessity given the ongoing occurrence of serious violent incidents in schools and the need to involve a variety of people in creating effective plans to respond to complex and varied threats (Associated Press, 2007; Boyd, 2000; CNN.com, 1999, 2001; Crews & Counts, 1997; Dwyer et al., 1998; Infoplease, 2008; Kozaczek, 2000; McGee & DeBernardo, 2001; Milicia, 2007; “Newsbriefs,” 2002; School Violence Resource Center, 2007; U.S. Department of Justice & U.S. Department of Education, 2007; U.S. Secret Service & U.S. Department of Education, 2002; Vestermark, 1996; Watson & Watson, 2002). The researcher had considered the best way to develop and practice safety drills for some time based on personal experiences as a high school administrator, his reading of the literature, and his research conducted on school violence (Boyd, 2000; Canter & Garrison, 1994; Dwyer et al., 1998; Kelley, 2008; Simonds, in press; Vestermark, 1996; Watson, 2003). A conversation with a school administrator sparked an idea for a study of how to practice and improve school safety drills.

The researcher learned from a school administrator that his high school was planning to conduct school safety drills and then conduct debriefing sessions to evaluate the effectiveness of the school’s safety plan. Given the complex nature of school safety drills, and the great need to create effective drills, the researcher thought that these safety drills and debriefing sessions offered a unique opportunity to study how one school sought to improve school safety plans. The researcher chose to study the safety drills and debriefing sessions by taking on the role of an onsite observer (Creswell, 2005). As an onsite observer, the researcher was able to be present during the safety drills and debriefing sessions, record his observations, and reflect on his observations in order to share important conclusions and questions with interested professionals and researchers.

The researcher contacted the school administration and requested permission to observe the safety drills and debriefing sessions. The school administration granted permission, and the researcher conducted the observations at the school site on two days in the fall of 2007. After his visits to the school site, the researcher shared his observations with the assistant principal of the school where the observations were conducted in order to confirm that his observations were accurate. The assistant principal confirmed that the researcher had accurately described what
had occurred during the safety drills and the debriefing sessions in the fall of 2007.

Conducting the Observations

The researcher arrived at the Midwestern U.S. high school campus on a morning in the fall of 2007. Once on campus, the researcher joined a group of school administrators from other schools in the city, members of law enforcement, and rescue personnel who were present to observe the safety drills in order to help school personnel create a better safety plan. The researcher and other observers accompanied one of the assistant principals as he carried out his duties during the safety drills.

A series of four safety drills were conducted over the course of the morning: (1) a fire drill, (2) a school evacuation drill, (3) a lockdown drill, and (4) a tornado drill. The drills were completed in two and one half hours. In between drills, students went to homeroom and held club meetings.

To practice the fire drill, the fire alarm was sounded, and everyone evacuated the building to a predetermined location. An all-clear was given, and everyone came back into the school building.

The fire alarm was again sounded to initiate the evacuation drill. Everyone exited the building to a predetermined site. Students lined up in areas by grades, and teachers took attendance. Teachers used laminated colored cards to report attendance. One color of card meant all students were present. Another color of card meant some students were absent, and the names of absent students were written on the cards by the teachers. The onsite school administrators gathered the attendance cards from teachers and met at a central location to discuss attendance-related issues. One of the onsite school administrators gave the all-clear signal, and everyone returned to the school building. Once inside the building, the onsite school administrators continued to discuss issues of student attendance.

About 15 minutes after returning to the building from the evacuation drill, the assistant principal used the school intercom system to initiate the school lockdown drill. The researcher walked through the building with the assistant principal and other observers. The assistant principal collected attendance cards that teachers had slid out into the hall under classroom doors.

The building was absolutely silent. No one was in the hallways. All the classroom doors were closed, and the rooms were dark. All the lights in the rooms had been turned off. We could not see or hear the people in the classrooms from out in the hallway. The assistant principal and members of law enforcement checked the classroom doors to see that they were locked, making a record of those doors that were unlocked for future follow-up with teachers.

Immediately after the all-clear was given for the lockdown drill, all the observers and two assistant principals at the school met in a conference room to discuss the safety drills. The focus of the discussion was on the lockdown drill. Following the debriefing session, the assistant principal used the intercom to initiate a tornado drill. During the tornado drill, school staff and students went to predetermined
locations in the building to take shelter. After the tornado drill, the safety drills were concluded and the observers left the school campus.

**The Debriefing Session with Onsite School Administrators and Emergency Responders**

During a 30-minute debriefing session, school administrators from other schools in the city, members of law enforcement, and city rescue personnel shared insights with the onsite school administrators and asked clarifying questions about procedures and preparedness. The onsite school administrators hoped that the diverse group of observers would bring to light new ideas on how to create a better school safety plan.

The observers commended the school for the quick and orderly evacuation of the school building. Observers asked the following questions of the onsite school administrators.

- “How will the lockdown alert be given if the intercom cannot be used?”
- “How will people in the classrooms communicate with people outside the classrooms?”
- “How should teachers respond to students who use cell phones during the crisis?”
- “How do teachers in classrooms receive an all-clear message?”
- “What are police and rescue personnel response times?”
- “Do people in the classrooms have access to first aid supplies?”
- “Are there people in the building with special medical needs?”
- “How do school personnel and emergency responders coordinate their actions?”
- “How will emergency responders gain access to the building?” (All outside doors of the building are locked during school hours.)
- “Will school administrators respond to the crisis or shelter in place?”
- “How will school and emergency personnel respond to parents or others who come on campus and attempt to enter the school building during a crisis situation?”
- “What should people in open spaces such as bathrooms and lunchrooms do during a crisis?”
- “How long will the school remain in lockdown, and what issues will arise if the lockdown lasts for more than 20 minutes?” (e.g., bathroom, food, water, panic, medical needs)

The onsite school administrators and observers discussed some of the questions, formulating tentative answers to a few and leaving the other questions to be addressed later. One question that was discussed was how to account for all the students during a crisis event. The onsite school administrators stated that they needed to think more about the best way to make sure that every student is safe and accounted for. Members of law enforcement stated that they thought the first priority should be to get as many people as possible to safe places and that accounting for every student and staff member would be done after the incident was resolved.
Onsite school administrators asked the observers their thoughts about using code words to initiate school safety response plans. Members of law enforcement and the onsite school administrators agreed that plain speech should be used. Those present in the debriefing session stated that the purpose of using plain speech in a crisis is to ensure that everyone immediately understands the situation and responds without the hesitation that might occur if a code word were to be used.

Some observers also suggested that the school practice doing a lockdown in response to a simulated intruder in which onsite school administrators go to a safe room; call 911; and wait for police to come into the building, do a walk-through, and give the all-clear. Other observers and the onsite school administrators stated that advance planning and good communication between school officials and emergency responders would be vital in order to avoid the unnecessary panic that could arise in a simulated crisis.

The Debriefing Session with Students

One week after the safety drills were conducted, the researcher returned to the school to observe a debriefing session with the students. The session was conducted by the assistant principal of the school. There were nine boys and three girls in the class, and the session lasted 25 minutes.

The assistant principal stood at the front of the room and asked students questions about how they felt during the safety drills. Two students said that safety drills are necessary to help everyone prepare in case a crisis occurs. Some students also talked about how they would respond in a real crisis. For example, six students said that in a real crisis situation, they would run out of the building and leave campus, either on foot or in their cars. These students said that they would not feel safe staying in the school building. One student said, “In a real lockdown, people would freak out. They would go to their cars and leave.” Another student said, “We would be better off getting out of the building because couldn’t they get in the rooms anyway? They will know people are in school when they see cars outside and come looking for us.”

Four students said that if a shooter was in the school building, they thought the shooter could get into the classrooms and hurt them. The students went on to explain how a shooter could gain access to the people in the classrooms and wanted to know what to do and how to protect themselves. One student said, “If there’s a lockdown and someone gets in the room, what do you do?” Along these same lines, another student said, “Do you (the assistant principal) think you could stop someone with a gun from doing anything they wanted to do if they got into the school?”

What Can We Learn from These Observations?

These observations generated a number of important points for school personnel and emergency responders to consider. A number of questions for future study also emerged from these observations.

One question that emerged from the study related to the use of the fire alarm. The school in this study used the fire alarm to signal both a fire drill and an evacuation
drill. The observers present at the school did not comment on this fact; however, the researcher wonders whether or not it is advisable to use a fire alarm for anything other than an actual fire or a fire drill. This is an open question for local school personnel and emergency responders to discuss and answer.

Another question raised by this study involves the taking of student attendance. During the evacuation drill, the school administrators tried to obtain an accurate student attendance list using colored cards completed by grade-level teachers. Administrators were able to verify that all but a few students were present at the evacuation site.

During the lockdown drill, school administrators picked up attendance cards that teachers had put out in the hall under the classroom doors. Obtaining an accurate student attendance list was one of the primary duties of the onsite school administrators during the safety drills. Taking attendance immediately following a school safety drill is certainly prudent so that students do not use the drill as an opportunity to skip school. In some actual crisis scenarios, such as a lockdown due to a disturbance in the neighborhood, school administrators will be able to obtain attendance and should do so to verify that all students are safe. In other crisis scenarios, such as an active shooter in the school building, however, obtaining an accurate accounting of the whereabouts and well-being of everyone in the school might not be possible until days following the event. Attendance lists put in the hall by teachers could even be counterproductive, giving intruders information about the location of a potential victim.

What is the best policy on taking student attendance during various types of crisis situations? This is a question that must be considered by school personnel and emergency responders. Plans for accounting for students will need to be tailored to fit a number of different crisis scenarios and also ought to consider the need to account for staff and others present in the school at the time of the incident.

A third question raised as a result of these observations has to do with the use of plain speech to announce a crisis. If school personnel use plain speech to announce a crisis, what will be the result? For example, suppose that a school administrator made the following announcement on the school intercom: “There is a man with a gun in the school lobby, and he is firing shots in the air. Teachers, please initiate the school safety plan.” The location and nature of the threat is clear, and the command to put the safety plan into action is also clear, but how will teachers, students, and others respond to the plain speech announcement? Researchers could study this question by interviewing people who have been involved in school violence incidents or simulated drills in which either plain speech or code words were used to initiate the school safety plan. Researchers could then compare the responses of people in the different schools and determine if one practice seemed more effective than another.

The use of debriefing sessions following the safety drills were an effective means to improve the school safety plan, and this process can be used by other schools. The discussion between onsite school administrators and observers highlighted the strengths of the plan and the areas that needed improvement. The debriefing session with students helped the assistant principal gain insight into how students might respond in a real crisis situation. Information from debriefing sessions, such
as the ones in this study, can be used to improve existing school safety plans. Additional debriefing sessions in which onsite school administrators listen to the observations of faculty and staff about safety drills could also prove beneficial for improving safety plans.

Additional research could be conducted on the use of debriefing sessions following school safety drills. For example, researchers could study how effectively schools execute safety drills, comparing schools that practice drills often, schools that practice drills often and use debriefing sessions, and schools that practice drills rarely and do not use debriefing sessions. If a simulated intruder drill were to be conducted in a school, researchers could study how people in the school respond in this simulated crisis. Such a study could be very beneficial for school personnel, emergency responders, and all of those who teach and learn in our schools. However, conducting such a drill may cause panic and psychological distress for those people in the school, their family members, and others; this risk must be carefully considered.

The fact that most recent school shooters have been students or former students must be considered when planning and conducting school safety drills (Associated Press, 2007; CNN.com, 1999, 2001; Crews & Counts, 1997; Infoplease, 2008; McGee & DeBernardo, 2001; Milicia, 2007; “Newsbriefs,” 2002; School Violence Resource Center, 2007; U.S. Department of Justice & U.S. Department of Education, 2007; U.S. Secret Service & U.S. Department of Education, 2002; Watson & Watson, 2002); however, since it is possible that students may find themselves alone in a bathroom or out on a practice field when a crisis occurs, and because normal means of communication often fail in a crisis, students need to know what steps to take to protect themselves while a crisis is occurring. The need to give students information must be balanced with the knowledge that students might use information to harm others in the school.

The importance of giving students information and involving them in crisis planning and response was clear from student comments during their debriefing session with the assistant principal. Student comments indicated that they did not feel safe. The students were worried, and they were not sure if school personnel would be able to keep them safe during a situation in which an intruder was in the school. Students indicated that they would take matters into their own hands and flee the school building by any means possible if an armed person came into the school.

This study indicates that onsite school administrators and emergency responders need to develop new ways to bring students into the crisis planning process to lessen the likelihood that students will place themselves in danger by acting impulsively out of extreme panic. Involving students in the crisis planning process may result in more effective school safety plans and may also help students feel safer at school.

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**Dr. Thomas A. Simonds** is the director of the secondary education program and assistant professor of education at Creighton University in Omaha, Nebraska. He has been a coach and instructor at the middle school level, and a teacher, coach, assistant principal, and principal in secondary schools. His doctoral degree in education is from the University of San Francisco in School Leadership. He is also an ordained priest and serves at Saint John’s Church on the campus of Creighton University. His current research interests are school violence prevention and methods of teaching religion and values in schools. His research on school violence prevention has been accepted for publication in the *Journal of School Violence.* This year (2008), he will give presentations on his school violence research at three national conferences: Indianapolis, Indiana; Louisville, Kentucky; and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

**Bibliography of Works Published and Presentations Given by the Author on School Violence Prevention**


Invited presenter, Creighton University Faculty Development Panel on Violence, Omaha, NE, April 17, 2008: *Research on Violence in Catholic Secondary Schools*.

Invited presenter, Education Law Symposium, Louisville, KY, July 10-13, 2008: *Bullying and Harassment in Schools*.
Invited presenter, Chief Administrators of Catholic Education Annual Fall Meeting, Oklahoma City, OK, October 27, 2008: *When the Crisis Drill Becomes Real.*

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Why Schools Are Likely to See More School Riots in the Future

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When I created the Surviving a Riot or Civil Disturbance slide presentation a number of years ago, I began paying closer attention to the number of riots that were occurring in the public schools. It became obvious that there were far more riots than school shootings. In the past year or two, Long Island school districts experienced at least a dozen riots. While only six or seven made the papers, I learned of several others because I worked with teachers from those districts. This raises a number of interesting questions. Were there others besides the ones I heard about that didn’t make the papers? Are the papers selectively reporting these events, was this an isolated series of events, or are we seeing a trend? Finally, what is happening in the rest of the country?

This article will address some of the risk factors that make riots possible and suggest areas for school districts and law enforcement to examine that might eliminate or at least minimize some of these risk factors. Many of these suggestions are not new, and some are just common sense. It is amazing that educators have not become aware of or implemented these ideas. Unfortunately, the “pot is beginning to bubble over” now and unless serious proactive steps are taken, we are likely to see greater numbers of riots in our public schools. You know who they will call when things get out of hand. This might suggest another role for law enforcement—to educate the educators.

First, it is important to know the secret formula for a riot to occur. The two key elements are a large group or crowding combined with an emotional component intense enough to trigger the group. The emotional component could be anger, rage, jubilation, or fear. They all work equally well. A school does not have to be overcrowded to be dangerous, although overcrowding adds to the stress and risk. All schools have to do is have a large concentration of students (i.e., in the halls or cafeteria, at a sports event or dance, etc.) and all schools do.

Escape/panic riots are the most likely type of riot to occur at school. Prior to some riots, there is a warning in the form of racial or ethnic tension building or agitators at work, but panic riots are the hardest riots to predict or prepare for. They can be instantly triggered by an explosion, shooting, fire/smoke, rumors, or a natural disaster, and the list of triggers goes on and on. If exits are limited and cannot handle the escaping crowd, crushing and trampling are often the result. The volatility of young people, the recent surge in bomb threats, past school shootings, the presence of gangs, or a host of other factors yet to be mentioned all contribute to the possibility of a panic riot.

Frightening as it may be, schools have a long laundry list of risk factors. Some can be direct triggers to ignite a riot and others might be situations that act as “fertilizer” for future eruptions. In some cases, we have to live with the risk factors because they are part of adolescence or human behavior, or part of growing up in
a more congested society. The day of the “little red school house” is gone. Thus, there are quite a few risk factors that must be addressed because they increase the chance of riots well above the acceptable level.

At this point, actual external terrorism is probably one of the least likely threats facing our schools, although some law enforcement experts predict it is only a matter of time before this could happen. The Russian school hostage situation and shooting a few years ago has let the genie out of the bottle. Terrorists realize the fear and chaos an event like this can generate. At one point in time, an attack like this on a school would have been unthinkable; however, it is always easier the second or third time. Just the fear of or rumors about terrorist threats could provide a trigger.

Internal terrorism is a much more likely threat. Threats from American groups (e.g., the Oklahoma City Bombing) or our own children (e.g., Columbine) are far more likely. Columbine has in essence set the bar; it gives ideas to wannabes who seek that one minute of fame. Klebold and Harris have become role models for the next generation of school shooters, and we have already uncovered cases in which teens were planning an attack on their school that would surpass Columbine just so they could go down in the history books as #1.

We must keep in mind that schools are vulnerable, and they always will be vulnerable. In spite of the billions spent in the past few years to “target harden” schools, they are still quite vulnerable. It should also be noted that technology does not eliminate the need for teacher or staff training. Because of their size and the efforts of educators to keep schools a “friendly” place, we could never totally secure a school. For quite some time I have been an advocate for police presence in schools. Additionally, a law enforcement presence in a school would be a great asset to establish a school crisis plan and to be of assistance to administrators during a crisis. Police presence can only do so much, however. They cannot be everywhere in the building when violence erupts. It is more likely that a teacher would be on the scene first and, therefore, teachers must get some violence prevention training. Also, in spite of police presence, a determined attacker would have no problem bringing a gun or bomb into a school.

Our own children can be the very trigger that spurs a riot either intentionally or unintentionally. Some studies suggest as many as 15% of adolescents suffer some form of mental health problems. Several studies indicate that 800,000 teenagers suffer from depression each year, and over 500,000 make an attempt at suicide that requires medical intervention. Currently, suicide is the third leading killer of 15 to 19 year olds, and it continues to rise. Kids need our help. Unfortunately, these problems are not being adequately addressed. To make matters worse, only half the schoolchildren in the U.S. who seek mental health care get it. Excuses often given are “We don’t have the resources or the money” or “It is not our job.” Kids are our job, and as educators, we are going to have to accept this additional responsibility. A study by Human Rights Watch (“Prisons Clogged,” 2004) found there are as many as 300,000 mentally ill prison inmates nationally. Could they be our former students who never received help? Just possibly, if we invested more money in providing screening and counseling services in elementary school, some of the violence we are encountering in middle and high schools might be averted.
Also, some of the cost of incarcerating criminals might diminish (see also “Violent Youth,” 2001).

Teenage alcohol abuse is responsible for about 40% of all crimes, violent and nonviolent, which are committed while under the influence of alcohol. Alcohol is commonly a contributor to college and sports riots. At many high school events, kids are either coming under the influence or smuggling liquor in. A good screening process by professionals is needed to control this problem.

Unfortunately, schools tend to be reactive and not proactive. Here is a meaningful quote told to me years ago by Dr. Arun Gandhi, director of The Gandhi Institute of Non-Violence: “Unless we deal with covert violence, it will eventually bubble up and become overt violence.” Some form of covert violence exists in every school, and in most cases it is being ignored or tolerated. Bullying is a classic example. In spite of all the efforts in recent years to address this problem, some research indicates it has gotten worse.

Kids have a tendency to get caught up in the moment. When in a group, there is a contagion factor that makes it easier to do things that one would not do when alone. Combine this with the excitement of X-treme and dangerous sports, which are very popular among the younger generation; a riot to some might seem like “an exciting day at the ranch.” There have been numerous instances wherein students have brought explosive devices to school and detonated them. Believe it or not, they had no intent on harming anyone. It was just a “joke.” Actual threats combined with rumors could easily generate fear into panic. Bomb threats are coming in to schools by the thousands nationally. A car backfiring could be all that might be needed to trigger a panic riot. The Internet, text messaging, and e-mail are easy ways to spread rumors and create an atmosphere of fear.

Every group establishes a pecking order. With most groups, it is clearly established by rank, seniority, etc. Kids, on the other hand, have an invisible pecking order. In order to move up, there is either fighting or at least threats made in the form of ritualistic combat. If fights are not stopped quickly, they can easily turn into riots because of the alliances that form in school. Alliances in the form of gangs, teams, or fraternities compel members to assist their friends when they are in trouble. Many of these groups have strong support bonds that compel them to join in regardless of the consequences. In addition to this, sometimes there is tension or hostility between racial, ethnic, cultural, or religious groups. Years ago, Wayne Sakamotto, Director of Safety for the San Diego Public Schools, told me of a study done in Los Angeles over ten years ago that found that a 10% change in the student population demographics seemed to contribute to student riots. Since school populations are steadily changing, this might be something educators should be alert to. All these factors add to the danger that a fight could easily escalate into a much larger event. Incorporating tolerance programs into the school curriculum might be helpful.

With the spread of gangs to suburban and rural areas, there is additional risk that fights could easily expand into some type of riot. Gang loyalty is a key to their strength and success. To ensure future membership, gangs are recruiting in elementary schools. With the aid of cell phones, a fight can grow from two to a large group. Adult gang members have been known to show up at the school in
anticipation of a fight. This also increases the possibility that weapons might be used.

To make matters even worse, according to my own unofficial survey of hundreds of educators, few in the school setting, not teachers, administrators, nor even school security guards, are trained to physically break up a fight. In fact, my informal survey suggests less than five percent of the teachers I have worked with have had any training at all. Teachers will probably be the first on the scene, and most lack even nonphysical verbal intervention strategies for dealing with fights. Only professional law enforcement or school resource officers are trained to accomplish this. But will they be on the scene soon enough to prevent a situation from escalating?

Competition, like anything else, can have a positive or negative influence. Winning at any cost has too often replaced good sportsmanship and honor. Creating school and team rivalries has reached a fevered pitch in many school districts, and riots are becoming more common. Many a riot was triggered by an excited athlete, coach, parent, or spectator. Schools are somewhat complicit by having pep rallies prior to games that pump up student emotions. Our school district had two high schools at one time. Administrators at both schools would almost create a student frenzy prior to the schools meeting for a local football game. I have seen this same situation created in many other school districts with little thought given to the negative aspects. Lately, because of disruptive incidents at some games, there has been an effort by a few school districts to curb sports violence by requiring parents to attend a fan support seminar before being allowed to attend sporting events. They have even banned some parents from attending sporting events because of their poor behavior.

Once you have a large group, sports games have triggered riots when a team loses or when a team wins. To excited fans, almost any excuse seems reasonable, and they are easily caught up in a group dynamic. A panic riot could be easily triggered by collapsing stands; pushing in crowded, confined spaces; a fire cracker thrown by a “clown”; or a fight between spectators. Something as simple as having adequate restrooms is critical. It is important to have professional crowd control people working these events, and the event should be planned in advance to eliminate needless problems.

Another way educators can actually create a potentially dangerous situation is through a school activity called “Battle of the Classes.” While the intent is to promote school spirit, it often creates a tense confrontation. First of all, having teams from grades 9 through 12 physically compete is not actually fair. Twelfth graders are going to have a physical superiority over ninth graders. I experienced this years ago chaperoning such an event in my middle school. For an entire week, the classes were pumped up by the teachers for the Friday night event. During the competition, the ninth graders showed a clear superiority over the other grades. It was so clear, several of the teachers working with the lower grades began helping their students, actually cheating for them, during the events. However, it was the tug of war that almost “blew the lid” off the event. The ninth grade was clearly beating the seventh grade when several teachers joined onto the seventh grade team and pulled the ninth graders across the line. Then all hell broke loose. Several hundred ninth graders started coming out of the stands yelling “Teachers cheat.”
It was by luck we were able to get them back in their seats. Fortunately, we did not have a gang problem, there was not any drinking, and no weapons were brought by students. Later that evening, several seventh graders were beaten up outside the building while waiting for their parents to pick them up. The next week I approached the teacher in charge of the event to share my concern about a potential riot. She told me, “You are the only one who complained.” Later, I spoke with the principal who had not attended the event; he also wasn’t interested in my opinion. He was just concerned about taking credit for “another successful event.” Many school administrators have little background in violence prevention, and they are very protective of their power and authority. When approaching to help them, a tactful approach is best.

In my experience, teacher presence is critical to preventing many problems. Research and evidence gathered over the years reinforces my view and points to the importance of teacher presence everywhere in the building and grounds where kids can be found. Bullies operate and fights often start in the absence of teachers or adult supervision. If young people do not feel safe, they might resort to bringing weapons or joining gangs. These are all potential sparks for rioting. Teacher presence does not fit well with teacher fear, however. When teachers feel unsafe and are afraid of students, they will tend to avoid any disciplinary or confrontational situation with students. Administrators must take a more active role in removing students who refuse to follow directions and who are verbally and physically abusive to adults in the building. Unfortunately, many students who should not be in the building because of their behavior are kept there because it is more economical to do so. If that happens, teachers will avoid being in the halls with students, avoid supervising, and avoid disciplinary action for fear of being verbally or physically assaulted. To make matters worse, most teachers and even school security guards are not trained in any form of physical violence prevention or control. Combine the stress of a riot with no training and you have a prescription for disaster.

Are schools prepared to handle a crisis or riot? Here are some things to consider. In the event of a crisis, can we count on the administrators to lead and communicate instructions to the staff? Can we count on the teachers to take charge of students? And finally, can we count on the students to follow directions? From what I have seen, most schools do not even have an effective mobile communication system that would be essential in most crisis situations to keep teachers and students informed. Without training and some practice, we cannot expect the teachers and students to perform well during a crisis.

There are a few additional reasons why we are likely to see more riots in the future. Some say rioting does not work to effect social change. Tell this to the French. After young people rioted in and around Paris, the French Youth Labor Law was retracted. Riots or the threat of riots have changed public discourse in many places, including the United States. Many jury decisions have been influenced by the fear that the wrong outcome would trigger violent protests. Thus, the message is clear: the threat of riots does work.

Furthermore, there is a growing acceptance to rioting as a form of protest. Excuses are often given by politicians and community “leaders” to justify why groups riot. When college students rioted to protest closing bars earlier, they were referred to
by school officials as “good kids who mistepped.” Often, people rioting in poverty areas are referred to as people who didn’t have a chance by our own politicians. The results: We are encouraging future riots and children mimic adults.

Since young people are often involved in, caught up in, or start riots, it is important to educate them on the risks and safety factors associated with riots. Just like in the past when we introduced the dangers of smoking and reduced the numbers of smokers, educating young people about the risks to everyone near a riot might work as well. Once again, this might be a new role for the law enforcement community.

Unless some steps are taken to reduce the risk factors, the next major event is just around the corner. Stay safe!

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Assessing the True Dangerousness of Domestic Violence Calls

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Introduction

Domestic violence continues to be a serious problem in American society. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Reports, over four million people each year are victims of domestic violence offenses, and more than a quarter of all female homicide victims are killed by a family member or romantic partner (FBI, 2006b). Uniformed law enforcement officers spend a significant amount of time responding to domestic violence and domestic disturbance calls. Research has revealed that, on average, one in ten calls for service handled by patrol officers in urban areas involves a domestic violence situation (Hirschel, Dean, & Lumb, 1994; Uchida, Brooks, & Kopers, 1987). As a result, domestic violence is the most frequently encountered type of violent crime call that patrol officers handle.

Police officer culture and training has often portrayed the handling of domestic violence calls as one of the most dangerous tasks patrol officers can perform. Is this an accurate description, however, of the actual danger level encountered at domestic violence calls? Some of the policing literature over the last two decades has debated the validity of this dangerousness assumption. The purpose of this article is to review the empirical literature on police officer assaults at domestic violence calls and attempt to answer several key questions. First, where did this assumption about the dangerousness of domestic violence calls originate? Second, has this assumption been supported by the empirical research on officers assaulted and murdered in the line of duty? Third, what is the true risk level for patrol officers handling domestic violence calls today? Finally, have domestic violence calls been getting safer or more dangerous since the implementation of pro-arrest policies?

Domestic Violence Calls as the Most Dangerous Type of Call

The dangerousness of domestic violence calls to police officers in North America has been the subject of some debate over the last few decades. Early qualitative studies of the police in several cities across the nation found that officers viewed the handling of domestic violence calls with trepidation. Officers frequently stated to field observers that domestic violence calls posed the greatest risks to officers in the form of physical assaults (Broderick, 1977; Brown, 1981; Muir, 1977; Rubinstein, 1973; Westley, 1970; Wilson, 1968). While the officers observed and interviewed in those early studies offered many reasons for disliking having to handle domestic violence calls, most officers cited the dangerousness of these types of calls as their primary concern.

Wilson (1968) explained that the source of this apprehension about handling domestic violence calls was really the result of the unpredictability of the parties involved in these incidents. While officers would respond to other crimes in progress, such as a robbery, fully prepared to face violent resistance from a criminal
suspect, domestics were often classified as civil disturbances that suggested no overt indication of a crime. Therefore, when violence did occur at domestic incidents, it often caught officers off-guard. Furthermore, the victim was, at times, one of the parties found assaulting the officer (pp. 19-20). This unpredictability heightened the officers’ perceptions of danger associated with these calls that, prior to the 1980s, were not generally considered crime-related incidents. Unfortunately, the qualitative research was unable to discern if these types of calls actually did pose the greatest risks to officers.

In addition to its coverage in the qualitative literature, the dangerousness of domestic violence calls has also been addressed with empirical research. The topic of the dangerousness of domestic violence calls first arose in the empirical literature in 1970 when the U.S. Department of Justice published a report on family crisis intervention entitled Training Police as Specialists in Family Crisis Intervention (Bard, 1970). This report began with the declaration that domestic violence calls were the most dangerous type of call handled by the police. To support this assertion, the author stated that according to FBI statistics, 22% of all police officers murdered in the line of duty in the U.S. between 1960 and 1969 were killed while handling family disturbance incidents (p. 1). This interpretation of the FBI statistics on officers killed in the line of duty was not entirely accurate, however.

In actuality, 22% of the officers killed between 1960 and 1969 were murdered while handling all types of disturbances (Garner & Clemmer, 1986). Bard (1970) incorrectly assumed that the majority of the disturbances handled by the police were domestic in nature, and that the majority of police casualties occurring at disturbance calls resulted from domestic disturbances. The category of disturbances in the FBI data included many kinds of dangerous disturbance calls such as bar fights and shots fired incidents. In fact, when the same FBI data was reanalyzed, and officer murders at domestic violence calls were classified separately, only one in four of the officers killed at a disturbance were killed at a domestic disturbance (Garner & Clemmer, 1986).

Partly in response to Bard’s (1970) assertion and partly because social scientists in the 1970s were testing many of the commonly assumed “truths” of policing (such as the crime reduction effects of random patrol), empirical inquiry began testing the hypothesis that domestic violence calls were the most dangerous duty for police officers. Several studies were conducted to determine what types of duties officers were performing when they were assaulted, injured, or murdered in the line of duty. This was done with the hopes of identifying what types of activities truly were the most dangerous duties for police officers, the identification of which could help inform the development of better officer safety policies.

Are Domestic Violence Calls Really the Most Dangerous Type of Call?

Bannon (1976) reviewed all officer assaults recorded by the Detroit Police Department for a 12-month period from the summer of 1973 to the summer of 1974. When classifying the assaults by the type of assignment the officer was performing when assaulted, he found that domestic violence calls were the fourth most likely type of duty to result in an attack. Robbery calls, general disturbances, and traffic stops resulted in more officer assaults than domestic violence calls in
this sample. On a national level, Garner and Clemmer (1986) reviewed FBI statistics on all officers murdered in the line of duty in the U.S. from 1972 through 1982. They found that domestic violence calls ranked sixth in likelihood of resulting in an officer murder.

Uchida et al. (1987) reviewed all assaults on officers with the Baltimore County Police Department in Maryland from 1984 through 1986. Instead of using the raw number of assaults recorded, they divided the number of assaults during each type of call by the number of each type of call handled by the department. This allowed them to control for the rate of officer exposure to each type of call. Their findings suggested that even after controlling for the frequency of the number of different duties officers perform, domestic violence calls ranked third for the number of assaults per call handled. Transporting prisoners and serving warrants had higher rates of assault per duty performed.

Hirschel et al. (1994) conducted a similar analysis utilizing assault and calls for service data from the Charlotte Police Department in North Carolina from 1988 through 1990. After controlling for the number of each type of call handled, they found that domestic violence calls ranked fourth in the number of assaults per call handled and fifth in the number of officer assaults resulting in an injury per call handled.

In Canada, Ellis, Choi, and Blaus (1993) reviewed the number of assaults that resulted in an injury against police officers from all of the law enforcement agencies in the province of Ontario during a three-month period in 1987. Again, this study controlled for how frequently officers performed each type of duty. Their findings indicated that compared to other types of calls and duties, domestic disturbances ranked third in likelihood of injury per call handled. Transporting prisoners and robbery calls had higher rates of injuries from assaults per duty performed.

Table 1 lists the summary information for each of these studies. Two conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, geographical variation exists as the likelihood of assault ranking varied from community to community. This would suggest that in some communities, domestic violence calls are more dangerous than in other communities. The second conclusion is that, regardless of community, domestic violence calls do not appear to be the most dangerous duty police officers handle. Even after controlling for the number of each type of call handled, the highest domestic violence calls ever ranked was third. In all of these studies, transporting prisoners and responding to robberies in progress were the most dangerous duties performed, having the highest rates of officer assault, injury, and death. The empirical evidence is clear, domestic violence calls are not the most dangerous duty handled by the police.
Table 1. Research Studies Ranking the Dangerousness of Family Disturbance Calls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Dangerousness Ranking</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bannon (1976)</td>
<td>All assaults against officers with the Detroit PD for a 12-month period from 1973-1974.</td>
<td>Domestic disturbances ranked as the 4th most likely type of police officer duty to result in an officer assault.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garner &amp; Clemmer (1986)</td>
<td>National-level data on all officers murdered in the line of duty in the U.S. from 1973 through 1982.</td>
<td>Domestic disturbances ranked as the 6th most likely type of police officer duty to result in an officer murder.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uchida et al. (1987)</td>
<td>All assaults against officers with the Baltimore County PD (Maryland) from 1984 through 1986. Calculated the assault rate per call handled for each type of call for service.</td>
<td>After controlling for the number of calls officers handled in each category, domestic disturbances ranked as the 3rd most likely type of police officer duty to result in an officer assault.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellis et al. (1993)</td>
<td>All assaults resulting in injury against municipal officers and provincial officers in the province of Ontario (Canada) for three months in 1987. Calculated the injury rate per call handled for each type of call for service.</td>
<td>After controlling for the number of calls officers handled in each category, domestic disturbances ranked as the 3rd most likely type of police officer duty to result in an officer injury from an assault.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirschel et al. (1994)</td>
<td>All assaults against officers with the Charlotte PD (North Carolina) from 1988 through 1990. Calculated the assault rate per call handled and injury rate per call handled for each type of call for service.</td>
<td>After controlling for the number of calls officers handled in each category, domestic disturbances ranked as the 4th most likely type of police officer duty to result in an officer assault. Domestic disturbances also ranked as the 5th most likely type of police officer duty to result in an officer injury.</td>
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Putting Dangerousness in Perspective

Unfortunately, these findings have led some scholars to suggest that domestic violence calls pose little danger to police officers (Hirschel et al., 1994; Kappeler, Blumberg, & Potter, 1993). Furthermore, all of the researchers who conducted the studies in Table 1 used terminology which implied that domestic violence calls were not dangerous. For example, all of the authors used the terminology that domestic violence calls “only” ranked third, fourth, or fifth in dangerousness. They made statements such as “domestic disturbance calls were only responsible for 61 police officers’ deaths” (Hirschel et al., 1994, p. 102). Such statements suggest that police officer assaults and homicides are tolerable at certain levels.

The viewpoints of these researchers ignore the fact that in each one of the above described studies, police officers actually were assaulted and injured at domestic violence calls and that this criminal behavior at any level is unacceptable for society. The injuries or deaths of police officers, no matter how few, are always a tragedy that negatively impacts the officers’ families, communities, and peers. While more officers were assaulted and injured at other types of calls or while performing other types of duties, this does not mean that officers handling domestics were not assaulted, injured, and killed. Nor should it mean that domestic violence calls are safe for officers.

Table 2 summarizes all of the existing published studies the author could locate regarding assaults on officers at domestic violence calls and the casualties each of these studies reported. As can be seen, all of the studies from Table 1 are also included in Table 2, with the addition of other studies that had not sought to rank the danger levels of different types of police duties. All eleven of these studies returned findings that officers had been assaulted while handling domestic
violence calls, clearly demonstrating that these types of calls do result in officers being attacked, regardless of historical time period or geographic location. Eight of these eleven studies also examined fatal and nonfatal injuries to officers, with every one of the studies finding that officers are frequently injured by these assaults and that several officers die annually as a result of assaults at domestic violence calls. This empirical research plainly indicates that, while domestic violence calls might not be the most dangerous duty police officers perform, domestic violence calls do result in many assaults on officers annually, some resulting in officer injuries and deaths.

Table 2. Casualties Revealed in Family Disturbance Call Assault Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Casualties Reported</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapman, Swanson, &amp; Meyer (1974)</td>
<td>Reviewed 1,897 nonfatal assaults on police officers from 37 municipal police agencies in five Southern states in 1973. 163 of the officer assaults (9%) occurred at family disturbance calls, and 75 of these assaults (46%) resulted in an officer injury.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bannon (1976)</td>
<td>Reviewed 436 assaults against officers with the Detroit PD (Michigan) for a 12-month period from 1973-1974. 37 of the officer assaults (9%) occurred at family disturbance calls.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Margarita (1980)</td>
<td>Reviewed all 245 New York City police officers murdered in the line of duty from 1844 through 1978. Also reviewed all 1,622 assaults on NYPD officers from 1973 through 1978 that resulted in great bodily harm to the officer. Four of the officer murders (2%) resulted from an assault at a family disturbance call. Of the great bodily harm assaults, 26 (2%) occurred at a family disturbance call.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geller &amp; Karales (1981)</td>
<td>Reviewed all 97 Chicago police officers murdered in the line of duty between 1874 and 1978. Four of the officer murders (4%) resulted from an assault at a family disturbance call.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garner &amp; Clemmer (1986)</td>
<td>Reviewed all 1,078 officers murdered in the line of duty in the U.S. from 1973 through 1982. 61 officer murders (6%) resulted from assaults at family disturbance calls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uchida et al. (1987)</td>
<td>Reviewed 1,550 assaults against officers with the Baltimore County PD (Maryland) from 1984 through 1986. 375 of the officer assaults (24%) occurred at family disturbance calls.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stanford &amp; Mowry (1990)</td>
<td>Reviewed all 34,839 domestic disturbance calls handled by the Tampa PD in 1989. 46 calls (0.1%) resulted in an assault on the responding officers, and 26 of these assault incidents (57%) resulted in an officer injury.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellis et al. (1993)</td>
<td>Reviewed 324 assaults involving injury against officers from all agencies in Ontario, Canada, during a three-month period in 1987. Eight (3%) of the officer assaults resulting in injury occurred at family disturbance calls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirschel et al. (1994)</td>
<td>Reviewed 1,038 assaults against officers with Charlotte PD (North Carolina) from 1988 through 1990. 122 of the officer assaults (12%) occurred at family disturbance calls, and 48 of these assaults (39%) resulted in an officer injury.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bannan (1999)</td>
<td>Surveyed 1,987 police officers in Chicago about their assault victimizations while on duty. 914 respondents indicated that they had been assaulted at least once in the last five years. 201 (22%) of the respondents who had reported being assaulted indicated that at least one of their assaults had occurred while handling a family dispute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson (2007)</td>
<td>Reviewed newspaper databases to locate incidents of firearms assaults against officers at domestic violence calls in the U.S. from 1999 through 2003. 143 assaults with firearms occurred at domestic violence calls involving 225 victim officers, of whom 65 were wounded and 31 were killed.</td>
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</table>

The contention that domestic violence calls are not safe is also supported by national-level statistics on officer assaults and fatalities. Since 1960, the FBI has
been gathering data on every law enforcement officer who dies in the line of duty, whether the death is by accidental causes or through an assault incident. This descriptive data is released annually in the *Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted* (LEOKA) reports published by the FBI. Prior to 1980, officers murdered while handling domestic violence calls were incorporated with the statistics on officers killed at all kinds of disturbances. Beginning in 1980, however, the FBI began reporting data on the murders of officers at family disturbance calls separately from the data on officers killed at general disturbance calls. This data indicated that from 1980 through 2006, assaults at family disturbance calls have resulted in the deaths of 160 police officers—an average of six per year (FBI, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006a, 2007).

These LEOKA reports also provide annual data on the total number of police officers in the nation who were assaulted. Unfortunately, with this nonlethal assault data, assaults at domestic violence calls are still incorporated in the same category as assaults at all other kinds of disturbances. Therefore, it is not possible to accurately determine how many nonlethal assaults have occurred specifically at domestic violence calls. An estimate could be made, however, based on Garner and Clemmer’s (1986) finding that assaults at domestic disturbances make up about 22% of the officer assaults at all types of disturbances. From 1980 through 2006, there were 514,711 officer assaults reported at disturbance calls nationwide (FBI, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006a, 2007). If 22% of these assaults occurred at domestic violence calls, then approximately 113,236 officer assaults occurred while the assaulted officers were handling domestic violence calls. If this estimate is correct, each year there are on average 4,194 assaults on police officers who are handling domestic violence calls. Clearly, domestic violence calls are not danger free.

**The Trend in Officer Murders at Domestic Violence Calls**

It is also important to consider whether the dangerousness of domestic violence calls has been increasing or decreasing over time. Previous research has revealed that the number of officers murdered in the line of duty each year in the U.S. has been steadily declining since the 1970s. During the 1970s, the average number of officers murdered each year was 113. In the 1980s, the average fell to 82; in the 1990s, it was 66; and so far in the 2000s, the average has been 56 officer murders per year (FBI, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006a, 2007). This decline in officer deaths has occurred in spite of a violent crime surge in the late 1980s (Blumstein & Wallman, 2000), an increasing U.S. population, and a significant increase in the number of law enforcement officers in the nation due to increased personnel funding from the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1994 (Zhao, Scheider, & Thurman, 2002). Even with a surge in violent crime, more potential offenders on the streets, and more officers as potential targets, the average number of officers murdered in the U.S. has continued to decline.

Scholars have offered a number of explanations for this decrease in officer deaths. Kaminski and Marvell (2002) have attributed part of the decrease to the overall decline in all types of homicides in the U.S. since the early 1990s. Quinet, Bordua, and Lassiter (1997) documented that the decrease in officer murders coincided with the development of formalized officer safety and defensive tactics training for police officers. Kaminski (2004) attributed the decrease in officer homicides to the development of new safety equipment (such as body armor) and the development
of better weaponry options for officers (such as chemical sprays, electrical stun devices, and semiautomatic weapons with less recoil and larger magazine capacities). Batton and Wilson (2006) considered the impact advances in emergency medical care since the 1960s may have had on increasing the survivability rates for officers seriously injured in violent encounters with citizens.

One way to determine if officers are still being attacked as often but are just becoming more likely to survive assaults is to look at the total number of assaults committed against officers each year. Relying on FBI statistics from the annual LEOKA reports since 1970, it appears that the number of assaults on officers has actually increased over time. The mean number of assaults on police officers reported each year during the 1970s was 43,091. In the 1980s, the mean annual number of assaults was 47,447. During the 1990s, the mean was 61,448; and so far in the 2000s, it has been 57,740 (FBI, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006a, 2007). Therefore, it appears that police work has actually become more violent over the last four decades, but officers are becoming better able to survive these assaults. Is the same true, however, for domestic violence calls?

Buzawa, Hotaling, and Klein (1998) predicted that as law enforcement agencies took more aggressive action to arrest domestic batterers (as opposed to just counseling them or sending them away for the night), and as the courts began to prosecute more cases of domestic abuse, batterers would begin to strike out more violently against representatives of the criminal justice system. They predicted that an unintended consequence of pro-arrest policies and “no-drop” prosecution policies regarding domestic violence cases would be that these pathologically violent batterers would expand their violence to include police officers, court personnel, and probation officers as their victims. Unfortunately, these writers only provided anecdotal evidence from their own court experiences to support their contention.

A review of the FBI data on officers murdered in the line of duty could provide a test of this assertion that domestic violence call situations have actually become more dangerous for police officers over time. Only since 1980 have the LEOKA reports differentiated between officers murdered at family disturbance calls and officers killed while handling other types of disturbances. Figure 1 graphically displays the national trend in police officers murdered in the line of duty since 1980 in the U.S. It also reveals the trend in officers murdered at family disturbance situations since that year.

Figure 1 reveals the general decline in officer homicides since the 1970s that was discussed above. This decline over the 28 years since 1980 has been a statistically significant change ($r^2 = -0.821$, $p < 0.001$). The number of officer homicides that occurred at family disturbances, however, has not shown any statistically significant change ($r^2 = 0.052$, $p = 0.795$). In the 1980s, for example, the average number of officers murdered at family disturbances was 5.6 officers. During the 1990s, the average was 6.2 officers; and so far in the 2000s, the average has been 6.0 officers. Therefore, while the total number of officers murdered in the line of duty has been declining for almost 40 years, the number of officers murdered at domestic violence calls has remained stable. For some reason, these types of calls have not become less lethal for officers while most other types of calls have.
Unfortunately, the FBI data found in the LEOKA reports on nonlethal assaults against officers do not differentiate between officers assaulted at family disturbance calls and officers assaulted while handling other types of disturbances. As a result, it is impossible to know if any changes have occurred in the number of nonlethal assaults at domestic violence calls.

**Conclusion**

This article sought to determine what the social scientific research had to say about the true dangerousness of handling domestic violence calls. Although police culture and old training materials have suggested that domestic violence calls are the most dangerous calls handled by patrol officers, the empirical research has revealed that this is not the case. No matter if one is comparing the raw numbers of officer assaults, injuries, and deaths, or if one is controlling for the rate of exposure to these types of calls, domestic violence calls usually rank third or fourth in dangerousness. Transporting prisoners and responding to robberies in progress tend to consistently rank as the most dangerous assignments for patrol officers.

Nevertheless, domestic violence calls are still dangerous. Although domestic violence calls may not be the most dangerous type of call patrol officers can handle, each year, approximately 4,000 officers are assaulted while handling domestic calls and six of these officers are fatally injured. Furthermore, even though the number of police officers murdered in the line of duty has been steadily declining since 1970, the number of officers killed at domestic violence calls each year has remained relatively stable. While officers are surviving assaults at higher rates in general, this increased survivability does not appear to be happening in assaults at domestic violence calls.
This reveals a serious need for further research into the circumstances surrounding officer assaults at domestic violence calls. Since officers appear less likely to survive assaults at domestic violence incidents, research should be conducted that compares officer assaults in general with assaults at domestic calls. Research also should be conducted to determine what factors are correlated with surviving an assault at a domestic violence call. Finally, studies should be conducted to identify offender and situational characteristics that are correlated with officer assaults at domestic violence calls in an attempt to identify risk factors that could help forecast a possible officer assault. The findings of such future research could have practical applications for officer safety and could help save officer lives.

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Police Response to Domestic Violence: The Role of an Intervention Counselor

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Julie Pietroburgo, Associate Professor, Department of Public Administration and Policy Analysis, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville

Domestic violence presents complex social and criminal justice issues that challenge law enforcement personnel to intervene in the personal relationships of victims and perpetrators. The nature of domestic violence typically involves repeated incidents which place significant demands on the resources of municipal police departments. Uniformed officers are prepared to intervene through the exercise of their power to arrest offenders. But exercising this power may have a short-term impact with little long-term change in the underlying abusive behavior. Increasingly, police departments are concluding that effective intervention requires a collaborative partnership between law enforcement and social service professionals. Professionals, such as social workers, have the critical training and skills necessary to work with victims to develop long-term solutions which reduce the ongoing demands on uniformed officers.

Project Description

This case study examines the successful effort of the police department of a municipality (Hazelwood, Missouri) to establish a domestic violence intervention program within that department. Serving a Midwestern suburban community of 26,000, the Hazelwood Police Department is accredited by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) and serves what can be described as a typical middle-class suburban community. What is unusual about the department, however, is the programmatic solution it has adopted to address the complexities of responding to domestic violence cases. The department’s strategy has involved integrating a social services component into traditional law enforcement response.

In September 1998, the Hazelwood Police Department received an Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grant from the U.S. Department of Justice, which provided for the establishment of the Crime Victim/Domestic Violence Assistance Unit. From the beginning, this unit was staffed by an intervention counselor who is a professional social worker with a background in domestic violence counseling through her work with women’s shelters in the region. Focus areas of this unit include the following:

- Safety of victims and their families
- Empowerment of victims through education and support
- Effective prosecution/treatment of offenders
- Prevention of generational violence
- Trust building and better understanding between law enforcement and victims
- Officer support, assistance, and training
• Community awareness and education
• Participation in a coordinated community-wide response

Among the services offered by the intervention counselor are crisis intervention, advocacy, referral, public awareness and education, crime prevention, and police officer training and support. Chief among these responsibilities are crisis intervention services. The counselor routinely provides for follow-up with crime victims within 20 hours of the incident, assists in relocating victims and witnesses when necessary, secures the issuance of emergency orders of protection, intervenes in safety planning, provides process information for victims, and offers psychosocial counseling and emotional support. The advocacy role of the counselor extends to coordinating shelter services and serving as an advocate for victims in matters before the court, the prosecutor’s office, children’s protective services, and other agencies. Finally, the counselor assists victims in obtaining other vital support in the form of legal assistance, financial aid, relocation and housing assistance, and help from healthcare and mental health providers.

The Hazelwood Police Department is unique in that the intervention counselor on staff is a domestic violence counselor and a social worker. The position is employed by the department and reports to the Chief of Police. According to the intervention counselor and police chief, this arrangement has several positive implications for the delivery of domestic violence services:

• As a police department employee, the intervention counselor is a professional colleague of the uniformed officers within the department. This provides a foundation for the creation of an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect between the patrol officers and the intervention counselor.
• The flow of information between uniformed officers and the intervention counselor is unrestricted since the requirements for confidentiality of sensitive information are the same for both parties.
• Follow-up for cases is enhanced as officers and the intervention counselor confer both formally and informally concerning the disposition of cases. The intervention counselor’s physical presence at police headquarters (as well as the common reporting structure that the officers and intervention counselor share) facilitates communication and has enabled the unit to achieve a 20-hour follow-up by the department for domestic violence incidents.
• The presence of a highly trained intervention counselor working within the police department acts to demonstrate to the victim of domestic violence that the police department has a genuine concern for their plight.
• The public image of the department has been enhanced as victims benefit from the care and compassion provided by the intervention counselor during a period of trauma and stress.
• Relationships with representatives of women’s shelters have been strengthened. In the past, some shelter employees and/or volunteers were hesitant to notify uniformed police of the specific location of women seeking safety. With a full-time intervention counselor serving as liaison with shelters, this issue has been minimized.
• The orientation of the police department has been transformed to a “What can we do to help you?” approach to the victims of domestic violence. The intervention counselor within the police department has long-term relationships with shelters, food banks, counseling services, and access to a variety of other services important to victims of domestic violence.
These factors, and others, have allowed the department to develop more successful intervention strategies with victims of domestic violence. Formal and informal surveys of domestic violence victims indicate a heightened sense of trust and respect for the police department as a result of this program.

Literature Review

Statistics confirm that domestic violence continues to be a serious social crisis. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2006), 64,000 domestic violence-related homicides occurred throughout the U.S. between 1976 and 2004 or an average of 2,300 victims per year. In Illinois, government-funded Illinois domestic violence programs served 44,526 adults (96% women) and 9,596 children in 2007 (Illinois Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2008). Missouri law enforcement agencies reported 39,850 incidents of domestic violence in 2006, an increase of nearly 1,000 cases over 2005 and the highest reported rate of domestic violence since 1999 (Missouri Coalition Against Domestic and Sexual Violence, 2008). Despite high levels of reported incidents, Erez and Belknap (1998) have found that most battered women place little faith in the criminal justice system to effectively solve their abuse problems.

As the number of cases involving domestic violence has risen, various alternatives for law enforcement response have been proposed, examined, and adopted. Since the 1970s, police and courts have instituted a number of initiatives, including the use of protection orders to assist victims of violence, mandatory and presumptive arrest policies, and “in some areas, experimentation with alternative sanctions in the form of abuser programs and other forms of focused work within probation” (Dobash, 2003; Humphries, 2002).

Structural solutions to improve domestic violence response have also been tested, including the use of specialized domestic violence units and expanded response teams staffed by probation, parole, and corrections personnel. Among the diversity of approaches most recently tested is the use of partnerships between law enforcement, the courts, and domestic violence agencies. Such partnerships involve integrated, cross-discipline teams and are based on the simple premise that the sum of collaborative action is greater than the individual parts (Thelen, 1998; Whetstone, 2001). Proponents contend that coordination between the various responding stakeholders can better ensure the protection and advocacy for victims of domestic violence than the disaggregated actions of the independent parties.

In part, these experimental programs have been prompted by a realization among police agencies that many of the problems encountered with domestic violence cases are “outside the scope of their mission or power to change with traditional police practices. Based on substantial amounts of federal funding, many agencies have begun to implement community-oriented policing that considers how to include the community and multiple agencies to solve problems” (Zhao, Scheidner, & Thurman, 2002). In theory, such collaborative efforts hold promise in improving effective intervention over traditional models of response to domestic abuse. Initial reports from such collaborative agencies purport success as measured by higher arrest, prosecution, and conviction rates and greater access to shelter and legal assistance for victims. Further, collaborative arrangements have been successful in bringing about legislative change and greater recognition of the breadth and complexity of domestic violence as a societal problem (Lutze & Symons, 2003).
Yet, even these approaches, drawing upon the collaborative strengths of the various independent parties, have drawbacks. These drawbacks have to do with the unequal distribution of power and embedded law enforcement perceptions regarding the seriousness of domestic violence cases.

Lutze and Symons (2003) contend that the primary obstacles lie in the unequal distribution of power between criminal justice and victim advocacy agencies:

> Although both sets of agencies recognize and appreciate the need for each other in resolving DV, criminal justice agencies tend to be better funded and possess greater power to determine the boundaries of the relationship. Therefore, although arrest may be made easy due to the resources of law enforcement agencies, social services and victim advocates continue to financially struggle to provide basic services to victims. . . . It could be argued that the extensive funding of police agencies, in comparison to victim advocacy, distorts DV policy toward a one-sided system that favors the limitations of police responses to DV versus a collaborative empowerment model that relies on multiple agencies. It may be that helping agencies are perceived as women-centered and thus less important than criminal justice agencies that are viewed as male-centered and doing the real work of protecting our society. Thus legislative change is about keeping the power within male-centered institutions such as the police. Until an equalization of power is established through adequate resources for all agencies, attempts at effective collaboration may be slow to evolve. (p. 325)

The effectiveness of coordinated response efforts may also be hampered by embedded law enforcement perceptions of domestic violence cases. Graves (2004) says that

> Many officers are of the mindset that responding to “domestics” is social work not police work. They make no effort to conceal their frustration and anxiety with victims who seek intervention and then implore the officer not to make an arrest but to make him keep away for the night. Confusion and frustration among the rank and file of law enforcers mounts when victims recant statements made at the scene, conjure excuses for bruises or injury and reconcile with the individual who inflicted physical injury on them. For the most part, police departments have initiated improved domestic violence training and insisted on paradigm shifts among veterans with education of the dynamics of domestic abuse. (p. 111)

### Measures of Success and Program Performance

The Crime Victim/Domestic Violence Assistance Unit has a record of providing an extensive range of services to victims within the boundaries of the municipality. During calendar year 2007, a total of 454 victims received services from the unit. Of this number, 122 were new cases that were referred to the unit. The total caseload includes some 332 individuals with cases that had been opened prior to 2007. The number of old cases reflects the fact that the nature of domestic violence keeps a large number of cases from ever closing. Cases are carried for multiple years due to the repetitive nature of the behavior.

The demographics of the victims of domestic violence within the municipality during the past two years are as follow:
Since the unit was created in 1998, a total of 2,813 cases have been opened for the provision of services and follow-up. An important impact of the operation of the unit is that most of the cases are processed at the misdemeanor level. This is reflective of the ability of the unit to intervene at relatively early points in time and prevent domestic violence cases from escalating to felony levels. This was achieved by the department adopting a special process to track service calls that were related to domestic issues when only minor incidents were reported. Information provided from these calls had the objective of keeping victims informed of their rights and of services available to them from both the police department and a range of other social service agencies. This early intervention by the Hazelwood Crime Victim/Domestic Violence Assistance Unit has proven to be an important factor in reducing the level of violence experienced by victims.

The Crime Victim/Domestic Violence Assistance Unit provides intervention/support services for a range of services such as the following:

- **Criminal Proceedings**
  - Victim interviews and warrant applications
  - Services for criminal preliminary hearings, trials, and sentencing
  - Parole revocation hearings

- **Civil Proceedings**
  - Full order of protection hearings
  - Child custody/paternity hearings
  - Pre-divorce litigation settlement conferences and hearings
  - Juvenile family court proceedings

- **Civil and Criminal Related Services**
  - Filing petition for ex parte for adult abuse cases
  - Conferences with the Department of Family Services (child abuse)
  - Conferences with guardians ad litem for children
  - Facilitating meetings between victims and attorneys
  - Facilitating civil depositions from victims

- **Uniformed Police Officer Support**
  - Attend victim interviews
  - Follow-up with officer-referred cases for service delivery
  - Accompany victims for medical treatment
  - Accompany victims transported to safe houses or shelters
  - Serve as the police liaison with victims concerning police procedures
  - Provide updated training to police officers relative to changes in state laws

In addition to these services, the Crime Victim/Domestic Violence Assistance Unit participates in a range of community activities. These include speaking engagements with local service agencies and the provision of domestic violence awareness training to both private corporations and public organizations within the municipality.
One significant accomplishment of this unit is the certification of supervisory personnel within the police department for temporary orders of protection to victims of domestic violence. This allows for a relatively quick protective response by the department until permanent orders can be issued by the County Court.

Conclusion

Domestic violence can best be described as messy, complicated, long-term, and a challenge to uniformed police officers. Uniformed police officers are trained and equipped to handle major crimes such as robbery, armed criminal action, drug distribution, murder, and other criminal activity that occurs within the public eye. Domestic violence is different in that it occurs within a private and personal arena but has a public impact. It impacts the performance of students in schools, has an impact on performance in the workplace, and, ultimately, it impacts the quality of life of victims and their acquaintances. Uniformed officers are not equipped, nor should they be, to serve as long-term counselors for the resolution of domestic problems.

The Hazelwood Police Department has acted to create an appropriate and effective mechanism to address domestic violence issues through the employment of a trained social worker to work as a colleague with uniformed officers. This arrangement is unique within the State of Missouri and serves as a model for other law enforcement agencies seeking to adopt innovative programs that can be classified as a best practice.

Endnote

1 The Police, Advocacy, Courts Together Project (PACT) in St. Louis, Missouri, represents one such joint endeavor to increase victim safety and advocacy. This collaborative project between the St. Louis County Domestic and Family Violence Council, the St. Louis County Family Court, St. Louis County Police Department, and the Legal Advocates for Abused Women was instituted in 2002 through a $600,000 federal grant to “encourage arrest policies and enforcement of protection orders” with the objective of enhancing the handling of domestic violence cases in St. Louis County (Carr & Pietroburgo, 2006).

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United Kingdom Criminal Justice Issues: The Sex Trafficking and Child Pornography Trade—Can They Be Prevented?

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Introduction

The purpose of this research paper is to further examine the United Kingdom’s (UK) illicit sex trafficking and child pornography trades. These two crimes are fast emerging as new markets for human exploitation. Both are hard to track and prevent, and with a growing demand, these crimes are rich in financial gain for global criminal networking and organized criminal enterprises. The author will pay particular attention as to why these two crimes are at the forefront of criminal justice issues facing the UK, and in addition, what still needs to be done by law enforcement and criminal justice officials to reduce the occurrence of these crimes. Furthermore, the central question that arises from this paper will be answered—that is, the UK’s sex trafficking and child pornography trades can be reduced but not prevented.

This paper begins by defining what constitutes sex trafficking because there are inconsistencies concerning its definition. Following this, the UK’s sex trafficking trade will be examined in-depth concerning the extent of the problem; who is involved with the trafficking of victims; and what laws, task forces, and organizations have been set up to reduce this crime. Specific reference will be made to the UK’s domestic legislation and international law surrounding the issue, and also to Operation Pentameter, and the UK’s Human Trafficking Center. Next, what child pornography entails will be defined. Following this, child pornography will be explored in regards to the extent of the crime; the role of the Internet as a tool to produce, distribute, and download images; and what laws, task forces, and organizations have been established as a result of child pornography. Specific focus will be given to the UK’s legislation concerning the issue, Operation Ore, and the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre. Conclusions will then be offered as to what still needs to be done by the UK concerning sex trafficking and child pornography. It will also be shown that crimes like sex trafficking and child pornography are impossible to prevent in the UK because of the vicious supply and demand cycle.

Sex Trafficking

Defining sex trafficking presents an inconsistency between definitions because each state, institution, and government agency has a different consensus as to what exactly constitutes the crime of sex trafficking. Although there is no concrete definition that the UK adheres to, for the purpose of this paper the author will define sex trafficking on general agreement as the recruitment and movement of human
beings, mainly women, from third world countries into the European Union for the sole purpose of sexual exploitation. This movement can be either legal or illegal, and it generally involves selling victims to individuals or organizations without their consent through means of enticement, deception, force, or intimidation (Churches Against Sex Trafficking in Europe [CHASTE], 2007; Joint Committee on Human Rights [JCOHR], 2006; Kelly & Regan, 2000).

“As the United Kingdom marks 200 years since the Parliamentary Act to abolish the slave trade, slavery goes on in another form” (BBC News, 2007c, p. 1)—that is, in the form of sex trafficking. The UK is a major destination country for trafficked women, with these women being found all over the UK not just in metropolitan areas as most people think. Once trafficked into the country, the fate of the majority of these women is unknown because escaping is a rare and extremely risky event. Furthermore, they are moved about the country very frequently and can also be sold on an exchange basis in deals between other traffickers and organized crime gangs (BBC News, 2006b; Maryniak, 2006). A victim of trafficking will usually be sold for between £2,000 and £8,000, depending on how much she can earn a day from sex and how many hours a day she can physically sustain sexual activity. Most of these trafficked women are usually aged between 18 and 24 years; however, some are even as young as 11 years old, showing that children can be just as easily exploited as women (BBC News, 2006a, 2006b; CHASTE, 2007).

Sex trafficking is a supply and demand crime. The demand for women tends to be higher in countries where there is already a strong, organized sex industry such as in the UK. Although the full extent of sex trafficking in the UK is unknown, intelligence experts believe that this crime is on the rise. This can be corroborated by the fact that 85% of women in UK brothels now come from outside of the country, and between 142 and 4,000 women are estimated to be trafficked into the UK in a given year (BBC News, 2006c; JCOHR, 2006; Kelly & Regan, 2000). Unfortunately, sex trafficking is one of those crimes that cannot be accurately measured because of its secretive nature. Thus, we have to rely on expert estimates and statistics which give us, at best, a generalization of the sex trafficking trade in the UK.

There are many reasons to explain the increase of sex trafficking into the UK. Most of these reasons, besides demand, center on poverty, low social status of women, a lack of opportunity for a stable future, and an inadequacy of laws and law enforcement from the country of origin into the UK (Miko, 2003; Sulaimanova, 2006). However, in light of terrorism being the most eminent threat in the 21st century, a new theory has emerged. This theory purports that the reason for the increase in sex trafficking in the UK is that these trafficked women see prostitution as a way to free themselves from war and terrorism in their home country. By being trafficked for sex, they get safety, shelter, and can earn a living, or so they think (Sarup, 2006; Sulaimanova, 2006). The actual figures on displacement from terrorism to sexual exploitation are not known; neither is whether or not traffickers use the funds acquired from sex trafficking to finance terror in their country due to ties with organized crime. Nevertheless, it is a theory that can account for the increase in sex trafficking in regards to victims from wartorn countries (i.e., Russia). Further, it may result after more research that sex trafficking will be seen to have declined due to recent and continual terrorist activity within the UK.
Sex trafficking has strong affiliations with organized crime. Those involved with the trafficking of victims are well-organized and flexible, who are either enterprising individuals or who work in a local network under an organized crime gang (i.e., the Russian Mafia). Because of the geographical location of the UK, it is primarily used as a destination country rather than a transit country for various sex trafficking routes (JCOHR, 2006; Miko, 2003). Those involved in the delivery of trafficked victims are usually split between the “Far East, Chinese gangs, and Eastern European gangs” (JCOHR, 2006, p. 32) because these have proven the most resilient over the years. Furthermore, they are at ease conjuring up victims who want to leave their country due to political violence, war, poverty, etc., but who do not know what they are getting into. These organized crime gangs view sex trafficking as a truly lucrative business, which is less risky than drug trafficking but produces the same high profit. Traffickers do not care about their victims and will use any means possible to traffic them into the UK such as sea routes (e.g., boats and cargo ships) through to land routes (e.g., car/bus/rail/foot/truck) and even by air. It all depends on which will be the cheapest route (Kelly & Regan, 2000; United Kingdom Human Trafficking Center [UKHTC], 2007). Women are trafficked from all around the world, but looking at the map below (BBC News, 2006b), the countries marked provide the cheapest and easiest route for traffickers to get victims to the UK, with Lithuania being the key country and biggest source of women trafficked into the UK for sexual exploitation (BBC News, 2007b; Miko, 2003; Sulaimanova, 2006).

Figure 1. Origin of Trafficking Victims and Gangs

Since the discovery of the UK’s sex trafficking trade, various laws, task forces, and organizations have been set up to help understand and prevent this crime. Until recently, there was no legislation in the UK that criminalized the crime of
sex trafficking. Rather, certain aspects of this crime were covered under a range of different legislation. Needless to say, the UK government has since realized that sex trafficking was a rather large crime problem. In order to successfully police it, prosecute offenders, and punish traffickers, they needed to modernize the pre-existing domestic legal framework and come up with stronger legislation that would define all forms of sexual exploitation as crimes. From this, the UK introduced the Sexual Offences Act of 2003, which came into full effect on May 1, 2004 (Office of Public Sector Information [OPSI], 2003; United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF], 2007). This act “established wide-ranging offences of trafficking of people into, within or from the UK for sexual purposes, carrying with it a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment” (JCOHR, 2006, p. 39). The Sex Offences Act of 2003 not only includes trafficking (Sections 57-59), it also includes child sex offences (Sections 9-15), which are relevant to the sex trafficking trade as children are also victims of this crime (OPSI, 2003).

Under UK domestic legislation, The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and also The Children Act of 1989 both set forth extra significant laws that are applicable to the crime of sex trafficking. The Proceeds of Crime Act basically states that UK authorities can confiscate any criminal assets that have been acquired through the act of sex trafficking, while The Children Act refers to protecting the rights of the child (JCOHR, 2006; U.S. Department of State, 2003). All three of these UK laws are in place to help build a solid legislative framework that forms the backbone of legal and criminal justice resistance to the crime of sex trafficking; however, although all of this legislation is a step in the right direction, the three laws mentioned fail to address a human rights approach. This is because these laws are so focused on criminalizing and prohibiting sex trafficking that they neglect the rights of the victims. The neglecting of these rights risks the UK government treating victims as criminals—for example, police treat trafficked women as potential witnesses, while immigration views them as illegal immigrants. Thus, the UK government does not take into account what is in the best interests of the victims and can send them home without properly assessing their cases (JCOHR, 2006; Kelly & Regan, 2000; UNICEF, 2007).

As an international response to the concerns of the UK’s domestic legislation failing to take into consideration the rights of trafficked victims, the European Union (EU) became involved. In 2006, the Council of Europe Campaign to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings was launched. This international legislation is not binding on members of the EU, but if signed and ratified by a member country, this new legislation becomes domestic law. Therefore, after much debate, the UK agreed to sign this Convention in March of 2007 to ensure legal protection and minimum standards of care for victims of trafficking. However, to date, the UK has still not ratified this Convention and, therefore, they technically do not have to meet all of the EU’s requirements (CHASTE, 2007; UNICEF, 2007). Thus, this poses a problem because the UK is currently free from international human rights standards concerning victims of sex trafficking.

Apart from domestic and international laws surrounding the prevention of sex trafficking, various task forces have been set up over the years to provide aid. To date, the most effective task force to tackle the UK’s sex trafficking industry was Operation Pentameter. This task force was “the first proactive policing operation to simultaneously involve all 55 forces in the UK, with cooperation and contribution
from law enforcement agencies across Europe” (Gloucestershire Constabulary [GC], 2006, p. 1). Basically Operation Pentameter aimed to combat sex trafficking in the UK by raising awareness of this crime problem, rescuing trafficked victims, and improving intelligence about individuals and organized crime groups that are involved. This task force ran until the end of May 2006 and resulted in hundreds of rescues and arrests (GC, 2006). However, although Operation Pentameter was credited as being a highly successful task force in achieving what it set out to do, thousands more victims and traffickers remain to be found and prosecuted.

Along with the task forces set up to combat sex trafficking, a number of different organizations have been established in response to the success that the police and their various partnerships have had working together on this issue. The United Kingdom Human Trafficking Center (UKHTC) is proving to be at the forefront of these organizations, being established as a direct result of the success of the Operation Pentameter task force in 2006. This organization follows the same aims as Operation Pentameter, acting as a center that researches and advises police on sex trafficking in the UK and placing rescued women into safety. The UKHTC also aims to inform the public of the work that is currently being done within the UK to combat and prevent the crime of sex trafficking (CHASTE, 2007; Human Trafficking [HT], 2006; UKHTC, 2007).

With all of these domestic and international laws, task forces, and organizations that have been solely established for the purpose of combating sex trafficking, it is obvious that the UK is taking a step in the right direction. So long as UK policy and practice are subject to continual review and modification to suit the changing times, and these task forces and organizations are regulated and evaluated as to their successfulness, sex trafficking in the UK can be controlled. The key to reducing the sex trafficking trade is for all of the above-mentioned elements to work together in sharing information and training so that together they can proactively reduce the incidents of sex trafficking into and within the UK.

**Child Pornography**

The crime of child pornography is yet another expanding criminal justice issue which the UK is helpless in preventing. As with the crime of sex trafficking, child pornography is one of those supply and demand crimes. It is impossible to assess its full extent because it has a global networking scale that reaches outside of UK borders.

Child pornography refers to pornographic material that depicts children. It is defined as any kind of image that clearly shows a prepubescent human being that is being exploited in a sexually explicit manner (Ferraro & Casey, 2005; Wikipedia, 2007). Child pornography is also regarded as a form of child sex abuse because children are vulnerable and unable to protect themselves, and pedophiles and other sexual predators directly or indirectly exploit them (BBC News, 2001; Dunaigre, 2001). Child pornography is illegal in the UK, and as with the crime of sex trafficking, victims of child pornography forever carry the scars of physical, psychological, and emotional abuse.

Judging the extent of child pornography within the UK is an impossible task. With the advent of the Internet and the many sexual predators and pedophiles
out there, the full level of child pornography cannot be estimated because much of it remains hidden. As with the crime of sex trafficking, the very nature of child pornography is clandestine, and police are really only touching the tip of the iceberg in trying to counter this sex crime. Although exact figures are unknown, child pornography is on the rise in the UK. This rise is evident through the fact that arrest and conviction rates in England have quadrupled over the years, and many more sex offenders are being registered. Furthermore, parents are more aware of this growing epidemic and have been exercising tighter controls and supervision concerning the use of the Internet and their children’s daily activities (BBC News, 2005; Carr, 2004; Home Office [HO], 2007).

The crime of child pornography has been greatly escalated by the invention of the Internet. This is because the Internet acts as a catalyst; those involved with child pornography are able to increase the amount of images available for viewing because the Internet allows easier distribution and accessibility (Calcetas-Santos, 2001; Carr, 2004). With the Internet as a tool, child pornography can be available at any time, and it becomes a lot easier for sexual predators to reach and sexually abuse more children. With the Internet enabling the production, distribution, and downloading of child pornographic images with great ease, it is no wonder that people are presented with greater opportunities to access child pornography. In the UK alone, the number of websites that have been discovered to be offering images of child pornography has increased by some 75%, and on any given day, UK Internet service providers are blocking over 20,000 attempts to view child pornography (BBC News, 2004; Doward, 2006). Furthermore, as with the quadruple increase in arrest and conviction rates concerning child pornography, the number of people cautioned over Internet child pornography offences has also quadrupled. For example, one UK offender was found to have viewed 450,000 child pornography images (HO, 2007; Wortley & Smallbone, 2006).

The crime of child pornography is similar to that of sex trafficking in that organized criminal networks control most of the trade by producing large numbers of images to sell. A lot of the people in these organized crime groups are pedophiles, who interact in a virtual community never having to actually meet in person. The scary thing to point out is that these networks are able to safely exchange information and images in order to educate one another, making it a “how to” online seminar concerning child pornography (Mahoney, 2001; O’Connell, 2001). As with the sex trafficking trade, child pornography is a very lucrative trade for these organized crime gangs. It reaches far beyond the borders of the UK, with the majority of the images that are being downloaded in Britain coming from organized pedophile rings all around the world.

Since 1958 when child pornography images were first discovered to be circulating around the UK, legislation was established to punish those depicting these images. Over the years, amendments have been made to this existing legal framework so that the UK can keep up with the changing nature of child pornography (i.e., the use of the Internet). There are three main pieces of legislation that are relevant to child pornography in the UK. These pieces set out maximum penalties which are accepted by international standards concerning the possession and distribution of child pornography. To date, the legal framework surrounding the child pornography issue in the UK has a consensus that penalties for possession of child
pornographic material is up to five years, and distribution of this material has a penalty of 10 years (Carr, 2004; Darlington, 2005).

The first relevant piece of legislation is The Protection of Children Act of 1978, which was passed to put strict controls on child pornography. This act deals with the use of children under the age of 16 years old in indecent photography and states that it is a criminal offence to take, distribute, show, or advertise images of this nature (Akdeniz, 1997b; Darlington, 2005). The only problem with this piece of legislation is that it is left at the mercy of the court to decide what an “indecent” photograph constitutes. However, with the outrage at child pornography today, one would think that UK courts could accurately rule on certain photographs in agreement with societal views.

The second act is The Criminal Justice Act of 1988, and it only has one section dealing with child pornography (Section 160). This section ascertains that the simple possession of indecent photographs of children is a punishable offence. Anyone caught with this kind of material in their possession will be subject to arrest and sentenced to a prison sentence of six months at minimum (Akdeniz, 1997b; Darlington, 2005). As a result of the need to further clarify what was defined as a child pornography “photograph,” The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 was established as a sort of update on the Criminal Justice Act of 1988. This third piece of legislation included “pseudo-photographs,” which means that along with normal indecent photographs of children, these pseudo-photos, which are images generated by computer graphics, are also illegal to possess. In addition, anyone caught with stored data that is capable of producing these pseudo-photos are also subject to arrest (Akdeniz, 1997a).

There is no actual international law with which the UK is a part of that concerns the crime of child pornography. Under EU standards, each country is left on their own to decide what legislation should be established in response to child pornography—for example, at what level minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment will be set to ensure fair standards. In addition to having no international legislation, the UK currently has no legislation solely directed at the regulation of the Internet (Akdeniz, 1997a, 1997b; Calcetas-Santos, 2001). This poses a huge problem because, from what we already know, the Internet is the new gateway for child pornography to be easily accessed. With no legal regulatory controls in place, UK citizens are free to roam the Internet in search of child pornographic images.

Various task forces have been set up over the years to try and combat the crime of child pornography. Perhaps the task force that had the most effect on the UK in terms of shock value was Operation Ore, which was launched in May of 2002. This task force was a wake-up call for the UK because they were not prepared to deal with the results that were acquired from this. Operation Ore led to volumes of information concerning child pornography, mainly the individuals involved who were numbering up into the thousands on a global scale. This task force was established after U.S. authorities contacted the UK concerning customers who had accessed child pornography from a U.S.-based website with their credit card. Operation Ore led to the discovery of 7,250 offenders living in the UK, with 1,200 of these people being convicted pedophiles. The rest of these offenders involved businessmen, lawyers, media representatives, police, doctors, and teachers. To date, 1,230 people have been convicted, and investigations are still ongoing (BBC
News, 2004, 2007a; Darlington, 2005). Thus, what resulted out of this task force was that the UK is now aware that child pornography reaches scales far bigger than what it was prepared for. An old crime like child pornography was being committed in a new environment (the Internet), and it was obvious that the UK alone cannot deal with it. A joint international task force is needed.

In response to Operation Ore’s astounding results, the UK established The Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP) (2007) organization. This organization is unique to the UK, having the primary function to “receive, assess and disseminate intelligence coming into the UK on online and offline offenders, including pedophiles and other serious sex offenders” (p. 6). The CEOP organization is very similar to the UK’s Human Trafficking Centre because it also understands the importance of partnerships among the police, government officials, public interest groups, etc. Thus, it is easy to see that in order for the UK to gain some sort of control over the child pornography trade, they need to get all the help they can as law enforcement cannot work alone to achieve any sort of success. The greater the information that is shared domestically and internationally concerning the UK, the greater the knowledge they will have in devising methods/laws/task forces, etc., to reduce the supply of child pornography.

Conclusion

This paper has presented a thorough analysis of the United Kingdom’s sex trafficking and child pornography trades. Definitions of these crimes, along with the estimated extent and links to global organized crime gangs, have also been reviewed. Furthermore, the legislative framework along with the task forces and organizations that surround sex trafficking and child pornography have also been explored. From this it can be seen that both sex trafficking and child pornography are still very much at the core of criminal justice issues facing the UK.

Sex trafficking and child pornography are truly lucrative trades. Both are fast emerging as new markets, willing and readily able to supply the growing demand. Thus, as long as there is this continuing demand, criminal activity on behalf of these two crimes will continue to exist. It appears as though the criminals involved are one step ahead of the UK’s efforts to combat them. Sex trafficking and child pornography are continually increasing, with traffickers finding new ways to get victims into the UK and to move them around, and pedophiles encrypting their distributed images. In all reality, these two crimes cannot be prevented because they operate and run on a global scale; the number of offenders can be reduced, however.

In the author’s opinion, the UK needs to take a more holistic approach to tackling the crimes of sex trafficking and child pornography. What they currently are doing is a start. However, these two crimes need to be countered at a more international level. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies from all over the world need to get together and set up some sort of global task force; this way they can all share information and, as a partnership, come up with ways to reduce these crimes. The UK alone cannot control the sex trafficking or child pornography trades, but with more international cooperation, they will further their chances. As an extension of this international task force, a universal standard concerning laws relating to sex trafficking and child pornography should also occur. If everyone is subject to the
same legislation, then the law is applied fairly and equally across the board and there is no room for misinterpretation or grey areas. In addition, the UK needs to target the sex traffickers more instead of the victims, and the distributors of child pornography instead of the possessors. By going after the suppliers, demand cannot be met.

Lastly, the author recommends that harsher sentencing needs to be given to sex traffickers and pedophiles. Something to the effect of mandatory sentencing would work with repeat offenders because the author feels that two strikes are enough. If they have not learned from the first time, then there is no point in rehabilitation—life imprisonment should result. The only way to fight crime is to take a tougher stance on it, regardless of whether or not people agree. However, in terms of sex trafficking and child pornography, these two crimes are fundamental violations of human rights. Therefore, society should not be so concerned with the rights of the offenders nor the fact that some of these offenders may need mental health treatment.

References


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The Psychology of Hit and Run

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Despite the high incidence of both motor vehicle accidents and mental disorders in the general population, a literature examining correlates between the two is sparse. Almost 70 years ago, a Detroit psychiatrist, Lowell Selling, pioneered work in this area with a series of unfortunately forgotten journal articles (Selling, 1940a, 1940b, 1940c; 1941, 1942). Beyond his seminal contributions, little has been published on this important area of crime. In this paper, we sketch out some potential links between driving behavior and mental disorders or states that may be considered in analyzing motor vehicle collisions, focusing specifically on hit-and-run collisions.

After the occurrence of a motor vehicle accident, traffic and criminal codes require the drivers involved to follow set procedures, including the exchange of identifying information to begin a process of resolution and accountability. In the case of personal injury, it is the duty of all parties to seek medical attention for injured individuals and to remain at the scene until released to leave by authorities. In fatal collisions, the fault may not necessarily lie with the party striking the victims and, therefore, no criminal charge would automatically result from the accident. Even in cases lacking culpability, however, some drivers will flee the scene and bring charges to rest upon themselves, independent of their lack of responsibility in the collision. It is instructive, therefore, to consider some of the behavioral elements that can occur in hit-and-run cases.

The reasons for hit-and-run reactions in drivers are multiple. The first, and most prevalent, is the simple attempt at evasion of responsibility. In these scenarios, there is overt deliberate action—the perpetrator speeds away after a collision, cleans his or her vehicle of incriminating evidence, stores the vehicle in a location that may evade detection, and, if they had been consuming alcohol prior to the crash, will often consume more (often with witnesses) so that their post-accident legal consumption will mask their impaired and illegal state of intoxication at the time of the offense. This *hip flask defense* can now be challenged because comparisons of blood and urine blood alcohol concentrations can display a profile to show when alcohol was consumed (Iffland & Jones, 2002). Early versus recent consumption of alcohol can thus be distinguished, and impaired drivers who claim they were only drinking after they finished driving can be challenged.

Other advances in the physical aspects of determining and prosecuting hit-and-run accidents show the sophistication in this aspect of forensic analysis. For example, identifying vehicular paint samples has been both computerized and encyclopedic for several decades, thereby making rapid recognition of the make of an offending vehicle possible (Cartwright, Cartwright, Norman, Cameron, MacDougall, & Clark, 1982). When a pedestrian’s remains are found alongside a road hours after a collision, it is relatively easy to determine if the victim had been simply run over while lying on the road or struck while upright by using analysis of bone fractures.
and other physical evidence (Karger, 2003). Compared to these forensic tools, the behavioral sciences have lagged in our understanding of hit-and-run crimes.

Who commits hit-and-run offenses? The obvious answer is that any person able to operate a vehicle is a potential candidate to become a hit-and-run driver. A simple search of the public media, for example, reveals cases where the accused was a member of the clergy, a school teacher, a banker, a fire chief, and a police officer. Although hit-and-run drivers can obviously encompass a wide range of individuals—from the young and inexperienced to the elderly or infirm—disqualified drivers appear to be overrepresented among this group of offenders. The disproportionate involvement of unlicensed drivers in hit-and-run offenses was first noted by Selling in 1941. Selling’s (1941) robust findings also revealed that “the hit-and-run group has a surprisingly high record of previous traffic offenses, as well as other criminal offenses” (p. 95). These early observations suggested the involvement of an antisocial factor in hit-and-run offenses. The disqualified driver is also overrepresented in single vehicle crashes and those involving stationary objects (Harrison, 1997). This group of drivers has a stronger incentive to flee the scene of an accident given the greater penalty they would receive; they generally seem to represent a particularly hazardous faction of operators.

More recent work by Solnick and Hemenway (1994) empirically documented a link between alcohol use and hit-and-run behavior. In this study, researchers examined all pedestrian fatalities that occurred in Massachusetts during 1989 and 1990. In addition to documenting that 19% of all pedestrian fatalities involved a hit-and-run driver, researchers in this study found that hit-and-run drivers were more likely than drivers who remained at the scene to have prior convictions for impaired driving and elevated blood alcohol concentrations. Drivers who left the scene of the accident in this study were also more likely to be young and male. In an independent study conducted a few years later, Harrison (1997) also found a link between alcohol consumption and hit-and-run offenses. Further, Harrison’s study found that hit-and-run offenses were more likely to occur during the evening or on weekends, presumably times when alcohol is more likely to be consumed. Although illegal intoxicants are more difficult to detect in the driver than alcohol, their ability to impair visuospatial accuracy and overall judgment in driving behavior seems obvious.

Solnick and Hemenway (1994) offered a two-pronged theoretical explanation for hit-and-run offenses: (1) Personality Theory and (2) Rational Decision Theory. Consistent with the early work of Selling (1941), the former postulates an antisocial component that manifests as social irresponsibility leading both to repeated risk taking in the form of drinking and driving and callousness that dampens feelings of responsibility for the victim. Insofar as impulsivity and failure to anticipate consequences are common correlates of antisocial behavior (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000), these personality traits are also implicated by the Personality Theory prong of Solnick and Hemenway’s analysis.

The second component of this model—Rational Decision Theory—simply proposes that a driver engages in a rapid cost benefit analysis that weighs the likelihood of successful evasion against the consequences of remaining at the scene of the accident. The decision to flee or remain is then determined by the outcome of this analysis. In our experience, these individuals tend to present as normal people (i.e., free of mental illness) who panic and flee without reflection on their decision or become overwhelmed by the prospect of a criminal record. They clearly lacked
intent to commit a crime and often succumb to the adrenaline response that can lead to a flight response. As with nearly all criminal offenses, females are vastly outnumbered in any review of hit-and-run offenders.

Other writers have proposed a link between some mental disorders and hit-and-run accidents. Persons with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, for example, have been noted to have a higher incidence of hit-and-run accidents (Fischer, Barkley, Smallish, & Fletcher, 2007). These drivers have impulsive and inattentive behavior that may directly influence the decision to leave the scene of an accident. Other disorders with a high level of impulsivity (e.g., Bipolar Disorder) may also be related to these occurrences. Surveys of mental health and traffic accidents, however, reveal that those individuals instrumental in automobile accidents are more likely to have acute transitory stress and negative life events rather than a chronic mental disorder (Tsuang, Boor, & Fleming, 1985) or that social stress interacted with alcohol use (Selzer & Vinokur, 1974) to precipitate the hit-and-run scenario. As a whole, then, these data suggest a role for both mental illness and compromising social stress, with the latter being somewhat more common.

Defenses to the charge of hit and run can include lack of knowledge that an accident occurred (although hitting a pedestrian or cyclist with any vehicle other than a very large truck should bring awareness of the situation), automatism states caused by the shock of the situation, a rational decision not to stop because of the dangerousness of the neighbourhood, insufficient capacity due to head injury from the same collision or other mental infirmity, and insanity. Another method used to deflect responsibility by perpetrators is calling the police to report that their vehicle had been stolen when, in reality, they had abandoned the car and made their way home by other means. Taxi cab audits are useful tools in such investigations and can quickly dispel such claims.

Next, we offer some illustrative case studies. Although these case studies can help identify variables for further exploration, large-scale, multi-site studies are necessary before reliable conclusions about the psychology of hit-and-run offenses can be drawn.

**Illustrative Cases Involving Hit-and-Run Offenders**

**Case 1**

Mr. A was a 48-year-old divorced man with three prior convictions for impaired driving. On a July evening, at dusk, he was returning home from his favorite bar after being there for five hours. As he crested a hill, Mr. A struck a mother crossing the street with her young child. He did not apply breaks, and witnesses saw the vehicle increase its speed after the collision. Mr. A stopped at a coin-operated manual car wash, washed his car, and then drove home and parked his vehicle in his (rarely used) garage. He went into his home and began to consume more alcohol. A witness had recalled a partial plate number, and police arrived at Mr. A’s home four hours after the collision. He was very impaired and professed to have no recollection of the collision or of being in the bar or of traveling on that specific road. He indicated that he had been home since midafternoon, although this was not corroborated. His efforts to create an alibi were interpreted as a clear motive to evade prosecution, and through physical evidence, he was convicted.
Case 2
Mr. B was an 81-year-old man who had been driving all of his adult life. He lived with his 78-year-old spouse, but they had little other family to assist them. He had not previously been involved in a motor vehicle accident, and in recent years he had developed a means of avoiding stressful traffic by driving only during the daylight hours and not at rush hours, using only familiar routes and not venturing forth in bad weather. He had worried about his driver’s license being renewed as his reaction time and general cognitive skills were noted by acquaintances to be radically diminished in the past year. Coming home from picking up a prescription for his wife one evening, he sideswiped a car with a man standing there who had just exited his vehicle. The driver continued on at slow speed, drove home, and parked his car without closing the door. Mr. B. was delirious at his home and was taken by ambulance to the hospital with a suspected closed head injury. Clinical examination revealed evidence of moderate dementia of the Alzheimer’s variety—it was uncertain if the accident had exacerbated his cognitive impairment. Charges from the collision were stayed as Mr. B’s capacity for a defense was seen as insufficient.

Case 3
Ms. C was a 17-year-old woman who had been driving for six months. She was late for work and speeding in a residential area when she failed to stop at a crosswalk (with flashing lights). She struck a young man and left the scene, returning home rather than heading to work. She was distraught and unable to describe to her parents what had occurred. They observed the damage to her vehicle and telephoned the police. Although she had no history of ever having a mental disorder, when examined, the young driver had immediately obvious signs of Acute Stress Disorder—she was “in a daze” and described feelings of depersonalization. She had persistent nightmares of the accident for months and intrusive daytime thoughts about it. Other symptoms included difficulty sleeping and motor restlessness. She later developed a Major Depression with suicidal thoughts that was linked to the accident.

Discussion
Although it can be argued that the driver in Case 1 made a rational decision to avoid detection following a cost-benefit analysis, we believe the post-accident callousness he displayed more clearly identifies personality factors as causal forces in the decision to leave the scene of the accident. Consistent with the early analyses of Selling (1941), this driver had a history of driving offenses and irresponsible behavior, and his callousness is quite suggestive of antisocial tendencies.

Case 2, on the other hand, more clearly involves a mental infirmity—in this case, a dementia. Note also that in contrast to the behavior of the driver in Case 1, the driver in the second case study did not actively seek to avoid contact with the authorities. Case 3 similarly involves a mental illness and no attempt to evade detection. In this case, though, the mental illness was triggered directly by the accident rather than being a pre-existing condition.

Bearing the aforementioned need for larger studies firmly in mind, some tentative observations can be gleaned from these case studies. First, the characteristics
exhibited by these drivers are consistent with existing theoretical formulations and clinical observations about hit-and-run drivers. Case 1, for instance, implicates the antisocial qualities first suggested by Selling (1941) as well as the irresponsibility highlighted by the Personality Theory of Solnick and Hemenway (1994). Cases 2 and 3 are consistent with past arguments linking mental illness/infirmitly to hit-and-run offenses (Fischer et al., 2007). The post-accident behavior of the driver in Case 1 is also quite different from the behaviors of the drivers in Cases 2 and 3. Post-accident behavior, therefore, is often key to understanding or legally interpreting the actions of a hit-and-run driver.

Second, some behavioral characteristics of hit-and-run drivers can tentatively be identified. Thus, it seems that drivers who actively seek to avoid apprehension are likely to be young males who display a constellation of traits commonly observed among antisocial groups (e.g., callousness, irresponsibility, failure to consider consequences, and substance abuse tendencies). This suggestion is consistent with our clinical experience as well as with previous formulations regarding hit-and-run drivers (e.g., Selling, 1941) and a very large body of literature concerning the behavior of antisocial males (e.g., Webster & Jackson, 1997). Conversely, drivers who do not actively attempt to avoid detection by, for example, simply continuing on their route without obvious change in their driving pattern, are less likely to be antisocial and more likely to suffer from a mental illness or infirmity (e.g., dementia).

At the risk of vexing redundancy, these observations and suggestions are tentative pending further investigation with large-scale studies. Studies examining hit-and-run cases in a specific jurisdiction over a specific period of time would seem to be an ideal follow-up for this paper. In any event, it is our hope that this brief exploratory study provides an impetus for more rigorous research by identifying some potential variables of interest and by highlighting the need for more research on this group of scientifically neglected offenders.

References


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Two Shades of Blue: Black and White in the Blue Brotherhood

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[The cops] whipped his ass like they’re supposed to! There they go jumping on the racist bandwagon. This ain’t no White and Black issue. It’s a police issue. He shot a cop, and I’ll whip his ass myself!

A Black female police officer watching TV news footage of a Black man being beaten by Philadelphia police, July 2000

Introduction

Police repeat the mantra that the only race among police officers is blue. Police officers do share a common police identity based on conservative social beliefs, opposition to ghetto culture, dangerous work conditions, irregular hours, excessive paperwork, and negative opinions of most “victims” (see Table 1). But these shared values exist distinct from and do not lessen a certain level of distrust and attitudinal differences between Black and White police officers. Despite an outward emphasis on the unity of blue over any division between Black and White, Black and White police officers remain two distinct shades of blue, with distinct attitudes toward each other and the community they serve (see Table 2).

Black police officers are more inclined to see their role as protecting the “good people”; White police officers place greater emphasis on arresting criminals. Both Black and White police officers see the police administration and departmental discipline process as unfairly biased against their own respective race. And morale differs by race, with higher morale among Black police officers.

Research on African Americans in Policing

The history of Blacks in policing is quite distinct from the history of police overall. Kelling and Moore (1988) describe three historical eras of police—(1) political, (2) reform, and (3) community/problem-solving—that conceptualize major changes in the White-dominated police organizations of the 19th and 20th centuries. From 1845 to the early 1900s, urban police departments were decentralized power structures that were indebted to local political alderman. High levels of police discretion went along with low levels of accountability. For better or for worse, police officers were intrinsically tied to their local political surroundings. Reformers liked neither the immigrant-based politics of this era nor the police. As reformers won political battles, changes occurred in policing.

The reform era, under the banner of science and progress, saw standards in hiring and promotions implemented, departments centralized, and efforts made to separate police from the corrupting influence of elected officials (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Police in the reform era shifted away from crime prevention and toward a more narrow focus on law enforcement and reactive crime fighting. Limitations
of this era came to light during the Civil Rights era. Along with calls to question police discretion (Goldstein, 1963; Kadish, 1962; LaFave, 1962; Piliavin & Briar, 1964), police were seen as particularly challenged in minority neighborhoods (Banton, 1964).

Table 1. Summary of Black and White Police Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Attitudes Shared by Police (No Significant Racial Differences)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The ghetto</td>
<td>Violent, bad, dirty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departmental discipline</td>
<td>Department will sacrifice an officer for political reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social ideology</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims who know their assailant</td>
<td>Deserve what they get</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-class Whites</td>
<td>Fat, wife beating, inbred, no teeth, cop fighting, redneck drunks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-class Blacks</td>
<td>Baby making, welfare dependent, drug using, cop-hating drunks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Attitudes Not Shared by Police (Significant Racial Differences) |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Black Police**                                                | **White Police**                                                                                                              |
| Residents of the ghetto                                        | Good and bad people live in ghetto                                                                                           |
| Departmental discipline                                        | Biased against Blacks because standards lowered for Blacks                                                                    |
| Hiring process                                                  | Process is tougher for Blacks                                                                                                 |
| Black police identity                                          | Cop identity more important than race identity                                                                                |
| White police identity                                          | Too many racist redneck crackers                                                                                              |
| Self-identity as police                                        | Strong, but just a job                                                                                                        |
| Political ideology                                             | Independent, conservative, or liberal                                                                                         |
| Role of police                                                 | Peacekeepers                                                                                                                  |
| The city                                                       | Bad, but problems are everywhere                                                                                              |

The reform era of policing seemed to have ended around 1970 (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Egon Bittner (1967) cast a positive spin on discretion, and this led, at least eventually, to a greater focus on problem-solving policing (Goldstein, 1990; Skogan, 1990; Wilson & Kelling, 1982). The true death of the reform era may have been as late as the aftermaths of the 1992 Rodney King riots in Los Angeles. High crime rates and the inability of politicians to fire Los Angeles Police Chief Darryl Gates led to a radical rethinking of the role of police *vis-à-vis* the community. Combined with a dramatic decline in crime in New York and other cities, the paradigm of police has shifted, but exactly to what is not yet clear.

The three eras of policing, while great for mainstream society, fail to have much relevance to the African-American policing experience (Williams & Murphy, 1990). In the South, police descended not from the noble ideals of London’s Robert Peel but from horrific slave patrols (Reichel, 1988; Walker, 1977). Throughout America, the political era did not benefit African Americans who had little if any political power; the reform era’s emphasis on law enforcement did little to help victims of legal discrimination; and the problem-solving or community era rarely solved problems working with the Black community but, instead, focused on the Black community as the problem to be solved (Williams & Murphy, 1990).
Table 2. Similar and Dissimilar Black and White Police Attitudes, Survey Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similar Attitudes</th>
<th>Black Mean (SD)</th>
<th>White Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Racial Correlation</th>
<th>Level of Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proud and happy to work for Baltimore City Police Department; put in a lot of effort to help department.</td>
<td>4.2 (0.55)</td>
<td>3.5 (0.85)</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being a cop is a good job.</td>
<td>3.9 (1.07)</td>
<td>4.2 (0.77)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens know more about neighborhoods than police; police need more and better contact with citizens; police should work to reduce citizens' fear of crime.</td>
<td>4.3 (0.48)</td>
<td>4.2 (0.43)</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Disagree with) the media treats police fairly.</td>
<td>2.3 (1.18)</td>
<td>2.0 (1.08)</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Disagree with) affirmative action is good for hiring and promotions.</td>
<td>1.7 (1.11)</td>
<td>1.5 (0.76)</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When growing up, physically disciplined by parents with hits, fists, belts, cords, or any other method more severe than open-handed spanking on behind.</td>
<td>All the time: 13% Often: 8% Sometimes: 62% Never: 17%</td>
<td>All the time: 5% Often: 14% Sometimes: 36% Never: 45%</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>0.132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dissimilar Attitudes</th>
<th>Black Mean (SD)</th>
<th>White Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Racial Correlation</th>
<th>Level of Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police officers have reason to be distrustful of most citizens. (White police are more distrustful.)</td>
<td>2.2 (1.14)</td>
<td>3.1 (0.91)</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The main job of police should be to arrest criminals. (Black police disagree.)</td>
<td>2.2 (0.60)</td>
<td>3.1 (1.05)</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To prevent crime, society must attack the root causes of crime (e.g., poverty, unemployment, poor education, racism, etc.). (Black police agree more.)</td>
<td>4.3 (0.73)</td>
<td>3.5 (1.07)</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I could just as well be working for another police department. (White police agree.)</td>
<td>2.9 (1.23)</td>
<td>3.8 (1.11)</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This department really inspires the very best in me in the way of job performance. (Black police agree.)</td>
<td>3.6 (0.96)</td>
<td>2.8 (1.07)</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A combination of 10 morale-related questions. (Morale for Black police is higher than White police.)</td>
<td>3.7 (0.66)</td>
<td>3.2 (0.60)</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean on a 1 to 5 scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree. At t = 3, n = 13 Blacks and 22 Whites.

This history of Blacks in policing differs from White police officers who held both political and legal advantage. While token appointments of Blacks were made in Northern police departments in the 1870s (Lane, 1986; Walker, 1977), these officers were not on equal footing with White officers (Williams & Murphy, 1990). As late as 1961, many departments severely restricted the right of Black police officers to make arrests (President’s Commission, 1967). In the post-bellum South, Blacks were appointed to the police in large numbers in New Orleans, but following the departure of Northern troops and the return of local civilian rule, the number of Black police officers in New Orleans dropped from 177 in 1870 to 27 in 1880. Between 1910 and 1950, there were no Black police in New Orleans (Williams & Murphy, 1990).

Black police officers faced further difficulties in the 1960s. Even though Blacks entered police departments as legal equals to White officers, police departments
remained White-dominated organizations at odds with many in the Black community. Blacks had to cope with problems beyond the “normal” scope of police work (Alex, 1969). Perhaps the simplest description is from the 2000 movie *Shaft* in which Richard Roundtree describes the problem to Samuel L. Jackson: “Too black for the brotherhood, too blue for the brothers.”

Race as a variable in policing has reoccurred in countless studies, but it appears most always in relation to criminals, victims, profiling, discretion, and arrest decisions (e.g., Black & Reiss, 1970; Holdaway, 1997a; Mastrofski et al., 2002; Sampson & Lauritsen, 1997; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Tonry, 1995). Klinger (1997) observed that police officers in high-crime districts treat all members of the public, regardless of race, worse than police officers in low-crime districts. While within a district race may not be a significant causal factor, high and low crime districts are correlated with race, and this affects police officer behavior.

Compared to race as a variable in police-public interactions, little is known about differences between Black and White police officers (Alex, 1969; Beard, 1977; Campbell, 1980; Dowler, 2005; Haarr, 1997, 2005; Haarr & Morash, 1999; Leinen, 1984; Teahan, 1975). While Alex (1969) documented differences between Black and White officers, much has changed in both policing and society at large in the 40 years since his groundbreaking 1965 research. Overt racism has lessened over the decades, and minority police are no longer considered novelties. While on the street, Black officers will still be accused of being an “Uncle Tom,” this insult has lost much of any weight it may have held. When a contemporary Black officer was asked, “You ever get the feeling you’re working for the Man?” He gave a quizzical look and replied, “We all working for the Man somehow.”

Despite the passage of time, many of Alex’s (1969) conclusions remain valid: a dislike of police in general is still present in many minority communities; despite social differences between Black and White police officers, the job is seen as a basis for cooperation that overrides race; overt appeals from suspects for racial solidarity fall on deaf ears; and African Americans are more likely to become police officers because of the benefits in a civil service job rather than wanting to be a police officer per se.

Black (1971) and Geller and Scott (1991) found similar policing styles and behavior among Black and White police officers. Holdaway (1997b), in a study of British police, found that White police officers’ behavior and attitudes negatively affected Black and Asian colleagues. Yet, despite problems, Dowler (2005) found morale to be higher for Black officers. While not explicitly comparing Black and White police, Barlow and Barlow (2002) clearly show elements of racial distinctions in police. They propose that Black police have largely been co-opted by a corrupt White power structure (Barlow & Barlow, 2000) and racially profile against other Blacks. They found a majority of Black officers perceive themselves as targets of racial profiling at the hands of other police and one in ten Black officers admit using racial profiling on others (Barlow & Barlow, 2002).

Some propose that differences among police are minor or have little if any work-related impact. Brown (1981) emphasized the inherently political nature of policing as more important than individual differences among police officers. He warned of long-term changes in policing in which—like Weber’s (1918/1946) view
of politicians—the judgment of bureaucrats would replace passion, responsibility, and proportion. Klinger (1997) recognized a high degree of potential discretion among individual police officers, but he claimed that such freedom was negated by the social realities and working norms of individual police districts such as Van Maanen’s (1982) “informal” organizational rules.

In contrast to those who deemphasize the role of race and police, research on those policed (Websdale, 2001; Weitzer, 2000) finds that many citizens—particularly poor Blacks—believe that Black and White officers do behave differently. Weitzer (2000) emphasizes class distinctions between lower- and middle-class Blacks. Additionally, personal narratives (Bentley, 1997) and newspaper reporting (Winerip, 2000) have documented different attitudes among Black and White police.

Police actions in America’s high-crime minority neighborhoods have additional significance. Arguably the first anti-police riot by African Americans took place in 1935 Harlem (Barlow & Barlow, 2000). Since then, real and perceived police misconduct in non-White communities has sparked almost every major civil disturbance in America. While police perform vital functions in all locales, violent crime—and police response toward that violence—is heavily concentrated in a more limited number of specific urban neighborhoods. In the late 1990s, for instance, decreasing violence in a limited number of high-crime neighborhoods in New York City significantly lowered the violent crime rate in the United States overall. Between 1990 and 1997, New York City’s homicides declined from 2,245 to 770 (Langan & Durose, 2004). This accounted for one-third of the total U.S. homicide decline during this period (U.S. Department of Justice, 1992, 1999). Improved police-minority relations, further crime reductions, and lasting urban peace depend on greater understanding of police in high-crime urban areas.

Research on the U.S. Army (Moskos & Butler, 1996) found that even in a relatively successfully integrated institution, Blacks and Whites do not share identical views on professional opportunities or race relations. Given differences between Blacks and Whites in American society, certainly the idea that differences would exist both within and between Black and White police has a certain *prima facie* logic to it.

**Methods**

As an institution, police have been known to be extremely insular (Rubinstein, 1973); resentful of outsiders (Friedmann, 1992); and in general hostile to research, experimentation, and analysis (Bouza, 1990). Some of this hostility may be explained by a desire to avoid being exposed, yet an aversion to researchers may rest more on deeply rooted ideological grounds (Young, 1991). Police simply—and usually correctly—don’t see how an outside researcher will help their work.

Access problems can be avoided if one uses precollected quantitative data. But the cleanliness of computer data sets should not obscure the methods and limitations of the original data collection. From the yearly *Uniform Crime Reports* to Reiss’s (1971) oft-cited research, police officers and graduate student researchers witness, define, and categorize subjective realities into *UCR* Part I crimes or police-citizen encounters. Outside of arrests and traffic citations, however, most police activity
has no formal record, and official police statistics are notoriously susceptible to manipulation (Manning, 2001; Young, 1991).

While there is much to be gained from macro-level statistical regressions, such analyses miss police attitudes and behavior on an individual level. Just as the national average income means little if one is unemployed, average police behavior can easily be overshadowed by specific incidents. People angry at the New York police for torturing Abner Louima or killing Amadou Diallo were not assuaged by a Deputy Police Commissioner who stated that New York City police were six times less likely to use lethal force compared to the police in Washington, DC (“NYPD Blues,” 1999). A motorist pulled over by a police officer cares more about the individual officer than police officers’ behavior in general toward people of his or her race. Even when quantitative data are relatively accessible, valid, and reliable—such as numbers of police-involved shootings in a certain city—statistical outliers and individual experiences can have more qualitative significance than any statistically significant correlation.

Maurice Punch (1979) argues that participant observation is the best and perhaps only means to gather valid job-related police data. The researcher must “outwit the institutional obstacle-course to gain entry and . . . penetrate the mine-field of social defenses to reach the inner reality of police work” (p. 4). While participant-observation researchers may risk “going native” and losing unbiased objectivity, the enormous benefits of rich, qualitative police data reward those who confront and overcome such risks.

In order to gain unrestricted research access to the Baltimore police, this author became an employed and uniformed Baltimore City police officer in 1999. The status as police officer overcame much of the hostility traditionally present from police toward academic researchers. The research occurred in three continuous stages totaling 20 months. At all stages (including the hiring process), the research was conducted in an overt manner. The first research stage was six months as a trainee in the Baltimore City Police Academy. The second stage, two months of field training in Baltimore’s Eastern District, consisted of uniformed patrol with a more experienced field training officer as partner. During this stage, the officer learns the nuts and bolts of police patrol work (Van Maanen, 1973). The third and primary research site was 12 months in Eastern District uniformed patrol on the permanent midnight shift (11:39 PM to 8:12 AM). During the final two stages, more experienced veteran officers, primarily squad mates, were informally interviewed both on and off the job.

Research as a police officer was facilitated by frequent downtime while working and the job requirement to carry pen and paper at all times. Some of the time detailed notes were written in the squad car during slow periods. More often, very brief field notes were expanded after returning home from work. Quotes were reconstructed as accurately as possible. Unless otherwise implied, all quotations are from personal and private conversations with research subjects. Names have been changed. Identifiers are intentionally vague to preserve anonymity.

Participant-observation and extensive informal interviews were supplemented with a longitudinal 65-question survey. The survey was given to a class of 50 Baltimore police recruits at the beginning and end of the police academy, and a
third time to the same group after a year on the street for an overall response rate of 86% \((n = 45, 50,\text{ and } 34,\text{ respectively, for the first, second, and third administration of the survey})\). There were 25 Blacks and 25 Whites (including one Hispanic), 37 men and 13 women (the largest number of women ever in a single Baltimore police academy class). Toward the end of the police academy, a supplement on racial attitudes was added to the survey.

While the first two stages of the questionnaire occurred in the closed environment of the police academy, the final stage necessitated tracking individual subjects down at their respective work districts. Many subjects expressed strong aversion to completing the questionnaire, especially when they had already done so once or twice before. No incentive was offered, but no individual refused to complete the questionnaire when personally asked. Some subjects, due to days off and other factors, could not be located. A copy of the questionnaire, including a cover letter and stamped return envelope, was mailed to the academy classmates who could not be located in person. None of these questionnaires were returned.

While the phenomenon that attitudes and beliefs are correlated in general with the race of police officers is a reasonable hypothesis, care should be taken before generalizing these data to other cities or even other police districts in Baltimore. The Eastern District is not a typical police working environment. All four variables cited by Klinger (1997) as affecting police behavior—(1) the severity of “normal” crime, (2) the perceived “deservedness” of victims, (3) the level of officer cynicism, and (4) the overall workload—are extreme in the Eastern District. Baltimore’s rate of violence remains among the nation’s highest (Broadwater, 2008). Although comprising only 7% of Baltimore’s 650,000 total population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002), approximately one-fifth of Baltimore’s annual 270 homicides and one-fourth of its 95,000 arrests occur in Baltimore’s Eastern District.

In 2000, approximately two-thirds of Baltimore, one-half of the police academy class, one-third of the Baltimore Police Department, and one-sixth of police officers working the Eastern District midnight shift were African American.

**Becoming Blue: Police Socialization**

Colman and Gorman (1982) showed the police academy to have a temporary liberalizing effect on police trainees. This research confirms that finding but only for White trainees. For most White police academy trainees, the police academy provided the first deep personal interaction with both the city and with Blacks. There is no residency requirement in Baltimore for police officers. Sixteen of 25 Black trainees in the academy were born and raised in Baltimore City, while only two of 25 Whites could claim likewise. With the exception of this author, all the White trainees in the academy class lived outside the city. Most of the Black trainees lived in the city.

In general, Whites’ favorable opinions of Blacks increased during the academy. Negative stereotypes about Black men from the “ghetto” were often dispelled. After four months in the academy, one White trainee discussed his perceptions of one of the Blacks in the class:
You know, I felt really bad because here’s a Black from the city, from Barclay Street [a street in the Eastern District]. I think he’s just some dumb Black. Then I find out he’s got a four-year degree. I don’t have a degree. And he gets hundreds on the tests! He’s a smart guy and here I am thinking he’s not because of my first impression.

Another White trainee said, “I didn’t avoid Blacks. There just aren’t any blacks where I grew up. I guess you could say I’m a redneck. A lot of my family are racist. But I don’t think I am; it’s just I’ve never really known any Blacks.”

Black trainees’ opinions of Whites were much less changed by the academy experience as Blacks had greater previous experience with Whites:

I don’t think my opinions have changed [regarding White people]. I think for a lot of Whites in the class, it’s strange for them to be around Blacks for the first time. But Black folks? You’re going to deal with Whites no matter what. So for me, it’s no big deal. Sometimes I’m surprised by some of the things I hear in class [from Whites], but I guess that’s what diversity is all about.

White police believed that standards were lowered to accommodate for Black officers. While the class valedictorian was Black, 14 of the top 16 class members in “academics” were White. The lowest performers in “academics,” shooting, and driving range were Black. I asked a Black trainee to explain the racial disparity in “academics.” He said, “I think it’s a joke. They end up giving you all the answers anyway. I think it’s just that Whites go home and study while the brothers don’t. Do you study? What’s the point of studying if you know you’re going to pass?” One White trainee said,

Look, they need more cops and at the same time they are trying to get all these Blacks in the police? Well how are you going to do that? Half the people in the city have criminal records or can’t finish high school. How much you want to bet that half the Blacks in the class were hired because they were Black.

Only 6% of respondents, 11% of Blacks and no Whites, indicated support for affirmative action on the anonymous questionnaire. In public, all officers—Black, White, male, and female—openly expressed an aversion to any form of preferences based on race or gender. The hiring process frustrated both Blacks and Whites due to the length of time involved (anywhere between three and nine months) and the closed and seemingly arbitrary nature in which hiring decisions were made.

One Black trainee with a personal connection in the personnel department reported in a conversation to a small group of Blacks and Whites that the start of the class was held up until 25 qualified Blacks could be hired to match with 25 Whites previously approved. Qualified candidates are those who have a high school diploma or GED, can meet minimum physical requirements, do not have an extensive arrest record or any domestic violence convictions, and want to become police officers.

Many Black officers believed the hiring process was tougher for Blacks because of racism within the police department. One Black woman trainee told of her
experience taking the polygraph exam, one stage of the hiring process: “That [White] guy was a real . . . mmm, well I don’t like using those words. But he asked me, ‘What is it like to be raised without a father, like most people of your race?’ Like most people of your race! I was burning up.” Other Blacks also reported a confrontational polygraph exam, while this author and some (but not all) of the other White candidates recalled the same polygrapher as cordial and polite.

In the police academy class setting, police trainees expressed “proper” sentiments about policing as a means to help people. As a police sergeant told the academy class, “You’re being assimilated into the blue brotherhood.” In conversations and interviews, however, White police—younger on average than Black police and many just over the minimum 21 years of age requirement—were more likely to stress the perceived action of the job. One White trainee exclaimed, “I can’t believe they’re going to pay me to carry a gun!” Other trainees said, “I’ve always wanted to be a cop since the day I was born.” A third said, “I can’t wait to get out there. Maybe I watched [the TV show] COPS too much as a kid.” A White trainee who was in a bar after work a few hours after handling his departmental gun for the first time expressed simply, “Just looking at that gun gave me a boner!”

Black police were quicker to emphasize the benefits of policing as a worthwhile and stable occupation. Black trainees were more attracted by an opportunity to “do good” and the stability of a government job, especially considering the poor alternative job opportunities available to those with only a high school diploma or GED. A Black trainee told me in private that with only a Baltimore public high school education, finding a good job was difficult: “I’m a single mother. I don’t want to rely on some boss or some man just to get by. This is a real job: health care, the works. I’ve got to settle down and think of my family.” Another Black woman said, “My sister is a cop. And I see the opportunities it’s given her. Opportunities as a woman, as a mother, that I don’t think you could get elsewhere.” One Black male emphasized Christianity saying, “I’m a religious person, and one day I just got the calling.” Another male said, “I believe that we can actually do some good and help people.” At least one Black trainee saw policing as a way out of a dangerous life. In class, he explained why he stayed out of trouble and became a police officer:

I had to go to a lot of funerals when I was a kid, of my friends and people I knew. And every time you go you see their mothers crying, going “My baby!” I didn’t want to put my mother through that. You see the look in their eyes and I said, “My mother’s never going to be crying like that because of me.” I didn’t want to put her through that.

At the end of the police academy, 83% of Black trainees and 43% of White trainees listed the “chance to help people” as an important reason why they wanted to be a cop. “Job excitement” was mentioned by 17% of Blacks compared to 43% of Whites.

Five of the 25 Blacks and nine of the 25 Whites in the academy class were military veterans. For veterans and those who had previously worked for a department of corrections, policing was seen as the next step up on a career path.

The academy is not a “weed-out” process (Moskos, 2008). Toward the end of the academy period, the department assigned the class to two very similar police
districts: (1) the high-crime Eastern District and (2) the high-crime Western District. It was left to the class to decide who would go where. Instructors emphasized the benefits of working in dangerous areas: “You should be happy you’re going to the Eastern and Western. You’ll learn a lot there. Just keep a good attitude. Stay humble.” Another instructor said, “You’re going to see more and do more in your first years than many police deal with their whole careers. After a few years, you can go anywhere; write your own ticket.” Instructors downplayed work-related danger with a commonly expressed fatalism: “Why are you afraid of being shot? Once it’s your time to go, it’s time to go.”

Despite the instructors’ reassuring words, in reality, the Eastern and Western Districts are the worst patrol assignments in the city. Virtually no police officer volunteers to work in these districts, and many officers assigned to these districts have standing transfer requests. In the police academy, only three of 50 trainees desired to work in either the Eastern or Western districts.

For all the same reasons most people wish to live outside bad neighborhoods, most patrol officers wish to work outside bad neighborhoods. Along with increased danger, working conditions are a significant factor: equipment is more battered, with primarily too few radios and broken cars; eating choices are limited; the streets are dirty; contagious diseases are more common; unpleasant interactions with a hostile public are more frequent; permanent “manpower shortages” limit officers’ ability to take days off and make transferring out of the district difficult.

Socially, the class divided along racial lines. Reflecting the social networks that developed in class, all but two Whites chose the Eastern District and all but two Blacks chose the Western District. During academy free time, such as lunch, Blacks and Whites usually sat with others of the same race. Outside of the academy, friendships also tended to develop with others of the same race. During a break, class members got together with their friends to see which district they wanted to go to. Most made the decision based on lessening commuting time and a desire to work with friends made in the police academy. As one Black class member put it, “Well, I guess [the racial split] really shouldn’t surprise anybody. I don’t think it’s that people were trying to avoid others. But you see the way people hang out. Perhaps with the exception of you and [another trainee], all the Whites are at one table and all the Blacks another.” The other trainee was the self-proclaimed “redneck” who had grown up not knowing any Blacks.

White officers’ attitudes towards the ghetto were based more on racial and cultural stereotypes, while the opinions of Black officers were more nuanced, based on personal experience and class distinctions in these ghetto communities. Neither Blacks nor Whites hold a positive view of the ghetto. There is no definitive definition for an American ghetto. Ghettos can be diverse and encompass a wide variety of cultures and classes (Anderson, 1999; Duneier, 1992; Wilson, 1996). Depending on use and context, ghetto can be either a geographic area or a personal character trait. If one accepts the concept of a ghetto as a description of a geographic entity, certainly Baltimore’s Eastern District qualifies. If one accepts the concept of ghetto as a descriptive term related to behavior and beliefs, certainly many residents of the Eastern District qualify. As ghetto is usually a negative descriptor, many residents would strongly object to themselves or their community being labeled that way.
At the same time, other residents—seen celebrating gangsta or thug life—claim to be proud of being ghetto.

The term ghetto was used by Black and White police officers as a negative term both to describe a geographic area and individual character traits (see discussion by Anderson, 1999). Styles of behavior, movement, and physical appearance were all at various times described as ghetto. Whites associated ghetto as synonymous with being inarticulate, Black, and criminal. White officers were quick to label people as ghetto, while Blacks used the term to define specific actions or characteristics of a person. In other words, a Black officer is more likely to say a person is “acting ghetto,” while a White officer is more likely to label the person as ghetto.

Many Black police saw themselves as rising above the ghetto. I asked a Black officer why Blacks were disparaged for talking “ghetto.” His reply, which is akin to Goffman’s (1959) concept of role playing, “You can be from the ghetto, but you don’t have to act it out.” For this Black officer, ghetto was a geographic entity and a lifestyle choice, not a state of being.

While most Black officers in the academy believed they had a better idea than White officers regarding realities in the Eastern and Western District ghettos, apprehension crossed racial lines: “They don’t play around there. You got some hard brothers, no doubt.” In class, some Blacks expressed resentment of the negative attitudes held by Whites toward people living in the two districts: “These neighborhoods aren’t that bad. I grew up in the Western. Am I a bad person? There are lots of good people there.” A White trainee, whose brother was a Baltimore County police officer, was a bit more introspective in private:

I think the problem is that I’m afraid of Blacks. Isn’t that a horrible thing to say? It’s not that I’m prejudiced, but I was raised thinking, “Oh, the city. You go there and you get shot.” I wouldn’t even go downtown. I didn’t grow up with any Blacks, and all you hear are bad things. When I was sixteen, I was even afraid to go to Fell’s Point [a popular and “safe” neighborhood]!

He described his feelings on first hearing the news of the unpopular and dangerous assignment:

My heart was a-flutter. I’m going to hyperventilate when I get home. But maybe it’s good. It’s not something I would have picked, but sometimes it’s good to be forced into something. It’s like being afraid to ride a really scary roller-coaster. . . . I can take my county friends for ride-alongs and show them how police work is really done in the city!

The same trainee was physically ill during the last days of the academy. He described it as “Eastern District Flu, I guess. It’s just all nerves. I’m scared. Because it’s like a roller-coaster, and we’re going up and all you hear is that ‘click-click-clack’ sound. But you know what’s coming up next!” In class, a slightly built White man said, “Dude, I’m not a big guy. How am I going to tell a corner of big, uh, Black drug dealers to clear off? I mean, what’s to stop them from raping me!?” A Black in class noted, “But a lot of these people [Whites] aren’t from these areas. They don’t know.” In private, a Black trainee said that while the perceptions of many of the Whites in the academy were based on ignorance and prejudice, the
realities of the ghetto could often live up to the worst stereotypes: “Whites here are going to be in for quite a culture shock.”

Rookie police quickly see what give the ghetto a bad name: unsanitary living conditions, rats, roaches, broken glass, trash, disease, addiction, nonworking plumbing, and violence. For some Whites, this confirms preexisting negative stereotypes:

If you’re documenting this for your research or whatever, get this down: These people out here are a subhuman race. I mean, this raid we did today. You pull up a sheet, and cockroaches are running around the bed. Who can sleep like this? Everyone is drugged out, like that Zombie movie: “Brains, I want brains!”

Another White officer explained,

It’s a different world [here in the Eastern]. Girls running around with babies. Shaneequa and Laquanda. Half the time they don’t even know how to spell it. Look around: trash, shit, rats, junkies. They don’t want to work. People prefer to take drugs, drink a “double-deuce” [22-ounce bottle of Malt Liquor], get in the cheese line.

White officers see living in the ghetto as a choice people make and cannot comprehend why anybody, including Anderson’s (1999) “decent people,” would choose such a life:

I don’t understand why anybody would want to live in this shithole [the Eastern District]. If I lived here, I would leave. If you chose to stay here, I have no sympathy for you . . . . What are you hanging around for? The smell? To call us racist for trying to clear hoodlum-heads off the corners? No, I don’t care if you have a job. It’s their [working people’s] kids who are out causing all the trouble. [Working parents] want us to clean up the neighborhood, but they’re the first ones to bitch when we lock up their son. Nobody ever believes it’s their baby out there causing trouble. If you choose to live here, you’re part of the problem.

One discussion with a White officer focused on the idea of living in the ghetto by choice:

**Officer:** I don’t understand why anybody lives here.

**Question:** Where do you want them to live? You want them to move to your neighborhood?

**Officer:** [chuckles] No, but they could move to another neighborhood in the city.

**Question:** Would you rent to them?

**Officer:** Some slumlord would rent to them there, too.
Question: Then they’d be in another ghetto. How would it help this place if every working person left? Call me liberal, but jobs would help.

Officer: That’s not the issue. These people don’t want to leave ‘cause “baby’s motha’” is here. Because they make their money selling drugs here. You liberals always want to blame society. Well, there’s nothing about society or poverty that keeps you from cleaning your home. You want to give these people something? How about a broom. And a frying pan. You don’t have to be rich to clean your house. I mean the kids are living in filth. That’s got nothing to do with money. And all that crappy food they buy? It costs more. But they’re lazy. [Getting government] disability [checks] is like winning the lotto.

Black officers’ sympathies extend moreso to the working residents of the ghetto. Some older residents cannot afford to leave, while others are too stubborn to leave their home of many decades. Other residents feel a civic duty to stay and make things better. Both Black and White police have sympathy for those perceived as having no means to leave—specifically old people; infants; and the multitude of stray, abandoned, and abused animals. “The old people, the dogs,” one White officer said, “I feel for them. They can’t leave. But anybody with a job? You could live anywhere. If you chose to bring up your family here, I don’t get it.”

Black officers are more likely to think of the ghetto in class terms, with ghetto being synonymous with lower-class Blacks and conscious lifestyle choices. These attitudes correspond to Anderson’s (1990, 1999) delineation between decent versus street or ghetto residents.

A Black officer described ghetto in terms of property owners:

The problem here is nobody owns their property. There are plenty of Black neighborhoods where people have lawns. Take care of things. Don’t let kids deal drugs on their block. But those are mostly the homeowners. Everything here is Section 8 [government subsidized rent]. Just trash one place and move on to the next. Who would ever buy into here? . . . Some people think whenever they see Black, it’s ghetto. But it’s not like that.

Asked to be specific about what makes an area a ghetto, the Black officer said,

Single mothers, kids by different fathers, drugs, alcohol, hanging out all night. You don’t know where your 14-year-old is because [you are] strung out yourself. You don’t care. It’s a way you dress, a way you talk, a forty [ounce bottle of malt liquor]. [Using the expressions] “Bs and Hs” [bitches and whores], “yo,” “aw’ite” [all right]. The [summer] uniform [of drug dealers, White t-shirt, baggy jeans worn low, beige Timberland boots]. . . . You can’t be a bad-ass forever. A junkie is just a “yo-boy” [kid hanging on the corner] plus a few years of heroin. You start sniffing the profits [of drug deals]. These people need some religion. Religion and a good ass whoopin’.

Some White officers make similar distinctions about property owners but still conceive of sharp geographic boundaries. One young White officer said, “Near the Eastern [District police station], the neighborhood is nice. There are [Black]
While acknowledging that some “decent” people live in the ghetto, White police are quicker to conceive of the ghetto as a monolithic geographic entity. Black police mirrored Anderson’s (1990, 1999) language, distinguishing between those in the ghetto whom they consider to be “ghetto” and the middle and working-class “decent” people also living in the same area:

I’m from the ghetto. I speak three languages: English, bad English, and profanity! But that don’t mean I got to act ghetto. I could stand on the corner with the “yo”s [term for troublesome youths who use the word “yo” a lot], pants hung low, wearing Tims [Timberland boots], saying, “whatup, yo?” But that ain’t me.

Most police, both Black and White, believe that the social problems in the Eastern District are hopeless. One Black officer said, “It’s hard not to think that this is a jungle here. People running around in the street at all hours. Getting high, acting like fools. . . . They ought to tear everything down. All of it!” A White officer echoed this belief: “I’d like to napalm the whole area. Wouldn’t that be beautiful? Just come in with the air strikes and watch the whole thing go up in flames. . . . I don’t know what else you can do. If people want to live this way, I say fuck ’em.”

A Black officer proposed similar ends through different means: “If it were up to me, I’d build big walls and just flood the place [the Eastern District]. Biblical like. Flood the place and start a-fresh. I think that’s all you can do.” When I asked the Black officer how his belief that the entire area be “flooded” differed from the attitudes of White police, he responded, “Naw, I’m not like that because I’d let the good people build an ark and float out. Old people, working people, line ’em up, two by two. White cops will be standing on the walls with big poles pushing people back in.”

In a different context, the same African-American officer said, “I just wish some of them [White officers] would take the time to talk to people rather than just talking at people. . . . There are lots of good people here, but you’d never know it if you don’t make the effort.” In a previous conversation with me, a White officer had labeled this Black officer “a sympathizer.”

Derogatory talk about residents of the Eastern District does not necessarily reflect race. Cops share an equally hostile attitude towards lower-class Whites and anybody who repeatedly demands police attention. A White cop explained, “My philosophy is I hate everybody equally. We’re dealing with shits no matter where we work. Everyone is going to lie to you.” One White officer described the perils of working in a White neighborhood:

Those rednecks are just [as] bad [as “ghetto” Blacks in the Eastern District]. Same drinking, same domestics [domestic violence], same kids, same welfare. But in Pigtown or South Baltimore [lower-class White neighborhoods], you’ll see things you never get here, like incest and huffing [inhaling fumes]. It’s like one big Jerry Springer set. Pookie [in the ghetto] may not know who his daddy is, but half the time those [White] motherfuckers don’t want to know!
Plus, they [Whites] fight cops more. But it’s strange because the same people who fight cops one day will help you out the next. Here, [Black] people just want nothing to do with you.

Driving through a lower-class White neighborhood, a Black officer looked out the window and said, “You get weird stuff here, like incest reports.” Describing the same area, another White officer said, “Man, those rednecks are stupid. At least the Blacks [in the Eastern] got an excuse; they were born in the ghetto. But those Whites are just dumb!” Lower-class Whites in poor White neighborhoods were routinely disparaged with greater venom than middle or working-class African Americans living in the ghetto. While the word ghetto was not used to describe a White neighborhood, negative characteristics of the ghetto were seen to transcend racial and geographic boundaries.

While police freely make negative comments about the Black residents of the ghetto, only once did this author hear the word nigger used by a White officer. A White officer described how he was off duty, standing in a check-out line at a grocery store while a young “ghetto” Black man was in front of him on his cell phone making a drug deal. “All I could think,” said the officer, “was ‘that nigger!’” Black officers were much more free to use the word and its derivative, nigga. But its use was controversial. When a Black officer used the word in a negative context in a crowded station house at shift change, a White officer ran from the area saying, “Whoa! Dropping the N-Bomb. I’m getting out of here.”

Deserving Victims

Both Black and White police believe that the vast majority of victims—if not completely deserving of their predicament—are at least complicit in their victimization. “Innocent” or “true” or “real” victims would be those who do not know their assailant and were not participating in criminal activity (usually buying or selling drugs) at the time of their victimization. The concept of the “deserving” victim, the idea that the victim had it coming, is a large source of police officers’ negative attitudes toward citizens.

A veteran of over 15 years discussed how many truly “innocent” victims he had seen:

Well, I’d say a lot of the theft from autos are probably legit. Some of the yokings [unarmed muggings] and robberies. Child abuse, things like that. But shooting victims, probably three or four total. Often the guy shot isn’t the intended victim. Nobody here can aim. But he’s a cousin or someone involved. Once there was a stray bullet that went into a second floor window and got this guy watching TV. He was innocent! Three or four out of a couple of hundred. I’d say 99% of these idiots deserve it in one way or another.

Police disparage both the willing participation which leads to some victimization and the repeated strains on police time and resources. An officer explains, “If every idiot who could pick up a phone didn’t call us whenever they wanted—‘My daughter won’t go to school,’ ‘My boyfriend put his feet in my hair’—we might have a little time to clear the corners, do [drug] surveillance, [or] walk foot.” “Everybody lies,” a Black officer said, “especially the shooting victims. Because
they all know who shot them. And why. They don’t want police involved with them any more than they did before they got shot.”

One gunshot victim, despite a serious bullet wound and full knowledge of who shot him, wouldn’t even tell this author his own name. The shooter was later arrested, but the State Attorney’s office dropped the charges because “[the victim] wouldn’t tell us the same story twice. He’s no angel himself.” Victims may be wanted for other crimes or simply have no desire to get involved in the criminal justice system at any level.

A police officer, after being awakened by a 4:00 AM call for an in-progress aggravated assault, rhetorically asked,

> What are you doing out at 4:00 AM? It’s not like anything’s open. Even the yakomee [Chinese take out] joint is closed. If you weren’t out trying to cop [buy drugs] or burn somebody [sell fake drugs], you wouldn’t get your ass kicked. There’s no reason to be on the street at this hour. Asshole did something wrong. He deserves it.

Another officer described a call that was dispatched as a rape:

> That’s no rape. That’s FTP: failure to pay. She consented to sex and didn’t get her $20, so she wants him locked up. Then she changes her mind because she doesn’t want to go to the hospital. So I’ve got to write it up as agg [aggravated] assault? Why do I want to increase the crime rate [statistics] because she won’t stop sucking dicks?

While prejudging the situation may close the mind to the possibility of a “legitimate” victim, officers would change their attitude when there was a victim perceived as “real.”

Domestic violence, occasionally disparaged as “ghetto foreplay,” contributed heavily to the belief of “complicit” victims. A Black officer explains,

> You know how often I’ve locked him up? Locked her up a few times, too. But it doesn’t matter. It doesn’t matter what we do because she don’t go to court. Or if she does, they’ll come in all lovey-dovey and she’ll say, “I loves him.” She could leave [him]. Or at least get him locked up [for longer] and have the place to herself. But she keeps going back to him. [Then she calls us because she] just wants him out of the house for the night.

A White officer received a call from a family trapped in their own house by an unfamiliar pit bull resting on their marble stoop. The dog had clear facial scars from dog fighting and, though calm, showed no desire to move from the stoop. The officer told me, “It’s sad that I feel more for the dog than the people here. What did the dog do to deserve this? . . . I mean, I can rationalize and say the people choose to live this way. But the dog?”

Both Black and White police recognize the chasm between the police and the public as problematic:
Nobody here will talk to police. Half the public hates us. The other half is scared to talk to us. I would be, too. But we can’t do anything without the public. They know who’s dirty [involved with drugs] and who’s not. They know who’s shooting who. We don’t know. They live here. We just drive around in big billboards. How are we supposed to see anything? The public doesn’t understand that nothing will ever go to court if nobody talks. We can only do so much. As long as nobody ever sees anything, things aren’t going to change.

White officers are more likely to blame the public for these bad relations:

People get bad ideas from the media or from criminals that we’re corrupt or brutal. But we’re not. Or they refuse to think that their son could be involved with drugs. They want the corner cleared, but if we pick up their son it must be the racist cops picking on him because he’s Black. And with the amount of drugs you’ve got in this area, of course they aren’t going to like police because we’re trying to lock them up. Too many people here are pro-criminal.

Black officers are more likely to place some of the blame for poor public relations on the police: “Police just don’t know how to talk to people. We’re too rude. We piss someone off and the next time he don’t want nothing to do with us. Or he starts to believe some of the things people say about police. Can you blame him?”

Blame the Liberals

Black and White police share a belief that the root causes of most social problems are values they perceive as politically “liberal”: affirmative action, welfare, premarital sex, and parents who refuse to physically discipline their children. In the police academy, a high-ranking instructor said, “Sometimes you get those bleeding-heart liberals who think everything is [child] abuse. But it’s up to us to decide what is criminal child abuse . . . [But] you shouldn’t be using a belt [in disciplining a child].” At this point, there was a loud and open groan in the classroom. One Black trainee said, “Nobody would have been left to raise me.” Another Black commented, “Both my parents would have been locked up.”

Over 70% of the recruits in academy class admitted, most often proudly, that they were physically disciplined with methods defined by academy instructors as physical child abuse under Maryland law (see Table 2). A White instructor stated, “People haven’t had their asses whipped. Now nobody beats them, not parents, not friends, and certainly not the police. That’s the problem.”

White police were quicker than Black police to blame the problems of the ghetto on liberal politicians. The First Lady, Hillary Clinton, was a surprisingly popular scapegoat:

I hate Hillary Clinton, that bitch. Her book: It Takes a Village. And all these liberals giving her awards. It takes a parent. Fuck a village! It takes one good parent. That’s what these people don’t have. If they had a parent who raised them right, instead of calling the police every fucking time they had a problem, half of the kids would turn out OK. . . . That motherfucker there [on the last call], when was the last time he read a book to his kid? Being a father
is more than buying Pampers. These idiots can’t raise kids. They shouldn’t have them in the first place. And then they don’t know how to be parents and blame the school for everything.

Another White officer said, “I don’t understand how you can be liberal. You want to see 30 years of failed liberal policy? Just look around the Eastern. Everything is fucked up.”

Many Black police shared similarly conservative views towards “ghetto” residents:

People out here are lazy. L – A – Z – Y. Waiting in the cheese line. Being poor is no excuse for being ignorant. I made it in this country. It can be done. But you got to work for it. As long as the welfare checks [and] the disability [checks] keep coming and people want to shoot up [inject drugs], nothing is going to change. But it’s not society’s fault. Society doesn’t make you sell drugs any more than it made me police. You’ve got to take responsibility for your actions. Stop whining and blaming others.

While being arrested, one suspect appealed to a Black officer by pleading, “Brother, you got to understand.” The officer responded, “I’m not your brother! I’m not your cousin. I’m not your ‘homie.’ And no, I don’t understand where you’re ‘coming from.’ I’m old enough to be your daddy!” Neither party had anything else to say.14

Morale

Police morale is highest the day job applicants are hired. Morale drops for police through the academy and again after the first year on the street. This decline is much more pronounced for White police.15 I asked a more veteran White officer if he thought White police were more demoralized than Black police (Dowler, 2005). He responded,

It wouldn’t surprise me. Everybody is always talking about racism. Well you know what? We’re [White people are] a minority here [in Baltimore]. Who’s sticking up for our rights? Where’s our NAACP? One of us gets fired and nobody cares. But try and fire a number one [Black person], people are out on the streets. City hall has meetings (Epstein, 2001). You don’t think that has an effect?

Another White officer addressed the problems of working patrol in the Eastern:

They give lip service to patrol being the backbone of the department. But if they were really serious about the Eastern, they wouldn’t always dump on patrol. If they need officers for a specialized unit, they take them from patrol. Now we can’t get days off. If what we do is really so important, patrol should be taking officers from other divisions. Entice people to work patrol in the Eastern. How can we do a good job if half the district has 70s [transfer request forms] written and the other half is bitter?
A Black officer expressed a slightly better view of the Eastern District: “People are always going to bitch and complain. I don’t know what they were expecting. People always think the grass is greener on the other side. You come here. You do your job. You go home. It’s not so bad.”

A small minority of young officers, both Black and White, enjoy working the Eastern District because of the faster-paced work or because the district is one of the least desirable assignments. A young Black cop said, “I don’t want to hump out [do nothing] all day. I want to go out and do things; lock people up!” A White officer explained the advantages of working in an unpopular locale:

You can fuck around here. What can they do to you? I’m already in the Eastern, working midnights! There’s nothing lower. They want to transfer me? Go right ahead. Put me somewhere better. Here, pretty much everybody just leaves you alone to do your job. It’s just one less thing to worry about.

Most officers who are able to eventually do transfer out of the Eastern District to districts less “ghetto.” For the short term, morale for these officers tends to go up. A White officer gloated soon after a transfer out of the Eastern:

It’s great [in another district]! It’s like a whole ‘nother department. People wave to the police. People like the police. It’s weird. . . . There’s only one drug corner in the whole sector. . . . And things work smoothly. There are enough cars to go around. Everybody is not whining all the time. It’s like things are supposed to work. . . . I even look forward to coming to work. I can’t believe I’m saying that. But at the Eastern, I was thinking about quitting.

Reasons frequently given by police for poor morale include no reward for a job well done but quick punishment for mistakes; police management perceived as out of touch and unsupportive of patrol officers (Reuss-Ianni, 1983); poor working conditions (previously mentioned); and excessive paperwork—for example, arresting a juvenile for minor drug possession requires completing 15 forms, all but two in longhand, and a three- to six-hour booking process in four separate locations.

Many older patrol officers know they are past any chance for promotion and worry about providing for their families after they retire. Pension generally represents a 50% cut in pay. With only a high school diploma, these officers fear for their post-police job prospects and ability to provide for their families. On one call, police responded to a man on the side of the street crying. He kept repeating, “I want to kill myself. I want to kill myself. I want to kill myself.” A long-time White veteran of the Eastern District told him, “Come on, it can’t be that bad. At least you’re not stuck in a dead-end job [like me]!”

**Biased Discipline**

Both Black and White police view the police administration and departmental discipline process as unfairly biased against their own respective race. According to the 2000 Baltimore Police Department Internal Survey, 80% of Baltimore police officers believe that departmental discipline is unfair and inconsistent. Both Black
and White police officers believe that the department is unwilling or unable to thoroughly discipline officers of the other race.

Paradoxically, both Black and White officers see their own race as disproportionately punished by the system. It seems incongruous that the police department disciplinary process can be simultaneously biased against Blacks and biased against Whites. But the biases are perceived in different parts of the system. Black officers perceive the informal process of discipline as benefiting White officers (Beard, 1977; Leinen, 1984); White officers see the formal process of discipline as benefiting Black officers. To a large extent, both beliefs have merit. A White officer said, “They’ll never punish a Black officer unless they can find a White officer to balance the numbers”; a Black officer said, “You Whites can get away with anything.”

For instance, an off-duty White officer was being arrested for being drunk and disorderly. Before going to central booking, this officer was released without charges by a White supervisor after a stern lecture and warning—an informal resolution. The supervisor, however, was then brought up on formal charges for not booking the suspect. Another sergeant related the story to me:

You know Lieutenant DiMaggio? Used to be Sergeant? Well he hit the jackpot [got in trouble]. A Black officer arrested an [off-duty White] officer for being disorderly in a bar or something like that. Well, Lieutenant DiMaggio is on duty. He talks to them and lets him go. How are you going to risk an officer’s career on one misdemeanor? So he drops it. Next thing we hear is that he’s being charged. Big time. I don’t know if it was the arresting officer or IID [Internal Affairs, known by the acronym for the unit’s former name: Internal Investigation Division] or what. But he could be fired. I don’t know if it will come to that. But they could easily push him back to Sergeant. He doesn’t deserve that.

Departmental discipline is based on violations of General Orders, a system common to most police departments. These rules are collected by individual officers in a confusing, four-inch-thick binder filled, in no particular order, with individual regulations quixotically designed to cover every aspect of police work both on and off duty. General Orders are often outdated, impractical, and occasionally even contradictory. General Orders are perceived by rank-and-file police officers as neither a help nor a guide to policing. Instead, they are a way for the department to avoid legal liability and punish any officer it chooses. Standard operating procedures are in contradiction with many General Orders. Police officers congregate, go to the bathroom without notifying dispatch, improvise based on necessity, and exercise discretion. None of these practices is condoned by the book of General Orders.

The relationship between formal and informal rules is simultaneously schizophrenic and symbiotic. Implicit is the assumption that the efficiency of the smart rules allows the formal, proper rules to survive.” Freilich and Schubert (1991) write,

Formal writings created to control police behaviors are termed proper [formal] rules and principles. Police officers who avoid or evade these rules and principles are considered as deviants, actors who deviate from the proper. Deviants, contrary to public opinion, sometimes make positive
contributions to the success and vitality of organizations. . . . Such deviant behavior sometimes is copied by actors who have important positions in the organization. As other actors join the bandwagon, a new rule slowly develops . . . a “smart [informal] rule.”

Yet any deviation from the formal rules—no matter how smart, creative, or well-intentioned—is potentially subject to disciplinary action. Police codify proper rules in extremely great detail. Yet these details are often out-of-touch with on-the-street job realities.

A White officer described General Orders as . . .

[a] way to fuck you. If they want to get you, they’ll find something. If they can’t, there’s always “conduct unbecoming.” That’s kind of the catch-all, at least till they write a new GO [General Order] to cover what you did. Some of those GOs are actually a hoot to read because most are only written after somebody jackpots [messes up and gets caught]. Like there’s one saying you can’t shoot an animal from more than 30 feet away or something. That means somebody somewhere was squeezing off rounds from halfway down the block and hit something he shouldn’t have.

A Black officer expressed similar feelings:

Look, we’ve [patrol officers] got to cover our ass and they’ve [the administration] got to cover theirs. We write reports to cover ours and they’ve got the GOs to cover theirs. It’s all about protecting that behind. . . . When it hits the fan, they’ll hang you out to dry before you even know you’re wet!

The gap between how things must be done and how things should be done, though faced in many occupations, is perhaps larger and more critical in policing (Freilich & Schubert, 1991).

The seemingly random nature of the discipline process is reflected in the slang use of the word *jackpot* to describe getting in trouble. To *jackpot* or *get in the jackpot* does not describe an act of wrongdoing but, rather, the act of getting mired in the departmental discipline process regardless of the nature of the transgression or the officer’s actual guilt or innocence.

As White officers have always been the majority in the Baltimore Police Department, Black officers perceive an “old boy’s club” which allows Whites to get away with certain behavior. One Black officer described an entire work shift of one district as “just a bunch of drinking buddies. That’s not fair to the rest of us. I think the whole shift should be broken up.” Another Black officer said, “White police get away with bloody murder around here. You know how it is. You spend enough time with them, and they start talking about [how Black people are] monkeys and all that kind of thing. How are you going to punish your friends if you go hunting with them?”

Whether a violation of a General Order is grounds for official reprimand is usually up to a police officer’s immediate supervisor, the sergeant. As described in greater detail by Van Maanen (1983), the sergeant is the keystone of the discipline
process. While Internal Affairs can and does investigate and punish officers, the vast majority of minor violations are punished at the discretion of the sergeant. A sergeant can completely overlook an offense or demand a formal written account. Sergeants are expected to consider a wide variety of factors such as context, frequency, and severity before disciplining officers. For good and for bad, personal factors inevitably come into play.

Black police continue to see racism among White officers as a significant and socially segregating issue. One Black female said, “You see all those cops who wear gloves all the time, even though it’s against General Orders? They don’t want to touch a Black person.” Black officers perceived a large percentage of White officers—particularly those who act or proclaim themselves to be “redneck”—as racist.

Compared with Black officers, White police perceive far fewer racial issues and problems. Reverse racism, however, is seen as a significant factor by most White officers:

We got to watch what we say, what we do. Blacks can use the N-word anytime they want. They can screw up and people say it’s not their fault. We mess up and we’re called racist. How many White people do you see around here [on the streets of the Eastern District]? We can’t do anything without being called racists. “White motherfucker” this and “White motherfucker” that. The only racism around here is against White people. I’m sick of it.

Whites see affirmative action, political correctness, and a Black majority in the city as strong evidence that the department is biased against Whites in general. One White officer said, “[The administration] is afraid to punish Blacks. It’s all political. They don’t want the media and politicians screaming bloody murder. So every time a [Black] is suspended, they’ve got to find a White to fuck with too.” Another White officer said, “They should get rid of all bad cops, and stop talking about race all the time. Every time they [the administration] wants to jackpot [punish] a Black, I guarantee you they’re going to find a White to balance the numbers. You just hope it’s not you.” A White officer cynically explained that when it came to punishment, the department simply needed “White meat.”

A White officer expressed a belief common among White officers that Black officers were responsible for a disproportionate share of transgressions:

You know it’s always the number ones [Black officers], hitting that ass [sleeping with women], domesticics with baby’s motha’, getting in the jackpot [getting caught]. But they know nothing’s going to happen to them. All they have to do is scream racism, or sexism, or both! How can you prove it’s not?

A Black officer explained that since more Black officers lived in the city, their transgressions were more visible: “It’s off-duty that kills you. That’s why I moved out. Far away. You got to learn: Don’t get yo’ honey where you make yo’ money.”

Conclusion

Blue exists before Black and White, but Black and White have not blended into blue. Black police officers see race relations within the department as more problematic
than do White police. While the police department is not torn by racial strife, clear and meaningful differences exist between Black and White police officers’ beliefs regarding crime fighting, departmental politics, and the African-American community. Black police, more than White police, see crime to be a direct result of the root causes of poverty, racism, and poor education. White police are more likely to believe crime escalates from general social disorder. White officers, more than Black officers, see the role of police as “crime fighters” locking up “bad guys.” Black police are more likely to see their role as “peacekeepers,” protecting the “good people” in the ghetto. Black police officers emphasize class struggle between the “decent” working class and the “street” or “ghetto” culture within the community. White police officers see the “ghetto” more as a miasma that pollutes all in its midst. A fraternity of blue coexists with but does not eliminate nor significantly lessen these differences.

Much of what is perceived as police identity—socially conservative values and a rejection of lower-class culture—is present before officers enter the police department. The shared experiences of police work help overcome racial differences, but they do not eliminate differences between Black and White police officers. Black and White Baltimore City police officers are born into dissimilar social and geographic conditions and remain in largely separate social worlds before, during, and after their entry into the police department. Not surprisingly, attitudes reflect this social separation.\(^1\)

Police identity—the so-called “blue brotherhood”—is less a unifying force than a tool that allows effective functioning in spite of racial differences. In work-related situations, especially those involving danger, the race of a police officer is irrelevant.\(^2\) When backup is needed, police officers do not care about the race of the responding officer. One Black academy instructor said, “I don’t care if you’re white, black, green, or brown, as long as you back me up when I’m getting my ass kicked, you’re blue. And that’s all that matters.”\(^3\) The so-called “blue brotherhood” is not a monolithic entity as much as a tent under which a clan of cousins constantly feeds and squabbles: “When you put on that uniform, you’re not White or Black. You’re blue. We’re one big happy family, right? Dysfunctional as hell. But what family isn’t?”

**Endnotes**

1. The term *ghetto* is used because it is the vernacular of police officers and many (though by no means all) of the residents in the area.

2. The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment provides a good example of poor methods influencing quantitative results and, as result, public police (Sherman & Berk, 1984). In this study, mandatory arrest was shown to reduce reoccurring domestic violence. Officers were supposed to handle domestic violence situations based on the response indicated on the top card of a random deck. The “problem” was that police officers, unbeknownst to the researchers, were exercising professional discretion and, in effect, stacking the deck (Berk, Smith, & Sherman, 1989). More careful replication shows that in many cases a mandatory domestic violence arrest makes the problem worse. Nevertheless, mandatory arrest became and remains law in many jurisdictions.

3. Though charges of “going native” can neither be disproved nor dismissed, I believe that methodological risks inherent to participant-observation research are generally
overblown. *Objectivity* is too often a mask for ignorance. And attempts by outsiders to gain trust and access as an outsider can lead to even greater methodological corruption.

4 Ironically, there was more hassle from my Harvard professors about me being a Baltimore police officer than there was from Baltimore police officers about me being a Harvard graduate student.

5 The survey is available from the author on request and is reprinted in Moskos (2008).

6 Resistance to completing the questionnaire was most often rooted in the belief that completion of the survey would not benefit research subjects and could, perhaps, come back to haunt them. There was also an undercurrent of ideological opposition to research, generally perceived to be anti-police (Young, 1991). But ties from the police academy overcame any such opposition . . . at least in person.

7 On one hand, the aversion police have to filling out questionnaires cannot be overemphasized. Cops will do anything to avoid filling out a survey. Simply put, no good is coming from others knowing their inside beliefs. Perhaps more importantly, too many questionnaires are too long, poorly written, and fail to guarantee anonymity through overly specific background questions (simply asking race, sex, and rank is usually a giveaway). On the other hand, cops can be an easy group from which to get high response rates. Given the pseudo-military chain-of-command, officers will fill out a survey when a higher-ranking officer implies they have to. Officers will also fill out a survey as a personal favor to a sympathetic researcher, at least if the researcher confronts them in person.

8 The Eastern District homicide rate for men 18 to 24 is 615 per 100,000. This rate is approximately four times the national rate for Black men of this age and 40 times the rate for the equivalent White Baltimoreans. A 15-year-old male in Baltimore’s Eastern District has a 11.6% chance of being murdered before age 35 (Moskos, 2008, footnote 14, pp. 203-204). Another way to conceive of the level of violence is to note that more people are lost to homicide each year in the Eastern District—both in raw numbers and per capita—than the hardest hit community, Hoboken, New Jersey, lost in the World Trade Center attacks of September 11, 2001 (Newman, 2002).

9 Most of the White recruits would have preferred a better paying police job outside of the city but took jobs in the city because Baltimore City was hiring. There is also the perception that a police officer in a high-crime city is somehow more “real police” than an officer working in a quiet town. Some trainees, mostly White, claimed to have taken large pay cuts to work for the Baltimore City Police Department. At the time, the starting annual police salary was $28,400. After two years and a new contract, the salary was $32,000.

10 “Academics” was a loose term to describe all classroom subjects that could be tested on paper. I put the word in quotes because the “academics” of the Baltimore Police Academy bore little resemblance to any standard school program I know. Little emphasis was placed on subject retention. Lessons were geared more toward protecting the department from legal liability than educating police officers. There was an open secret that answers to some tests would be given to the class in pretest review sessions. Very little attempt was made to explain to trainees how the material presented in the police academy was relevant to day-to-day police work. Survey data show that less than half the class saw a relationship between what police learn in the academy and what police need to know on the street.
Initially, the academy trainees were allowed to ask for any of the nine police districts. But these requests were later ignored, and the class was informed it was to be split entirely into the two highest-crime districts. Perhaps as a consolation, it was left to the class to divide itself between the two districts.

The flooding metaphor was said before the flooding and destruction of New Orleans, Louisiana. But the attempts by neighboring White communities to keep displaced Black New Orleans residents from taking refuge in their communities showed the painful truth of this officer’s beliefs.

I can’t be certain what was meant by the label *sympathizer* as I did not ask the White officer what he meant. My interpretation is that the White officer was questioning the Black officer’s loyalty toward police *vis-à-vis* the Black residents of the Eastern District. This may lend support to Dowler’s (2005) link between perceived criticism toward Black officers and the perceived militancy of Black officers (though I would not describe this particular Black officer as “militant”).

I would expect the police officer’s response to be similar even if no White police officer was present. But of course, as a White person, I cannot know for sure.

Qualitative evidence is strong. Quantitatively, morale is measured in the questionnaire as a combination of the mean for ten questions. At the start of the academy, on a one-to-five scale with five equaling high morale, Whites measured 3.9 and Blacks 3.8. After a year on the streets, Whites measured 3.2 and Blacks 3.7. Collectively, the decline over time was significant at the 0.05 level. The decline for Whites was significant at the 0.01 level.

Reuss-Ianni articulates the rift between patrol officers and management-level officers in her wonderful “Cop’s Code.”

For an example regarding radio communication, see Manning (1997, p. 262).

The link between police officers’ personal beliefs and their professional behavior is vital and yet very poorly understood. I believe that most police are professional inasmuch as the link between personal beliefs and professional behavior is quite small. In other words, police officers can overcome their personal prejudices and treat citizens in a professional manner. Of course, I saw some unprofessional police work toward citizens, but bad (and good) behavior came from both Black and White officers. Try as I might, I could see very little significant correlation between police officers’ personal attitudes and professional behavior. Some police officers were undoubtedly better than others. Yet work quality ultimately seems little related to personal beliefs or barroom bravado.

An intellectual sergeant discussing this matter said, “Everyone says that race is the issue, but basically race isn’t a problem. There will always be issues, but your White cop isn’t drastically different from your Black cop. The real issue is gender, but people don’t want to talk about that!”

Slow backup is a very rare but very serious occupational hazard. When it happens, it is generally a personal issue that transcends race. In the Eastern District, given the number of officers in a small geographic area, backup is never far away and generally quick (though when you need backup every second counts). Slow backup is a very serious informal sanction often caused by the belief that the requesting officer repeatedly puts
him- or herself into dangerous or unethical situations that could and should be avoided. Failure to provide backup can be an attempt to change an officer’s behavior and a way of avoiding responsibility for whatever situation has developed.

References


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Complaints of Police Misconduct: Are There Differences Between Male and Female Officers?

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Introduction

Law enforcement has been a male-dominated profession in the United States dating as far back as the early 1900s. After the Equal Employment Opportunity Act was passed in 1972, the number of women choosing law enforcement as a career began to gradually increase (Grant, 2000). In the 1970s, female police officers represented nearly 7% of the total number of sworn law enforcement officers in the United States (Sims, Scarborough, & Ahmad, 2003). Recent statistics provided by the National Center for Women and Policing (2001) report that female officers accounted for 12.6% of all sworn law enforcement positions in police agencies employing 100 or more officers in 2001. Although the number of female police officers has increased in recent decades, women are still classified as minorities within nearly all law enforcement agencies (Lersch, 1998).

As a result of more females entering the law enforcement profession, researchers began to study differences between male and female police officers. This body of research has focused on differences in police patrol practices (Bloch & Anderson, 1974; Sherman, 1975; Sichel, Friedman, Quint, & Smith, 1978), incidents involving the use of excessive and deadly force (Brandl, Stroshine, & Frank, 2001; Garner, Maxwell, & Heraux, 2002; Garner, Schade, Hepburn, & Buchanan, 1995; Grennan, 1987; Horvath, 1987; National Center for Women and Policing, 2002; Sherman, 1973) and allegations of police officer misconduct (Lersch, 1998; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 1996, 2000). Additional research has focused on differences related to communication skills of both male and female police officers (National Center for Women and Policing, 2002; Snortum & Byers, 1983) as well as differences in the level of authoritarianism among male and female police officers (Bell, 1982; Eagly & Steffen, 1986; Grennan, 1987; National Center for Women and Policing, 1999; Remmington, 1981; Sherman, 1973).

In general, the research findings from early studies have been inconsistent in identifying differences in both police behavior and job performance among male and female police officers. Lersch (1998), however, points out one area of this research that has produced somewhat consistent research findings: complaints of misconduct filed against male and female police officers. This category of research has found that female police officers are less likely than male officers to be named in complaints filed by either citizens or police supervisors (Brandl et al., 2001; Lersch, 1998; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 1996, 2000; National Center for Women and Policing, 2002; Pate & Fridell, 1993; Steffensmeier, 1979; Van Wormer, 1981).
The study presented in this paper contributes to the existing body of literature by examining differences between male and female officers named in allegations of police misconduct using contemporary complaint data from a Midwestern police agency. More specifically, this study explores differences in both the frequency and type of formal and informal complaints of police misconduct filed against male and female police officers. This study also examines characteristics of complainants who file formal and informal complaints of misconduct against male and female patrol officers. The major contribution of this study is the examination of the differences between male and female officers in the formal complaint process, including disposition and discipline following investigations of formal complaints.

Differences Between Male and Female Police Officers: What Do We Know?

There have been many studies over the last three decades that have focused on differences between male and female police officers. This literature can be sorted into two general categories: (1) differences in police behavior and (2) differences in police officer job performance.

Several empirical studies have uncovered differences in police behavior between male and female officers. Some researchers have discovered that female police officers communicate more effectively with citizens when compared to their male counterparts and that women express greater levels of empathy for victims of rape and domestic violence (Bloch, Anderson, & Gervais, 1973; Christopher Commission Report, 1991; Grennan, 1987; Homant & Kennedy, 1985; Kennedy & Homant, 1983; Melchionne, 1967; National Center for Women and Policing, 2002; Price, 1974; Snortum & Beyers, 1983; Van Wormer, 1981). Researchers have also found support for the notion that female police officers are less authoritarian than male police officers (Bell, 1982; Grennan, 1987; National Center for Women and Policing, 1999; Perlstein, 1970; Steffensmeier, 1979). Other research has revealed that male police officers tend to possess a more aggressive approach to conducting police work compared to female officers (Eagly & Steffen, 1986; Marshall, 1973; National Center for Women and Policing, 1999; Remmington, 1981; Sherman, 1973).

Past research has also examined differences between male and female police officers in regard to job performance. A large portion of the research on differences in job performance between male and female officers focuses on patrol activities. In general, the early studies found that male and female police officers performed their patrol duties in a similar manner (Bloch & Anderson, 1974; Sherman, 1975; Sichel et al., 1978). Interestingly, the main difference found between male and female officers in all three of these early studies was that male officers were more heavily involved in proactive patrol incidents, while female officers were overrepresented in reactive patrol incidents (responding to dispatch/calls for service). As a result of these differences, male officers issued more traffic tickets and made a greater number of arrests than female officers (Bloch & Anderson, 1974; Sherman, 1975; Sichel et al., 1978).

Previous research on job performance of both male and female officers also revealed that female police officers are involved in fewer acts of violence compared to male police officers (Brandl et al., 2001; Garner et al., 1995, 2002; Grennan, 1987; Horvath, 1987; National Center for Women and Policing, 2002; Sherman, 1973;
Steffensmeier, 1979). In contrast, other studies have found no difference between male and female police officers in regard to allegations of the use of verbal or physical coercion or force on citizens (Lersch, 1998; Paoline & Terrill, 2004; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002).

### Complaints of Misconduct: Male Police Officers vs. Female Police Officers

Another way to examine differences in job performance among male and female officers is to study complaints of police misconduct filed against police officers. Previous research that has examined differences between the overall number of citizen complaints generated by male and female police officers have produced consistent results. The vast majority of these studies indicate that female officers are significantly less likely to be the subject of citizen complaints (Lersch, 1998; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 1996, 2000; National Center for Women and Policing, 2002; Pate & Fridell, 1993; Steffensmeier, 1979; Van Wormer, 1981). Previous research also found interesting patterns in complainant characteristics. For example, Wagner (1980) revealed that most of the complainants in his study were African American (63.7%), male (77.5%), and within the age range of 15 to 24 years old (43%). African-American complainants identified verbal and physical abuse as the basis of most of their allegations of police misconduct. In addition, Wagner (1980) found that women were more likely to complain about verbal abuse/discourtesy, while men were more likely to complain about physical abuse. Over a decade later, Pate and Fridell (1993) found that men filed 73% of the complaints against police in their national data set. They also found that African Americans accounted for 42.3% of the complaints filed against the police when they only represent 21.4% of the overall population.

Lersch and Mieczkowski (1996) reported that police officers who had citizen complaints filed against them were disproportionately male. The researchers further compared police officers who had received five or more complaints in the past three years (those deemed repeat offenders) with officers who had only received one complaint during the same time frame. Repeat offenders represented 7% of the total police population and were responsible for over one-third of all citizen complaints that were filed in that police agency (Lersch, 1998). The officers who were categorized as repeat offenders were exclusively male and were younger and less experienced than the officers who were not categorized as repeat offenders. In regard to complainant characteristics, Lersch and Mieczkowski (1996) found that racial/ethnic minorities filed over half (50.5%) of all complaints in “Sunnyville” when they only comprise 22.2% of the overall population in that city. They also learned that most complaints were intraracial after examining the race of both police officers named in the complaints and complainants (p. 36).

A few years later, Lersch (1998) examined a variety of characteristics associated with police officers who were named in citizen complaints. In addition to examining the distribution of police officer complaints between male and female officers, she also explored additional officer characteristics such as age, race, and tenure. Results of her study revealed that while male police officers were more likely to be the subject of citizen complaints, there were no significant differences in the type of citizen complaints filed against male and female police officers. Also, female police officers were more likely than male police officers to receive a citizen complaint as the result of a proactive citizen encounter. In regard to complainant
characteristics, Lersch (1998) found that neither complainant sex nor race was a significant predictor of the sex of the officers named in complaints. She did, however, find that male complainants were more likely to file complaints against male police officers, and white citizens were more likely to accuse female police officers of misconduct.

More recently, Lersch and Mieczkowski (2000) examined external and internal allegations of police officer misconduct and found that male officers were more likely than female officers to receive both internal and external complaints. The authors concluded that while the majority of the police officers in this agency did not receive any complaints, male officers were responsible for 94.8% of complaints filed by citizens and 94.5% of complaints filed internally by police supervisors.

Most of the studies that have used citizen complaint data to explore differences between male and female police officers were conducted nearly a decade ago. The study presented in this paper contributes to the existing body of literature by using contemporary complaint data to explore differences specific to complaints of police officer misconduct. More specifically, the following research questions are examined with respect to formal and informal complaints of police misconduct:

1. Do male police officers generate a disproportionate number of formal and informal complaints compared to female police officers?

2. What is the relationship between officer characteristics (sex, age, and marital status), complainant characteristics (sex and age), and formal and informal complaints of police misconduct?

Research Methods

Research Site

The research site for this study is a Midwestern municipal police agency in the United States that employs 129 sworn police officers. The analysis presented in this paper will only include complaints filed against patrol officers (n = 109). The department is located in a city with a population of nearly 100,000 people (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). According to 2000 Census figures, racial composition of the city includes 94.8% white, 0.7% African American, and 4.5% other races (including American Indian, Asian, and Hispanic/Latino). The city has a mixed economy (including retail, manufacturing jobs, etc.) and can be described as a university town as it has several universities and community/technical colleges in the surrounding area. The police population is predominantly male (80%) and white (97%). The age of patrol officers range from 23 to 64 years old, with a mean age of 35 years. Patrol officers in the department average 7.9 years of service, with a range of 1 to 33 years of service.

Data

Demographic information for all sworn patrol officers (including the patrol officers who had not received any complaints) was collected from the Human Resources Division within the police agency. Information collected for all patrol officers includes officer sex, race, age, and marital status. With the help of the Internal
Affairs Division, we were able to collect all formal and informal complaints filed against patrol officers from 2002 to 2005. This data allowed us to examine the frequency, type, and disposition of all complaints filed against patrol officers in this police department, including whether discipline was administered.

In this study, the complaints are separated into two groups: (1) formal and (2) informal. The formal complaints include all complaints officially filed against patrol officers. Overall, the range of formal complaints by officer is 0 to 14, with a mean of 3.25 (SD = 2.695). The informal complaints in this study include the complaints reported to the Internal Affairs Division by citizens either by phone, e-mail, letters, or face-to-face conversations. In these cases, citizens did not wish to file a formal complaint; instead, citizens merely wanted an opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with police service. The range of informal complaints by officer is 0 to 11 with a mean of 1.62 (SD = 2.103).

The following information was collected on all formal and informal complaints filed against patrol officers: (1) the year that each complaint was filed; (2) the age, sex, and race of each complainant; (3) the nature of each complaint; (4) the outcome of each complaint; and (5) whether discipline was administered to patrol officers.

Variables

There are five dependent variables used in the analyses of this study: (1) whether the patrol officer was named in a complaint, (2) the frequency of complaints against patrol officers, (3) the type/nature of complaints filed against patrol officers, (4) the outcome/disposition of complaints filed against patrol officers, and (5) whether discipline was handed out to patrol officers named in the complaints (see Table 1).

Two methods were used to operationalize frequency of complaints. For the t-test analyses, we added all complaints for each patrol officer across the four-year time period (2002 to 2005) and collapsed the count into three categories: (1) officers with no complaints, (2) officers with one complaint, and (3) officers with two or more complaints. Three categories were used based on the distribution of complaints. In this population, 40 patrol officers did not receive any formal complaints, 33 patrol officers received one complaint, and the remaining 36 patrol officers received two or more formal complaints during the four-year time period. Forty-five patrol officers did not receive any informal complaints, while 24 patrol officers received one complaint, and another 40 patrol officers received two or more informal complaints from citizens. The count of all formal and informal complaints were used in the regression analyses.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of formal complaints</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.838</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 = Zero</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = One</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 = Two or more</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of formal complaints</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>2.275</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of informal complaints</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.886</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 = Zero</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = One</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 = Two or more</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of informal complaints</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>2.103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of formal complaints</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>0.815</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = Police action</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 = Work performance</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 = Departmental policy violation</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of informal complaints</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = Police action</td>
<td>94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 = Work performance</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposition of formal complaints</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 = Not sustained</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = Sustained</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline administered in formal complaints</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 = No discipline</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = Some form of discipline</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer sex</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.403</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 = Male</td>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = Female</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer age</td>
<td>35.34</td>
<td>8.766</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = Single</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 = Married</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complainant sex*</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.471</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 = Male</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = Female</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complainant age*</td>
<td>37.78</td>
<td>10.825</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For complainant characteristics, the complaint is the unit of analysis.

The nature or type of complaint was coded into three categories for all formal complaints: (1) police practices (includes physical complaints or allegations of police use of force, and nonphysical complaints, including verbal discourtesy, harassment, abuse of authority, and verbal threats), (2) work performance issues (including dereliction of duties), and (3) departmental policy violations. For formal complaints, there were 62 complaints based on allegations of police practices, 57 formal complaints based on issues related to work performance, and the remaining 51 complaints were based on allegations of a violation of department policies and guidelines. For informal complaints, the nature of the complaint was coded into two categories: (1) police practices (n = 94) and (2) work performance issues (n = 66).
The outcome of formal complaints was operationalized as a dichotomous variable: (1) sustained \((n = 101)\) and (2) not sustained \((n = 69)\). A sustained complaint is one in which the investigation revealed sufficient evidence to support the allegations made in the complaint. Complaints that were not sustained include cases in which the acts providing the basis for the complaint occurred but were justified, lawful, or proper; when the investigation proved that the allegation was false; the basis for the complaint was fabricated; and when the investigation failed to disclose sufficient evidence to support the allegation. Only formal complaints generated any type of outcome as informal complaints typically do not receive any kind of formal investigation. Type of discipline (which only applies to formal complaints) was also coded as a dichotomous variable: (1) there was some form of discipline following the outcome of the investigation \((n = 105)\) and (2) there was no form of discipline administered \((n = 65)\).

Several independent variables based on both police officer and complainant characteristics were utilized in the analyses (see Table 1). Variables associated with police officer characteristics include (1) sex of the officer \((0 = \text{male} \text{ or } 1 = \text{female})\); (2) officer marital status \((1 = \text{single} \text{ or } 2 = \text{married})\); and (3) age of the officer in years. Variables associated with complainant characteristics include (1) complainant’s sex \((0 = \text{male} \text{ or } 1 = \text{female})\) and (2) complainant’s age in years. This paper is specifically concerned with whether police and complainant characteristics influence the complaint process in this police agency with a particular focus on sex. Past research has indicated that male and female police officers differ in the number of complaints that they generate. What has yet to be investigated is whether sex of the police officer and complainant impacts the complaint process (specifically the disposition of complaints and the administration of discipline as a result of complaints).

Other variables of interest include age of the officer and age of the complainant. Police officer age is also theoretically relevant as older officers are expected to be more mature and experienced and, therefore, should generate fewer complaints. The age of the complainant is relevant because the police generally have more frequent contact with younger segments of the population rather than older citizens (Walker & Katz, 2005). With this in mind, it would be logical that the age of the complainant will reflect the people that the police are more likely to have contact with while on duty. And finally, marital status of the police officer was included in the model because of its potential impact on complaints of misconduct. While the relationship between marital status and misconduct in policing has been largely overlooked, the criminological literature indicates that married persons are less likely to engage in criminality (Benson, 2002; Sampson & Laub, 1993; Sampson, Laub & Wimmer, 2006; Warr, 1998). Knowing the marital status for each officer allows for a parallel test to determine its relationship to police misconduct.

**Analytic Techniques**

Several analyses were performed to uncover the effect of officer and complainant characteristics on both formal and informal complaints. Chi-Square \((\chi^2)\) Goodness of Fit \(t\)-tests were used to determine whether there were statistically significant differences between the frequency of complaints filed against male and female officers. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was used for analyses using the frequency of formal and informal complaints as the dependent variables (since the data is count data). Multinomial and binary logistic regressions were
used to determine the effect of the independent variables on the complaint types, disposition of complaints, and discipline received after internal investigations. Multinomial regression analyses were used because one of the dependent variables (nature of formal complaints) is categorical (but not rank-ordered). The remaining three dependent variables are dichotomous variables and are analyzed using binary logistic regression. Multicollinearity diagnostic tests were performed and demonstrated no severe collinearity issues.\(^4\)

**Findings**

The first research question in this study examines whether men are overrepresented among police officers named in formal complaints. Prior research indicates that males are generally overrepresented in allegations of complaints. In this police department, 69 of 109 officers were named in formal complaints of misconduct: 56 of the officers were male and 13 of the officers were female. The distribution of officers named in complaints is nearly identical to the male and female representation of patrol officers employed in the police department. Twenty percent of the officers employed in the police department are female and 19% of the complaints filed were against female officers. T-tests were used to determine whether male officers generate a greater frequency of formal complaints. Male officers averaged 3.49 (SD = 2.822) formal external complaints, while female officers averaged 2.33 (SD = 2.0). The t-test results indicate that there are no statistically significant differences between male and female officers in the number of formal complaints filed against them during the time frame of this study (\(t = 1.148, df = 42, p > 0.05\)).

Informal complaints are those complaints for which a citizen chooses not to fill out an official formal complaint sheet regarding his or her complaint but, instead, chooses to communicate the problem to a departmental representative. Sixty-four of the 109 officers have been named in at least one informal complaint (53 males and 11 females). While female officers represented 20% of the patrol officers in the department, they represented 17% of those named in informal complaints. A Chi Square Goodness of Fit test did not indicate a significant difference in the distribution of male and female officers named in the complaint and the distribution of the officers employed in the police department (\(\chi^2 = 0.386, df = 1, p > 0.05\)). T-test results also indicate that male and female officers generated a similar number of informal complaints over the time period of this study (\(t = 0.091; df = 62; p > 0.05\)). Male officers averaged 2.75 (SD = 2.111) informal complaints, while female officers averaged 2.82 (SD = 2.089) informal complaints.

The second research question focuses on the relationship between police officer and complainant characteristics on formal and informal complaints of police misconduct. OLS regression was used to determine the relationship between officer characteristics and the frequency (count) of formal and informal complaints. Several regression analyses (binary and multinomial) were used to assess the relationship between officer and complainant characteristics and the nature of formal and informal complaints as well as the disposition and discipline of formal complaints. Table 2 presents the findings from the OLS analysis for frequency of formal and informal complaints. Neither model was statistically significant, which means that officer sex, age, and marital status as well as the complainant characteristics do not influence the number of complaints generated by police officers.
Table 2. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analyses of the Relationship Between Officer and Complainant Characteristics and the Frequency of Informal and Formal Complaints

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Frequency of Formal Complaints</th>
<th>Frequency of Informal Complaints</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Beta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>0.524</td>
<td>0.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer sex</td>
<td>-0.444</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer age</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Ratio</td>
<td>1.268</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p ≤ 0.05

Table 3 presents the findings from the binary logistic regressions for nature of informal complaints, disposition of formal complaints, and discipline administered following the disposition of formal complaints. The nature of complaints model as a whole was statistically insignificant. The two remaining models—disposition of formal complaints and discipline after disposition of complaints—were statistically significant. For disposition of formal complaints, complainant sex (-0.942) and complainant age (0.050) were both statistically significant. Complainant sex has a negative relationship to disposition, indicating that male complainants are more likely to have their complaints sustained than female complainants. Older complainants, similarly, are more likely to have their complaints sustained than younger complainants. These findings indicate that complainant characteristics influence the complaint process in this police department.

Table 3. Binary Logistic Regression Analyses of the Relationship Between Officer and Complainant Characteristics and Informal and Formal Complaints (Odd Ratios in Parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Nature of Informal Complaints</th>
<th>Disposition of Formal Complaints</th>
<th>Discipline After Disposition of Complaints</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>0.659</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>-0.709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.933)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.324)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer sex</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.206)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer age</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.026)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.981)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complainant sex</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.340</td>
<td>-0.942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.368)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.324)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complainant age</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.051)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model $\chi^2$ Df 6.293 5 27.152* 5 27.201* 5

*p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed test

Table 4 presents the findings from the multinomial logistic regression for nature of formal complaints. The results of the multinomial logistic regression for nature of
formal complaints indicate that complainant sex (1.186) is statistically significant in one of the models. More specifically, female complainants are more likely to complain about specific police actions/practices when compared to departmental policy violations.

Table 4. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of the Relationship Between Officer and Complainant Characteristics and Informal and Formal Complaints (Odd Ratios in Parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Nature of Formal Complaints</th>
<th></th>
<th>Nature of Formal Complaints</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police Action Versus</td>
<td>Work Performance Versus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Departmental Policy</td>
<td>Departmental Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>-0.550</td>
<td>0.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.563)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.577)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer sex</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>0.512</td>
<td>-0.940</td>
<td>0.574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.858)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.391)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer age</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.039)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complainant sex</td>
<td>1.186</td>
<td>0.426*</td>
<td>-0.313</td>
<td>0.495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3.275)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.732)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complainant age</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.978)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.030)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model $\chi^2$ 37.402* 10

*p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed test.

The nature of formal complaints is impacted by complainant sex—that is, females are more likely to complain about police actions/practices than males. For both the disposition and discipline administered following the investigations of formal complaints, complainant sex and age were both statistically significant. In both models, complainant sex was negative and complainant age was positive indicating that police officers are more likely to have a complaint sustained against them, and to have discipline administered if the complainant is male and older. None of the police officer characteristics (including sex) were statistically significant in any of the models. The findings demonstrate that the formal complaint process—nature of the complaint, investigation of the complaint leading to a disposition, and the administration of discipline—is an important point of inquiry. Complainant characteristics appear to affect this formal process more than officer characteristics.

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between police officer and complainant characteristics and allegations of police misconduct (specifically formal and informal complaints). Data analyses revealed several important research findings. First, police officer characteristics (including sex) demonstrated no statistical significance. Contrary to expectation, the distribution of formal and informal complaints among the male and female officers was generally representative of the department population. This finding contradicts prior research discussed in the literature review. It is possible that any differences in
police misconduct between male and female police officers are washed out when females represent a large percentage of the overall police department population. Recent statistics provided by the National Center for Women and Policing (2002) report that female officers accounted for 12.6% of all sworn law enforcement positions in police agencies employing 100 or more officers in 2001. Female officers comprise 20% of all sworn positions within the police agency featured in this study.

Regression analyses further indicate that police officer characteristics—sex, marital status, and age—have no impact on the frequency and nature of formal or informal complaints that are filed against them, or the disposition and administration of discipline received after the investigation of formal complaints. Diverging from criminological studies on the desistance of crime, being married has no impact on complaints of police misconduct in this department. In addition, neither police officer nor complainant characteristics explain the frequency of complaints (formal or informal) or the nature of informal complaints as these three models were statistically insignificant.

The findings demonstrate the significance of complainant characteristics on the nature, disposition, and administration of discipline of formal complaints. For the nature of formal complaints, females are more likely to complain about police actions rather than department policy violations. Female complainants, when compared to male complainants, may be particularly sensitive to perceived abuse of police authority on the street. Females may have a higher expectation of police service or an increased sensitivity to police use of force (regardless of whether that force is manifested verbally or physically). When their expectations are not realized, females may be more likely to complain about their interaction with the police.

The findings also demonstrate that complaints made by males and persons who are older are more likely to be sustained and will likely invoke some form of discipline as the binary regressions reveal a negative relationship between complainant sex and the outcome and administration of discipline of formal complaints. Further, complainant age was significant and positive for both dependent variables. There are several possible explanations for these findings. First, males may be more likely to have substantial complaints for which ample evidence is available. Since the analysis shows that females are more likely to complain about police actions/practices rather than department policy violations, it may be the case that female complainants are more sensitive to forceful police interactions that may be within the realm of accepted police behavior. Also, most police behavior on the street is largely unobserved by command staff. It seems reasonable that complaints regarding police mistreatment may be more difficult to prove when compared to department policy violations or work performance issues.

Second, police administrators may take male complainants more seriously than female complainants. Complaints generated by male complainants may be better documented, investigated more thoroughly, and, as a result, are more likely to result in some form of discipline administered against the officers. Male complainants may also be more assertive while reporting the complaint, which also may explain why their complaints are more likely to be sustained and will ultimately result in some form of discipline. A more assertive or aggressive tone (or more
forceful body language for complaints reported in person) would automatically invoke reciprocal reactions by the person taking the complaints. Further, it may be that female complainants are dismissed as hypersensitive or are regarded as less important than their male counterparts, which would result in less attention directed toward their complaints. Older complainants may also receive more attention from police administrators compared to younger complainants. Older complainants may be regarded as more mature and, therefore, more ingenuous. They also may be able to more clearly articulate their complaints against police officers compared to younger complainants.

While the findings from this study are important, they are not without limitation. First, the findings from this study may not be generalizable to smaller or larger police agencies across the United States. Similarly, the data used in this study is drawn from a homogenous police population working in a homogenous community. If this study was conducted in a larger, more diverse (or heterogeneous) community and/or police agency, the research findings might be quite different. The department is also atypical in that it employs a greater number of female officers than other equally sized departments (National Center for Women and Policing, 2002). The greater representation of sworn female officers may impact complaints of misconduct as citizens come to accept female officers as commonplace. This general level of acceptance may explain why male and female officers are equally represented in complaints of police misconduct. Another limitation of this study is the nature of the primary data source: citizen complaints. It has been argued that citizen complaints may not be the best indicator of police misconduct, and that it may be an indicator of the most productive police officers (Lersch, 2002). Caution should also be used when interpreting some of the quantitative analyses as there were instances in which comparisons were made between nonequivalent groups, which could inflate significance.

In spite of these limitations, this study adds to the existing body of police misconduct. In this police department, most officers had a complaint filed against them in the four-year time span. There were no differences based on police officer sex, which is an important finding. Even more substantial, none of the officer characteristics included in the statistical models had an impact on formal or informal complaints in this department. Of particular significance is the finding regarding complainant characteristics. Complainant sex is an important predictor of the nature, disposition, and administration of discipline in formal complaints of police misconduct. Complainant age is important in the disposition and discipline of formal complaints. More research is needed to further disentangle the relationships between police officer and complainant characteristics and complaints of police misconduct, with particular emphasis on the formal complaint process and not merely the frequency of complaints.

Endnotes

1 The distribution of complaints in this police department is unique as approximately one-third of all officers were not named in any complaints. Previous studies involving citizen complaints have found that only a small percentage of police officers are named in complaints, while a majority of officers are not named in complaints (Brandl et al., 2001; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 1996).
The police agency featured in this study does not formally investigate informal complaints. Most of the informal complaints are handled by Internal Affairs on an “informal” basis. In cases in which citizens make informal allegations that are related to use of physical force, discrimination, or some other serious matter, Internal Affairs will conduct informal investigations by speaking with the officers named in the informal complaint and anyone else that can provide useful information about the interaction in question. If there is evidence found that reflects the claims in the informal allegation, a more formal investigation is likely to occur. For most of the informal complaints, the allegations are recorded by Internal Affairs and kept on file within that division. Due to the informal handling of informal complaints, there is no discipline handed out for these kinds of complaints filed by citizens.

Race of complainant and race of police officer could not be used in this analysis due to the homogeneity of both the city population and the population within the police agency.

Walker and Madden (2005) state that Variance Inflation Factor scores of 5 or less are acceptable in social science research. Any VIF scores above 5 require further collinearity diagnostics (p. 293).

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Effectively Communicating Performance Expectations to Subordinates: Patrol Officer Perceptions

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Introduction

Patrol officers are permitted a large degree of discretion in deciding how best to handle many of the situations they encounter. They are granted this discretion because of the complexities of police work as no department’s policies and procedures could possibly be so detailed as to cover every situation patrol officers may encounter on the street (Goldstein, 1977). Nevertheless, while patrol officers operate with tremendous autonomy, they generally do not ignore the wishes of their supervisors. Patrol officers frequently tailor their activities to the perceived expectations of their superiors. Most officers choose to pursue actions that they believe will avoid trouble and that will bring them desired rewards from their chain of command (Brown, 1981; Van Maanen, 1983). Unfortunately, their attempts to successfully do what they think their supervisors want are fraught with uncertainty because patrol officers do not always have an accurate perception of their supervisors’ expectations (Brown, 1981; Engel & Worden, 2003; Wilson, 1968).

So how can police administrators better communicate the behavioral performance standards they expect from their officers? Perhaps the best place to start when trying to answer such a question is to ask the patrol officers themselves. The present study was an exploratory project that surveyed a small sample of patrol officers from a sheriff’s department in the Midwest. These patrol officers were asked to rate the effectiveness of several potential means of communicating expectations that could be used by supervisors on their department. It was hoped that this survey would provide insight into how patrol officers perceive that departmental expectations and goals could effectively be conveyed.

Problems Related to Communicating Expectations

Why is communicating an agency’s goals and expected performance standards difficult in law enforcement agencies? Almost all law enforcement agencies have extensive policy and procedural manuals with hundreds of pages of written rules about what is expected of officers. Most police agencies also have regular face-to-face communication sessions between supervisors and patrol officers in the form of roll call shift briefings, squad meetings, and inservice training. Yet, somehow, patrol officers frequently do not have a completely accurate grasp on what their supervisors truly want or expect.

Studying officers and field supervisors in the police departments of Indianapolis, Indiana, and St. Petersburg, Florida, Engel and Worden (2003) evaluated how well patrol officers understood what work activities their immediate supervisors held
as priorities. They found that in both departments studied, the activities that the field supervisors listed as priorities were not the same items that their subordinates listed as the priorities they thought their supervisors wanted addressed. Regardless of department, precinct, or shift, almost all of the patrol officers in that study were completely inaccurate in guessing the priorities valued by their immediate supervisors, much less the priorities held by the higher-level commanders. This empirical finding supported earlier qualitative research observations. Brown (1981) and Wilson (1968) both observed that most officers were doing their best to try to decipher the true expectations and goals of their supervisors, but interviews with their supervisors revealed that they were often unsuccessful in doing so.

Sometimes the communication breakdown may be the result of a police supervisor who is a poor communicator or is indecisive, changing his or her mind frequently. In most cases, however, the communication difficulties arise because of the nature of the goals and expectations involved in law enforcement. These goals and expectations are often vague and contradictory (Engel & Worden, 2003; Lipsky, 1980). The mission and goals of the law enforcement agency, especially with respect to the patrol officer, are often ambiguous. For example, patrol officers are directed to enforce the criminal and traffic laws, but, of course, it is impossible (and impractical) for an officer to enforce all of the laws all of the time. If an officer attempted to enforce all of the laws, he or she wouldn’t get very far from the station house after roll call as traffic violations alone would keep the officer continuously busy from the moment he or she pulls out onto the street.

When police administrators state that they expect patrol officers to enforce the law, they are usually also implying that they expect officers to exercise common sense in deciding which laws should be enforced at any given time. They imply that some law violations have a higher priority than others (such as running a stop sign at a busy intersection being more serious than having a license plate light out) and that enforcement of the law must also be balanced with the need to be available to handle calls for service (Wilson, 1968). Unfortunately, many police supervisors expect patrol officers to understand their implied expectations as just “common sense.” The fact that police administrators encounter patrol officers who do not meet their expectations suggests that this common sense may not be as common as they would have hoped.

Another factor complicating the communication of expectations to patrol officers is the contradictory nature of many of the directives they receive. For example, patrol officers are given missions such as the prevention of crime. At the same time they are also expected to meet the equally ambiguous and contradictory goals of fostering community support for the police and protecting civil liberties. Aggressive patrolling by stopping and questioning citizens in high crime hot spot locations has been found to reduce and prevent crime (Sherman & Rogan, 1995); however, it may also result in the alienation of the citizens who reside in these hot spot areas (Anderson, 1990). Inevitably, patrol officers will fashion their own solutions to achieve (at least in their minds) a resolution to the ambiguous and conflicting expectations they are given. Unfortunately, their solutions to these problems may not necessarily be consistent with the expectations of the chief executives of their agency (Lipsky, 1980).
Furthermore, the structure of police organizations requires that the expectations of the chief executive be subjected to interpretation by field supervisors (Brown, 1981). Even if the directives and goals assigned to patrol officers weren’t ambiguous or contradictory, they would still suffer from the fact that they rely upon a chain of command in order to be communicated effectively and upheld. The police chief or sheriff, through his or her actions, policies, and official statements, may set the tone for the department, but the chief’s agenda always must pass through the filter of the chain of command before reaching the patrol officers. The responsibility for communicating and interpreting the chief’s agenda rests with the sergeants and lieutenants in the field (Brown, 1981; Engel & Worden, 2003; Wilson, 1968). It is their interpretation of the department rules and policies that determines how accurately they are communicated and how stringently these policies are applied. There may be little consistency across supervisors about how these expectations are interpreted, causing confusion among the line staff as they try to interpret what it is they are expected to be doing and how they are to be doing it.

Unfortunately, there is little research on how to overcome these issues and effectively communicate performance goals and expectations to officers. In March 2004, and again in March 2008, the author conducted searches of the Sociological Abstracts, Criminal Justice Abstracts, and the National Criminal Justice Reference Service databases in an attempt to locate empirical studies discussing the effective communication of goals and expectations to subordinates within a criminal justice agency environment. No such studies were found through any of these searches. The present study therefore is an early exploratory investigation into patrol officer perceptions about how supervisors can best communicate agency performance goals and expectations.

**Methods**

The present study involved a brief survey that was administered in May 2004 to a sample of patrol officers with a sheriff’s department in a predominantly suburban county in southwestern Ohio. A survey questionnaire was constructed that asked officers to rank the effectiveness of five methods supervisors could use to communicate agency performance goals and expectations. These five methods included written directives, verbal feedback, supervisory modeling of expected behavior, rewarding proper performance, and punishing improper performance. The respondents were asked to rank the perceived effectiveness of each method using a scale from one to ten, with one indicating the method was totally ineffective and ten indicating that the method was extremely effective. The questionnaire also asked the respondents a question about how they would handle a call if they encountered a new situation with which they were unfamiliar. The respondents were given four response choices from which to answer.

The researcher was permitted to attend the roll call briefing sessions of all three shifts for the department to distribute the survey questionnaire. Roll call sessions for the same shifts were also attended multiple times on different calendar days so that the researcher could survey officers who had been sick or on days off when the first visit was made. The researcher explained the purpose of the survey to the officers and distributed the survey to all of the officers present. The officers were informed that their participation was voluntary and that their individual responses would not be shared with any member of their department. They were also
directed to return their completed questionnaires directly to the researcher, who remained present in the briefing room while they completed their questionnaires. The response rate for the officers in attendance at these roll call sessions was 100% as no officer declined to participate. This unusually high response rate may suggest the importance this topic holds among patrol officers.

The total sample included 64 deputy sheriffs who were assigned to the duty position of patrol officer. This sample was approximately 91% male (n = 58) and ranged in age from 21 to 51 years old, with a mean of 33 years of age. The respondents’ police experience ranged from one to twenty years, with a mean of six years of full-time sworn officer experience. The highest education level attained was a high school diploma for 37% of the sample, an associate’s degree for another 33%, and a bachelor’s degree for the remaining 30%.

Findings
In the survey questionnaire, the respondents were asked to respond to the following question: If you were faced with a new situation that you were unsure about how to handle, in which of the following ways would you be most likely to handle the situation? Table 1 reveals the four responses that the officers had to choose from in answering this question. The purpose of this question was to begin to identify how patrol officers cope with situations not clearly covered by their rules, regulations, or training.

As can be seen in Table 1, the majority of the respondents indicated that they would try to handle the situation the way they would expect their immediate supervisor would handle the situation. This does not mean, however, that the officers truly know how their supervisors would handle such situations, but it does suggest that the majority of the respondents desired to handle the situation in a manner that they think their supervisor would find appropriate. Table 1 also reveals that while approximately one-third of the respondents indicated that they would try to handle the situation the way they thought their peers would handle it, only three respondents would try to handle the situation based solely on their own ideas. This finding suggested that the majority of patrol officers want to appease their supervisors when doing their job. Furthermore, while most would try to model the behavior of their supervisor and some looked to peers for precedent in how best to handle unique situations, few officers desired to take the initiative to embark into uncharted territory and develop a unique response on their own.

Table 1. Responses to the Question Regarding How to Handle Ambiguous Situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If you were faced with a new situation that you were unsure about how to handle, in which of the following ways would you be most likely to handle the situation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Make up a new solution to the situation on my own.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handle the situation like I think most of my fellow officers would.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handle the situation like I think my supervisor would.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The next section of the questionnaire asked the respondents to rate, on a scale from one to ten, their perceptions about the effectiveness of five different methods supervisors may use to communicate performance goals and expectations to patrol officers. The survey instrument instructed the respondents that a score of one on the scale indicated that the method was totally ineffective at communicating performance goals and expectations, while a score of ten indicated that the method was extremely effective. Table 2 summarizes the results of these rankings.

The raw means displayed in Table 2 indicate that rewarding appropriate job performance was ranked as the most effective method, followed in order of importance by providing verbal feedback, supervisor modeling, written rules and directives, and punishing unsatisfactory performance. As can be seen by the minimum and maximum scores for each communication method and their standard deviations, great variation existed across respondents within each method. Therefore, a single sample t-test was conducted for each method, using the combined mean score of all of the other methods as a reference group, to determine if the differences in the mean of each method were statistically significantly different given the small sample size. The results indicate that the scoring for rewarding appropriate performance was significantly higher than that of the other methods and the scoring for punishing unsatisfactory performance was significantly lower than that of the other methods. The scores of the three remaining methods (verbal feedback, supervisor modeling, and written rules and directives) were not significantly different from each other.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>t-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rewarding appropriate performance</td>
<td>7.89 (2.09)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.075***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing verbal feedback</td>
<td>7.19 (1.85)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor modeling</td>
<td>7.09 (2.29)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Written rules and directives</td>
<td>7.06 (1.14)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishing inappropriate performance</td>
<td>4.91 (1.79)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-10.743***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance level: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

This suggests that the respondents perceived rewarding them for proper behavior was the most effective method supervisors could use for communicating proper performance expectations. Providing verbal feedback, having supervisors model correct behavior, and creating written rules and regulations were also highly and similarly ranked in their effectiveness for communicating proper performance, though they ranked lower in effectiveness than rewards. Finally, punishing officers for inappropriate performance was ranked lowest, and it could be argued that the respondents perceived this method as generally ineffective at communicating performance expectations as its mean score was less than five on a scale from one to ten.

Next, the demographic characteristics of the officers, such as their age, sex, education, and experience, were analyzed in relation to each officer’s responses to the communication methods. Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, the score on each communication method was regressed on these four officer demographic characteristics. The results of these analyses are displayed in Table 3.
As can be seen in the table, all of the officers were fairly similar in their support for rewarding proper performance as the most effective way to communicate performance expectations. The low $R^2$ value of 0.119 suggests that these officer characteristics do little to explain differences between officers in their responses. Only officer experience was statistically significant as officers with more experience were slightly more likely than less experienced officers to support the use of rewards for communicating performance expectations.

Officer characteristics did make a difference, however, in officer support for the use of verbal feedback to communicate expectations. Officers with a four-year college degree were more likely to favor the use of verbal feedback than were less educated officers. Furthermore, officers who were older and had more experience were less supportive of the use of verbal feedback than were younger officers and officers with less experience. Supervisor modeling was similarly appreciated by all the respondents for its ability to communicate performance expectations, but the use of written rules and policies was valued more by officers with a college degree than by officers with less education.

Table 3. OLS Regression of Responses by Officer Demographic Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer Demographics</th>
<th>Rewards Beta</th>
<th>Verbal Feedback Beta</th>
<th>Supervisor Modeling Beta</th>
<th>Written Directives Beta</th>
<th>Punishments Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>-0.540***</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.621***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>-0.186</td>
<td>-0.289*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>0.357*</td>
<td>-0.395**</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.138</td>
<td>0.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA/BS degree</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.227*</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
<td>0.780***</td>
<td>0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model $R^2$ value</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>0.345</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance level: *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

While all of the respondents rated the punishment of poor performance low in effectiveness for communicating performance expectations, there was some significant variation by officer characteristics. While all respondents gave punishments a low score, older officers scored this method higher than did younger officers, suggesting older officers saw more utility in punishments than did younger officers. There was also a significant difference regarding officer sex. The female officers in the sample tended to rate the effectiveness of punishments to communicate expectations lower than did the male officers.

Discussion

Several key results were revealed by this initial exploratory study. First, the findings suggested that patrol officers try to conform to agency expectations in their behaviors by imitating their supervisors or fellow officers, and most prefer to avoid being personally creative in their responses to problems. The majority try to emulate the behaviors of their supervisors if they are unsure how to handle a situation. This suggested that, for whatever reason, most patrol officers do not wish their behavior to deviate from the expectations of management or their peers. This finding continues to support the previous literature which claimed that most officers choose to pursue actions that they believe will avoid trouble and bring
them desired rewards from their chain of command (Brown, 1981; Van Maanen, 1983; Wilson, 1968).

Second, the findings suggested the importance of rewarding officers for good behavior. Previous studies that have looked at individual officer differences in productivity for traffic citations (Johnson, 2006), drunk driver arrests (Johnson, 2006; Mastrofski, Ritti, & Snipes, 1994), and domestic violence arrests (Johnson, 2007) have revealed that rewards were a very significant predictor of officer behavior. The previous literature suggests that if officers perceived that they would be rewarded (either formally or informally) for a specific behavior, they were very likely to perform that behavior, provided that they also had the capability and opportunity to do it (Mastrofski et al., 1994). The findings here continued to support this position and lend an explanation for the power of rewards. Apparently rewards are seen by patrol officers as a way through which they can decipher what is expected of them. The activities and behaviors that bring rewards appear to be the right things to do. Those that do not bring rewards are not perceived of as important.

Exactly which rewards are important remain to be studied and determined. Whetstone (2001) and Van Maanen (1985) found that promotion was only viewed as a reward by a small number of patrol officers. Most officers strongly indicated that they had no desire to be promoted to sergeant. Other less formal rewards have been suggested to have an influence on patrol officer behavior. Van Maanen (1983) found that patrol sergeants shaped officer behavior through granting such informal rewards as requests to use a vacation day or compensatory time, requests for overtime pay, requests to work a particular beat, or requests to work (or not work) with a specific partner. Moskos (2008) also suggested that overtime pay for processing arrests or attending court was an incentive that influenced officer behavior. Nevertheless, little is known about which specific rewards drive officer behavior. More research is clearly needed in this area. Third, the findings suggested the utility of verbal praise, supervisor modeling, and written rules and regulations. Although ranked less important than rewarding good performance, these methods of communicating performance expectations were still ranked high in overall importance. Verbal praise by supervisors when they observe appropriate work performance appears to be an important method for reinforcing appropriate conduct. Unfortunately, verbal praise tends to be underutilized in law enforcement organizations (Gove, 2005). Supervisor modeling of expected behavior also appears to be an important way of letting patrol officers know how to conduct themselves. This finding also agrees with the previous literature on the influence of police supervisors on patrol officers.

Engel (2000) found that patrol officers looked to their field supervisors for concrete examples of how to perform their jobs, especially in the area of use of force. Johnson (2006) found that when a field supervisor issues traffic citations or makes drunk driver arrests, the number of citations and drunk driver arrests issued by the supervisor’s subordinates increase exponentially. Patrol officers look to their patrol supervisors and engage in whatever behaviors they see their supervisors doing. The findings in the present study suggest that when patrol officers are doing this they are attempting to decipher what performance expectations their supervisors hold by their behavior, and then they try to meet these expectations themselves.
The findings here continued to support the importance of written rules and policies in the law enforcement organization. Having extensive written rules and policies has been shown to increase the odds that a law enforcement agency can win the lawsuits brought against it (Gallagher, 1990) and can reduce the overall likelihood of lawsuits being filed in the first place (Worrall, 1998). Written rules and policies can also reduce the degree of liability on police administrators if an officer’s misbehavior clearly violates an explicitly written department policy (Cordner, 1989). The findings of the present study add one more benefit to written rules and policies in that they help patrol officers interpret what are proper performance expectations. Therefore, it is important that mixed messages be avoided. Compliance with written rules and regulations should be rewarded (at least informally or with verbal praise), and field supervisors should take care to model appropriate behavior by adhering to every rule and policy with their own conduct.

Fourth, the findings suggested the ineffectiveness of using punishments to communicate expectations. The primary purpose of punishments in the criminal justice system is retribution for an offender’s misdeeds. The criminological evidence suggests that the deterrence value of the punishments given out by the criminal justice system is small (Stafford & Warr, 1993). Most offenders are not deterred by the punishments given to others (general deterrence). The recidivism rate of offenders in the U.S. clearly illustrates that most offenders are not deterred by the punishments they receive either. The same may be true for punishments within the law enforcement organization. While administrative discipline may serve the necessary purpose of retribution against those officers who have violated department policies, and justice for the community, it does not appear to be an effective method for communicating performance expectations.

Finally, the findings suggested only minor differences existed between officers in their attitudes about the effective communication of performance expectations. Older and more experienced officers were somewhat more supportive of the use of rewards and less supportive of verbal feedback than were younger and less experienced officers; officers with a four-year college degree were more supportive of verbal feedback and written rules and policies than were less educated officers; and female officers were less supportive of punishments than were male officers. Yet, these differences were all minor as, by and large, most of the officers held similar perceptions about the usefulness of these methods in communicating performance expectation.

Conclusion

Patrol officers frequently tailor their activities to the perceived expectations of their superiors (Brown, 1981; Van Maanen, 1983). Unfortunately, patrol officers frequently do not have an accurate perception of their supervisors’ expectations (Brown, 1981; Engel & Worden, 2003; Wilson, 1968). The present study was an exploratory survey of patrol officers to rate the effectiveness of several potential means of communicating expectations that could be used by police supervisors to ensure that their subordinates know what is expected of them. It was hoped that this survey would provide insight into how department expectations and goals could effectively be conveyed.
The findings suggested that rewarding good behavior is perceived as the best way to communicate what is expected of patrol officers. Verbal feedback, supervisor modeling, and written rules and policies are also perceived as effective methods for communicating what is expected. It is important to note, however, that this was only an exploratory study with a small sample of officers from only one department. This survey also did not permit the author to actually test whether these methods truly do communicate expectations well. Further study, especially with larger samples, is needed on this topic. Nevertheless, the findings do offer police administrators some initial information on the perceived effectiveness of communicating performance expectations to patrol officers.

References


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Change in Police Organizations: Stimuli and Sustainability Efforts

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Introduction

Not all change is improvement but all improvement is change. –Donald Berwick

Organizations, like humans, face change. As organizations, law enforcement agencies around the world face the prospect of change. Indeed, they have changed greatly throughout their history from the first vesting of the policing function in clans in Europe to the modern incarnation of a civilian vocational police (Klockars, 1985). The current global climate indicates that police will likely be forced to change substantially in the future. Certainly, globalization and the penetration of technology into many aspects of life have increased the flow of goods, services, and information around the world. Criminality has taken advantage of these new currents, and law enforcement has been forced to respond. Moreover, the technology employed in policing has clearly changed substantially across time. Policing has become an increasingly technically dependent process due to the need to function in increasingly complex and mobile societies. The forces of globalization and technical innovation appear to be long-lasting cultural influences. As a result, police organizations can expect to experience substantial pressures to change in the future. This paper will first explore the general research on organizational change. Next, the general sources of change stimuli will be examined. Examples of change stimuli facing police organizations in the near future are provided. Last, several methods for institutionalizing change effort in police organizations will be explored.

Research on Police Innovation

When we speak of organizational change, we are specifically concerned with the organizational innovations that are put into practice. According to Damapour (1987), “innovation does not occur when a new idea is generated, but rather when a new idea is put into use” (p. 676). Some organizational structural characteristics have been examined in relationship to organizational change. King’s (1998) literature review notes that “specialization, functional differentiation, and administrative intensity” (p. 18) have been positively associated with organizational innovativeness. Similarly associated with organizational innovativeness are the variables of an organization’s technical knowledge and its external communication, which are hypothesized to facilitate innovation. Factors thought to be negatively associated with innovation include vertical differentiation, centralization of decisionmaking, and formalization. Interestingly, organizational size is thought to foster innovation because large organizations must change to survive or because change is more economically feasible due to economies of scale. Organizations with substantial
resources are also thought to be more innovative. Simply stated, extra resources allow experimentation with new ideas and equipment.

Variables associated with the nature of organizational leadership are also thought to have an impact on innovativeness. Longer job tenure for managers is thought to allow the opportunities for innovations to occur. Managers with higher education levels are thought to be more open to change. Additionally, a manager’s investment in professional information and participation with professional organizations is thought to aid in change (King, 1998). With regard to environmental variables, there is some support for the proposition that increased “environmental heterogeneity and complexity lead to increased innovation in public service organizations” (p. 28).

With regard to the spread of change across police departments, Monkkonen (1981) found that innovation occurred in large organizations and then spread to smaller departments. Weiss (1992) noted that the presence of communication channels between police departments in the United States aided in the adoption of innovations, and the size of police organizations was found to relate to early adoption of innovation (Mullen, 1996). Guyot (1991) found that a police chief’s position regarding innovation is an important variable in the adoption of change for his or her organization. She also concluded that strong unions and civil service are negatively related to innovation. Skolnick and Bayley (1986) have concluded that the police chief and decentralization are critical elements in innovation for police departments. A last variable that may affect a police department’s innovative posture concerns the divide between a department’s managerial culture and its line officer culture. Ruess-Ianni (1983) noted that there might be a general cultural divide in departments between managers and line officers. Buerger (1993) has extrapolated this idea to posit that certain innovations will be more acceptable to line officers than other forms of innovations. Specifically, those innovations that are directly related to their law enforcement function and effectiveness will be more readily accepted.

While the above research focused on organizational variables, some theorists focused on the idea of change itself. Lewin (1951) introduced a mode of change that reinforces its process orientation. His model consists of three stages. The first stage of the model requires that the status quo be unfrozen. In this phase, forces that reinforce and direct employees to the status quo must be reduced. In the second stage, called movement, the organization must be brought to a new status quo or equilibrium. Refreezing is the third stage in the change process. Here the changes are locked into the organizational culture. Without a refreezing or internalization stage, members may well revert to their previous ways.

**Change Stimuli**

The factors that shape the development and implementation of the “character and nature” of law enforcement within a society are numerous and complex. In analyses of change, the principle that open systems “exchange signals through a boundary with their environment gives rise to the concept of inputs to a system that stimulate and motivate change—these may be termed ‘change stimuli’” (Hart, 1996, p. 202). Kast and Rosenzweig (1981, as cited in Pagon, 1996) described such “stimuli” as arising from multiple origins: (1) environmental, (2) technical, (3) structural, (4) psychological, (5) managerial, and (6) goals and values. As with most social phenomenon, these sources are not mutually exclusive but, instead, are best
conceptualized as categorical groupings of stimuli with overlapping and mingled boundaries. While it is generally only possible to segregate the origin of these sources conceptually, the various forms of change stimuli may arise from sources both internal and external to the organization. The environmental, managerial, and goals and values stimuli will be examined in the following sections.

**Environmental Stimuli**

Police agencies are open systems. As such, they are influenced by a variety of environmental stimuli. One powerful influence over police agencies is the nature of the political system in which they operate. Many forms of policing may be compatible with democracy, and there are “real-world” examples of police agencies with “non-democratic characteristics” flourishing within democratic societies (Bayley, 1997). However, it is hard to believe that policing based on democratic principles could exist outside of a democratic society. The legitimation of police as the authority to maintain public order and social control comes from the state. The basic principles of the state define the mechanisms through which this legitimation is translated into specific roles, responsibilities, policies, and practices within policing. While the standards of a democratic state may be minimized or even ignored within the process of defining the strategies and practices that follow from the legitimation of police within a society, it is difficult to imagine that the tenets of a totalitarian state would be lessened and so permit the evolution of a democratic model of policing.

A democratic state sets into motion the development of expectations and responsibilities of civilians, which are based upon the core values of civilians’ relationship to the state. These expectations of civilians translate into responsibilities on the part of the police and contribute to the formulation of policies and practices within the police organization. The public must have expectations consistent with democratic police practices to move the organization to implement changes consistent with these values. The responsibilities of civilians that must be accepted if a democratic model of policing is to be institutionalized relate to cooperation, shared interests and values in achieving public order, and social control in partnership with the police. Recent international changes have resulted in the democratization of numerous nations and have set into motion social trends that require greater police and public cooperation, shared vigilance, and partnership initiatives. Thus, a major environmental force for police innovation will be the spread of democracy.

External environmental economic factors may also function as a strong impetus for promoting change in policing. Globalization has enhanced the interconnectedness of individuals and of nation-states. This movement has expanded flows of information, technology, money, goods, services, and people throughout the world. These flows create a wide variety of outcomes in societies around the planet. Many of these outcomes require intervention by government actors, who are frequently the police.

Globalization has also increased international scrutiny of the actions of nations relative to basic human and civil rights. The police have become, in many instances, a central focus in this scrutiny. Additionally, adherence to specified standards related to human and civil rights, with police practices as a major emphasis, has been made a requirement for membership in significant political alliances such as the European Union (EU). The aspiration for membership in the EU and the social, political, and economic benefits it can bring has prompted the adoption of
a democratic model of policing in more than one country in Central and Eastern Europe. In effect, globalization has created new challenges for police forces around the world and has subjected them to new standards of conduct and scrutiny.

One result of globalization is an increased flow in labor markets. An influx of foreign workers provides a substantial environmental impetus for police change. To be sure, there have been substantial migrations in history. It may be, though, that the speed and diversity of migrations in combination with falling birthrates in some areas have created a unique phenomenon. Today’s workers may be persons seeking asylum and/or economic migrants looking for better opportunities. Moreover, within these groups, persons may resist or refuse assimilation to their new country (Hujer & Steinvorth, 2007). Economic growth, global markets, and a shortage of skilled labor have resulted in a strong desire on the part of many Western European nations to import skilled labor from other parts of the world. France, The Netherlands, and Germany have all attempted to entice a greater number of skilled workers to their respective countries (Sauga, 2007). Due to these forces and changes, evidence indicates that skilled workers are moving to find better economic conditions. Slovakia has experienced a substantial drain of skilled and trained professionals since entering the EU. Many skilled laborers have left Eastern Europe for Western European economic opportunities. The migration of skilled labor includes healthcare workers, architects, engineers, and technology experts. Ireland has experienced a substantial increase in Western European workers (63,276 Poles permanently living in Ireland, up from 2,124 in the previous census [Quinn, 2007]). Feeling the drain on their intellectual capital, some Eastern European countries have attempted to recruit replacement skilled workers from other nations around the world. The logical outcome of this migration and reaction is a substantial increase of multiculturalism in nations all across Europe (Dempsey, 2007b).

Illegal economic immigration also has salience around the globe. It is estimated that 500,000 illegal immigrants come to the EU each year (Arie, 2004). While politicians from the United States to Italy struggle to deal with the policies surrounding illegal immigrants, law enforcement organizations are frequently charged with addressing the issue. The actions of one nation can have substantial impact on other nations as illegal immigrants move to a wide variety of cities after a substantial initial relocation. For example, Italy, with 1,500 miles of coastline, has seen a substantial influx of immigrants. As a result, Italy has inherited a heightened role as gatekeeper for illegal immigration to the rest of the European mainland. The Italian response to this influx has substantial repercussions for many sister European countries. This reality acts as an environmental stimulus for interagency cooperation. Governments and police agencies for nations removed from immigration hubs would be wise to aid and support the efforts of these border nations.

What this influx means for the police function in a particular locale is unknown, but it is likely they will face substantial challenges as these new populations encounter their new host cultures. The influx of these people brings with it a wide variety of experiences, perspectives, and concerns regarding government and policing. Moreover, their integration can be hampered by prejudice and fear in their new communities. In those areas experiencing an increase in multiculturalism, police departments may face a substantial increase in the “native” population’s fear of crime. Current residents may see the new dangerous class of people as responsible for crime in their neighborhoods. In response, departments may be asked to
improve their ability to measure crime and to educate their current populations on their fear of crime and risk of victimization (Ewald & Feltes, 2003).

Multicultural communities may also suffer from hate crimes or xenophobic crimes. Agents of formal social control may be asked to respond to these crimes with legal and policy initiatives. A recent report indicated a general trend of increased racism in Europe toward certain populations (Roma, Jews, immigrants) and noted that violent racist attacks were on the rise in Germany (Kubosova, 2007; Surmeli, 2007). Police organizations will be placed in a position that will require dealing with these conflicts and concerns. They will have to provide feedback for appropriate behavior for newcomers and mediate conflicts. In short, police organizations may have to increase their ability to respond to a diverse population, maintain order, and socialize new residents.

The experience of police in Canada may prove instructive. Canada has long been a multicultural society. As a result, the police in Canada have experienced issues related to substantial immigration and diversification of its population in many urban areas. The result of this experience has led to policy responses advocated by or thrust upon the Canadian police, including the following:

- Diversification of police organizations
- Training of police officers in cultural sensitivity
- Increased and better communication between the police and the minority communities
- Organizational policy responses creating and enforcing antidiscrimination policies by police departments
- An examination of current and future policing organizational practices that could foster or allow a systematic negative impact on minority community members
- Greater representation of minorities in police management and governance (Stenning, 2003)

Police organizations facing an increasingly diverse parent community may be asked to adopt one or all of the above responses to changes in their communities. In short, they will likely be asked to change some or many aspects of their organization. In attempting this change, departments should review the research evaluating these various programs and focus on the process of planned change and implementation.

Population demographics regarding the age of policed populations will also influence policing in the future. Law enforcement agencies must build new capacities to forecast crime trends and generate creative responses. For example, a population with a substantial amount of young high-rate offenders or a large demographic of older, retired citizens has substantial implications for the number of likely offenders as well as potential suitable targets for crime. Some European countries face a large aging population demographic. For some nations, the shift in the labor market also exacerbates the aging population problem. A combination of skilled workers moving for higher wages and an overall falling population result in an increase in average age for many countries in the region. By the year 2025, more than one-fifth of the population in Eastern Europe will be 65 or older. The countries of the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia will likely have a 60% increase in citizens over the age of 65 (Dempsey, 2007a). The aged population will have both a direct and indirect impact upon police agencies. As noted above, population demographics will impact crime and victimization. In addition, older populations will draw substantial amounts
of government funding for pension and healthcare needs. This draw may reduce the available resources for police expenses. Managers may have to deal with years of flat budgets and the resulting impacts upon all areas of an agency’s operations. Indeed, police executives may have to demonstrate empirically why current or future efforts should be funded from a shrinking resource pool.

Technical Stimuli

Another potent force for change within organizations involves the impact of new technology. Few would dispute the import of technology on daily life in the developed world. Globalization has begun to allow technology to permeate less developed nations. Moreover, the pace of technological innovations does not appear to be slowing. Crimes committed electronically demonstrate an area where technology, globalization, and law enforcement intersect.

So-called cyber crime is a worldwide phenomenon that involves computer-related criminality. Computers and networks are frequently attacked around the globe. These crimes present powerful opportunities for criminals, organized crime, and hostile groups or governments. The nature of the Internet removes geographical and physical constraints. Innovations like satellite phones and battery power have made traditional requirements like the connection to a phone line or power grid superfluous. Moreover, due to the connectivity of networks, there exists potential access to most Internet-linked information anywhere in the world. Any individual, business, or state connected to the World Wide Web incurs this risk. In this connected world, criminal threats are diverse, dispersed, and ambiguous (Rho, 2007). The spread of this computer technology will increase the risks of cyber crime. As criminals avail themselves of new technology in their misdeeds, police will have to adapt using innovations of their own.

Effectively responding to cyber crime and the impact of diffuse technology will require substantial change for police organizations around the globe. First, police organizations must ensure that they have the current and relevant technical abilities. The creation of this capacity will require a substantial paradigm shift for police agencies. The pace of computer innovation, its increasing complexity, and the scope of its application to critical areas may force police organizations to abandon efforts to cultivate substantial in-house abilities (Jackson, 2007). If the pace of innovation increases, law enforcement will have to outsource technological abilities to vetted service providers (Williams, 2001). Recently, the National Aviation and Space Administration (NASA) outsourced much of the support for its use of supercomputers (Marshall, 2007). Private providers will be better, cheaper, and faster in adaptability than police agencies. As a result, governments and law enforcement agencies will likely serve a constructive leadership role in technological security but will have to rely on private industry to perform and research issues at the technical level (Jackson, 2007). This leadership role will require agencies to be open to true information-sharing with private and academic partners.

Law enforcement agencies will also have to ensure the intelligent use of technology. That is, the adoption of technology must be driven by a careful process wherein products and services are honestly evaluated relative to both organizational needs and the products’ or services’ impact upon those needs. This will undoubtedly require a substantial cultural change for some agencies. Products and services will
have to be rigorously evaluated on their return on investment. In-house evaluation capabilities will have to be cultivated or evaluations outsourced to evaluation specialists. The smart use of technology by police organizations will require police leaders to guard against a flood of information and technology that threatens to wash over employees and the organization. So-called data smog, which results from substantial interconnectedness of employees to the world and the resulting massive information flow, can cloud individual and organizational decisionmaking (Shenk, 2007). Managers will likely have to structure the work environment so that information is sifted for relevance and workers’ decisionmaking is protected from information overload.¹

Second, the influence of technology will likely occur in a dynamic and diffuse legal environment (Rho, 2007). Legal rules often lag behind social trends. Police agencies will have to adopt a flexible posture for evidence collection and retention. Moreover, agencies will likely have to engage in continuing education of investigators regarding relevant legal and evidentiary issues and prepare officers for the frustration created by a dynamic playing field (Williams, 2001).

Third, organizations of formal social control must also understand that diffuse technology and cyber crime are a threat to their organizations and to their parent government. Police organizations are repositories for a vast amount of personal data. They also often house criminal intelligence and offender information. Potentially, this data has value to a variety of people. For example, such information could be stolen and sold for a variety of purposes or manipulated for some future benefit.² These cyber concerns may be less acute than direct physical threats, but law enforcement is wise to consider their potential.³

Fourth, cooperation within a country’s law enforcement community, as well as international cooperation, will be critical to dealing successfully with the crimes associated with technology. These crimes are not bound by normal physical requirements, and they may originate in any jurisdiction. The investigation and prosecution of cyber crimes (as well as other crimes like terrorism) will require real information-sharing and partnerships with law enforcement organizations around the world.⁴ More than lip service to information-sharing must occur. This will be true even for nations that are progressive and successful in dealing with cyber crime within their borders. Due to the diverse nature of this type of crime, diligent countries may still face hostile acts from elsewhere.

In addition to true cooperation and information-sharing, law enforcement agencies will need a clear understanding of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. They will also have a substantial advisory role when their parent nation-states seek to address this issue in current or future agreements. Cooperation with other law enforcement agencies will be critical to the creation of an open path for investigations. It may be that police organizations will have to task certain employees to be liaisons to specific external agencies. Moreover, this external cooperation will not be limited to only organizations engaged in the competitive enterprise of crime fighting. Police organizations, due to privatization, are increasingly likely to need the cooperation of external business entities and nongovernment organizations. This will require a sensitivity toward profit business models and the constraints of the free market.
Successful efforts to address cyber crime and other complex criminal issues will require technical abilities, complex legal knowledge, and an aware population. Partnerships between law enforcement, business, and citizens will be needed to create real solutions to these future criminal threats. True partnerships will require cooperation from all parties. Building a police organization’s capacity to cooperate will take time, but such an organizational capacity will allow new levels of interorganizational life to develop.

Law enforcement agencies would be wise to cultivate an understanding of their potential partners in their attempts to create trusted relationships. In short, effective responses to technological criminological issues (and many others) will require a substantially more permeable law enforcement organization, one with an understanding of other organizations. Simple acceptance of other law enforcement agencies will not suffice; rather, a real understanding, acceptance, and cooperation with a variety of business and civic interests, civilians, and contractors will be necessary to generate solutions to crime in the future.

Managerial Stimuli

Factors internal to the organization and the state also function as change stimuli. First, national leadership within the state must be willing to support and sustain initiatives proposed by law enforcement leadership. Second, leadership within the police organization itself must be willing to make a long-term commitment to organizational change and to develop and implement strategies in a deliberative and progressive manner. The strategies must incorporate members of the organization and so develop, among these members, a stake in the organizational change. As noted above, the complexity of future change will likely require true partnerships with a variety of entities. Leaders will have to ensure a permeable organization that shares information with external stakeholders. Leadership must be willing to take risks and to share authority and power in order to promote change.

One innovation police managers may use to increase their organizations’ permeability and responsiveness focuses on democratization of the police organization. Here, police managers seek to democratize both the workplace and organizational innovation. As noted above, democracy is frequently seen as a positive political model, yet this positive view is not shared by many in the managerial setting (Thomas, 2007). The idea of democracy in this organizational instance is not the macro-level political model but, rather, an organizational paradigm for problem solving. Democratizing law enforcement agencies will not be an easy task. As organizations with a rich history of top-down management and a political need for high accountability, resistance will be substantial. The increased proliferation of information technology and an influx of young workers will aid in this endeavor, however (Gardner, 2007). Managers may find that subunit membership shifts substantially based upon a specific organizational goal or mission. Cloke and Goldsmith (2007) note that in democratic organizations, “rigid boundaries can be broken down to form organic, evolving webs of association” (p. xi). Democratic organizations increase employee participation in all aspects and seek to align organizational goals with the goals of individual workers. There are substantial potential benefits for workers and organizations that become more democratic in their operation. For example, workers can expect an increase in their
satisfaction, and executives will have enhanced the organization’s ability to adapt and change in a dynamic environment (Holtzhausen, 2001).

Under a democratic model, future police leaders may have to oversee the creation, supervision, and disbandment of teams as a normal part of their management responsibility. This would logically create an organization with greater decentralization and require more coordination and cultivation skills on the part of police executives than traditional command and control skills (Weisman, 2007). Police executives in a democratic organization will also need “new management qualifications which encourage critical thinking, networking, humility and diversity” (Thomas, 2007). Democratic enforcement entities will not be as “controllable” as managers have experienced in the past. As mentioned earlier, partnerships must also be fostered with individuals and organizations external to the organization. Police leaders will be required to ameliorate past power imbalances, rivalries, and mistrust in both internal and external constituencies.

Change is facilitated if leadership is stable. The institutionalization of democratic policing within several countries in Central and Eastern Europe was impeded by the instability of leadership within the national police organization. For example, within Romania, over a five-year period during which democratization of policing was a major national goal, there were eight heads of the national police organization. In both the creation of new democratic police organizations and in the reformation of existing police agencies to a more democratic organizational culture, stable, capable leadership is necessary. Efforts to enhance police innovation must allow police executives time to implement substantial and even radical change. Thus, a delicate balance between needed managerial tenure and necessary oversight of police executives must be struck. Police leaders must be given the time and security to move their organizations. Purely political motivations should not end a leader’s tenure lest all of his or her efforts at change be lost. Moreover, if the rank and file of the agency knows their managerial staffs are likely to be replaced with the next political swing, employees may seek to simply resist innovation efforts and maintain the status quo until the next “new” administration. A democratic organization blessed with capable and stable leadership will have strong learning and change capacities for dealing with an evolving environment.

Goals and Values

As populations change, the goals and values of police organizations will likely change somewhat as well. Beliefs regarding new citizen subgroups will develop. Managers must ensure that the organization and its actors exhibit fair and balanced values. These values must be a driving factor in creating organizational goals. Moreover, agencies will be exposed to a larger array of goals and values as interconnectedness and information-sharing occur between police agencies and other entities. Police organizations likely face a diversification both in terms of the population they police as well as those who work within or for the police organization. One possible result is that police organizations may come to view themselves less monolithically. The idea of a single police culture or ethos may weaken as more external people and resources are incorporated into the daily functions of the police.
Managers will be critical to the democratization of their organization’s work process; however, the organization’s culture must adopt, promote, and institutionalize these democratic goals and values if a democratic model of operation is to be implemented and sustained. The democratic goals and values must come to be reflected in the organization’s mission, structure, policies, and practices. Leadership must acknowledge the benefits of organizational members to play a role in defining the nature and scope of strategies used by the organization. Members of the organization must come to believe that they, too, are the recipients of the “benefits” of the change to a democratic model.

Institutionalization Strategies

The adoption of any innovation involves multiple stages, which most generally may be conceived of as planning, implementation, and institutionalization. While changes may be introduced into an organization, they are not automatically permanent. Purposive attempts to undermine change, changes in personnel, changes in leadership, and stressors on the organization such as financial crises may interrupt and impede change as well as eliminate changes that have been made and prevent the implementation of further change. Unless actions are taken to institutionalize changes and to make them sustainable, change-related activities may be futile, and resources of the organization may be wasted on nonpermanent change.

Sustainability and institutionalization mean (1) changes remain over time, (2) changes remain through successive organizational “generations” of personnel, and (3) changes become part of the organizational culture and are regularized throughout both the formal and informal subsystems that exist within the organization. The strategies to accomplish institutionalization of organizational changes include treating change as a planned process, organization-wide participation and communication, change-supportive training and education, and evaluation of the impact and relevancy of new programs and paradigms.

The first way to sustain change is to treat it as a planned and purposeful process. When change is seen as a process rather than an event, the difficulties associated with change and the energies needed for change are better understood. This process view of change acts to facilitate innovation, ensures the change efforts take root, and provides a palliative for those who fear change. Any planned change effort requires considerations of the unique features of the existing police organization and the larger cultural and historical context within which it functions.

Kotter (1995) elaborates on Lewin’s (1951) change model and prescribes eight stages of change. First, executives must establish and create a sense of urgency regarding the change. Employees must be provided with the necessary understanding of why change must happen now. In the second step, managers must create a powerful coalition within the organization to facilitate the change. This requires finding skilled and motivated change agents. Ideally, this must include organizational members at all ranks but especially those in mid-level management positions. These mid-level managers are critical in that it is through them that the goals of top-level leadership are translated to subordinates within the organization.

Next, executives must develop both the guiding vision and the strategy to accomplish change. This step requires that the change have a clear direction
and substantial planning concerning its implementation. Communicating the vision to the employees of the organization is the fourth step of Kotter’s model. To encourage participation in the institutionalization of change, leadership must provide for regular communication and information-sharing related to the status of change initiatives and the benefits and rewards that follow from adopting the new model. Communication must be clear, consistent, and repetitive.

Next, executives must empower organizational action. That is, they must work to remove organizational obstacles to change. Leadership must be prepared to address both support for and resistance to the new model. Adherence to the new model must be rewarded through incentives such as promotion, increased salary, recognition, and other benefits. Similarly, noncompliance must be addressed through sanctions such as nonpromotion, retraction of benefits, limited or no salary increases, and, in severe instances of noncompliance, disciplinary actions.

In the sixth step, managers must generate short-term wins. In this step, the chief executive must show concrete accomplishments regarding the change efforts. This provides evidentiary support for the change and undermines those who are critical. Seventh, managers must consolidate the improvements associated with the change effort. This requires aligning organizational mandates (policies/procedures) or structural components in accord with the envisioned change.

Last, leaders must anchor the change into the organizational culture. To sustain the organizational changes, members of the organization must internalize the basic values and mission. The values and mission must become a part of their personal set of professional values and beliefs; they must “make it their own.” They must see support of the values and mission as beneficial and rewarding to not only the organization but to themselves as individuals. Sustainable change requires ongoing education and training for constituencies both internal and external to the organization and provides for continuity and the transfer of support for the new model through successive generations of organizational leadership and personnel as well as other partners.

The content of the training and education programs must be consistent with the mission and values of the organization. Recruit training as well as ongoing professional training for police at all ranks within the organization must be conducted. Recruit training is necessary to appropriately socialize new members of the organization. Additionally, ongoing or inservice professional training is necessary to educate current officers about the change. Without this training, those who are trained at the entry level may encounter established coworkers with a misunderstanding and resistance to the change effort. Such bi-level training establishes common understandings and expectations regarding change for all members of the organization. Sustainability also requires the cultivation of new leaders who are in accord with the vision. A cadre of new leaders socialized to the new values of the innovation will aid in freezing the vision into the organization’s culture.

Throughout the change process, concrete and honest participation by employees fosters sustained organizational change. Leadership plays a primary role in facilitating this process. Leadership must provide for the participation of members of the organization in all phases of the change process. When individuals participate in the change process, they develop a stake in accomplishing as well as in sustaining change. Substantial and real two-way communication allows
employees to fully understand the change and its impact upon them. Moreover, the executive receives feedback regarding his or her change communication efforts and can thus remedy deficiencies in the current change communication as well as ensure more effective communication for the innovation.

All change efforts must be monitored to ensure that they remain consistent with the needs and circumstances of the organization’s internal and external environments. Change efforts must also be evaluated to determine if they have provided the desired impact (i.e., efficiency, effectiveness, and appropriateness). If, after a full and fair organizational change, an initiative is found to be lacking, a new organizational adaptation or change is warranted. The outcomes of these evaluation processes must be shared with organizational consistencies and partners. Such sharing is part and parcel to a true partnership and thus sustains the organizational need for true cooperation. The sharing of this information also fosters organizational transparency, which supports the credibility of police leaders and their agencies. In short, constant evaluation of organizational actions allows the organization to learn. The sharing of this knowledge allows the organization to honestly partner with the community and other organizations in an effort to meet new challenges.

Conclusion

Police agencies have changed substantially in the past and will likely undergo more innovation as societies change. Population demographics and the increasing complexity of technology and its impact upon crime will likely require police organizations to become more open. Responding to the problems of the future may require a more democratic workplace. Such a work environment requires different managerial skills than those traditionally associated with a quasi-militaristic bureaucracy. Organizations that face change are encouraged to adopt a process model for planned change. Such a model provides a clear pathway for instituting and sustaining change.

Endnotes

1 Specialization refers to specially trained or skilled workers. Functional differentiation refers to different units within an organization based upon their function. Last, administrative intensity encompasses the strength of managerial skill and oversight.

2 For example, the creation and distribution to developing nations of laptop computers that cost around $100 (Twist, 2005).

3 Some “traditional” crimes will simply be facilitated via the Web. For example, extortion has been easily morphed into cyberextortion. Here, the traditional threat of physical harm is altered to a threat to disrupt information flow, reveal embarrassing information, or to destroy data (Williams, 2001). Other new crimes may be created due to the increase in computer use and information storage.

4 This wash of information not only threatens effectiveness and decisionmaking, but it may also threaten quality interactions between police and the citizens they serve.

5 Recently, the risk of cyber crime to a nation state was demonstrated in Estonia. For two weeks, the state websites were hit with a wave of denial of service attacks. As nation-
states move to a greater use of E-government, wherein many of a citizen’s functions can be performed over the Internet, the potential damage to nations increases (“Estonia and Russia,” 2007). While the attack likely did not threaten Estonia’s overall existence, a larger coordinated attack on public and private cyber resources could substantially harm a targeted country. Such an attack could have a direct negative impact on economic prosperity and the psyche of the general population.

6 The United States will again test its response to such an attack in a “red team” exercise in 2008. Larger tests such as this will likely involve a nation’s military, but some tests and other initiatives to prepare for cyber attacks and victimization will be the province of law enforcement organizations (Hines, 2007).

7 In the past, the New York Police Department has been criticized for a lack of information-sharing of the terrorism intelligence it has collected (Miller, 2007).

8 Several of these ideas flowed from presentations at International Association of Chiefs of Police’s 24th Executive Policing Conference in Amsterdam in 2007.

9 An example of the democratization of innovation and change can be seen in the technological private sector. Here, the proliferations of inexpensive tools and networks have allowed groups of users to create their own innovations. These groups may also take existing technologies in new and unanticipated directions (Zachary, 2007).

10 Leaders of individual law enforcement organizations with varied missions and substantial bureaucratic layers may have to guide the restructuring and breakup of large organizations. For example, some have called for the breakup of large law enforcement organizations such as the FBI into smaller component organizations better able to adapt and focus on their core mission (Yoo, 2007).

11 The recent efforts of the New York Police Department to liaison with the FBI as well as local security firms will likely become the standard form of information-sharing and partnership (Miller, 2007).

12 This may involve the use of SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats), PESTE (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, and Environmental), or SLEPT (Social, Legal, Economic, Political, and Technical) analytic techniques.

References


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Police Administration After the Millennium

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At the midpoint of the 19th century, policing witnessed a proliferation of reforms and studies by administrative theorists focusing upon the strategic management of the police department. Prominent names such as O. W. Wilson (1950), Don MacNamara (1950), and Bruce Smith (1949) each commented on and laid frameworks for the beneficial development of an ever rapidly professionalizing police service. In 1950, MacNamara published an article in *Public Administration Review* stating how the midpoint of the century seemed an appropriate time to survey the efficiency of administrative practices in American police departments. Now that we have passed into the 21st century, and a new millennium, it seems a fitting time to ask the same questions and assess the nature of changes proposed by the veritable ancestors of police administration. The purpose of this brief narrative is two-fold: first, to draw attention to the lack of conversation about current police administrative practices; and second, to attempt to reinvigorate conversations revolving around current efficient and effective police administrative practices. Highlights of some of the active debates of the early theorists will be explored first, followed by a discussion of whether the police service has achieved such reforms. Finally, some suggestions on conversations scholars and practitioners should be mutually engaging in will be proposed by posing a set of policy-related research questions.

Undoubtedly, the police administrator in the 21st century operates in a considerably more complex environment than their predecessors of the 1950s. This has resulted in useful research being performed in the areas of race and policing, use of force, gender issues, and other pertinent domains. These topical areas are crucial to the modern police administrator, yet by emphasizing these issues, it has to be asked what happened to researching and developing issues related to police strategic management? Further, how do we integrate these pieces of research into the larger system to provide frameworks for assisting police administrators in carrying out their duties?

Looking to past practices and conversations can greatly assist in the formulation of solutions for the future. Much like engaging in strategic planning, we first want to know where we have been, where we are currently at, and from that point where we would like to go. In reporting to a National Institute of Justice advisory panel, Mastrofski (2007) has reiterated the call to focus upon police organization and management to improve policing for the future. As Mastrofski noted, many of the salient administrative issues of today have been around for some time. If police administrators and researchers are engaged in dialogues similar to their predecessors, it could be argued that this is indicative that we have not been overly successful in solving these problems; the complexity of the problems has increased; or there is some combination of the two. I offer that we have not fully focused on this strategic visioning for a police administration future; rather, we have been overly concerned with attempting to adopt tactics tied to funding.
Early police administrative theorists tended to focus upon arguments surrounding the efficiency of American police departments. As Hoover (2005) notes, the genesis of police administrative theory largely begins with O. W. Wilson and his publication of *Police Administration* in 1950. Hoover also observes that this publication came at an epoch when rational administrative theory from Urwick (1937), Gulick (1937) and Fayol (1949) were at their peak. MacNamara (1950) plainly stated in his survey of police administration at mid-century that police departments were “sprawling, complex, expensive, and a confused pattern of vertical and horizontal duplication” (p. 181). These early administrative theorists did recognize that there was no consistent (or standardized) measure of what might be considered effective policing. Figure 1 summarizes some of the common themes noted by early studies in police administration.

**Figure 1. Problems Noted by Early Police Administrative Theorists**

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<th>Common Themes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Stifling civil service</td>
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<td>Lack of mechanisms to promote leadership skills in talented officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Years-in-grade/seniority provisions</td>
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<td>Lack of lateral entry system</td>
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<td>College education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decentralization</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Spanning across several levels</td>
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<td>• Duplication of services</td>
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<td>Inefficiency of small agencies</td>
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Interestingly enough, a survey among modern police administrators would probably evoke many of the same concerns. The fathers of police administration placed a great deal of emphasis on notions of solving problems to improve efficiency. Yet, currently, the lack of conversation revolving around organizational effectiveness must be noted. Efficiency is an internal measure of the department’s success; whereas, effectiveness is an external measure. Efficiency is concerned with allocating and performing tasks that the organization is expected to accomplish. It only speaks to the manner in which the tasks are carried out, not whether the tasks being performed are appropriate (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Conversely, an organization’s effectiveness is ultimately judged by those it serves. In the context of policing, the community and political structure determine how well the policing entity is carrying out its mission. With ever diminishing and constraining fiscal resources, arguments of efficiency are certainly a concern, but not at the sacrifice of organizational effectiveness.

The preoccupation with police system efficiency is a burdensome load that researchers and administrators alike must overcome. They must ask themselves whether efficient methods are achieving the organizational mission, which in a community-based policing era is contingent upon evaluation by the community. Current conversations of police administration at criminal justice conferences today still largely revolve around notions of efficiency. This is truly an artifact.
of our heritage as early police administrative theorists were products of F. W. Taylor’s (1997) scientific management revolution. Many of the issues this article discusses address arguments of efficiency, but they also delve deeper into the concepts to assist the modern police executive in relating the concepts to effectiveness. Outside of our history of police administration, there are two other reasons that we seem overly concerned with efficiency versus effectiveness. First, the rise of the New Public Management movement with its notions of “reinventing government” brought private sector models into public service in an attempt to make governmental structures lean (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993). This had a dramatic influence on public administrators who were constantly seeking to operate their organizations in a more efficient manner at the sacrifice of achieving effectiveness. Second, as Cordner and Scarborough (2007) posit, police executives are more concerned with “not getting in trouble” versus achieving organizational effectiveness. In the following discussions comparing administrative problems of the past and present, arguments revolving around the efficiency and effectiveness dichotomy will continually surface.

Civil Service

Civil service requirements were largely instituted in an effort to professionalize police services across a country that was rife with political patronage and nepotism. In many states, however, the civil service system continues to be as burdensome as it was in the 1950s. The modern police administrator is faced with growing concerns regarding officer recruitment and retention (Mastrofski, 2007; Orrick, 2008). Stringent civil service requirements mandating local residence, providing minimal testing dates, and placing barriers for lateral entry do not aid in this current administrative dilemma. It must be noted that many states have engaged in civil service reform allowing for lateral entry of officers, and many have even been able to provide substantial signing bonuses for the experienced officer. However, the lack of uniformity within civil service contributes to the challenges for police administrators operating in a local or state jurisdiction that does not allow for such incentives, which may result in a retention issue for the police administrator. Conversations and research regarding the nexus between civil service structures and officer retention are scant. Departments that lose officers to other jurisdictions that allow lateral entry face losing officers with a wealth of experience and education related to police work. Furthermore, administrators in this position must constantly seek new recruits, who, in turn, must receive training and gain experience. Not only does this create a budgetary issue for the administrator, who is now forced to back-fill the empty position while a recruit is in training, but it also perpetuates a younger, inexperienced department. For the department that has gained the lateral officer, they have conceivably gained immediate policing capacity. The yet unanswered policy questions that arise from this situation concern both efficiency and effectiveness:

- What is the influence of hiring lateral officers on policing effectiveness?
- How cost effective are lateral incentive packages in reaching a desired policing goal?

Answering these questions has the potential to have a significant impact on the administration of police departments as well as on changes in local civil service laws. If viewed from the national level, it also speaks to MacNamara’s (1950) arguments about leadership. MacNamara stated that someone entering the
police profession should look forward to a rewarding career with infinite lateral promotional possibilities instead of the prospect of being forced to remain in the same department during their entire tenure. Although relaxing civil service laws would greatly assist in this, proper leadership training is equally essential.

**Leadership**

The early administrative theorists also mentioned the lack of mechanisms to promote leadership skills among talented officers. Although it is unlikely that a centralized academy that resembles the military service academies, as advocated by Smith (1949), will ever exist under our fragmented system of policing, modern police administrators will undoubtedly like to see improvements in leadership training. This is partly evidenced by the International Association of Chiefs of Police’s (IACP) 1999 report on police leadership in the 21st century, which argued for further development and refinements of leadership curricula as well as ensuring that “every officer as a leader” programs remain of the highest concern. Yet, researchers have still not fully explored police administrators’ perceptions of leadership training. Leadership is a frequently used word in policing; yet, it remains an amorphous concept with little concrete scholarship dedicated to its relationship with policing.¹

The closest resemblance to Smith’s (1949) service academy idea was the Department of Justice’s Police Corps program, which assisted with higher education reimbursement for men and women who agreed to serve in a local or state police agency for four years after graduation. In many respects, this could be likened to the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) model supported by the Department of Defense. The primary goal of the Police Corps program was to produce highly trained officers to fill anticipated vacancies in communities, not to promote leadership skills in newly inducted individuals as is done with ROTC. Regardless, the Police Corps program is currently not operational because of a lack of funding.

Several new police executive leadership programs have been developed over the last couple of decades. Many of these programs are based out of colleges and universities and, therefore, conceivably provide the modern executive with high caliber training and education. Recently, the IACP has developed a center for police leadership that provides a structured curriculum to executive officers across the country. One thing that remains constant (unlike the military service academies and ROTC), however, is that those promoted frequently receive leadership training after their placement in the new position rather than before. In the police service, those seeking promotion to the ranks of sergeant and lieutenant typically engage in a civil service process whereby an exam is taken followed by some variant of an assessment center. The candidates are then placed on an eligibility list and promoted in a sequential manner often without any prior leadership training or skill development. This is especially problematic for officers rising to the sergeant level because one day they are serving as line officers, and the next day they are expected to serve as front line supervisors, mentors, and leaders. Two key policy questions arise out of this conversation regarding leadership training:

1. How can the academic and professional community come together to provide leadership training and education to police departments across the country?
2. What effect does receiving leadership training before promotion have upon the effectiveness of police managers and leaders?

Programs targeted at officer leadership may be beneficial, but they have been narrowly instituted and evaluated. The first step for administrators and scholars is to collectively establish local models of leadership training available to the majority of police agencies. The next step is to evaluate the effects of differing types of leadership training offered during the promotional process. Not surprisingly, the agencies that are more likely not to have a chance to participate in such training due to cost and personnel issues are the smaller agencies.

Inefficiency of Small Agencies

Early administrative theorists such as MacNamara (1950) called for the disbanding of smaller agencies because, due to their size, they were inherently inefficient. MacNamara claimed that these agencies simply did not have the resources available for efficiently carrying out the policing function. Much of this argument was based upon personnel issues, with specific mention given to the smaller agencies not being able to attract the most desirable candidates, not being able to afford the services of top administrators, not having adequate training facilities, and being forced to assign higher percentages of their officers to administrative duties. In all of these respects, there has not been a significant change in problems facing the small agency police administrator. Studies have reiterated that smaller police agencies tend to be more administratively intense than other agencies, with officers devoting a greater amount of their time to housekeeping chores as compared to their counterparts in larger agencies (Jones, 2008). This once again speaks to the differences between measuring organizations based upon efficiency rather than effectiveness.

According to the IACP, 76% of the police agencies in the Unites States have 25 or fewer officers or serve jurisdictions with populations of less than 25,000. Simply dismissing them and advocating for their disbandment is not an acceptable or realistic solution. Unlike MacNamara (1950), current researchers and practitioners must question the assertions about whether these departments are effective or not. Likely, many administrators of smaller police agencies would argue that they are effective in the service they provide the community; they just might not be doing it in an efficient manner. With the rise of the community policing paradigm, it is surprising that administrators frequently still hear about professional policing models that emphasize efficiency rather than community-based models of co-production that emphasize the effectiveness of the department. If policing has truly moved into an era of co-production with the community, should researchers not be concerned with helping administrators develop measures of policing effectiveness in their communities? Measures of efficiency (e.g., call response time, patrol coverage, citations issued, etc.) tell very little about how well a small department is serving its community. Yet, these measures remain the standard for determining a department’s success.

Assistance to smaller police agencies is improving, however. The IACP operates the smaller police department technical assistance program, which aids executives in small agencies in carrying out administrative tasks. Yet, much remains to be accomplished. One idea is to utilize the model of small business development
centers located in many colleges and universities. These development centers receive partial funding by the Small Business Administration as well as support from the affiliate academic institutions. Given the prevalence of small police departments, the idea of regional small police department development centers would be feasible and practical. The centers could operate in a similar manner by receiving funding from the Department of Justice as well as the IACP. These regional centers could serve as clearing houses of information, training, and resources for the police administrator, not to mention centers for gathering data and producing research that is more accurate and pertinent to the smaller agency. The following policy questions directed toward smaller agencies deserve further attention from research:

- Does department efficiency in smaller communities directly lead to the effectiveness of that department in the community?
- What is the impact of external assistance in the form of grants, training, and technical expertise on the operation of small police departments?

Smaller police departments, which comprise the majority of policing entities within the United States, have a great deal to gain from scholars willing to divert their attention away from the larger urban departments and assist in answering questions and alleviating the dilemmas of small police department administrators.

Early arguments for the abolition of smaller departments also spoke to the fragmented nature of policing in the United States. MacNamara (1950) and other theorists spoke of the decentralization of departments spanning across multiple levels of government and the duplication of services as somewhat ridiculous. Policing in 2008 is considerably more fragmented and specialized than in 1950. The cross-duplication of services still exists between towns, villages, counties, and their respective states. The duplication and specialization has actually increased given the proliferation of special district police such as airport and port authority, transit districts, and water conservation districts. Moreover, in many states, colleges and universities are increasingly starting their own campus police departments. There is some evidence pointing to the fact that many smaller departments are increasingly disbanding (Maguire & King, 2006), however. Two interesting policy questions arise out of this:

1. What gives rise to increasing fragmentation of police services in the U.S.?
   Under what conditions do departments arise and disband?
2. Is there a discernible effect on public safety between jurisdictions that have highly fragmented policing systems versus those that rely upon regionally consolidated policing agencies?

By addressing these questions, we can understand what factors and circumstances lead to the point of critical mass causing the death of a smaller department. In doing this, researchers can perhaps diagnose problematic areas and offer solutions that may potentially cause a government structure to retain its police department. Moreover, arguments for consolidation of police services frequently cite efficiency as a driving cause. Investigating the effectiveness of these consolidated service districts will help us provide better advice to smaller jurisdictions on the ramifications of service consolidation.
Conclusion

A historical perspective has illustrated that in many ways modern police administrators are faced with the same issues as their 1950s counterparts. Although the field of policing has become increasingly complex over the last several decades, it has not managed to escape many of these same problems. Police researchers must assist in answering some of the policy questions posed in an effort to aid modern police administrators in decisionmaking. Likewise, police administrators must assist researchers in identifying problematic issues in the administration of their departments. Moreover, police researchers must engage in attempts to integrate all of the aforementioned policy questions into a larger theory of modern police administration and practice. This paper does not in any way attempt to detract from these early pioneers as they had a part in significantly transforming police departments across the nation. As Hoover (2005) stated, a modern police executive could still take Wilson’s (1950) text on police administration and run a department rather well. American police departments still suffer in many respects from a lack of efficiency, and efficiency is certainly important to any organization. Yet, it is time to stop being mesmerized by efficiency arguments and consider the nature of department effectiveness. If we once again establish a strong community of police administrative theorists who are actively engaged in research concerning police department strategic management, these questions can surely be answered.

Endnote

1 The author does not want to detract from some of the work that has been performed on police leadership and recognizes the existence of some scholarship on the topic (e.g. Haberfield, 2006). However, the point remains that the leadership studies of policing deserve further development.

References


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The Foundation of Modern Policing

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Introduction

Our English police system . . . rests on foundations designed with the full approval of the people, we know not how many hundreds of years before the Norman conquest, and has been slowly molded by the careful hand of experience, developing as a rule along the line of least resistance, now in advance of the general intelligence of the country, now lagging far behind, but always in the long run adjusting itself to the popular temper, always consistent with local self-government, and even at its worst, always English. (Lee, 1971, p. xxvii)

This statement by Captain Lee, one of the first historians of British policing, shows his view, and that of other Whig, or orthodox, historians (see Ascoli, 1979; Critchley, 1978), that British policing developed “in relatively simple terms of progress and presupposed the emergence of a broad consensus in politics and society from the Victorian period” (Emsley, 1991, pp. 3-4).

The development of the modern police system in the United Kingdom is a much more complex event. This policing system was greatly influenced by the foundations laid down by the Normans, King Charles, Colquhoun, and others who sought to perfect the maintenance of the “King’s Peace.” This article will endeavor to describe the foundations of this police system, the Constable and Watch, and the various attempts at reform of this less than perfect system.

These attempts to coordinate and direct the activities of the officers were failures. These failures and the continued urbanization of the population led to intolerable conditions. The traditional view of the development of the new police as a response to an ever-growing crime problem and the increased disorder of the streets had yet to be taken into account. Yet, whether one explains the development and passage of the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829, enacted by Sir Robert Peel, as a reaction to spreading crime or to the spreading political disorders of the period, one of the underlying causes of its passage was the disordered system it was to replace.

By the time of the passage of the Police Act in 1829, London was policed by some 86 separate law enforcement agencies with “little or no communication or cooperation among these different officers of law enforcement; their activities often interfered with each other causing conflict, jealousy, corruption and inefficiency” (Sopenoff, 1978, p. 4). Indeed, the strongest opponents of Peel’s new police were the various parish authorities who, like the City of London authorities, were not anxious to lose their authority or prerogatives. According to one author, “It was not in the attempts at improving, regulating and supervising the traditional officers of law enforcement that reformers failed to reform the system, but in the failure of the local districts to cooperate in these changes because of their unwillingness to give up their independent authority. In the end a more radical solution was imposed on them by Parliament” (p. 13). Peel adroitly negotiated the passage of his bill and
the creation of the new, centralized police for the metropolitan area of London. This Act was to be the first in several key pieces of legislation in a process of centralization of the police in the United Kingdom. The background to the process that brought Peel to the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 has many of its beginnings in the Magistrate’s Act of 1792.

This Act was an attempt to reform and reorganize the existing system of magistrates and constables in the capital city of London. The Act provided for the appointment of seven police offices, each staffed by three stipendiary magistrates, who were paid £400 per annum. Six constables, who were also salaried, were assigned to each of these offices. Additionally, this statute authorized these constables to arrest persons on suspicion of having committed an offense. These newly created police officers were modeled on Bow Street in an attempt to both purify the system by putting the people on salary rather than fees and rewards and increase their efficiency in the maintenance of order. The Act was also an appeasement to the vested interest of the City, the financial center, and others as it made no mention of nor interfered with the affairs of the City, and it maintained the status quo of the parish-watch system.

One of the first attempts to reform the old system was the Magistrate’s Act of 1792. This was not the only significant legislation to arise from Prime Minister Pitt’s attempt to reform policing in London: “While the British Parliament had rejected the Police Act of 1785, the Irish Parliament passed the Irish Police Act rapidly in 1786” (Lentz & Chaires, 1996, p. 5). Dublin, like other rapidly growing cities in the British Empire, had experienced a jump in crime. Henry (1993) has described crime and violence in Dublin during this period as catastrophic: “Dublin . . . reported 173 homicides . . . the three Dublin courts transported 1,400 convicts to the Americas . . . a total of 46 felons were executed in Dublin, including two females who were burned at the stake. . . . Dublin had become an urban jungle before its time” (p. 167). With Pitt’s attempt at centralization of the police in London as their blueprint, the Irish Parliament moved quickly on reorganizing and centralizing the 19 different parish authorities of Dublin.

This 1786 legislation provided for Dublin to be divided into four divisions with a central police headquarters. The force would be run by three police commissioners and was to be paid for by a “police” tax to be placed on houses and tenements. The force was mustered out on September 29, 1786, and proved a rapid success: “Overnight the city was occupied by an army of uniformed men: 40 petty constables were mounted on uniformed horses, and 400 policemen were armed with muskets charged with bayonets. The new police arrested hundreds of criminals in their first weekend, seeking to establish their superiority over the old, discredited parish watch” (Henry, 1993, p. 167). The success of this can be seen in the decline of the level of violence in the capital and the fact that the Dublin Parliament was not the subject of invasion by the mob during the force’s existence (Garnham, 2001, p. 87). This experiment in policing was to become a victim of its own success. The centralized power of this new police greatly reduced both the power and the influence of the old ward or parish system. This, added to the general dissatisfaction of the expense of the “police” tax, led to the Police Act of 1795.

This 1795 statute dismantled the Dublin police and authorized a reconstituted parish watch system. The nine years of existence of the Dublin police proved it
to be quite successful in the policing of Dublin but not in the politics of the Irish Parliament. This Act and the police force it created had wider consequences than just those in Dublin. Robert Peel, who was to become the founder of the London Metropolitan Police, served as Chief Secretary for Ireland for six years, 1812 to 1818. During this period, Peel introduced several items of police reform and undoubtedly was influenced by the previous police legislation in Ireland: “A full history of the new police would probably lay its first scene in Ireland, and begin with the Dublin Police Act passed by the Irish Parliament in 1786” (Critchley, 1978, p. 38).

One of the most significant figures in the field of policing was Patrick Colquhoun, who had written on crime in and around the docklands in his Treatise and later in his Treatise on the Commerce and Police of the River Thames. Colquhoun was invited by the West India Planters and Merchants to devise a scheme to cut theft and crime in general from their property, the various dockland areas along the Thames River. Together with John Harriot, Colquhoun organized a force of 60 salaried officers to form the Marine Police, making it the largest full-time force in London. This force was headquartered at Wapping, with Harriot as the resident magistrate and Colquhoun as the supervising magistrate. The Marine Police were armed with cutlasses and were charged with patrolling the river and the wharves. The force was organized into four departments: (1) the Preventive Department, guarding ships and quays and general surveillance of the dockland area; (2) the Judicial Department, hearing minor cases and committing serious crimes to higher courts; (3) the Solicitor for Prosecutions; and (4) a department charged with controlling the employment of dock laborers and contractors. The creation of this fourth department was an innovative plan, controlling access to the goods and completely in line with Colquhoun’s ideas on prevention. During the first eight months of operation, “losses from theft were reduced by ninety-five percent. The government was so favorably impressed that the scheme (minus the dock labor branch) was taken over as a wholly public responsibility. Colquhoun had proved that the presence of a disciplined police, in contrast to that of shabby watchmen, was an effective means of preventing crime” (Stead, 1985, p. 31).

The force was taken over by the central government and converted into a ninth police office under the Thames River Police Act. The Thames magistrates, like those of Bow Street, reported directly to the Home Secretary, unlike the seven parish magistrates set up under the Middlesex Justices Act. Bow Street and the Thames River Force were to be central government’s first steps toward a centralized police force. As Colquhoun stated, a disciplined and centralized police force could be used “To prevent Crimes . . . the fear of Detection and the certainty of being conveyed to a Magistrate. This effect belongs exclusively to the Science of Preventive Police, which is only beginning to be understood” (Stead, 1977, p. 60).

Directed by the Home Office, the forces under the control of the magistrates at Bow Street found themselves with a variety of new duties during the Napoleonic Wars. The appointment of a new Chief Magistrate, Sir Richard Ford, and the statutory regulations giving broad discretionary authority to these magistrates, allowed the Home Office to use these forces for counterespionage work and the use of the constables as “spies and informers to deal with enemy aliens” (Critchley, 1978, p. 43). Ford, who has been described as enterprising and ambitious, used his position
to expand the staffing and influence of Bow Street. In 1805, he revived the concept of a mounted patrol.

This patrol of 60 men, principally selected from cavalry regiments, monitored the major roads within twenty miles of London. This patrol wore blue coats and pants, black boots and hats, and crimson red vests, which led to their nickname, Robin Redbreasts. This force operated in posses and was armed with pistols and cutlasses. They were very effective in their mission and, as a result, were dispatched to various parts of England. The patrol was known for its habit of announcing their presence with horn blasts and the cry, “Bow Street Patrol.” This patrol was expanded in 1821 with the appointment of an additional 100 officers to serve as an unmounted patrol. This force operated in suburban areas within six miles of London. Two points are especially interesting about these mounted and unmounted patrols: (1) they were the first uniformed police force in England and (2) provisions were made for meeting points for both of these patrols, overlapping the “beats” of the officers. This management of the uniformed patrol force was another example of the uniqueness of the Bow Street Patrol.

The disorder and failure of the City of London policing system was to be highlighted in civil disorders, however. As was the case in 1780, during the Gordon Riots, the civil authorities in London were ill-suited to control or even attempt to control the situation. When the rioters stormed Parliament in March of 1815, the government was forced to call for the deployment of troops. Once again, the several “police” authorities of London failed to maintain any degree of law and order. In June 1815, following the curtailment of the rioting, “The Secretary of the Admiralty claimed that the civil power had been guilty of neglect of duty, and summoned the High Bailiff of Westminster to explain. His testimony is self-explanatory of the urgent need for police reform . . . of his 80 constables, about 50 attended today. . . . [H]e found this force, quite insufficient to restrain the mob. . . . He had no power over any constables but his own” (Lyman, 1964, p. 146). Society was continually concerned with the complete failure of civil authorities to deal with these types of situations. These concerns, however, did not lead to any attempts at reform or reorganization of the police. Indeed, a level of acceptance of the situation was characterized by a statement by Lord Castlereagh: “The police had not been negligent: but no police could prevent such attacks from being made in different parts of the town under circumstances like the present” (p. 147).

Peterloo

The economic depression and the civil disorder that it fostered were to continue for several years. Unrest and rioting broke out in manufacturing and textile centers around the country. These demonstrations were usually met with the summoning of troops. A large meeting was held on August 16, 1819, at St. Peter’s Field in Manchester. The purpose of the meeting was to hear a well-known radical orator, Henry Hunt, on the subjects of the repeal of the Corn Laws and the reform of Parliament. The meeting was well-attended by some 60,000 people. The local magistrates, fearing the worst, ordered the arrest of Hunt and his committee. In order to effect that arrest, the magistrates ordered the reading of the Riot Act and ordered the local militia, a troop of yeomanry cavalry, to disperse the crowd: “With drawn sabers, the mounted yeomanry charged. About eleven of the crowd were killed and four hundred wounded” (Lyman, 1964, p. 147). This yeomanry unit, an
amateur volunteer force of local gentry who supplied their own equipment and horses, was unfit to perform these types of duties. Fearing for the safety of this yeomanry unit, the magistrates ordered in newly arrived units of regular army cavalry. This secondary charge added to the chaos and to the overall casualties (Stead, 1985, p. 33).

The specter of these events at St. Peter’s Field, which became known as “Peterloo,” led the government to quickly pass a series of repressive measures that became known as the Six Acts: “The Acts prohibited unauthorized drilling; authorized the seizure of seditious and blasphemous literature, making transportation the penalty for a second offense; authorized the issue of warrants for the search for arms; imposed a stamp duty on pamphlets and leaflets; and restricted the size of public meetings. To workers and Radicals, Peterloo became a battle-cry” (Lyman, 1964, p. 147). These Acts were responsible for the transportation of several hundreds of convicted persons and numerous hangings.

Demonstrations took place throughout London during the divorce proceeding between the hated King George IV and Queen Caroline. A fear of revolution was sensed. The police, and even the troops, were unable to prevent these demonstrations. Various threatening placards and pamphlets appeared. In October 1820, during the debate on a new repressive law, The Manufacturing of Seditious and Treasonable Placards, one of these placards was read aloud:

Let us, in this mighty crisis, bear in mind that the great are not our only foes. Those middling ranks who make us hew and draw, and dole our pittance to us according to their humour—these are our most grinding enemies. What is the constituent body but the tyrants of the nonrepresentatives? What are the tens of thousands of wretches . . . in Westminster . . . but the oppressors of their non-enfranchised fellow-citizens—content to crawl before higher orders, that we may continue slaves to both? Alike then, and equal be their common destiny. The brave, though starving outstanders of Manchester (Peterloo), should be avenged in London. Shall we non-represented Britons . . . be scared by the fear of gibbets or bayonets? . . . [L]et us in one heroic day, convince mankind that the grievances of non-representation are now become insupportable. (Lyman, 1964, p. 148)

The situation continued to move toward instability as fresh rioting broke out. The Queen’s trial ended in November 1820 with her complete vindication. This was a cause for great celebration by most of the lower classes, and it proved to be the catalyst for riots and widespread destruction. Troops again took to the streets to keep some pretense of order. Even the troops were unreliable; a detachment of the Guards regiment mutinied in 1820. This mutiny provoked the Duke of Wellington to urge the creation of a force to maintain order:

In one of the most critical moments that ever occurred in this country, we and the public have reason to doubt in the fidelity of the troops, the only security we have, not only against revolution but for the property and life of every individual in this country who has anything to lose. . . . The Government ought, without the loss of a moment’s time, to adopt measures to form either a police in London or a military corps, which should be of a different description from the regular military force, or both. (Repetto, 1976, p. 16)
During the next few months, the government suffered a great loss of support in Parliament. The political situation worsened when, in August 1821, Queen Caroline died. The Queen’s funeral procession became a battle as troops tried to keep order: “The scene at this moment was most awful—the carnage of Manchester . . . shot across our memory. Here a contest arose, and here blood was shed. Some stones and mud were thrown at the military, and . . . the soldiers were sanctioned in firing their pistols and carbines at the unarmed crowd. . . . [T]he number of shots fired . . . was not less than 40 or 50” (Lyman, 1964, p. 148). Rioting spread to other parts of London. The impotence of the various “police” forces was again brought under a glaring light. For his part in attempting to keep order, the Chief Magistrate of Bow Street was dismissed. The government was in a precarious position, and changes were necessary. In a Cabinet reshuffling, the Home Office was offered to Sir Robert Peel, an appointment which would prove to be one of the most important for the future of policing in London.

**Peel and the New Police**

Peel was sworn in and received the seal of the Home Office on January 17, 1822. He was immediately faced with a diversity of problems. High on his agenda of reforms were the police. The problems of policing were not new to Sir Robert. During his administration in Ireland, these issues had been of major concern to him. The violence, insurrection, and banditti in Ireland during his tenure were legendary. Law enforcement in Ireland relied heavily on the use of the military, militia, and Protestant Yeomanry. The police “were so inefficient as to be almost useless” (Broeker, 1961, p. 364). Peel faced a daunting task on assuming office. Immediately on taking over the Home Office, Peel was able to have Parliament form a new select committee to examine the “Police of the Metropolis.” Peel pressed for the creation of a centralized vigorous police force. The Select Committee of 1822 chose to mirror the statement of the previous committee on the police in 1818: “a unified police system would of necessity be odious and repulsive . . . and among free people, the very proposal would be rejected with abhorance” (Sopenoff, 1978, p. 31). The committee of 1822 asserted “it is difficult to reconcile an effective system of police with the perfect freedom of action and exemption from interference, which are the great privileges and blessings of society in this country” (Sopenoff, 1978, pp. 31-32). Peel knew that the time was not right for his plan.

Among the other plans which Peel brought into office was the revision of the complex criminal laws. Peel was preceded in this effort by several noted members of Parliament: Sir Samuel Romilly, Henry Brougham, and others. The intellectual groundwork was laid by Jeremy Bentham in his *Constitutional Code*. Peel stated that “The most perfect laws . . . were those ‘which ensured the greatest certainty of the conviction of the guilty’” (Sopenoff, 1978, p. 41). In order to accomplish this, Peel maintained that his plans were for pruning and grafting the existing laws rather than a radical change of scrapping those in existence. During 1823, Peel was able to consolidate 130 statutes dealing with larceny into one Act: “The death penalty was abolished for more than one hundred offenses. . . . He increased the number of judges and instituted a Third Assize to lessen delays. . . . ‘When he finally left office in 1830 he had reformed and consolidated practically the whole of the Criminal Law of England’” (Lyman, 1964, p. 149).
Peel also sought to bring other legislation in line with his thinking. He allowed the repressive Six Acts of 1819 to lapse. As the Home Secretary, Peel enjoyed some administrative and oversight responsibilities of the various “police” forces in London, thanks to the Middlesex Magistrates Act and the Thames River Police Act. As the Home Secretary, he tried, through these Acts, to regulate the assignment and conduct of the various constables. He also gained favor by increasing the salaries of the magistrates, the constables of the police offices, and the Thames River Police. Peel took an active and direct interest in the day-to-day operation of the various forces that constituted the “police” of London.

Peel had to concern himself with the continuing problems of the economy. In 1825, a recession overtook the English economy: “There was a run on banks. Seven London banks and eighty country banks failed. Wages dropped, factories and mills closed, and unemployment resulted. In the textile counties strikes against wage-cuts erupted, then riots. In London ten thousand Spitalfields weavers were jobless. Machinery was destroyed and troops fought mobs. Hungry people raided shops for bread” (Lyman, 1964, p. 149). These events and the inability of the various “police” forces to deal with them reinforced Peel’s belief in the urgent need of reform. Peel wrote to Henry Hobhouse, his Under-Secretary,

The continuous increase of crime in London and its neighborhood appears to me to call for some decisive measure. . . . My plan would be to take a radius of ten miles, St. Paul’s being the center. I consider the whole of the district included within the circumference excepting the City. . . . I would make six Police Divisions, not limiting them . . . by straight lines, but throwing together contiguous parishes. I would have no concern with parochial authorities. (Sopenoff, 1978, p. 44)

Peel felt that he could now turn his attention to reforming the police. Politics and outside factors were to intrude, however. The Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool, under whom Pitt served, was forced to resign after suffering a stroke and died shortly thereafter. The new Prime Minister, Lord Canning, was known to favor Catholic Emancipation and made several pro-Catholic appointments to the Cabinet. These policies caused several ministers to resign, among them Peel and the Duke of Wellington. Peel’s plans were to be temporarily shelved. The new government of Canning, however, was to be short lived. In August 1827, Canning died, and the King asked the Duke of Wellington to form a new government. Peel was returned to the Home Office.

Committee of Inquiry

Peel immediately moved for the establishment of a new Parliamentary committee to inquire into the state of the police, the fourth such committee since 1803. He presented most of his proposals in a speech to Parliament on February 28, 1828. Using a statistic on the increase of crime in the London area, showing a 55% increase of all crimes in the period from 1821 to 1828, Peel stated

that the time is come, when from an increase in population, the enlargement of its resources, and the multiplied development of its energies, we may fairly pronounce that the country has outgrown her police institutions, and that
the cheapest and safest course will be found to be the introduction of a new kind of protection. (Sopenoff, 1978, p. 49)

Peel did not intend to have a repeat of the report of the 1822 committee. He was appointed the chairman of the new committee and, as such, controlled those who would testify and the presentation of evidence or documents. Peel also maneuvered the appointment of the other members of this committee to those members of Parliament who were sympathetic to his views. The committee was to examine the present system of policing in London and to report their findings. The committee heard testimony about the corrupt and inefficient practices of the various parish watches and the failure of the magistrates at the several police offices to take any effective action to combat the continuing increase in crime. Peel, aware of the political situation in London, did not want to invite the opposition of the City of London to his plans. The committee’s report lauded the work of only two police organizations: (1) the Thames River Police, for their preventive tactics and as a disciplined, regulated force; and (2) the City of London. The report itself stated that there be no “interference with the powers at present exercised by the municipal authorities of the City of London over the Police and Watch Establishment of the City” (Sopenoff, 1978, p. 52). By eliminating any threat to the powerful special interest of the City and the various trade groups, Peel helped smooth the way of his proposal through the hurdles of Parliament.

The committee issued its report in July 1828. This report of the Select Committee of 1828, Police of Metropolis, was an embodiment of Peel’s plans for the policing of London. It stated

that the present system is, and must continue to be defective; that its condemnation has been the almost uniform result of previous inquiries; and that a better system can be adopted probably at less expense, and with no new restraint on the liberty of the subject. (Sopenoff, 1978, p. 53)

The report was all that Peel could have wanted. It recommended the establishment of the Office of Police under the Home Office, which would be responsible for the policing of the entity of the metropolitan area, giving unified control of all policing, except the City of London, to one office. Additionally, financing of the force would be accomplished by the levying of a special rate on the parishes in the metropolitan area, again excluding the City of London, and the remainder from public funds. The Office of Police would be managed by specially appointed magistrates.

Peel knew that there would still be opposition to any legislation which would arise from this report (for the details of the opposition to the Act, see Emsley [1991], The English Police, and Critchley [1978], A History of Police in England and Wales). Some opposed the imposition of the new tax. Some opposed the exclusion of the City of London. Peel decided to delay the introduction of any legislation, and in a letter to one of his assistants wrote that “he was worried about the expense of a new police and was concerned about overcoming the combined opposition of vestries and all other parish authorities” (Sopenoff, 1978, p. 54). Peel continued to try and sway public opinion and additional members of Parliament. The Edinburgh Review, an influential publication supporting the Whigs, the opposition party, came out in support of the Select Committee’s Report:
While the increase of population outstrips that of employment, the number of offences against property cannot . . . be stationary. But the public authority cannot connive at these irregular proceedings: they must be punished and prevented. . . . The Review also supported the concept of a centralized police with arguments based on cost and freedom: “. . . Such a system would be a great and decided improvement, . . . it might be adopted . . . at a less expense than the [parish watch], and with no new restraint on the liberty of the subject.” (Lyman, 1964, p. 150)

Metropolitan Police Bill

As public support rose and Parliamentary opposition waned, Peel was ready to move forward. In April 1829, Peel introduced his legislation, A Bill for Improving the Police in and Near the Metropolis. This legislation provided for the appointment of certain Crown Justices to be in charge of the new Office of Police under the Home Secretary. The title of Justice was later changed to Commissioner. The new force would police an area comprising all of Westminster and parts of Surrey, Kent, and Middlesex—and would be called the Metropolitan Police District. The force would be paid for by the imposition of a new tax, the Police Rate, on property holders within the new police district. All monies received for the force were to be controlled by a salaried official, the Receiver. Central government was given the power to compel any parishes within 12 miles of Charing Cross to become part of the police district. Additionally, the new force was only accountable to Parliament on an annual basis for its expenditures and activities—another assertion of central government’s control.

The preamble to this Act clearly states Peel’s philosophy of the new police:

Whereas Offences against Property have of late increased in and near the Metropolis; and the local Establishments of Nightly Watch and Nightly Police have been found inadequate to the Prevention and Detection of Crime, by reason of the frequent Unfitness of the individuals employed, the Insufficiency of their Number, the limited Sphere of their Authority, and their want of Connection and Cooperation with each other; and whereas it is expedient to substitute a new and more efficient System of Police in lieu of such Establishments of Nightly Watch and Nightly Police, within the limits hereinafter mentioned, and to constitute an Office of Police, which, acting under the immediate Authority of One of His Majesty’s Principal Secretaries of State, shall direct and control the whole of such new System of Police.

(Stead, 1985, p. 37)

Peel was able to negotiate the passage of the bill through the House of Commons with public support as “The demand for protection became widespread as business and industrial interests exerted a pressure which transcended party lines, a pressure which Parliament dared not ignore” (Lyman, 1964, p. 152). The Duke of Wellington, who was the Prime Minister, offered the bill to the House of Lords. In relaying the bill to the Duke of Wellington, who had been an advocate of a “police corp” since the Peterloo incident, Peel wrote, “Pray pass the bill through this session . . . for you cannot think what trouble it has given me” (Critchley, 1978, p. 50). Wellington prevailed in the House of Lords, and the bill received the Royal Assent on June 19, 1829.
Peel had succeeded in establishing a centralized preventive police force free from the restraints of the restrictive control of the various parishes. The new force was not to be the only force in London. The new legislation did not call for the abolition of several of the existing forces. The Bow Street Runners and the mounted and unmounted foot patrols, controlled by the Chief Magistrate at Bow Street; the Thames River Police; and the constables employed by the Seven Stipendiary Magistrate offices, established by Middlesex Justice Act of 1792, were all left in place. Additionally, the policing of the City of London was left in the hands of that City’s local control. It is interesting to note that while Peel was enormously successful in the passing of this Act, it was left to his successors to consolidate these various forces into the presently existing Metropolitan Police.

The New Commissioners

The problems of recruiting and organizing this new force were now to be Peel’s next challenge. The new police, as Peel envisioned it, would be a uniformed and disciplined force. In writing to his friend, William Gregory, for advice, he described the traits for which he was looking:

It has occurred to me that if there was a Military man conversant in the details of the Police System of Ireland, he might possibly be very usefully employed here. But then he must be a very superior man to what I recollect of police magistrates in Ireland. . . . I require a man of great energy, great activity both of body and mind, accustomed to strict discipline, and with the power of enforcing it, and taking an interest in the duty to be assigned to him. Then he must be a gentleman and entirely trustworthy.

There will be probably a force between two and three thousand men ultimately under his command. With the soldier I should unite a sensible lawyer as the other Magistrate. (Sopenoff, 1978, pp. 57-58)

Several individuals were presented to Peel for these positions via a variety of sources, including the politically connected. Peel decided on two Anglo-Irish gentlemen to fill the two positions that were authorized by this Act. The ex-military man was Colonel Charles Rowan, who retired from the 52nd Regiment and had fought under Wellington at Waterloo. The sensible lawyer was Richard Mayne, a practicing Irish barrister.

The last of the positions authorized under the Act, the Receiver, was Peel’s next appointment. Peel felt strongly about all three of these appointments and their influence on the success of the new police. Strong political pressure was brought to bear on Peel by Lord Chandos, one of the most influential men of the period, to appoint one of his protégés as the Receiver. Conscious of the political situation he found himself in, Peel wrote to Chandos that “The success of an important measure—and my own credit—are involved in this matter” (Sopenoff, 1978, p. 58). With this in mind, Peel appointed John Wray, his own man, as Receiver. Peel’s appointees now went to work on the organization and recruitment of the new force.

The process of the establishment of the force was set into motion. The newly appointed commissioners decided that while the force should be uniformed,
their uniform would be blue rather than the red of the British military, to thwart those critics who would equate the police with the oppression of the military. The command structure was to be based on the military, with the exception of the ranks. The area of their jurisdiction was to be divided into 17 police divisions. Each division would be comprised of 165 men, giving the new force a total complement of approximately 3,000 officers. A superintendent was given command of the division. Each division was assigned four inspectors and 16 sergeants, the only rank to be borrowed from the military. These sergeants were to be the principal field supervisors, being in charge of nine constables. These officers were to be armed with a rattle for calling for assistance and a short truncheon, which was to be concealed under their coats. One of the principal decisions of the new commissioners was to design the new divisions without regard to the prior existing parish lines: “They (the commissioners) wanted a clean break with the parish authorities and felt such action was an important ingredient for structural unity” (Sopenoff, 1978, p. 66).

The new force was to be under the centralized control of the commissioners, with whom local authorities would not interfere. The new headquarters would be the central command for the operations of the force and would be housed at “number four and five Whitehall Place. The rear of the building adjoined a courtyard known as Scotland Yard. It was so named because it had been the site of the Palace of Whitehall where the Scottish ambassadors and Kings resided while in London prior to the Union. The entire complex in 1829 was in poor condition and was described as resembling a rabbit-warren of interconnecting alleys and tortuous passageways” (Sopenoff, 1978, p. 66).

The Beginnings

Peel expressed his ideas on the new force, both to the force and the public, in *The General Instructions*:

> It should be understood at the outset, that the object to be attained is the prevention of crime.

> To this great end every effort of the police is to be directed. The security of person and property and the preservation of a police establishment will thus be better effected by the detection and punishment of the offender after he has succeeded in committing crime . . .

> He (the constable) will be civil and obliging to all people of every rank and class.

> He must be particularly cautious not to interfere idly or unnecessarily in order to make a display of his authority; when required to act, he will do so with decision and boldness; on all occasions he may expect to receive the fullest support in the proper exercise of his authority. He must remember that there is no qualification so indispensable to a police-officer as a perfect command of temper, never suffering himself to be moved in the slightest degree by any language or threats that may be used; if he do his duty in a quiet and determined manner, such conduct will probably excite the well-disposed of the bystanders to assist him, if he requires them.
In the novelty of the present establishment, particular care is to be taken that the constables of the police do not form false notions of their duties and powers. (Critchley, 1978, pp. 52-53)

The structure of the new police was complete, and the first officers were to appear on September 29, 1829. To mark the assumption of their new duties, notices were placed on the doors of the churches throughout London. These notices informed all that the “new police will be ready to undertake the change of the said Parish of ________ on the 29th of September, the Night Watch and Night Police appointed within the said Parish previously to, or independent of, the said act of Parliament, will be discontinued” (Sopenoff, 1978, p. 65).

The job of recruiting and training the new force was now to move forward. Peel felt strongly as to who would best serve in the new police and expressed his views in a letter to his Commissioners:

I propose to refer all applications to you, for inquiry into the character and qualifications of the candidates . . . all nominations for employment in the Police, as well as . . . promotions from inferior stations, should depend exclusively upon character, qualifications, and services of the person selected. . . . I am convinced that on a strict adherence to this principal must entirely depend the efficiency and character of the new Establishment.

When the whole Establishment shall be . . . in full operation, it may be fit to establish, as a fixed and inviolable rule, that all appointments . . . above that of . . . common constable, shall take place from out of the ranks of the Police. . . . The experience which you have already had will enable you to determine . . . what is the age, and . . . previous occupation of candidates, which offer the greatest probability that they can be usefully employed in the Police. And a reference to these . . ., combined with a personal examination into their character and habits of life, will enable you to select . . . those best entitled for recommendation. (Hewitt, 1965, p. 28)

Peel therefore gave over most of the authority of the new force to his two Commissioners. During the period of 1829 to 1830, a total of 8,000 men were hired and over 3,000 were fired, for a variety of reasons, by the Commissioners (Hewitt, 1965, p. 28). The guiding principals of the force were to be set forth in The General Instructions of 1829, which stated,

The absence of crime will be considered the best proof of the complete efficiency of the Police.

(The constable) must be particularly cautious not to interfere idly or unnecessarily. . . . He must remember that there is no quality more indispensable to a police officer than a perfect command of temper, language or threats . . . ; if he do his duty in a quiet and determined manner, such conduct will probably induce well disposed bystanders to assist him. (Lyman, 1964, p. 153)

The tone of the new police was set: a disciplined centralized force, answerable to the Commissioners, and they to the Home Secretary, with little comment from the
local parishes and vestries that had previously held sway in the old constable-watch system. Within several weeks of the force taking to the streets, Peel wrote, “I have been again busy all the morning about my Police. I think it is going very well, the men look smart, and a strong contrast to the old watchmen” (Lyman, 1964, p. 153).

One of the most overlooked aspects of the new force was the position of Receiver. This position, which Peel had fought to keep from a political appointment, was filled by John Wray. The importance of this office was described by the Home Secretary:

The success of the bill turns on the office of Receiver. The Receiver will have to fight the battle with all parishes to collect the rates from each of them. He will have the whole police property, watch houses, watch boxes, arms, etc., vested in him, and the making of all legal contracts for the purchase of land and buildings. (Sopenoff, 1978, p. 87)

The opposition to the new police rate, the tax imposed by the Police Act of 1829, proved to be more extensive than anticipated. Peel had expressed concerns over the cost of his new force and had related these concerns to the force’s administration. Wray was famous for his review and oversight of any contract that the force would enter into. Despite the austerities of Mr. Wray’s administration, the opposition to the new rate continued for several years. One parish clerk wrote,

[Time] and experience only serves to confirm the Inhabitants of this parish in their original conviction of the vast superiority of the former system of watch altho the present System has increased the burdens of the parish £1,200 per year . . . so universal and deep is the feeling . . . against the Metropolitan Police Force that the Parochial authorities have determined to adopt every constitutional means within their reach to obtain removal and to restore the ancient and more efficient economical and constitutional system of watch under the Management of the local authorities. (Sopenoff, 1978, p. 89)

The situation that was created forced a series of compromises on the administration. Peel continued to press for economy and efficiency in the new police. He was compelled to allow the parishes to make installment payments of the new police rate and to allow the borrowing of substantial funds from the Treasury by the new administration. Opposition to the new force was not limited to finances. A variety of stories were raised against Peel’s force. “A coup d’etat was contemplated—it was Sir Robert Peel’s intention to place the Duke of Wellington on the throne—English liberty was to give place to military tyranny—under the pretence of providing protection for the people” (Lee, 1971, p. 245), so one news account related.

A new uniformed force, unarmed, highly centralized, and answerable to the Home Secretary, was to now take over the primary policing of the new Metropolitan Police District. The traditional answer to the growing crime problems of a rapidly industrializing and urbanizing England had been the creation of stipendiary magistrates, with staffs of constables to assist them. This traditional answer resulted in a decentralized, locally controlled organization with little or no coordination between the various magistrates’ offices. The new force was a complete departure from this tradition (Emsley, 1991, p. 229).
The new force moved quickly to establish itself in London. With the able leadership of its two commissioners, and the strict discipline that they encouraged, praise was promptly forthcoming. This praise is seen in an exchange of letters between Peel and the Duke of Wellington:

“I congratulate you on the entire success of the Police in London, it is impossible to see anything more respectable than they are” (Wellington wrote). Peel replied, "I am very glad indeed to hear that you think well of the Police. It has given me from first to last more trouble than anything I ever undertook. But the men are gaining a knowledge of their duties so rapidly, that I am very sanguine of the ultimate result. I want to teach people that liberty does not consist in having your house robbed by organised gangs of thieves, and in leaving the principal streets of London in the nightly possession of drunken women and vagabonds.” (Stead, 1985, p. 42)

Sir Robert Peel, the Father of Modern Policing, had successfully laid the foundation of what many consider to be the finest police force in the world.

**Bibliography**


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The Role of Universities in Preparing the Next Generation of Security Professionals

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Introduction

University contributions to the development of the next generation of security professionals are manifold. A principal focus is the substantive academic coursework that universities provide students. Next, students are exposed to practical, hands-on security-related functions during their internships and co-ops. They also meet and interact with security professionals when guest lecturers address classes as well as at on-campus job fairs. Familiarity with the security profession is enhanced when students participate in student professional organizations. Appreciation of cutting-edge security themes arises through exposure to security-related products, services, and publications. Career guidance and mentoring encompass other spheres of university contributions to students. Still, challenges exist to entice students to study security and pursue careers in that field.

Academic Coursework and Training

Universities provide substantive academic coursework and training. This can be demonstrated in many ways. There are a breadth of degrees—undergraduate, graduate, and doctoral—in security and information security as well as certificates in these fields. Additionally, there are disparate continuing education programs—some stand-alone, and others offered in connection with security associations and accreditation bodies (e.g., American Society of Industrial Security). These programs are offered at a full range of universities from large private and public universities and regional state universities to completely online offerings. While it is commendable that many courses are available, the weakness of some programs—including the quality of the instructors and students—is indicative that there is room for improvement.

Next, there are many security-related courses and topics covered at university security programs, including internal and security, retail security, information technology security, physical security, investigations, emergency management, business continuity, fire and safety, terrorism and homeland security, among others. Also relevant in the coursework/training arena is the role of teaching in the classroom. Instructors use diverse technologies—PowerPoint, Internet (e.g., Web links, instant messaging, online exams), podcasting, and multimedia (DVD and VCR)—to present the material in a variety of ways. This approach allows for repetition and exposure of content through multiple means.
Teaching methodologies and styles also influence the capacity of students to learn security-related content. For instance, instructors utilize traditional lectures, role-playing, fact patterns, guest lecturers, site visits, and exam/quizzes. The instruction and atmosphere in the classroom are other factors that impact the amount of content absorbed by students.

Another element affecting the substantive materials relayed to students includes the background of the instructor. Whether the instructor’s experience arises primarily in security (e.g., loss prevention, industrial, investigations), law enforcement (e.g., policing, FBI, ATF), business, legal, and/or the military impacts the material taught as well as which aspects therein are emphasized in class.

The use of security managers as adjunct instructors further aids the quality of instruction. Students can network with these future employers while adjunct instructors get first-hand exposure to prospective employees. Too, this focus impacts how students view particular themes within the security field and, ultimately, what security-related careers students follow, if at all.

Future trends in academic coursework include expanded recognition of security as an emerging academic discipline. These vast concepts are then shared with students, security practitioners, and instructors.

Student Internships and Co-Ops

Students also gain practical, hands-on experience during internships and co-ops (internships that pay students in addition to them earning academic credit). During internships and co-ops, students work on the employer’s premises, shadow staff, rotate among organizational units, and undertake specific assignments. Students often spend a semester or more at these employers, with disparities in the number of hours and credit earned for such activities. Generally, students keep a daily journal of their activities and produce a research paper on what they learned in the position. The internship and co-ops are often graded pass/fail for the majority of the credits, with a letter grade for the remainder of the credits.

The expectations of students, employers, and instructors are varied with regards to internships and co-ops. Students seek interesting, paid positions with tier-one entities. Another student goal is to obtain a full-time role with the firm subsequent to graduation. The employer wants to attract bright, hard-working, capable students who are mature and possess leadership traits. The instructor hopes that the student and employer are satisfied with their choices. Such a development will strengthen the university’s reputation among students and employers.

Following completion of the internship or co-ops, a number of revelations take hold. Students have a better appreciation of the level of effort, knowledge, and technical skills one needs to excel in security. Equally important, students determine whether a career in security is appropriate for them at this stage.

Employers can determine whether the student has been a worthy temporary employee, justifying a permanent full-time position. The instructor’s initial perspectives of the student’s readiness for the working world are confirmed or determined incorrect. The instructor decides whether that firm should receive
students in the future once he receives feedback from the student about the employer.

Still, obstacles to successful internships and co-ops remain. For instance, the student and employer might not be the right fit due to poor work performance by the student or a difficult work environment offered by the employer. Also, some positions are unpaid, making it a financial burden for students. This latter fact may contribute to occasional lackadaisical student efforts during internships.

Students would benefit from a greater diversity of internships, including types of entities, industries, and duties. Also, expanded responsibility and challenging roles—should students prove capable thereof—would be helpful.

As employers increasingly expect prospective employees to have work experience, internships and co-ops should remain very popular in the coming years. With the globalization of business and transnational risks, student internships undertaken overseas will likely be particularly helpful.

**Guest Lectures and Job Fairs**

Other opportunities for students to interact with security professionals arise during guest lectures and at job fairs. Guest lectures by security specialists allow for detailed explanations of security issues (e.g., stopping a shoplifter, workplace violence training, and background checks) and "real life" experiences (stories about the guest lecturers’ most interesting, challenging, or rewarding experiences).

During on-campus visits, security professionals provide feedback to instructors and students as to which skill sets and training are missing from newly minted graduates. This allows for refining or revising the materials presented in class as well as the creation of new course offerings, as appropriate. Students, too, may adjust their plans once exposed to security professional guidance.

Students gain role models as they view security executives in the classroom. A guest speaker will be able to break negative stereotypes that still exist today relative to the background, training, and activities of security professionals. Additionally, guest lectures enable students to establish contacts with future employers. With better recognition of the positive attributes of security professionals today, visits to university classrooms will occur with increasing prevalence.

Unfortunately, some impediments to bringing security professionals into classrooms exist, including the limited number of class periods per semester, busy schedules of security professionals, accessibility of remote universities, and speakers who do not relate pre-agreed content once in the classroom. While an online class may have a security professional as a guest lecturer, it is certainly not as powerful as a face-to-face presentation.

Job fairs provide another beneficial path to security professional/student interaction. During on-campus job fairs, students talk to employers about internships, co-ops, and post-graduate employment opportunities. Employers get face-to-face time with prospective employees, allowing for interchange and insight not possible through a glance at a résumé alone. Job fairs enable students
and employers to view many possibilities within a short time frame and setting. This characteristic of job fairs also reduces travel and preparation time for all.\cite{10}

Yet, some challenges remain as employers must choose among competing universities given limited time, funding, and manpower to service a job fair. Students must wade through many employers who have preconceived ideas of ideal prospective employees. Also, students try to call attention to themselves while competing against numerous classmates. The security professionals sent to attend the job fair are not always the hiring manager, so a student who excels at this venue is not guaranteed to proceed to the next stage of the hiring process. Still, the importance of job fairs for student and employer communications merits its inclusion in the university security program setting.

**Student Professional Organizations**

Students are exposed to security themes through their participation in a variety of student organizations: security-focused entities (e.g., clubs affiliated with the American Society of Industrial Security and Certified Fraud Examiners Association), criminal justice-related (e.g., law enforcement, corrections, law, and juvenile justice), business-centered clubs (e.g., finance, accounting, corporate investigations, and technology), information technology (e.g., information security), and other student organizations (e.g., student government, fraternities/sororities, and honor societies).\cite{11} Also, participation in such organizations allows for students to gain management, leadership, budgeting, and marketing skills in conjunction with a broader understanding of security.

Limits to participation in student professional organizations include time pressures, other commitments, and the unpaid nature of the activity. Nevertheless, students will continue to pursue such activities as it benefits their personal development. Also, employers view active membership in student professional organizations favorably.

**Exposure to Security Products, Services, and Publications**

Students obtain a further understanding of security by exposure to security products, services, and publications. Security products and services are shared with students during guest lectures, instructor presentation of company brochures, corporate videos, and online materials.\cite{11} Also, online and print versions of security publications—*Security Magazine*, *Security Management*, *CSO Magazine*, and *Security Technology and Design*—and business publications—*The Wall Street Journal*, *Business Week*, and *Forbes*—aid in broadening student perspectives on the multidisciplinary nature of security in the 21st century.\cite{11}

**Career Guidance and Mentoring**

Instructors provide students with career guidance and other mentoring activities. More specifically, instructors offer guidance to students about their current and future studies, internships/co-ops, initial jobs, and charting career paths. This outreach occurs in disparate settings: in the classroom, as an instructor advisor to a student organization, and during office hours. Students benefit from such activities as they receive information and perspectives on their studies and careers.\cite{12}
Instructors find such actions fruitful in that they can better benchmark student interests and needs. Career guidance is hampered when students do not take advantage of enthusiastic and helpful instructors. Still, some instructors are less than proactive and helpful, undermining student receptivity to the security field.

Other mentoring arises when students serve as research assistants. Such roles enable students to garner better research and writing skills while further exploring security themes. Should students become enthralled with research and writing, instructors often recommend that the student pursue graduate studies.

Challenges to Students Studying Security/Pursuing Careers in Security

While great strides have been made in enticing students to study security and pursue careers in that field, some roadblocks remain. Most prominently, instructors and the security industry struggle with combating the negative misconceptions about the security profession and career opportunities therein. Even today, many university students perceive security jobs as largely limited to low-waged, unarmed guards with limited training. In certain disciplines, including law enforcement studies, this stereotype is coupled with inferences that those working in security were not admitted or “couldn’t make it” in a law enforcement career.

Ill-informed students, friends, and family members sometimes repeat negative stereotypes about security. Such remarks discourage some students from studying this field. Discussing security career opportunities with high school students will enable instructors to entice more students into corporate security studies.

Also, the security field must contend with recruiting students when many alternative, attractive careers exist. Among other careers available to students who might otherwise study security include criminal justice, business, computers, and engineering. Some students pursue graduate studies in other disciplines immediately upon completing their undergraduate degrees. Such steps often place them in a non-security-related career path. Yet, it is worth noting that, increasingly, security professionals recognize the need to pursue graduate studies in other fields, including business, law, and technology. Thereby, graduate studies in those non-security fields may actually advance security professionals.

Conclusion

Universities contribute to the development of the next generation of security professionals in many ways. A principal focus is the substantive academic coursework that universities provide students. Students are also exposed to practical, hands-on security-related functions during their internships and co-ops, and they meet and interact with security professionals when guest lecturers address classes as well as at on-campus job fairs. Familiarity with the security profession is enhanced when students participate in student professional organizations, and an appreciation of cutting-edge security themes arises through exposure to security-related products, services, and publications. Career guidance and mentoring encompass other spheres of university contributions to students. Still, challenges exist to entice students to study security and to pursue careers in that field.
Endnotes

1 See, for example, Academic Institutions Offering Degrees and/or Courses in Security (www.asisonline.org/education/universityPrograms/traditionalprograms.pdf), University of Detroit Mercy (MS in Security Administration (http://liberalarts.udmercy.edu/cjs/sa_grad.php), Eastern Kentucky University (BS in Asset Protection & Security) (www.lossprevention.eku.edu/aps/undergradDegree.asp), and Bellevue University (BS in Security Management) (www.bellevue.edu/cs/Satellite?c=buDegree&cid=1177033755082&p=1170772032738&pageName=bu%2FbuLayout).

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Crack, Powder Cocaine, and Meth: The Criminal Justice System’s Response to Drug Violations

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There are multiple issues facing the U.S. criminal justice system today as law-breaking segments of the population experience law enforcement. Starting with arrests, offenders are processed through the system and eventually released back into the populations from which they came. These issues are wide ranging and include such specific concerns as unprecedented reentry of ex-offenders back into the general population and a sustained emergence of the latest illicit drug, methamphetamine, that is wreaking havoc on very specific communities.

Although these issues appear to be unrelated, they do have something in common. What is fundamentally common between the reentry phenomenon and meth emergence is that the majority if not all of the offenders in each situation are drug violators. Prisoner reentry represents the aftermath of a series of strategies that were implemented to mostly deal with drug offenders. These policy implementations are often referred to as the war on drugs and/or the war on crime. The meth phenomenon represents a continued and present development in the same ongoing war. Both events are related to drug violations and both provide unique challenges for law enforcement in its mandate to punish law breakers. This essay explores the criminal justice system’s response to violations of drug laws.

Crack Cocaine: A Drug Crime Wave of the Past

By many accounts, it appears that the sale and use of crack cocaine as a drug offense at the forefront of law enforcement policy and punishment has subsided. As described in an executive summary published by the Criminal Justice Statistics Center in California, drug law violation was one of 11 explanations for a recent decrease in crime (Marowitz, 2000). Based on this report, the use of crack cocaine peaked in the late 1980s and early 1990s and was linked to increased homicide and robbery rates. It is suggested that the recent decline in violent crimes has followed “the abatement of the crack epidemic” (p. vi).

In a New York Times article, it was suggested that crack use began to diminish even before harsher penalties were imposed (Egan, 1999). Blumstein and Rosenfeld (1998) explain that the number of new crack users diminished in the early 1990s, and this reduction in the numbers of new crack users brought stability to the crack drug market. Stability to the drug market meant that those still using crack were able to function more in secret and were less out in the open on the street. This stealthy way of conducting illegal drug business reduced the need to continually recruit young people, and maturation occurred among the dealers who, much like the Mafia, developed dispute resolution mechanisms that didn’t require violence (p. 22).

Scholars have long discussed the issue of the crack epidemic and the criminal justice system’s response to it. Michael Tonry (1999) and others (Lyons & Scheingold,
show an association between politics and increased punitive enforcement that was mediated by race, crack cocaine, and a war on crime/drugs. In fact, Tonry establishes a connection between the crack epidemic and a seemingly unrelated political strategy that was designed to win votes and the U.S. presidency.

Tonry portrays a picture of the crack epidemic as an inevitable result of the use of anti-crime slogans in national elections. These slogans depicted African Americans in a negative light for the purpose of appealing to anti-black sentiments of White voters. This appeal to White voters was designed to win national elections. In keeping with anti-crime slogans of their campaign, the Reagan/Bush Administration established a war on drugs/crime that was characterized by vast increases in arrests and imprisonment of street-level drug dealers and a continuous movement toward harsher penalties and incarceration.

The tenets of the campaign were enforced through policy that included mandatory sentencing, three-strike laws, an overall sentencing-reform movement and an incredible move toward prison construction (Brown, 1989; Tonry, 1999). Unfortunately, of all the law-breaking Americans who participated in violations of drug laws during that time, African Americans were disproportionately targeted for punishment. Based on a report concerning the disproportionate incarceration of African Americans for drug offenses (Lurigio, 2003), findings from The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse showed that African Americans, Whites, and Hispanics use drugs in roughly the same proportions as they are represented in the general population.

For example, the survey revealed that in 1998, among the nation’s 10 million users of illicit drugs, approximately 72% were White, 15% were African American, and 10% were Hispanic. These percentages were similar to these groups’ percentages of the U.S. population. In 2000, 69% of the population was White, 12% were African American, and 12% were Hispanic. Much of the disproportion in punishment of African American drug offenders had to do with the type of cocaine that they were using and selling, which was crack cocaine as opposed to powder cocaine.

Crack and Powder Cocaine: Disparity in Punishment

One prevailing response of the criminal justice system to crack cocaine violations is the establishment of harsher punishment for crack than for other forms of the same drug. The 100 to 1 disparity in punishment of crack cocaine versus powder cocaine is very old news. The fact that African-American offenders disproportionately violated drug laws prohibiting the use and selling of crack as opposed to powder cocaine is also old news. According to The Washington Times, 82% of crack defendants in 2007 were African American compared with 9% who were White. For powder cocaine, 80% were White, and 14% were African American (Seper, 2008).

What is new and germane to the 100 to 1 punishment disparity in crack versus powder cocaine is the current response. A USA Today news article reports that the U.S. Supreme Court has boosted judges’ discretion to impose lenient criminal sentences, including shorter terms for crack cocaine offenses (Biskupic, 2007). In the article, this ruling is described as part of a recent trend toward giving judges greater leeway in setting prison time, which loosens the restrictions placed on their discretion by the sentencing guidelines established in the 1980s. Biskupic calls the disparity between crack and powder cocaine punishment great and controversial because stiffer crack penalties fell disproportionately on low-level and African-American defendants.
In this new turn of events, the court emphasized the lack of grounds for the disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenders but did not change basic criminal laws that treat crack and powder cocaine crimes differently. The 100 to 1 difference was narrowed in November 2007 to a crack and powder cocaine ratio that varied, depending on the offense, from 25:1 to 80:1. The narrower ratios applied retroactively means the early release of 19,500 inmates over the next 30 years. The Washington Times reports that the federal government has freed the first of thousands of federal inmates convicted on crack cocaine charges based on these amended U.S. Sentencing Commission guidelines that retroactively reduced their sentences (Seper, 2008).

Of the 19,500 offenders eligible nationwide for reductions in sentences, 1,944 are in federal prisons in Virginia; and in Illinois, there are 997 prisoners eligible for release. Enough time has passed to witness the full results of the criminal justice system’s response to crack violations. The punitive decisions for harsher penalties and increased incarceration are now being undone, but only after the prisoners have served their time. Many have written and warned about the adverse effects that these get tough policies would have and have had on the prisoners’ children, families, communities, and their futures (Hagan & Coleman, 2001; Lynch & Sabol, 1997; Lyons & Scheingold, 2000 ; Tonry, 1999). Prisoners are now being released back into the population. This event has become a new issue for the criminal justice system: the issue of prisoner reentry.

Prisoner Reentry and Current Developments: The Impact of the Criminal Justice System’s Response to the Crack Threat

There are several factors that are unsettling about the criminal justice system’s response to crack cocaine violations. In addition to the great disparity in punishment between the two forms of cocaine, recent court rulings make it clear that the disparity in punishment was not deserved. These offenders are rapidly becoming ex-offenders, and it still remains to be seen what long-term impact these stringent penal responses will have on the future of these individuals, their families, and the communities that absorb them.

As a result of these governmental policies aimed at combating a drug and violent crime crisis, the nation’s criminal justice system experienced substantial increases in both its juvenile and adult workloads and a surge in its correctional populations. State legislatures created new drug laws and changed sentencing practices, imposing mandatory minimums and consecutive sentences for drug possession and delivery. With the enforcement of these new and more stringent drug laws, large numbers of the general population, especially African-American men, became part of the correctional population (Martin, Olson, & Lurigio, 2000). From jail overcrowding to alternatives to incarceration and now reforms in sentencing guidelines, the punitive response to these drug offenders has continually been assuaged. The offenders have served their sentences and are being released. Criminologists are watching the activity of these returning ex-offenders closely as studies of prisoner reentry continue to be funded.

One interesting and current development in the war on drugs that has law enforcement practitioners worried is stiff cuts in the federal funding of the Edward Byrne Justice Assistance Grant. This grant has been used mostly for drug enforcement, which for the most part financed the criminal justice system’s response to the crack threat. In January 2008, Congress cut funding for the Byrne
Justice Assistance Grant by two-thirds, from $520 million to $170 million for fiscal year 2008. The Bush Administration argues that the program should end because crime is down and the money is needed elsewhere (Frazier, 2008).

Lingering suggestions of misuse of the funds are directly tied to the enforcement of crack cocaine violations. The article mentions that critics of the Byrne program suggested the money had been spent in a racially biased way, with complaints coming from Texas. A case was cited in Tulia, Texas, describing a 1999 Byrne-funded investigation that led to the cocaine arrests of 46 people who were mostly African American. The evidence in these arrests was so flimsy that in 2003 Governor Rick Perry ultimately pardoned 38 of those who had been convicted. What’s more, the undercover agent responsible for the arrests was convicted of perjury, and the wrongfully accused defendants were awarded $5 million from the state (Frazier, 2008).

The reason why law enforcement officials are concerned about the cut in funding is that, in their opinion, the money is needed to combat methamphetamine. An article published in the Chicago Tribune makes a direct link to the cut in Byrne funds and the ability to enforce meth drug law violations (Scharnberg, 2008). In this article, Terry Lemming, the statewide drug enforcement coordinator for the Illinois State Police, was quoted as saying, “It [the cut in funds] couldn’t have come at a worse time. . . . After all the success we’ve started to have, this could set the Midwest back a good 20 years in our fight against this drug.”

The criminal justice system’s response to the crack cocaine epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s has culminated in record numbers of ex-prisoners being released from prison. Ironically, what was sourced from a political action that evolved into a movement of harsher penalties for drug crimes is ending at the same level with a cut in federal funding that threatens to weaken the continued war on drugs. The new drug epidemic represents a completely different kind of user population than crack, mostly affecting a different geographic space than crack did and is also different in form and production. What’s more, it appears that a new approach than what was used to fight the crack cocaine epidemic has taken shape as law enforcement and the criminal justice system responds to the meth crime wave.

**Methamphetamine: The New Drug Crime Wave**

Methamphetamine is quite a different drug than cocaine. Cocaine is organic while meth is manmade. In the 1990s, meth started to be mass produced by Mexican drug organizations in Mexico and Southern California. Currently, meth is being produced by Caucasians in rural areas (Bauer & Olson, 2006; Dighton, 2004). Meth has been described as a central nervous system stimulant with similar effects as cocaine only more potent. The high from meth lasts for hours as opposed to fractions of an hour as is the case with cocaine (Weisheit, 2004). Since meth is not organic, its use and production pose unique and malevolent threats to not only the individuals who consume it but also to the environment in which it is produced. According to the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, the production of one pound of meth results in five to seven pounds of toxic waste (Dighton, 2004). This waste is oftentimes discarded down household drains, in yards, or in rural areas.

The meth problem appears to be concentrated in rural areas. For example, from 1994 to 2000, prison admissions from rural counties to the Illinois Department of Corrections
increased 80%. This increase corresponded with meth emergence in Illinois’s rural areas. From 2000 to 2005, admissions from these areas increased 130%. And by 2005, the prison admission rate for drug offenses from rural counties was 20% higher than the rate for urban counties except Cook County (Bauer & Olson, 2006).

The federal government regularly convenes commissions that determine whether harsher penalties enhance public safety or prevent crime (Tonry, 1999, p. 105). These commissions consistently report that harsher penalties do not enhance public safety or decrease crime. Such findings were available during the Reagan/Bush Administration and during the crack epidemic. This means that despite findings to the contrary, the war on drugs was pushed with an emphasis on law enforcement, arrest, and punishment of users and dealers. During the Reagan/Bush Administration, 70% of federal anti-drug funds were devoted to law enforcement and only 30% to treatment and education. The commissions made alternative suggestions for combating crime that were ignored during the crack epidemic but seem to have been adopted for combating the meth problem. The commissions suggested that emphasis should be placed on prevention, drug treatment, drug abuse education in schools, and mass media programs aimed at public education.

Despite the recent cut in federal money spent on anti-drug enforcement (Byrne-funds), there appears to be a marked change in how the criminal justice system has responded to meth drug violations in that there has been a purposeful move away from a strict, punitive response that was applied liberally with the crack epidemic to one that focuses just as much on prevention and rehabilitation. This shift in response to meth has been illustrated in many ways. These responses to meth uncannily correspond with some of the alternate suggestions put forth by commissions during the crack epidemic that were ignored. Suggestions that call for prevention strategies and mass media programs aimed at public education are obviously being employed in this current fight against meth.

**Responses to the Meth Threat: Meth Versus Crack**

It has been established that meth is considered to be a more potent and extensively more dangerous drug to man and the environment than crack cocaine. Weisheit (2004) states that meth may be more disruptive than other drugs because in addition to problems related to using meth, there is a host of problems related to its production.

In a report from the U.S. Sentencing Commission (2002) to Congress, it is admitted that at the time the Commission was developing the initial sentencing guidelines, Congress differentiated between powder cocaine and crack cocaine. They concluded that crack cocaine was more dangerous, thus establishing significantly higher penalties for crack cocaine offenses (Executive Summary, p. iv). Congress assigned harsher penalties against crack cocaine violations because they believed crack was extremely addictive compared with powder cocaine. They also believed that the correlation between crack use and distribution and the commission of other serious and violent crimes was greater than that with other drugs.

In recent evaluations of the cocaine penalty structure, the U.S. Sentencing Commission (2007) reported that the relative harmfulness of crack was exaggerated, that the penalties were applied more often to lower-level offenders, that the seriousness of most crack offenses was overstated, and that minorities were mostly
impacted. The Commission reported that two-thirds of the federal crack cocaine offenders were street-level dealers and not the serious major traffickers that the 1986 Drug Act intended to target. (The 1986 Drug Act created the basic framework of statutory mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses.) The crack punishment disparity was based on beliefs about the association between crack offenses and other violent behavior, but in 2000, three-fourths of federal crack offenders had no personal weapon involvement and only 2.3% discharged a weapon.

These revelations are contrary to original fears that crack produced more violence and danger than powder cocaine. In addition, meth is considered to be more addictive and dangerous a drug than crack or powder cocaine. Yet, despite these conclusions, laws against crack cocaine offenders continue to establish harsher punishment than both powder cocaine and meth.

The most recent U.S. Sentencing Commission Report to Congress (2007) provides a comparison between penalties for crack and those for methamphetamine offenses. Congress did not establish mandatory minimum penalties for meth until 1988, with ten grams and 100 grams of actual meth triggering five- and ten-year mandatory minimum penalties, and 100 grams and 1,000 grams of a mixture or substance containing meth triggering five- and ten-year mandatory minimums. By 1998, Congress stiffened the penalties for meth, triggering five- and ten-year mandatory minimum penalties for five and 50 grams of actual meth and triggering five- and ten-year minimums for 50 and 500 grams of meth-mixture.

The penalties for crack cocaine and actual meth are now the same. However, an important difference in the penalty structure persists. Mandatory minimum punishments that are triggered by grams of crack-mixture or non-pure crack are the same as those triggered by pure meth. This means that the punishment for crack-mixture is harsher than the punishment for comparable meth-mixture. For example, 50 grams of meth-mixture triggers a mandatory minimum penalty of five years compared with five grams of crack-mixture.

There is one response to the meth threat that is most pronounced. That is the obvious collaborative and almost uncharacteristic reaction from the criminal justice system, compared with its response to the crack threat, that leans heavily toward prevention and rehabilitation of the meth offender.

**Policy Response to the Meth Threat: Prevention and Rehabilitation**

The criminal justice system’s response to meth shows a trend towards prevention that is used in conjunction with enforcement, and this trend has been illustrated both locally and nationally. In Illinois, it is reported that Governor Rod Blagojevich initiated a $2.5 million initiative against meth and the drug Ecstasy called Project X that is designed to stamp out these drugs by putting resources in law enforcement, prevention, and treatment (Dighton, 2004). Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan’s response to meth took the form of an awareness campaign and a MethNet feature on her website that provides information on meth and efforts that are being made to address the problem.

Even front-line enforcement agents are pushing for less punitive measures and more prevention and rehabilitation. For example, drug enforcement agents in Illinois were reported as saying “[I]t’s going to take education and prevention to stem the
tide of the drug, because law enforcement efforts alone won’t be enough” (Dighton, 2004, p. 6). A commander of an Illinois Multijurisdictional Drug Task Force agrees with the movement away from solely punitive sanctions, suggesting that education is the key to stopping meth. Since it is one of the most difficult drugs to stop using once addicted, longer and more intense treatment programs are needed. Based on a report on meth in Illinois (Bauer & Olson, 2006), the Illinois State Police in 2005 implemented a statewide meth response team program to help local law enforcement fight meth offenses by seizing meth labs and making meth arrests.

In addition to raiding meth labs and arresting offenders, however, there is an increased emphasis placed on providing substance abuse treatment to the inmate population with the goal of breaking the cycle of abuse (Bauer & Olson, 2006, p. 4). What’s more, unlike in the past, prisons are offering aggressive and purposeful treatment options for meth abusers. Less than 20% of adult male inmates identified as drug abusers released from the Illinois prison system in 2002 received drug treatment during their incarceration. These released prisoners are part of the reentry phenomenon from the crack drug wars. In Illinois, a fully dedicated therapeutic community has been established at the Sheridan Correctional Center, and there exists an entire meth treatment wing at the Southwestern Illinois Correctional Center (Bauer & Olson, 2006). The purpose for this rehabilitation opportunity is to proactively attempt to reduce recidivism of ex-meth offenders, in effect avoiding the patterns of the ex-crack offenders who are now being released from prison in the prisoner reentry situation. The report explains the rationale for having rehabilitation opportunities in prisons as the hope to experience better post-prison success rates by meth users.

Emphasis on prevention and rehabilitation for the meth offender is not just a local criminal justice system response to the problem, but national efforts have also been made in this same direction. One very obvious development in the trend away from punitive responses to the meth problem, which is an idea that seems to be adapted from the very recommendations that were put forth by commissions during the Reagan and Bush Administration to combat crack but were rejected, includes local and national mass media programs aimed at public education. The report explains the rationale for having rehabilitation opportunities in prisons as the hope to experience better post-prison success rates by meth users.

The Meth Project

The Meth Project is a large-scale prevention program. It was established to reduce first-time meth use. This is accomplished through public service messaging, public policy, and community outreach. It is considered a private-sector response and has been recognized by the White House as one of the nation’s most effective prevention programs. It is considered to be a private sector response because it was conceived, founded, and funded by Thomas M. Siebel, a businessman. The program is focused entirely on prevention. It was first implemented in Montana, but it has since been expanded into Arizona, Idaho, and Illinois. The program is administered through research-based message campaigns and through public policy and community action.

The Meth Project is incredibly sophisticated. Periodic statewide and national surveys and focus groups are conducted to understand attitudes and behavior related to meth. The research collected establishes the foundation for the messaging and communication programs most notably illustrated in the project’s high-impact advertising. The project’s ads graphically portray the ravages of meth use. The ad campaign reportedly reaches
70 to 90% of teens statewide, three to five times a week, with a prevention message channeled through TV, radio, billboards, newspapers, and the Internet. The program has gained national attention, winning 40 awards, including Gold Abby Awards, Gold Effie Awards, and a Cannes Lion Award (see www.methproject.org).

The Meth Project is partnered with professional advertising, media, and public relations and research agencies, including GfK Roper Public Affairs and Media, Golin Harris, OMD, Safarik Media, and Venables, Bell and Partners. Donations of stock and financial gifts are accepted by the project. Financial gift sponsorship options include the $100,000 inner circle sponsorship, $50,000 benefactor sponsorship, $25,000 leader sponsorship, $10,000 sponsorship, $5,000 friend sponsorship, and $1,000 associate sponsorship. Sponsorship of any amount is also accepted as an anonymous donation.

Illinois launched their Meth Project in February 2008 and describes it as a nonprofit organization that implements a range of advertising and community action programs to reduce meth use in the state (see www.illinoismethproject.org). The Illinois project was established by the national Meth Project and received a grant from the Siebel Foundation. The Illinois Meth Project is governed by an advisory council of a mixed group of governmental and private sector leaders along with Tom Siebel, the founder of the national Meth Project, who is also the grantor of the Illinois Meth Project. Additional members of the advisory council include: Illinois’s Attorney General; the Illinois Secretary of State; the Illinois Deputy Governor; the Director of Substance Abuse Services at Franklin-Williamson Human Services; the President and CEO of Bensinger, DuPont and Associates; the Chairman of the Midwest Region Boys and Girls Club of America; the Director of Behavioral Health Services at OSF Saint Francis Medical Center; the President and CEO of the Field Museum of Natural History; the Director of the Illinois State Police; and the President of the Illinois Sheriff’s Association.

This marshalling of resources and cross-sectional collaboration is startling and has not been seen in the criminal justice field as a response to drug violation in this or past generations. The impact of this response to the meth problem promises much better results for the violators, their families, and their communities than what has happened for crack violators.

Discussion

It seems clear from the information gathered in this essay that the criminal justice system’s response to drug violations is related to the type of illegal drug being used and sold. It also seems evident that a shift has occurred in the response from the criminal justice system concerning drug violations from a heavily punitive and punishment-oriented approach to one that relies less on punishment and more on prevention and rehabilitation. What is disturbing is that the dangerousness and addictiveness of the two drugs, crack and meth, are not what distinguishes them from one another. Instead, there are other factors that set them apart. These factors include the criminal justice system’s response to combating them as drug problems; the difference in their form, nature, and extent of damage to the user and environment; and the social, spatial, and demographic differences that exist between the violators.

Crack cocaine offenders are punished more harshly than powder cocaine and meth offenders. This trend is only now being partially rectified as crack offenders are retroactively being released from prison. Mandatory sentences for crack
offenders have been served, and record numbers of prisoners are reentering their communities. These ex-offenders, their families, and their communities did not benefit from prevention or rehabilitation programs and continue even now to be studied and managed by the criminal justice system through funded reentry research and going home projects. These studies and projects are aimed at helping them ease back into the community. Adverse effects of the punitive approach to dealing with crack offenders are currently unfolding. Reentry and recidivism are activities that go hand-in-hand when describing these ex-offenders.

Meth offenders are demographically and geographically different from crack offenders, and so is the criminal justice system’s response to their law breaking. Instead of almost sole reliance on punitive punishment for violating meth drug laws, these offenders are provided with rehabilitation opportunities right in the prisons, and these prison rehabilitation programs are designed specifically for their particular type of drug abuse. First-time crack users experienced mandatory minimum prison sentences, similar to meth users, except pure meth triggers the same mandatory sentence that impure crack triggers, and first-time meth users are the recipients of a massive, national, professional, and collaborative prevention effort that should go a long way in discouraging new offenders and slowing the rate of recidivism among ex-offenders. With the efforts being made to solve the meth problem, the reentry activity currently being experienced by ex-crack offenders can be avoided for ex-meth offenders. Would there have been a difference in the lives and communities of the crack violator if these kinds of strategies had been employed? Perhaps the prevention and rehabilitation efforts provided to meth offenders would have gone a long way in preventing the type of reentry, recidivism, and family disruption that characterizes the ex-crack offender of today.

References


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Radical Islam and Islamist Terrorism: What War? Which Crime?

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Introduction

One of the highlights of our Book of the Year Award Ceremony in New York was the speech by Dr. Henry Kissinger (2008c), former Secretary of State and U.S. National Security Advisor. Dr. Kissinger reflected that

[t]errorism, what we call terrorism, refers to a method. What terrorism represents is an assault by radical Islam on the political structure of the Islamic world, but in a deeper sense, on the secular structure and international structure of anything, any society, within reach of Islam, which means almost every part of the world. That is a fundamental challenge. Therefore, to talk about withdrawal from any battlefield is to describe defeat. There is no way to escape the conflict with Islam by leaving Afghanistan or leaving Iraq. Now that is not only delusion and it is not something that will have long-term consequences, it is something that would have almost immediate consequences. That is the fundamental problem of our period. That this is a war against radical Islam that has to be won.

One month later, Dr. Kissinger (2008a), in an interview given to the Spiegel International on February 18, 2008, argued that Europeans hide behind the unpopularity of George Bush. Consider the following quotation:

Spiegel: What does Europe not understand? Paris, London, and Berlin do not see the “war on terror” as a common challenge for the West?

Kissinger: I don’t like the term “war on terror” because terror is a method, not a political movement. We are in a war against radical Islam that is trying to overthrow the moderate elements in the Islamic world and which is fundamentally challenging the secular structures of Western societies. All this is happening at a difficult period in European history.

Let us consider the questions “What war?” “Which crime?” against the background of Henry Kissinger’s comments and observations.

Obviously, terrorism is crime. It is sanctioned and punished by law. If it is right to say that what we call terrorism refers to a method—and it is obviously—it is then that terrorism, a method, is crime. And if terrorism represents the struggle, it is then that that specific crime which is sanctioned by law as terrorism to some point is to be thought of as war, though it is not war, but a method that is used in war.

The challenge lies in the linkage between crime and war inasmuch as it is necessary to think of radical Islamist terrorism as a crime and as a war. This is not an easy task since neither legal statute/regime that applies to the crime of terrorism nor the dichotomy
that is typical of the current concepts of terrorism and war suggests that it is possible to construct terrorism as the focus in the junction between crime and war.

Such a construct is foremost a conceptual problem since the former requires

- the deconstruction of the concepts of terrorism and war as they are currently used in the literature and as they impact political decisionmaking.
- the deconstruction of the legal statute/regime that is currently applied to the crime of terrorism.

There is hardly a need to comment that such a conceptual enterprise emerges from very practical and serious concerns. Given the global impact of Islamist terrorism and considering the catastrophic perspective that is involved in a counterterrorist strategy and in a conduct of war that lacks in efficiency, it is clear that the updated concepts impact the practical concerns from which they are derived.

War history teaches that mass media are used as weapons. In the assault of radical Islam against the secular structures on any society of the world, mass media play a central role in that they are more than elsewhere used as a means to promote and to exploit the very popular myth of the crime for the just cause. The success of the radical Islamist propaganda is due to the complicity of Western mass media as it stems from one-way, partial, and deliberately simplistic reports about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The propaganda is addressed to both Islamic and Western societies. It consists of the mix-up of items—post-modern variant of the Robin Hood tale, the right of resistance against oppression, etc.—that are not only attractive for Western mass media and public opinion but that are also celebrated as “politically and morally” correct in intellectual circles of the Western world.

One reason—perhaps the most important of all that can contribute to the explanation of this phenomenon—is that the items in question are altogether inherent of the tradition of values and morals that, in the Western world, developed in the aftermath of World War II as a reaction against the collapse of the traditional value systems and as a result of the wave of decolonization and national liberation movements. Today, Marxism, formerly the most powerful ideological supporter of these morals, can no longer provide support since the collapse of the former Soviet Union implied the crash of the whole ideological apparatus. The far-ranging repercussions of the collapse of the traditional bipolar bloc systems upon the values and the ideology of the Western world is just beginning to be measured. Through lack of a clearly defined enemy, the traditional values of the Western world and their ideological and normative subsystems are more than ever before predisposed towards anomie. The collapse of the Nation State, as it is involved, namely in Europe, in the progressive construction of the European Union (EU), and the lack of a clearly defined global political perspective for Europe and the world are certainly important factors in regards to the progressive eclipse of Western ideology.

Radical Islam explores, exploits, and manipulates the panel of items that can no longer be transported by the ideological apparatus as was typical of the former Soviet Union propaganda enterprise and its allies in the Western world. The Realpolitik of the communist utopia have been supplanted by the Realpolitik of religious fundamentalism. These two variants of utopia’s Realpolitik are comparable in at least two regards: (1) they are totalitarian politics, and (2) they are therapeutic in that they contribute to the rationalization of the cupidity complex of
the Western world that emanates from the Holocaust, Hiroshima, the debacles of colonization, and the war in Vietnam. This observation being put aside, the radical Islamist therapy, as I’ve shown in an earlier article,² works in so many different ways and addresses so many different clients that it is reasonable to argue that its impacts are less controllable, less predictable, more multifaceted and differentiated, more popular, and may be more efficient than those that were involved in the therapeutic program of the collapsed precursor.

I entirely agree with the opinion of a French philosopher who has recently argued that the lack of reaction against Iran is likely to make us regret the monstrosities of the 20th century. Consider the monstrosity of such regret. (By the way, he is Jewish.) This said, the impacts of the radical Islamist therapy are to be measured with reference to a catastrophic outcome as it has never been experienced under the Diktat of historical materialism, not even during the total eclipse of human being and humanism under the reign of Josef Stalin.

The synopsis of radical Islam can hardly leave out consideration of the following:

- What we call *radical Islam* represents radical politics of religion. Actually, the comeback of religion is observable in all parts of the world—namely, in secular societies. The politics of religion are predisposed to compensate for the “horror vacuum” as it results from the collapse of the former ideological bloc systems. Hence, the politics of religion are predisposed toward compensation of the horror vacui as it issues from the collapse not only of the former ideological antagonism but also, and in a more general and more substantial sense, of the ideologies that supported the process of secularization, among which the most important are the principles of laity and secular society.

- This might result in anomie inasmuch as the ideologies that developed during the secularization process can hardly be considered independently from the supporting norm and value systems. Hence, the politics of Islamic religion, by offering a compensation for the eclipse of ideology, is predisposed towards canalizing, containment, and exploitation of the inherent conflict potential in anomie. The target groups are the political and intellectual elites of the Muslim world who have adopted the Western ideology and value system as well as the masses of Muslims who continue to live in accordance with their traditional value system. The anomie in the Western world might prompt either a forced copying of the Western lifestyle by the acculturated elites in the Muslim world, with an open conflict between the elites and the masses of the Islamic world as a culminating point, or rejection of the Western values by the acculturated elites, which may result in a call for the radical comeback or renewal of traditional Islamist values.

- As far as the term of *politics of religion* denotes Islam, it is tautological in that Islam is the only one of the monotheist religions that is animated by a political project—the building of the Holy City here on earth. Hence, any disengagement of the Western world in regard to the fight against radical Islam is automatically perceived by the entire and not necessarily radical Muslim population, namely the Muslims living in the Western world, as a victory of Islam’s political project and a defeat of the Western world. In turn, a renewal of penal politics as it is actually observable in our Western societies, namely on the European Continent, may in association with a coherent and strong immigration policy prompt the radicalization of the Muslims
living in Western societies. The process is animated by a dreadful mechanism in that the radicalization may incidentally profit from the support of human rights. This may result in undervaluing the perception of and approach to the problem. From the “bagatelle” to the taboo, the shift is quickly done. But this is only one aspect of the dreadful mechanism. The canalization of the radicalization and its further management by radical Islamism is the other one.

Terrorism is, thus, central to the politics of radical Islam, though terrorism is not specific to Islam. Hence, radical Islam is, more than any other radical politics, predisposed towards the economy of terrorism. The former easily profits from the popularity and from the attraction of terrorism for Western mass media, intellectual circles, and public opinion. The successful promotion of radical Islamist propaganda in Western mass media, public opinion, and intellectual circles stems from the ideology that traditionally surrounds and supports terrorism. This ideology is aimed at the moralization of terrorism. The inversion or, even more, the perversion of the victim-offender scheme and moral relativism are central to the morals of terrorism. To the great amazement of all of us, these morals surround the modern political narrative.

Maybe this is the most powerful element in the strategy of radical Islam. Radical Islam is as a politics of religion predisposed towards the deconstruction of morals and ideological patterns that surround the modern political narrative and which are partly rooted in the philosophy of Enlightenment. Hence, radical Islam is capable of mobilizing for its archaic and theocratic fascist political program “the lost children of the old Marxist utopia” and all those who have joined the camp of the anti-globalization movement. To phrase it in another way: Radical Islam might be, and to some point effectively is, highly attractive for precisely those people who pretend to be and who perceive themselves to be the most certain defenders of enlightenment and the most certain opponents of fascism. Given the nature of the radical Islamists’ political program, the attraction is somehow paradoxical. In fact, it isn’t as much that the deconstruction of political modernity is operated by means of the morals and values that surround and support the modern political philosophical narrative as it is that the modern veiled transfiguration of modernity offers an ersatz commode of the collapsed ideological system to the lost children of the old utopia and the promoters of its post-modern version. The package is modern, but what it is is archaic theocratic fascism. So, as children are tempted to eat with their eyes, so the lost children of the old utopia and their post-modern twins are tempted to disconnect the form from the content. Rationalization in its purest form of expression!

In this and in the circumstance that radical Islam, contrary to the Marxist utopia, has no problem with high tech and the liberal market economy lays perhaps a strategic advantage. Thus, the challenge lies not only in the linkage between war and crime. No less important is the demolition of the morals of terrorism, and this is not a conceptual challenge but, foremost, an ethical challenge.

Ethical Challenges

Dr. Boaz Ganor (2001) in his article entitled “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter,” provides for a brilliant and systematic critique of a slogan that is central to the morals of terrorism. Three years before Ganor’s publication, Robert Kennedy, in an article published in 1999 in Terrorism and Political Violence, sought to answer the question, “Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?”
In both of these articles the adage is discussed within the frame of recent developments in the history of terrorism. But the inherent rationale of the discussion is different: Ganor’s critique confronts the adage with facts, with cruel reality. In the end, the adage is nothing but a dangerous myth.

Kennedy discusses the issue within a normative or even ethical framework since the question that is central to his paper is “Are there universally valid and accepted ethical norms that by transcending cultural and religious differences allow us to consider the maxim, ‘Terrorists are not freedom fighters,’ as a universally valid ethical norm?”

Both of the following points are worth serious consideration:

- The first one inasmuch as the systematic critique of the widespread attempt to link together terrorism and the fight for national liberation and emancipation seeks to prompt the definitive collapse of the propaganda campaign that is aimed at the moralization of crime. In this respect, the Ganor article is a major contribution to the counter-fight to terrorist propaganda and to counterterrorism in mass media and public opinion.

- The second one inasmuch as Kennedy’s central thesis, by arguing that the maxim, “Terrorists are not freedom fighters, but terrorists can be thought of as universally valid and accepted ethical norms,” demonstrates a strong commitment to the Kantian world peace utopia.

Both the fight against terrorist and radical Islamist propaganda and the project that is aimed at the establishment of a universally ethical norm are worth being encouraged and supported. Ethics are central to that aim: It is not only because ethics are predisposed to play a central role in the fight against morally veiled terrorist propaganda but also because the political, scientific, and public debate about terrorism and radical Islam are derived from an ethical dilemma that can only be resolved in and by means of ethics.

The following two observations are cited as support:

1. Can facts destroy moral statements? Nothing—not even the most coherent empirical demonstration of the irrelevance of moral statements—can ever impact the validity of a moral statement. Hence, facts cannot be used against morals. If they could, mass media would not be successful in promoting the moralization of Palestinian terrorists and the criminalization of Israel. Attempts made to confront moral statements with fact are always useful to point to the contradiction between both, but they can hardly be aimed at the demonstration of empirically irrelevant or even false moral statements. Such a criticism does not seek to question the aims, objectives, and motivation of Ganor’s (2001) article, and it is not aimed at the critique of its key proposals either. Rather, such criticism provides support to the ethical collapse of terrorism’s moralization.

2. Kennedy’s central thesis argues that there are shared norms that transcend religion, culture, even civilizations that can and should provide a guide for distinguishing between terrorism and other acts of war or conflict. The article concludes that, despite the existence of “fundamentalist” interpretations on all sides, generally shared norms do indeed exist. Kennedy also concludes, however, that a number of factors contribute to differences of perspective between and among Muslims and members of many
Western societies. These factors, according to the author, arise from dissonances and a lack of global consensus about the United Nations’ (UN’s) restrictions on the use of force, the impact of national liberation movements and theology, and the revival of *jus ad bellum* thinking that operates to the detriment of *jus in bello*.

If I have correctly understood the author, the argument that is developed by Kennedy is based on the following rationale: The shared norms that transcend religion, culture, and civilization cannot be thought of as independent from the framework of the UN. Hence, their existence or their actualization is conceivable only within the framework of the UN. Logically, this assumes that both the existence of such norms and their actualization and further development are issues that cannot be thought of without an institutional frame that works, per definition, in accordance to the model of *discourse ethics* as developed by the philosopher Jürgen Habermas. If the existence of such norms originates from the inherent rationale of discourse ethics, is it not possible then that existence and coming into existence are necessarily confused? How do we understand the actualization within the UN framework of the *existence* of transcendental norms that are to come into existence and that, given the dissonances and lack of consensus, do effectively not exist? How can transcendental norms exist when the frame of their existence does not allow us to think that they effectively exist?

Ethical norms that are *shared* can never transcend religion, culture, or civilization inasmuch as they are shared in accordance to religion, culture, and civilization. The argument that is central to such criticism is as follows: Norms that are shared can never transcend the context of those who share them. To be transcendental, ethical norms must transcend the fact that they are shared. As will be shown, ethical norms’ capability of transcendence can only occur in reference to the inherent normative ethics of religion.

The slogan, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” is central to the morals of terrorism. Hence, this proposal is derived from a moral judgment. Such proposals either approve or disapprove human behavior. In semiotics and analytical language philosophy, such proposals are called *evaluative proposals*. The opposite are *descriptive proposals*. From the semantic-logical viewpoint, there is a fundamental difference between each of these: Evaluative proposals are not verifiable/falsifiable (in accordance to Popper’s [1972] empirical test program). Accordingly, moral statements can never be thought of as true or false; they are equivalent in regard to their inherent value. In turn, descriptive proposals are verifiable/falsifiable since they stem from the observation and experience of the empirical fact they describe.

In regard to the semantic-logical structure, descriptive and evaluative proposals/statements belong to the different levels that are to be distinguished. In general ethics and moral philosophy, this semantic-logical difference between both translates as the difference between fact (what is) and values (what ought to be). The practical consequence, first developed by Hume and Kant and later by Poincaré, is appropriately resumed in the maxim, “It is impossible to derive what is from what ought to be (exceptionally, the inverse is possible).” Hence, axiological and empirical certainties, according to this scheme, have not only different origins but also preclude each other inasmuch as axiological certainties can never be derived from empirical certainties.

statements are verifiable/falsifiable. The relevance/irrelevance of the latter opinion will be discussed later in this paper.

Moral debates are often animated by opposite moral statements or by opposite moral positions. Moral statements about human behavior are always associated with the (moral) justice of the statements’ performance. This is to say that they are always perceived as just by those who produce them, regardless of their content. The question whether the statement’s content is just or not does not affect the justice of the performance (signifier). Hence, opposite moral statements are equivalent in regards to the correctness of their performance. The two statements, “This man is doing terrorism” and “This man is fighting for freedom,” are, thus, morally equivalent statements.

Such moral equivalence holds for moral relativism. Slogans such as “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” “One man’s crime for the just cause (“just” crime) is another man’s unjust crime,” and “What we do is counter-terrorism; what the other does is terrorism” spring from moral relativism.

What we believe is good or bad just and unjust, is central to descriptive ethics. The opposite is normative ethics which deals with what people should believe is good and evil, just and unjust.

At first glance, normative ethics can help to override the moral equivalency as it is involved in the morally rooted speech about terrorism. In fact, this is not possible, principally for two major reasons. The first one is rooted in general ethics; the second refers to the ethics of terrorism:

1. Moral relativism itself is the particular branch of normative ethics that provides for the maxim, “People shall believe that morals are relative.” The opposite is moral realism for which the central thesis is “People shall believe that morals are absolute, not relative.” The scheme cannot provide for a solution in that it supplants the moral equivalence that is involved in descriptive ethics by means of normative equivalency, which is involved in normative ethics.

2. Descriptive ethics are generally and genuinely determined by normative ethics. What we believe is good and evil, just and unjust, emanates to a large degree from the normative ethics (e.g., law, philosophy, religion, and culture) that tell us what we should believe. In the debate about terrorism, moral relativism, as it is involved in descriptive ethics and demonstrated by the slogans mentioned above, is largely determined by and genuinely associated with the equivalency of normative ethics as they are provided by the modern philosophical political narrative and its repercussions on social theory and sociology. For argument’s sake, Rousseau’s freedom fighter/fighter who makes use of the right to resist against oppression is Hobbes’ and Kant’s terrorist (see Hobbes’ [1660] Leviathan, Chapters XV, XVII, and XXIX, and Kant’s [1790, 1796] The Science of Right, Second Part). This assumes that the inherent normative ethics in modern political philosophical narrative are normatively equivalent. Consensus (Durkheim) and conflict theory (Marx/Hobbes), the social theoretical matching pieces, are equivalent, too.

The meta-ethics of terrorism offer ethically valid solutions to ethical conflicts as they develop on the grounds of moral and normative relativism. The following observation comes as support: When I express the opinion that, in terrorism, normative ethics
cause damage to democracy rather than provide for support, it is because I am convinced about the negative impact of that branch of normative ethics, which, in legal philosophy and justice theory, advocates the need for a transcendental, either natural, supernatural, or metaphysical, law that works, according to the teleological conception of justice, as a moral policeman whose aim is to correct or to prevent legality’s actual or potential injustice, and who is committed, according to his deontology, to punish the sovereign whenever the legal exercise of his power is unjust or abusive. Such a conviction is rooted in a moral judgment in favor of the normative ethics that in legal philosophy and justice theory support the morals of democracy’s and crime’s legality and contrary to those normative ethics that in legal philosophy and justice theory support the right of resistance. The normative authority of this judgment is equal in regard to the normative authority of the opposite judgment. Given the equivalence in normative authority, it follows that our initial statement, to be valid without contradiction, can be performed at the condition only that its normative authority is sufficiently strong to be not contradicted or annihilated by the normative authority that is inherent in the opposite statement. It is sufficiently strong when it is rooted in and refers to a framework of ethics other than the framework of normative ethics—that is, when it is rooted in and refers to meta-ethics. Meta-ethics only grant stronger normative authority to a statement that within the framework of normative ethics is as valid and strong as it is its opposite.

Hence, the meta-ethics of normative terrorism ethics offer an ethical, valid solution to ethical conflicts as they develop on the grounds of the inversion of the victim-offender scheme (equivalence) in the equivalence of the normative authority of those normative ethics that, within the frame of modern political philosophy, support the theory of the just crime/crime for the just cause (i.e., terrorists fight for the just cause/exercise the right for resistance against oppression, etc.) (Rousseau/ Marx) and those normative ethics that reject the theory (Hobbes/Kant). Finally, the meta-ethics of normative terrorism ethics offer a radical solution to the ethical problem that develops on the grounds of the postulated distinction between terrorism and diverse forms of political violence and nonconventional war (e.g., freedom fighting, movement of national liberation, resistance against oppression).

To better understand the way meta-ethics works and prompts the ethical collapse of moral relativism as it is involved in descriptive and normative terrorism ethics, let us consider the following example:

Terrorists are likely to be considered in public opinion, as well as in political and intellectual circles, as the victims of oppressive and unequal politics. The inherent rationale of this scheme supplants the quality of the real victim of the terrorist attack by that of the offender (terrorist). The meta-ethical counter-offensive comes in the following way: If the victim were the offender and the offender the victim, life would be synonymous with death and death synonymous with life. Life and death would be confused. This is contradicted by the whole of Jewish and Christian normative ethics. Hence, the inversion and the equivalence between life and death that is involved is a perversion of Jewish and Christian ethics as they develop on the basis of the Ten Commandments. Thus, if we use the Ten Commandments as a meta-ethical reference, the prohibition “Thou shalt not murder” is absolute and not up for debate. What is not up for debate translates, at the cognitive level, as absolute axiological certainty. It follows that terrorism is evil, not because we believe that, not because the norm of criminal law would make us believe that, and not even because the normative ethics
of Hobbes and of Kant command us to believe that, but because the prohibition of murder, as it is stated in that commandment is absolute. The fact that this absolute maxim is generally shared by the majority of us, even by the terrorist—otherwise it would make no sense to provide moralization to the crime of terrorism!—comes as support for Nagel and Putnam inasmuch as the absolute command constitutes an empirical certainty, though it is not required for consensus. The absolute prohibition which transcends descriptive and normative ethics does not require consensus because it transcends religious ethics and is an inherent part of Jewish and Christian normative ethics. In turn, the meta-ethical counter-offensive offers an ethically valid solution to the ethical conflict between Hobbes/Kant and Rousseau/Marx. The meta-ethical Diktat operates to the detriment of Rousseau’s and Marx’s normative ethics inasmuch as the latter provides support to the inversion of the victim-offender scheme. The meta-ethical Diktat also provides for the *jus ad bellum* (Gilly, 2007, 2008b):

The right to fight against oppression and for the human right of liberty perverts human right when its exercise allows both the violation and the complete annihilation of the basic human right of life through lack of which the other one, the right of liberty, is inconceivable, empirically and ethically, simply because free people are basically people (empirical argument) and because the contrary argument that consists of the idea that the human right for life is conceivable under the condition that life is free culminates into an ethical monstrosity: [Shall only] free people have the right to live? Are people who are not free people human beings? (Gilly, 2008b, pp. 73-74)

Finally the meta-ethical decisionmaking for the absolute primacy of Hobbes’ and Kant’s ethics upon those developed by Rousseau and Marx prompts the collapse of the diverse variants of the right for resistance against oppression as they arise from the old theory of Tyranticide. Given the circumstance that for both authors the right to resist against oppression is inconceivable inasmuch as resistance is absolutely illegal, the various attempts made in order to define terrorism’s unique nature by distinguishing the former from other forms of political conflict/violence become somehow artificial and superfluous, simply because such attempts, by operating the opposition between terrorism and other forms of political violence (freedom fighting, emancipation movements) no longer makes sense in regard to Hobbes and Kant, all the more so as such an opposition develops on the basis of a moral statement that grants that other resistance against oppression, national liberation movements, and other forms of political conflict and violence are, to some extent, legitimate actions.

To demonstrate the irrelevance of the preceding observation, one may argue that terrorism, as correctly pointed out by Henry Kissinger, is neither war nor political conflict but, rather, it is a method. Such an argument does not work, however. First, since the distinction between terrorism and various forms of political violence and conflict can be operated on the condition that the parameter of comparison is the same in both cases. As political conflicts are conflicts and not methods, the parameter for comparison is necessarily the conflict. Second, the right for resistance against oppression and the right to fight for liberty and emancipation, by lack of legality and legitimacy, can no longer provide moral support to the method we call terrorism. As terrorism is involved in the war that fights radical Islam and as the war propaganda is based upon the moralization of terrorism as it is supported by the right of resistance, the collapse of the latter heavily threatens the propaganda enterprise as well as the war strategy that aims to gain the sympathy of the mass media and public opinion.
Conceptual Challenges

Terrorism and Armed Political Conflicts

If we agree with the opinion that terrorism is a method, it follows logically that terrorism can be used in all sorts of armed conflicts. The observation is valid in regards to war, namely in regards to asymmetric conflicts, in movements of national liberation, in revolts, and in political violence as they develop in response to the right to resist oppression. Governments as well as citizens may use terrorism. For argument’s sake, terrorism has been used in the Algerian war of independence by both the National Front of Liberation in Algeria (FLN) and the Organisation Armée Sécrète (Secret Army Organization) (OAS). Terrorism has been used by the Palestinians in the fight for the establishment of a nation. In the literature, Iran and Syria are associated with state-sponsored terrorism. The preceding observation does not affect the thesis that argues that terrorism is to be distinguished from armed political conflicts inasmuch as the former does not respect the rules that govern traditional armed conflicts, namely little and big wars. Rather, it means that in asymmetrical political conflicts, terrorism might be used either as an exclusive strategy or as a strategy that applies as a complement to warfare. Asymmetric armed conflicts are predisposed towards terrorism inasmuch as terrorism is used by the weaker as a means to counter-balance the military and technological advantage of the stronger. On that account, guerilla warfare and terrorism can be thought of as the same strategic goals, though the concept of guerilla warfare refers traditionally to a rural context and is considered in current literature as a distinguished topic. Asymmetric conflicts apply to warring states, to conflicts between states and national liberation movements, to the struggle between governments and revolutionary movement, and finally to the struggle between governments and citizens who revolt.

Given that asymmetric conflicts are predisposed towards terrorism and considering that terrorism is to be distinguished from armed political conflicts (war and guerilla) inasmuch as the former does not respect the rules that govern the latter, it follows

- that terrorism is illegal in regard to the *jus in bello*.
- that the distinction between terrorism and armed conflicts is frail inasmuch as terrorism develops on the basis of asymmetric conflicts, which themselves develop on the basis of regular warfare and vary as a function of strategic requirements.

Let us now discuss this current distinction and traditional interpretation scheme against the background of the most significant events in the history of terrorism and in regards to recent developments in warship history:

- The 9/11 attacks constituted an act of terrorism. But what they represent is not only an irregular or even illegal declaration of war (that does not respect the rules that govern traditionally the engagement in war), but they were also an act of war that, here again, does neither respect the rules and conventions that govern the entry into war nor the *jus in bello* as it stems from the Geneva Conventions. On that account, 9/11 is comparable to the surprise attack of Pearl Harbor in World War II in regards to the nature of the events and their significance.
- Among the most striking changes and transformations that have affected the nature of war during the last decade are
• the substitution of a multifaceted and multilocated battlefield that covers all parts of the world for a unique or a central battlefield, more or less clearly identifiable and stable, and represented by a region, a country, or even a continent.
• the media and public opinion as a stage that has become central to warship (i.e., war in and by means of media and public opinion).
• the progressive involvement of civilians in warship strategy.

Therefore, the conceptual challenge lies in the paradigmatic turn that supplants the paradigmatic understanding of terrorism as it arises from the distinction between terrorism and armed political conflicts by that of an all over covering concept of warship which evolves from the maxim granting that war, today, is increasingly unconventional—in regards to the *jus in bello* and in regards to the battlefields as well as the central role of the media and public opinion.

As far as terrorism is defined as the transgression of the rules that govern traditional warfare, the new paradigm argues that the war that is being conducted by radical Islam against the Western world is terrorism. Two major questions arise on the grounds of this new paradigm:

1. How can the battle against irregular and unconventional warship be won when the latter is conducted in accordance with both conventional war strategy and *jus in bello*? Can we win it?

2. Are these restrictions in fundamental rights and liberties involved in the new strategy as it develops on the grounds of the new paradigm? Are they suitable and, if yes, to which point? Shall mass media no longer cover strategically highly relevant operations? The fact is that terrorists, during a given operation, adapt their tactic as a function of the event as it is covered “live” by the media and perceived in public opinion.

**How Shall We Deal with These Issues?**

Suppose that due to their traditions of human rights and the authority of the Geneva Conventions, the democracies of the Western world are not engaging in a new strategy. Is it then that warship subcontracting will eventually be associated with pacification as it derives from the British experience? Could this be an appropriate and realistic strategic option that offers the advantage of being combined with conventional (limited) warship?

These questions prompt several others:

At which point is the British experience with pacification susceptible to be copied? The war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan witness the limits and the counterproductive effects of such a strategic option.

As for subcontracting warship, suppose strong democracies, to successfully fight an unconventional war, are willing to engage in partnership with states that, due to their political tradition and their political constitution, have no problems with the transgression of the rules that govern *jus in bello* and, therefore, are more predisposed than our liberal Western democracies towards unconventional
warship. In other words, we let them do the dirty part of the war by means of warship subcontracts. This issue prompts several more questions.

Since totalitarian states or dictatorships might be involved, the first question that arises is, “Are they trustworthy and to what point can Western liberal democracies trust them?” In unconventional warship, subcontracting implies per definition a certain autonomy of the partner in regard to military action and command (including a counter-intelligence agency). The second question that comes to the fore of the debate is, “Are these activities controllable and, if so, how and to which point are the army, the intelligence services, and other security agencies of Western liberal democracies in the war against radical Islam capable of risk prevention?” The issue is particularly relevant in regards to secret strategic alliances and warship networks that might damage the strategic interests as well as the security of democracy (e.g., the warship subcontract partner partially delegates its subcontract to enemies or frail supporters of Western liberal democracy). Given the circumstance that we are in war against radical Islam and Islamic terrorism, the question of the criteria that shall guide the selection of our partner is highly relevant. Shall we choose the partner with reference to the criterion of Islam?

The advantage of this option stems from the evidence that Muslim states that are engaged in warship subcontracts are more aware of the complexity of the Islamic world than we are; consequently, they might be presumed to be more predisposed than non-Islamic countries towards the war against radical Islamism. On the contrary, the Islamic world is actually overflowing in the wages of radicalization; political instability is also a factor. Therefore, the other option that consists of warship subcontracting with partners outside the Islamic world is an issue worthy of consideration. The criterion of laity is another one.

**Terrorism and Political Crime**

It has long since been assumed that terrorism constitutes a particular facet of crime. It has been argued that terrorism, because of its manifest political dimension, is an issue that is to be distinguished from ordinary crime. In public opinion, and as considered by social and political sciences, the concept is labeled as a politically and intellectually correct issue. Curiously enough, the label fits in with the political connotation of threats and offenses against the sovereign’s power and authority, as it is developed by Hobbes and Kant on the grounds of the crime of *Lèse Majesté*. Such an opinion is to be considered against the background of legal history. The distinction between ordinary and political offenses has indeed a long tradition. The legal history supports terrorism’s classification under the general heading of political crime; criminology’s support is an added element. Lombroso, Garofalo, and Ferri already pointed to the difference between ordinary and political criminals. The question of whether terrorism and terrorists are to be governed by the rules of the common criminal law or not came rapidly to the forefront of the legal debate. In this respect, it is noteworthy that many sentenced terrorists have claimed the right to be granted with the status of political prisoners instead of being subjected to the status of ordinary criminals.

In democracy, the inherent rules of the criminal law regime that apply to political crime and to political prisoners are traditionally softer than those of the common criminal law regime. The lawmakers’ refusal to supplant the common regime by the special rules that govern political crime is not a surprise. A second explanation for the lawmakers’ attitude points at the inherent ambiguities of the distinction’s criteria, either criminological or
legal. Which criterion is to be applied? Is it a subjective one that focuses on the motivation of the agent, or is it an objective one according to Ortolan which refers exclusively to the political nature of the result or the target at which it is aimed? Although the rules are traditionally softer, they are harder when the distinction is made with reference to the objective criterion. Authoritarian states’ lawmakers are likely to support the objective criterion and to hyper-emphasize the political nature of crime, with the political transfiguration of ordinary crime as the most important consequence, whereas liberal democracies’ lawmakers support, instead, the subjective criterion.

Suppose that the lawmaker of a democratic liberal state, instead of dealing with terrorism as an issue that comes under the competence of the rules that govern the common criminal law regime, places terrorism under the general heading of political crime. Suppose, furthermore, that political crime is defined with reference to the objective criterion. It is then that liberal democracy is always suspected of authoritarian deviance—it is potentially totalitarian. The inverse case is not better either. The softer regime is likely to encourage people to become terrorists, and there is a great chance that it grants legitimacy and political and moral correctness to terrorists. Here is neither the place to engage in a debate about the advantages and disadvantages of both criteria, nor is it our purpose to study in-depth the pros and cons for both regimes. However, some observations should be made in regards to this:

• As far as the new paradigm (war as terrorism) grants that terrorism, being understood as unconventional warfare, is aimed at a political goal, the option of terrorism as a political crime in the objective sense of the term may be thought of as the legal matching-piece of the paradigm turned into warship strategy.

• The objective conception of political crime presents the advantage of being supported by exactly those normative ethics (Hobbes and Kant) which imply the collapse of terrorism’s morally veiled legitimization.

• The objective conception of political crime is the only one that fits well with the strategic requirements as they are utilized in a war that is battled at the homeland and global security levels.

Nontraditional Warship: Objective Concept of Political Crime and Organized Crime

It is clear that the ordinary criminal regime can hardly be applied to recent trends and developments in terrorism matters. Terrorism, in our times, is more than ever before thought of as a great war. This does not necessarily mean that terrorism is always synonymous with war. As pointed out by Kissinger (2008), what we call terrorism refers to a method; what terrorism really represents is quite another thing. If we refer to the common understanding of the word terrorism, it can hardly be synonymous with war.

As a method, terrorism is traditionally used in asymmetric conflicts. However, during the last decade, terrorism has developed from a method to a real strategy. What is involved in the process that supplants terrorism as a method with terrorism as a strategy is the transformation of the quality and the nature of asymmetric conflicts. Terrorism can no longer be thought as a method that is used by the weak in an asymmetric conflict, and it can no longer be thought of as the traditional concept of asymmetric conflict either. It is because the development from a method into a strategy implies the inversion of the weak—a strong scheme as it is involved in...
the traditional understanding of asymmetric conflict inasmuch as terrorism as a method or a tactic to reach a goal has become the quintessential war strategy. Thus, terrorism is no longer a means (method) to reach a goal; rather, it has become the goal itself. That strategy consists of using the civil population as a human shelter for terrorist attacks and against counterterrorism operations. What is involved here is the deliberate will to put the civil population at real risk in order to profit from the mass media exploitation of the “murder.” Might it then not be that the weak are the ones who are constrained by the terrorists to operate in areas with very dense civil populations and to make errors, though demonstrating a real and major concern for the tenets of the Geneva Conventions? Who are the weak—the ones who respect the Geneva Conventions but cannot always act as they want, not because they have the will to transgress the Geneva Conventions, but because the ones in command want them to act this way? Or is it the latter?

Per definition, terrorism is the attack on innocent civil populations. It is rooted in the deliberate transgression of the Geneva Conventions. It is that deliberate transgression which distinguishes terrorism from the rules that govern combat and war. But what happens to this traditional scheme when the systematic use of the civil population as a human shelter has become central to a strategy of war? Who are the strong—the ones who cannot fight a war because they are respectful of the rules of war? Or the enemy who fights his war without respect for the rules of war? Obviously, the scheme collapses.

When the civil population is used to win a war, when terrorism consists of the deliberate exposure of the civil population to risk with nuclear and biochemical threats, is it then not necessary to think of terrorism as an unconventional war? Suppose it is. It follows that the systematic transgression of the Geneva Conventions can no longer serve as criterion for the distinction between terrorism and war. Rather, it is the opposite. The systematic transgression is the criterion by virtue of which terrorism must be considered as unconventional war.

The crucial and certainly most controversial question, as already mentioned, is then, “How can a war that is respectful of the rules that govern war be successfully fought against an enemy who fights his war without any respect for the rules of war?”

In this respect, the ordinary regime (common law) can hardly be considered an appropriate means of counterterrorism. It is also clear that the humanitarian-faceted fundamentals of our liberal criminal justice system no longer are suitable with unconventional war strategies and with security requirements. For argument’s sake, ordinary crime prevention, restorative justice, mediation, the offender’s reintegration in social life—all of these issues and many others that witness the humanitarian concerns of our criminal justice system are more or less irrelevant to war, either little or big. The question of the offender’s political motivation (subjective criterion) is not relevant either to mega-attacks such as 9/11, suicide bombers, nor nuclear or biochemical threats. In this regard, it is an issue rather than a scandalous provocation. Furthermore, the argument that terrorism is to be distinguished from war because terrorists do not respect the rules that govern traditional warship can never affect the circumstance that today’s terrorism is an inherent part of war in global terms.

In all these instances, the challenge does not consist in raising the question of whether terrorists do or do not respect the rules that govern traditional war; rather, it consists in engaging in a debate about the opportunity or even the necessity to
associate terrorism with war—albeit a nontraditional war that escapes from the rules that traditionally govern the engagement in war itself. Attempts have been made to associate recent forms of terrorism with crime against humanity. This is a perspective that is worth seriously considering and developing.

To take up the challenge, there is an urgency to engage in a debate about developing at the level of law a scheme that is respectful of the preceding considerations and that is aimed at combining special, but inherent, topics of criminal law (crime against humanity) with new counterterrorism strategies as required by untraditional warship and to adjust traditional topics of criminal law by shifting the focal center from the ordinary to the objective criterion of political crime. The scheme does not preclude the association of such topics with those legal dispositions that currently govern the issue of organized crime. Given the multiple linkages between terrorism, organized crime, and money laundering, and considering the results obtained in recent research, such a combination is a necessity rather than a purely opportune think-piece. After all, organized crime is a highly relevant issue politically, and obviously such political relevance needs to be considered against the background of the objective criterion, not with reference to the subjective criterion.

Endnotes

1 For a systematic critique, see Cottee (2004).

2 See Gilly (2008) and also Gilly (2005b). The article was also published on the website of ICSP both in Czech and in English. In folder ACTUALITY, it was presented from August to October 2005; since this time, it has still been available in ACTUALITY-ARCHIVE 2005. Czech version: www.ok.cz/iksp/docs/p051118c.doc and English version: www.ok.cz/iksp/docs/p051118e.doc.

3 On this issue, see Gilly (2007).

Bibliography


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Dr. Gilly is author of more than 100 articles published in French, American, Russian, and German reviews. He gained his Master in Political Philosophy, with specializations in Terrorism, Applied and Normative Ethics, Legal History, and Political Philosophy. Dr. Gilly’s social and professional activities demonstrate a strong commitment to the knowledge exchange and transfer between Russia, Central Europe, and the American community of scientists.
Book Review

Investigating the Russian Mafia

Reviewed by Richard Allan, Brooklyn Law School

The author of Investigating the Russian Mafia may earn his present income in an academic environment, but unlike works by other scholars, Joe Serio’s world began outside the ivy walls when he was imbedded with the Organized Crime Control Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) prior to the collapse of the Soviet Empire. From there, his experience extended to his assignment as director of the Moscow Bureau of a global corporate investigation company. The author once told me that, when working in Moscow, he had to dress and comport himself as if he were a citizen of the East. His safety in Moscow was so tenuous that it required that he carry his passport, sufficient currency, and an open airline ticket on his person at all times.

It was, therefore, with reasonable eagerness that I approached the reading of Investigating the Russian Mafia—how compelling and how complete would be the narrative and the material. Let me begin with my conclusion. The book should be bought, read, reread, and then placed on a shelf with those works you know you will refer to in the future.

Investigating the Russian Mafia is viewed through a multi-prism approach. Although the title includes the subtitle, An Introduction for Students, Law Enforcement and International Business, I submit that it was written for anyone who desires a better understanding of the world they reside in and the impact of that understanding on their own lives. The word mafia conjures up an overflowing number of real and false premises, some true but most false, as we tend to think of the mafia based upon a mixture—part the creation of Hollywood and part with its foundation in the Italian culture and language centered in the southern portion of the Italian peninsula. A study of the Russian mafia demands that we think in an entirely different context, a new language, a new culture, and take an entirely different approach to the meaning of the word itself—mafia.

The author, whose writing is almost conversational in tone, introduces us to Russian police authorities who bridled at the term mafia when applied to their criminal/organized crime problems. There was no small group—as in the Italian mafia—of crime families or a commission that formed the nucleus of the criminal activity in that country. While powerful groups did, in fact, exist, there was, as the author recounts, no resolute effort by a single group or even a small number of groups to control the post-Soviet criminal world. What did exist was a vital system of relationships and access among various sectors of society with the Communist Party in the dominant role and the conventional criminal world playing a relatively minor part. In addition, the author rightly emphasizes that in discussing criminality within Russia society, three elements must be considered in distinguishing it from that of other nations. In addition to language and ethnicity, which is so crucial to understanding its very unique nature and the complexity of its prevailing conditions, the Russian mafia flourished in a country of rich, almost
untapped natural resources ready for pillage and was supported and sustained by widespread corruption.

For those with a mind for statistics, there is more than enough to satisfy the most avaricious need for that type of information. Of the eleven chapters that intersect this book, one that intrigued me was titled “Vory v Zakone.” In it the author illustrates the development of a criminal code to unite professional criminals during a time when their code contained prescriptions for daily life: that a thief had to turn his back on his family, that it was forbidden for a thief to work, and that a thief had to live off the fruits of criminal activity only. The author takes us from the late-Soviet era to the post-Soviet period and the evolution of the Vory v Zakone and the “survival mechanism” that transformed it from seeking “power, influence, and position”—what the corrupt criminality of the Soviet day sought as its currency—to money as the current foundation of its power.

Other chapters providing insight into the evolution of the Soviet economy must be read in tandem with the chapter reviewing Soviet law enforcement. Initially, Soviet law enforcement was either totally unprepared or unwilling to deal with organized crime while facing a population whose lack of respect for the police was palpable and who parenthetically played a key role in the development of the gulag system. Not only is the Russian economy poorly coordinated, but we learn that the real threats to its national economy range from gangsters and former Communist Party officials to the state security apparatus and police. Thus, across a wide spectrum, we find disparate criminal intent all fighting for control over the marketplace.

By the end of the 1990s, the government finally admitted that in the war against organized crime, the government had lost. In an August 2005 poll, it was found, unbelievably to a Western mindset, that the public identified the police with crime to a greater extent than any other organization. To the author of the book, the Russian mafia’s effect in the United States has yet to reach its potential impact.
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