The *Law Enforcement Executive Forum* is published six times per year by the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board’s Executive Institute. The journal is sponsored by Western Illinois University in Macomb, Illinois.

Subscription: $40 (see last page)

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Editorial

In an increasingly complex society, the cultivation of community infrastructure becomes evermore important. Citizens desire and need the support that a well-functioning community offers and have a need to be a part of something larger than themselves. In protecting themselves against crime, citizens need the police. In protecting the community against crime, police need the help of citizens. Over the past decade, a partnership between police and the community has been forged in such a way as to transform the role of police and the nature of services they provide to the community.

The focus of this issue of the Law Enforcement Executive Forum is “Police Patrol and the Community.” The heart of any successful community policing initiative involves the officer on the street—those officers who have day-to-day contact with the citizens, business owners, clergy, the schools, and youth. It is at this level that trust is earned. It is at this level that community members and police join hands to fight crime and protect their investment in community.

The series of articles contained herein are written by police scholars and practitioners addressing current thought, innovative programs, and strategies related to community service by police.

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Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board
Police Patrol Allocation in Context

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Introduction

Police patrol allocation has frequently been a topic of debate in police headquarters, political offices, and neighborhood groups. Hoover (2003) indicates that inquiries concerning the number of police officers needed in a particular community or neighborhood are continuous. Reflecting on the difficulty in ascertaining allocation patterns, Hoover states, “There are no fixed standards in this respect” (p. 1). He goes on to state that different communities demand different response times, levels of visibility, levels of proactive patrol, and levels of traffic enforcement. In addition, according to Hoover, community demand for neighborhood deployment of patrol officers is a significant factor. Hoover concludes, “A police manager has a finite amount of resources to do an infinite job. Given the nature of the police role, there is, for all practical purposes, no limit upon what a community might call upon the police to do” (p. 3).

In the following pages, we would like to examine, or reexamine, some of the factors that affect police administrators in their attempts to allocate patrol resources.

Police Patrol Allocation

First, let us be clear that the allocation of police patrol can only be understood in the larger context of political considerations/mandates, public demand, and the total allocation of police resources in a community. This has been clearly illustrated in the period following the terrorist attacks in the United States since September 11, 2001.

Prior to this date, municipal and county police had little to do with threats of terrorism that were largely dealt with at the national level. Since that date, municipal police forces have been called upon to provide increased protection at airports, seaports, chemical and industrial facilities, and university campuses among others, often with little or no increase in resources. According to Van Etten (2004), . . .

A wide array of critical infrastructure and key resources that are potential terrorist targets are owned and operated by local and state governments as well as the private sector located in the local community . . . Funding for law enforcement agencies is a growing concern for county and municipal governments that have to allocate adequate funding for the domestic security issues facing local governments. (pp. 31, 34)

In a survey conducted by Van Etten, almost 50% of the agencies responding indicated that they have had to reassign personnel to handle domestic security
issues. This might mean that agencies are reevaluating their allocation of manpower, reprioritizing their resources, and assessing what crimes will receive priority status (Van Etten, 2004, p. 33).

The institution and development of community policing, including problem-oriented policing, must not be overlooked when discussing factors complicating allocation decisions concerning the police. This approach is clearly more time consuming than more traditional policing approaches, and the number and types of police officers assigned to different areas must be recalculated when such programs are implemented.

Police allocation is never accomplished in a vacuum but is the product of those factors listed above as well as others. Among these other factors are the following (McCamey, Scaramella, & Cox, 2003, p. 64):

- Type of policing
- Type of neighborhood
- Crime patterns/rates
- Calls for service
- Traffic patterns
- Citizen desires
- Budget
- Productivity

Roberg and Kuykendall (1993, p. 313) indicate that there are at least three ways of analyzing factors such as those listed above to determine the number of police personnel needed in any jurisdiction: (1) intuitively, (2) comparatively, and (3) by workload. The intuitive approach is often based upon tradition, the number of crimes cleared, or the total number of arrests, but it is often little more than an educated guess. Using this approach, more police officers are typically required as the crime rate increases. Bayley (1994), however, indicates that this is little more than a game of catch-up that has no effect on the rate of increase in crime.

The comparative approach typically relies upon a ratio of police to citizens (number of officers per one thousand population) and comparisons between cities of similar size. This approach is not recommended due to differences in population characteristics, economic conditions, traffic patterns, and other unique characteristics of cities of similar size.

The workload approach depends upon the ability to define and analyze the workload in a rational manner. This requires determining the size of the patrol workload and the time required to perform the work and then translating that into the number of officers required in different areas at different times of day, different days of the week, and different seasons of the year. Patrol allocation is then based upon factors unique to areas, and such allocation seldom results in an equal number of officers being assigned to all areas. The areas with the highest crime rates are typically afforded the greatest amount of police patrol resources. Since these areas are often populated by minorities, charges of “overpolicing,” harassment, and civil rights violations based upon frequent use of stop-and-question and stop-and-frisk techniques often arise. In addition, allegations may be made that it is the number of police officers assigned to an area that determines in large measure what the crime rate in the area will be. This
is based upon the belief that the more officers there are watching for violations, the more violations will be detected. This implies that the police, themselves, contribute significantly to the crime rate (Taylor & Whitney, 1999). Thus, even the workload model, perhaps the best of the three discussed, has significant weaknesses. Some of these weaknesses may be overcome by taking into consideration the four categories of activities engaged in by patrol officers: (1) reactive; (2) proactive, self-initiated and community policing; (3) proactive, uncommitted patrol; and (4) administrative to define the workload (Stenzel, 1993).

To illustrate the importance of citizen desires as a factor in allocation of police personnel, we need only consider for a moment what would happen if police administrators, believing that the number of patrol officers assigned to an area determines in large measure the crime rate in that area, decided to cut the number of officers in high crime areas by a significant number. How long would it be before residents in the area and their political representatives began to criticize the police for “underpolicing”? (Cox & Hazlett, 2001, p. 97)

Based upon the complications described above, the Illinois State Police (1999) concludes that there is no exact science to the allocation of police personnel. While this may well be true, are there no factors that can help us identify at least the parameters of an allocation model?

Police Allocation Parameters

In 1994, the New York City Police Department, under police commissioner William Bratton initiated a management process known as COMPSTAT (Shane, 2004). COMPSTAT is a computer-based system developed by the New York City police department, and it is now used in a number of other cities as well (Schick, 2004). “COMPSTAT, a strategic crime-control technique, centers around four crime-reduction principles: accurate and timely intelligence, effective tactics, rapid deployment of personnel and resources, and relentless follow-up and assessment” (Shane, 2004, p. 13). This system and its counterparts generate timely and detailed information about criminal activity occurring within 24 hours of the criminal activity (Walker & Katz, 2002). To the extent that such programs focus solely on criminal behavior, they are subject to the criticisms above (e.g., local reporting differences, staff available, self-reported data, etc.). That is, using criminal activity as the sole determinant of police patrol allocation is unwise; however, if systems such as these can be broadened to include measures of the total workload of officers on a timely basis, they may be invaluable in allocating police resources, including patrol.

There is some evidence that this broadening of focus might be accomplished. The Denton, Texas, police department has instituted a program (based on COMPSTAT) known as CAMStat, which “is aimed at reducing criminal activity in every neighborhood” (Wiley & Smith, 2003, p. 47). More importantly, the computer language used “allows oncoming patrol units to view any or all call data from the previous shift . . . (which) enables officers to have a much clearer picture of the duties ahead by showing what has come before” (Wiley & Smith, 2003, p. 47).

A number of departments regularly conduct resident surveys in order to determine public satisfaction with and expectations of police services. These surveys are of value to the extent that they are conducted frequently and cover a broad spectrum
of police activities. Analysis of differences by race/ethnicity, neighborhood, income, education, experience with victimization, fear of crime, and level of trust in the police can easily be built into such surveys.

A study conducted in Charlotte, North Carolina, found that the characteristics of neighborhoods are important determinants of the amount of police resources required (LeBeau & Coulson, 1996). The study points out that communities are divided into different neighborhoods each characterized by certain routine activities performed at different times of the day or night. Comparisons of two neighborhoods at different ends of the quality-of-life continuum showed that the timing of calls for police services differed by type, quantity, and time of day.

Another patrol allocation study was conducted in order to develop a predictive model that would provide for the best possible deployment of police patrol personnel based upon the demand for police services at different times of the day, on different days of the week, and during different seasons of the year in Laguna Niguel, California (Spreine & Van Cleve, 2002). Among the specific activities noted in the Laguna Niguel study that should be considered when considering workloads of personnel are personal phone calls, administrative responsibilities, maintaining and cleaning equipment, report writing, eating, field briefings involving other officers, supervisor counseling, training, and time for personal needs.

In the belief that focusing police efforts of specific geographic areas can reduce crime, the Arlington, Texas, Police Department developed a “Geographic Policing Model” (Arlington’s, 1998). Arrest rates in Arlington increased steadily after the implementation of the geographic model (assignments by beat instead of shift as part of the community policing effort); however, this is attributed to the increase in the number of police personnel and in the number of personnel working afternoons and evenings.

The impact of the events of September 11, 2001, on police patrol allocation is illustrated by problems faced at the University of Illinois in Champaign/Urbana. After that date, according to Chief Oliver J. Clark, “Everybody recognized that we had greater concerns than we ever had before” (Bauer, 2004, p. A1). One of the first steps taken at the university was “to beef up security at Willard Airport, which is owned and operated by the U of I. In addition to federal transportation security workers to inspect luggage, university police maintain a constant presence at the airport. Working with university officials, Chief Clark increased security at major events, such as football and basketball games, concerts, and conferences” (Bauer, 2004, p. A3). In addition, training has been improved to include the goals of prevention, deterrence, and responsiveness to threats or acts of terrorism, all new duties for campus police as well as for most municipal police agencies.

Conclusions

Every police administrator is faced with the problem of providing a certain level of service to his/her community with a specified number of personnel . . . Many police functions do not lend themselves to precise time and motion studies, which might enable the police administrator to determine precisely his total police personnel needs . . . (yet the administrator must find a way to assign personnel to the places they are needed at the times they are needed
in proportion to the relative need for their services. (Iannone & Iannone, 2001, p. 291)

In order to determine proper allocation of police personnel and patrol officers in particular, it appears that a combination of parameters needs to be considered. This is particularly true when considering the impact of the events of September 11, 2001, and the requirements of community policing, both of which put an even greater strain on already limited police resources, and both of which clearly illustrate the need to consider factors other than crime rates when allocating police resources of whatever type. In an era of shrinking budgets, all possible approaches to improvement need to be considered.

“Effective management requires strategic planning, specific objectives, appropriate information, and the allocation of clear responsibility for monitoring and acting on response performance” (www.audit.com, 1998). Proactive policing based upon rapid assessment of reliable data, effective planning, quick response, and efficient deployment of resources holds out the possibility of rapid deployment of specific resources toward specific problems (Shane, 2003, p. 15).

References


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Is Assigning Patrol Officers Enough? Priorities and Community Policing: The Trojanowicz Perspective

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Beginning in the 1980s and through the 1990s, police departments turned to community policing as their purported method of operation. As a result, resources were diverted from customary patrol strategies to community policing efforts. We know that police departments have diverted resources to support community policing, but have they taken the necessary steps to optimize success? This study examines whether police departments have made changes to support community policing or merely reshuffled resources in a manner not likely to result in success and permanent change.

The work of Robert Trojanowicz is used to determine levels of commitment to community policing. Trojanowicz was a vocal advocate of community policing and an early force in the movement. His community policing research center provided consulting and training for thousands of American police officers. It is appropriate to use the work of Trojanowicz because his writings, consultations, site visits, and training seminars influenced many. He was an influential voice in American policing from the early 1980s until his death in 1994.

As a member of the Harvard Executive Sessions, Trojanowicz helped shape the rhetoric of police reform efforts and contributed to the widely read Perspectives on Policing series. He wrote a frequently cited community policing textbook and many widely circulated monographs. In 1992 alone, Trojanowicz received over 1,600 requests for information or consultations on community policing. At the 25th anniversary of Trojanowicz’s foot patrol experiment and the 10th anniversary of his death, we have an opportunity to use his work to evaluate police practices.

Selecting the work of Trojanowicz does not imply that he was the only or the most important voice of his time. The vast amount of community policing literature produced since the 1980s is the result of numerous policing scholars. Trojanowicz, however, was an important voice in the early community policing movement.

Literature Review

Historical accounts of the development of community policing vary, but three scholarly works are commonly referenced. Herman Goldstein’s (1979, 1990) concept of problem-solving policing helped to shift attention from the processes police use to the results they obtained. Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) theory of “Broken Windows” linked disorder to serious crime. Robert Trojanowicz’s (Trojanowicz, 1982; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990a) foot patrol experiment linked police-community involvement to crime control. These works sparked a deluge of other research on community policing.
There have been many efforts to determine whether community policing has been more effective than traditional patrol and response tactics. Sadd and Grinc (1996) found that police departments implementing community policing were unsuccessful in communicating goals to employees, and officers had difficulty adjusting to their new role. McGuire (1997) examined data from two national studies and concluded that organizational structure had not changed and levels of specialization actually increased under community policing. In a later effort when examining structural changes in police organizations, he found mixed evidence that community policing was being implemented (McGuire, Shin, Zhao, & Hassell, 2003). Zhoa, Ni, and Lovrich (2003) conducted an extensive panel study of community-oriented policing during the 1990s. They found little change in the core priorities of the police.

Gianakis and Davis (1998), in a study of Florida police departments, argued that community policing is often a charade to legitimize existing structure; seldom has it brought meaningful change. The study found no association between the chief’s years in office or tenure with the agency and the organization’s level of commitment to community policing. On the other hand, Breci and Erickson (1998) concluded that there is strong support for community policing in their study of 89 police agencies, but again, organizations were less successful implementing internal changes.

Not only are the results of implementation studies mixed, but comparison is problematic due to inconsistent measures. Researchers examine, and uniquely define, different components of the concept of community policing. Each study examined different aspects. We are faced with the same problem encountered in the Indian fable in which six blind men attempted to describe an elephant by touching a single appendage—each was partially right, and all were wrong. With no clear universally accepted definition of community policing, it is difficult to compare the results of one study to another or to interpret the state of community policing implementation; therefore, this study focuses on only one researcher to measure effectiveness.

Trojanowicz began to explore the relationship between the community and police in his book Criminal Justice and the Community (Trojanowicz & Dixon, 1974). He argued that police had become disconnected from their communities and needed to change their focus from crime fighting to preventing crime by working with the public. He began to develop a theme of community involvement and police-community partnership.

His research in Flint, Michigan, came to define Trojanowicz’s work. In a quasi-field experiment between 1979 and 1981, he applied his belief that crime could be reduced through more cooperative police and community interaction (Trojanowicz, 1982). Though at the time he called this strategy foot patrol, it was clear Trojanowicz advocated more than just getting police officers out of patrol cars. He felt foot patrol officers needed to actively engage the public to reduce crime and solve problems. He emphasized crime prevention, citizen involvement, proactive programs, police and community partnerships, and officers acting as catalytic links between the community and public services. Trojanowicz attributed reductions in crime, decreased calls for service, and increased citizen satisfaction to this new style of policing. He continued to develop his concept of a police-community partnership to reduce crime and increase quality of life through a department-wide philosophy that guided or changed the role, actions, and behaviors of police officers.
Trojanowicz followed up his Flint study with a manual for practitioners implementing this new style of policing (Trojanowicz & Smyth, 1984). He outlined the appropriate management techniques and skills needed by officers. The manual provided a variety of sample forms and surveys and was intended as a guide for proactive policing whereby officers would link citizens to social services. Trojanowicz argued that officers needed to develop better skills in communication, interpersonal relations, and crisis intervention and become more knowledgeable about community resources and services. He suggested that police needed to more readily adapt to changing conditions and focus on citizen satisfaction with police service. Trojanowicz called for participative management and administrative change.

With financial support from a Mott Foundation grant, Trojanowicz created the National Neighborhood Foot Patrol Center later to become the National Center for Community Policing (NCCP). Through this structure, Trojanowicz disseminated his research and organized his consultations. The Center’s principal mission was to publish a series of monographs (called the Green Books because of the color of their cover) and a newsletter (Footprints) dedicated to specific aspects of community policing. Of the 24 monographs, Trojanowicz authored 20. The series began by reporting aspects of his Flint research, such as officers’ job satisfaction, perception of safety, and community perceptions of police service. Later issues addressed such concerns as implementing community policing, reducing brutality, and preventing civil disturbances. These monographs helped develop and clarify his thoughts on community policing. In these monographs, Trojanowicz developed what would become recurring themes in his work: participative management; community policing as a philosophy; structural adaptation; administrative change; community involvement; and the modification of training, selection, and evaluation. Trojanowicz widely distributed these monographs at no cost to individuals and organizations (domestic and international) upon request or through the Center’s mailing list.

An article in the Journal of Police Science and Administration (Trojanowicz, 1983) summarized his previously published report on the Flint foot patrol experiment; he described how governmental services were delivered to underserved communities while reducing crime and increasing citizen satisfaction in a racially diverse city plagued by high crime and unemployment.

As part of the Perspectives on Policing series published by the National Institute of Justice and Harvard University, Trojanowicz coauthored three articles. “Crime and Policing” (Moore, Trojanowicz, & Kelling, 1988) examined the failures of traditional police practices and advocated problem-solving, closer relations with the community, and strengthening the self-defense capacities of communities. “Policing and the Fear of Crime” (Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988a) proposed that police expand their narrow view of crime control. The authors contended that social conditions, which exacerbate citizens’ fear of crime, were a legitimate concern for police to address through communal crime control. The third article, “Corporate Strategies for Policing” (Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988b), applied an economic perspective to police administrative practices to show police evolving from using stifling, bureaucratic strategies to more open and innovative practices. They advocated reducing specialization, decentralizing organizational structure, and delivering services based primarily on geographic area. These three articles proposed broadening the role of police under the guidance of the community policing philosophy to more effectively fight crime, the fear of crime, and social and physical disorder.
One of his best-known works, *Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective* (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990a), summarized Trojanowicz’s research and consultations on community policing and had a broad impact on police studies (Wright & Miller, 1998). It described his philosophy and justified expanding the role and mission of police. His Flint foot patrol research was prominent in the presentation. Trojanowicz argued that community policing must be a philosophy encompassing all policing efforts. Problem solving, proactive efforts to reduce physical and social disorder, officer empowerment, active citizen participation, and decentralized service delivery all form the core of Trojanowicz’s plan. He favored management by objective as a strategy to empower officers to negotiate manageable steps toward solving specific problems. Trojanowicz presented his vision of the future in which community resource centers (he called them Neighborhood Network Centers) would provide decentralized social services through social service providers and community policing officers working together to reduce crime and social disorder.

Also in 1990, Trojanowicz wrote two articles for the *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* and one for *Police Technology Management*. The first (Trojanowicz & Carter, 1990) argued that community policing provided the flexibility and sensitivity necessary to deal with America’s aging population, growing diversity, and immigration. He advocated more bilingual and culturally diverse officers. The second article (Trojanowicz, 1990) differentiates community policing from the police-community relations movement. Community policing is a department-wide commitment to a philosophy; whereas, police-community relations was limited to isolated add-on programs within police agencies. The third article (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990b) discussed political obstacles to community policing. Trojanowicz discussed the importance of police managers’ efforts to persuade officers of the benefits of community policing. He argued that greater attention to order-maintenance crimes would reduce more serious crime. These three articles detailed Trojanowicz’s call for philosophical, structural, and administrative change so that the police can more effectively engage the public.

Trojanowicz returned to the implementation manual approach with his book *Community Policing: How to Get Started* (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1994). It addressed frequently asked questions and focused on requests Trojanowicz had received for more specific details on how to implement community policing. He directly addressed the complaint that no one was telling practitioners how to integrate community policing into police organization. The book was a collection of lists and directions for implementing community policing. It was one of the first publications to contain his definition of community policing:

> . . . a philosophy of full service personalized policing where the same officer patrols and works in the same area on a permanent basis, from a decentralized place, working in a proactive partnership with citizens to identify and solve problems. (p. 3)

This definition captures many of the elements Trojanowicz had developed in his writings on community policing.
By the early 1990s, Trojanowicz saw the need for a national assessment of community policing. *Community Policing: A Survey of Police Departments in the United States* (Trojanowicz, Woods, Harpold, Reboussin, & Trojanowicz, 1994) was an attempt to determine the state of community policing through the eyes of police executives. An extensive 168-question survey was sent to police executives throughout the United States. The study reports demographic information, elements of community policing, planning and implementation, and the perceived effect of community policing on crime and disorder. This report provided a snapshot of community policing in the United States and collected data on many of the aspects and elements of community policing.

In his final article, “The Future of Community Policing,” (Trojanowicz, 1994), Trojanowicz’s optimistic approach to promoting community policing turned ominous and foreboding. For the first time in his writings, he raised questions about the survival of the concept and expressed his “serious reservations about the future of community policing.” He postulated that the removal of social service agents from the community made services more remote and eliminated role models from neighborhoods. He proposed creating community resource centers where service providers could work together to address neighborhood problems because police could not do it alone. In his view, community policing would fail without help. He expressed concern as to whether police were willing to transform themselves, whether other service agencies would cooperate, and whether the public would participate in the vision of community policing.

The work of Robert Trojanowicz can be summarized in the following recurring themes:

- Community policing is a philosophy, department-wide in scope, which must guide and change the roles, actions, and behaviors of police officers.
- True community involvement in identifying, prioritizing, and solving problems of crime and social and physical disorder is required.
- Participative management strategies that involve all members of the police department in the planning and implementation of community policing are essential.
- Police administrators must thoroughly prepare the organization through open communication and adequate training and planning to implement community policing.
- Organizations must be structured to allow broader line-level decisionmaking by generalist police officers.
- Police organizations need to be administered in a manner that reflects the mission of community policing, facilitates community policing, and rewards officers for actions that promote community policing.

Trojanowicz felt that police organizations should become more service-oriented and responsive by reducing layers of bureaucracy and specialization while transferring more decision-making responsibility to line-level officers in order to facilitate working partnerships between officers and the public.
Methodology

The data from a national survey of U.S. police departments conducted by the National Center for Community Policing and the Behavioral Sciences Unit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Trojanowicz et al., 1994) is used to evaluate police practices. The survey instrument was designed principally by Trojanowicz to collect data on the aspects of organizational behavior he believed were important to the implementation of community policing. The survey was comprehensive and national in scope. Data were collected during a critical period when community policing was taking root across the United States and at the height of Trojanowicz’s influence.

The survey instrument was sent to chief executives (i.e., chief, sheriff, director) of all U.S. law enforcement agencies that serve a population of 50,000 or more, or having 100 or more sworn officers (n = 686). Five hundred fifty-five surveys were returned for a response rate of 81%, and of these, 546 were usable. Two hundred twenty nine (42%) of these respondents reported that they were engaged in community policing. The data used in this study is drawn from this subset of 229 police departments. To focus on local law enforcement, four state agencies were removed from the sample. Two hundred twenty-five surveys were determined to be suitable for analysis. (This left a data pool of 199 city police departments and 26 sheriffs’ departments.)

Community policing has been defined as everything from a “catch-all phrase for all that is new” (Wolford, 1994) to a comprehensive restructuring of policing philosophy (Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988; Sparrow, Moore, & Kennedy, 1990; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990a). Often, discussions on community policing become hopelessly mired in this imprecise lexicon. Participants must decipher each other’s meaning before they can effectively communicate. While it may seem that there is no limit to the definitions of community policing, most do not reflect community policing as Trojanowicz envisioned it. This matter is resolved in this study by using Trojanowicz’s own definition as stated previously. This definition and Trojanowicz’s writings are used to construct a scale to measure levels of commitment to community policing in police organizations.

Initially, a few useful variables in the data set that reflected the common themes found in Trojanowicz’s writings were identified: a philosophy of department-wide commitment, which includes addressing social and physical disorder through problem solving; participative management; preparing the organization through planning and training; de-specialization; and rewarding community policing efforts. The adjustments that agencies made to their structure and procedures in order to measure their commitment to community policing were examined. A similar approach was successfully applied to evaluate job descriptions and definitions of community policing used by the police (Ziembo-Vogl & Woods, 1996).

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in this study is a scale of behaviors or actions that Trojanowicz believed indicated whether an organization was committed to community policing. The scale items were derived from questions on the 1994 survey that related to the recurring themes in his writings and his definition of community policing. The term organizational commitment is used to describe adherence to the activities and changes that are recommended by Trojanowicz when implementing community policing.
From his writings and definition, 43 elements in the original survey were identified and used to construct the commitment scale (See Table 1). Each element is coded from zero to one. Most of the elements are dichotomous. The theoretical range of the scale is 43, with zero indicating adoption of none of the elements and 43 indicating adoption of all the elements (alpha = .78).

**Table 1**

**Variables in Commitment Scale**

- Chief involved in planning/implementation
- Top command involved in planning/implementation
- Middle management involved in planning/implementation
- First-line supervisors involved in planning/implementation
- Line officers involved in planning/implementation
- Civilians involved in planning/implementation
- Special units involved in planning/implementation
- Community leaders involved in planning/implementation
- Community residents involved in planning/implementation
- Political leaders involved in planning/implementation
- Other governmental agencies involved in planning/implementation
- Business leaders involved in planning/implementation
- Consultants involved in planning/implementation
- Others involved in planning/implementation
- Department-wide commitment to community policing
- Community policing mission statement
- Hiring guidelines reflect community policing
- Officer training reflects community policing
- Manager training reflects community policing
- Civilian training reflects community policing
- Performance evaluation reflects community policing
- Promotional process reflects community policing
- Work rules reflect community policing
- Management structure reflects community policing
- Established defined community policing beats
- Amount of training for community police officers
- Time officers assigned to their beat area
- Program addresses fear of crime
- Program addresses social disorder
- Program addresses physical disorder
- Solicit support/participation from citizens
- Solicit support/participation from community leaders
- Solicit support/participation from political leaders
- Solicit support/participation from government officials
- Solicit support/participation from volunteers
- Community nominates/prioritizes problems
- Sergeants spend more time in community
- Middle management spends more time in community
- Top command spends more time in community
- Chief/sheriff spends more time in community
- Recognition/reward program reflects community policing
- Sworn officers express community policing philosophy in their jobs
- Unsworn officers express community policing philosophy in their jobs
Independent Variables

Department Size. Some have argued that the goal of community policing is to bring small town police-citizen interactions to large urban police departments. Understandably, this may be a difficult transformation for very large organizations. Police department size was measured in four ways: (1) total employees, (2) number of sworn officers, (3) population of jurisdiction, and (4) square miles of jurisdiction.

Selection and Security of Chief/Sheriff. Chiefs and sheriffs are public officials who operate in political environments. The feasibility of a new policy rests, in part, with the chief/sheriff’s view of his or her mission and the risk associated with adopting the policy. Trojanowicz often spoke of the necessity of job security for police chiefs. Three characteristics of the chief/sheriff are examined. The length of service as chief/sheriff (in months) was examined to determine whether newer or more established chief executives are more likely to implement community policing. The method of selecting the chief executive (whether promoted from within the department or hired from outside the department) was examined to determine whether insiders or outsiders are more likely to implement community policing. The security of the chief executive (whether the chief/sheriff has an employment contract) was examined to determine whether the safety of an employment contract influenced the likelihood of a chief executive implementing community policing.

Economic Factors. Organizations require resources to function. Resources are sometimes used to encourage change through supplementing or supplanting organizational budgets. (For example, the 1994 Crime Bill would later use funding to induce departments to implement community policing.) Respondents were asked to characterize three economic measures:

1. The condition of the local economy (four responses from thriving to declining)
2. Whether their department received additional funds to implement community policing (new local, state, or federal governmental funds; drug forfeiture monies; tax/millage; foundation grant; funds from business; or other)
3. Whether the department received an increase in personnel

Policy Issues. This area examined two policy issues that may affect the implementation of community policing: (1) civilianizing the workforce or the department’s reliance on civilian employees (five responses from great extent to not at all), and (2) experience with community policing or the length of time the organization had been practicing community policing (five responses from less than six months to more than five years). First, departments that extensively use civilians to supplement their workforce are already using nontraditional approaches and may be more amenable to community policing. Second, community policing is a long-term transformation process that may take 15 or more years (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1994). It is assumed that community policing will become more entrenched in the organization with the passage of time.

Region. Finally, we examined the geographic region in which the department was located. Three dummy variables were created, Northeast, Midwest, and West, with South the default variable. The Department of Justice Statistics reporting regions are used to assign geographic areas.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis was used to examine these variables and their relationship to Trojanowicz’s concept of organizational commitment.

**Results and Discussion**

The analysis indicates that levels of commitment to community policing varied widely. The observed range was 34.5 (from 6.5 to 41.0) with a mean of 23.7. This distribution is reasonably normal, as determined by statistical tests (mean = 23.7; median = 23.21; skewness = .19, sd .17; kurtosis = -.34) and visual examination of the distribution. Police departments are as likely to be marginally committed to Trojanowicz’s vision of community policing as they are to be significantly committed.

A normal distribution on the scale of Trojanowicz’s important aspects of community policing indicates a level of commitment to community policing as envisioned by Trojanowicz. It cannot be determined from this data whether Trojanowicz’s ideas resonated with practitioners or reflected existing practices. As a policy advocate, though, Trojanowicz’s vision of community policing was found dispersed among the policing population. Most agencies displayed some of his concepts, and nearly equal numbers of agencies fully embraced or rejected these ideas.

Next, each variable was regressed on the dependent variable (commitment) to assess its association with levels of organizational commitment. All indicators of department size were significant. Larger departments had higher levels of commitment to community policing. This may indicate that administrators of large police agencies have greater interest in community policing or that they perceived the steps described by Trojanowicz as a necessary precursor to change. The physical size of the jurisdiction (square miles), however, was negatively associated with levels of organizational commitment to community policing. This negative finding can best be understood by reflecting on the ratio of officers per geographic unit. It may be difficult for police agencies with few officers per geographic unit to reassign officers to the more restricted beat areas advocated by Trojanowicz.

**Table 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total employees</td>
<td>5.72833E-04</td>
<td>1.8308E-04</td>
<td>3.129</td>
<td>.0020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sworn officers</td>
<td>7.11836E-04</td>
<td>2.2728E04</td>
<td>3.132</td>
<td>.0020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>2.53292E-06</td>
<td>8.5363E-07</td>
<td>2.967</td>
<td>.0034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Square miles</td>
<td>-1.14309E-04</td>
<td>5.2820E-05</td>
<td>-2.164</td>
<td>.0316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How long</td>
<td>.003233</td>
<td>.008021</td>
<td>.403</td>
<td>.6873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoted</td>
<td>-2.259884</td>
<td>1.019460</td>
<td>-2.217</td>
<td>.0279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>.885069</td>
<td>1.365976</td>
<td>.648</td>
<td>.5178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local economy</td>
<td>.386499</td>
<td>.619019</td>
<td>.624</td>
<td>.5331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Added funds</td>
<td>1.344150</td>
<td>.329789</td>
<td>4.076</td>
<td>.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Added persons</td>
<td>.458905</td>
<td>1.067008</td>
<td>.430</td>
<td>.6676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Only one of the chief/sheriff variables was significant. Organizations that hire their chiefs from within (promoted) were less committed to community policing. This may indicate that chiefs/sheriffs who come up through the ranks of their department are more thoroughly socialized into the organization’s culture and less receptive to change. Their investment in the organization may make them less likely to embrace the sweeping change of community policing. It also may be that executives coming from within the organization feel they can lead through informal mechanisms and find less need to utilize formal procedures. Finally, it may mean that chiefs/sheriffs who are appointed from outside the department believe they have a mandate to implement change and are more likely to institute new policy.

The length of a chief executive’s (chief/sheriff) tenure or the presence of an executive contract for the chief was not found to be significant. Job security may not be a factor in a chief/sheriff’s decision to implement community policing. This was somewhat surprising. Trojanowicz believed that the security of an employment contract or long tenure would increase the likelihood that a chief/sheriff would make organizational change. He often quoted his police lieutenant father who said, “The chief needs to feel secure in his job before he can bring change to the organization.” The data, however, did not support this assumption. Risk aversion may not be important in this area.

Community policing has often been criticized for being labor intensive. It was felt that departments receiving additional resources, personnel, or funding or jurisdictions with strong local economies would be more likely to embrace community policing. Neither the condition of the local economy (economy) nor the addition of personnel (added personnel) had a significant effect on the level of commitment to community policing. Nonetheless, the acquisition of additional funding (added funds) was significant. Organizations that received additional funds to implement community policing had higher levels of organizational commitment.

The policy area variables were mixed. Departments relying more on civilian workers (civilianization) had higher levels of organizational commitment; this was expected because these agencies had already taken steps to expand activities beyond traditional roles. Levels of commitment were not significantly associated with how long a department had been engaged in community policing (when adopted). Commitment did not grow with the passage of time. It is generally believed that organizations progressively embrace community policing. It is thought that organizations incrementally increase their level of commitment as they gain experience with the community policing philosophy. As Sadd and Grinc (1996) found, the data do not support this assumption.

Finally, region of the country was not significant. It does not appear that police departments in any region of the country are any more or less committed to community policing.

Conclusions

From the evidence in this study, it can be argued that community policing is for some a systemic change and for others merely a rhetorical justification for old practices. Some police departments are expending resources on a program lacking sufficient organizational support. Several factors were found to be associated with
community policing as described by Trojanowicz. The number of sworn officers, size of jurisdiction, promotion of the chief from outside the department, acquisition of additional funds, and the department’s reliance on a civilian workforce were all found to be significant.

The data indicate that larger police departments are likely to exhibit the organizational characteristics identified as important by Trojanowicz. This was surprising considering some have argued that community policing is an attempt to get large organizations to behave as small departments do.

The physical size of the jurisdiction was negatively associated with Trojanowicz’s measures of organizational commitment to community policing. It is speculated that this is a product of a small number of officers trying to serve physically large patrol areas. Officers who must patrol large areas or travel long distances between calls for service may find it difficult to develop the neighborhood orientation advocated by Trojanowicz.

Departments in which the chief executive rose from within the rank structure to become chief were less likely to score high on the scale of Trojanowicz’s important aspects. Again, the data do not explain this finding. It may be that chief executives who emerged from the culture of the organization are more likely to want to refine existing practices rather than to try to turn the organization in a new direction.

On the other hand, departments that acquired additional funds to implement community policing had higher levels of organizational commitment. Some funding strategies may enhance levels of organizational commitment. Additional funding seemed to enhance organizational commitment while adding personnel did not. Developing more organizational commitment to community policing may be more complex than many have assumed.

It was not surprising to find that departments that reported more extensive use of civilians to perform departmental functions (civilianization) also scored higher on Trojanowicz’s scale of commitment to community policing. After all, these departments have already taken steps toward opening police duties to citizens. These departments have already begun to lift the shroud of secrecy that has enveloped much of the traditional policing activities (Manning, 1977) and are sharing police duties between sworn officers and civilians.

Though these findings represent a snapshot taken in 1993, the evidence suggests little has changed. No association was found between length of time departments have practiced community policing and their level of commitment to it. This is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Sadd & Grinc, 1996). Regardless of the rising number of departments claiming to be practicing community policing, there is little evidence that the passage of time has strengthened levels of organizational commitment. Some have suggested repeating Trojanowicz’s survey in an attempt to compare commitment levels then and now. While the results might be interesting, it would be difficult to repeat the high response rate achieved by Trojanowicz. The findings would likely need to be tempered by a lower rate of response. Such research also assumes that Trojanowicz would not have amended or further developed his ideas. The progression of Trojanowicz’s work suggests he would have continued
to develop his concepts of community policing to reflect current issues and needs. So this measure is best left in its historical context.

There are legitimate concerns about funds going to police departments that are unprepared to seriously embrace community policing. This situation often results in superficial practices unlikely to result in meaningful change. It is more likely that the cessation of funds will result in departments reverting to more customary practices. Monetary incentives used to transform the police may not be sufficient to ensure legitimate community policing.

Despite the increasing claims of widespread community policing, levels of organizational commitment vary greatly. A full spectrum of organizational commitment to Trojanowicz’s model of community policing was found. This diversity of commitment should concern those bolstered by widespread claims of success. Many patrol officers assigned to community policing are not supported to the fullest extent by the organizations that employ them.

References


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Police Vehicular Pursuits: A Policy Analysis of Tactical Operational Elements for State Police Agencies

Wendy L. Hicks, PhD, Assistant Professor, Loyola University, New Orleans

As is evident by viewing any weeknight television news program, police vehicular pursuits continue to pose dilemmas for police agencies, political figureheads, civil rights organizations, and the public in general. Police are placed time and time again in the awkward and unique position of endeavoring to apprehend a law violator or a known fugitive without placing the lives of innocent members of the general public in peril. A reckless, dangerous, or negligent pursuit can place innocent civilians in danger; however, a failure to successfully apprehend a suspect ultimately means that the general public is still placed in harm’s way due to the at-large nature of the suspect. Therein lies the crux of the problem, the Catch 22. The fundamental argument remains that the duty of the police is to protect, not harm.

The myriad of issues surrounding police pursuits is replete with concerns regarding liability, negligence, force, reporting, and community relations. As litigation continues to grow, the Constitutional issues raised by 4th and 14th Amendment considerations also plague many law enforcement agencies. Apart from considerations pertaining to departmental liability, there also exists the very real issue of monetary compensations concerning pursuits. Litigation resulting from tragic outcomes of vehicular pursuits can easily grow into the millions of dollars annually. Taxpayers and police agencies suffer equally when a pursuit goes awry and a claim of negligence or liability is substantiated. Thus, it is vital for law enforcement agencies to have in effect a viable, trainable vehicular pursuit policy to serve as a guide for officer discretion while in the field. A comprehensive policy acts as a guide for officers so that they can choose a more mindful course of action while conducting a pursuit.

In any decision to engage in a vehicular pursuit, the need to apprehend the suspect must be weighed against the need to avoid endangering civilians or other parties not directly involved in the ongoing pursuit. Generally, the greater the potential risk to the general public, the officer, or the suspect, the less justified the pursuit. While it is impractical, and perhaps illogical, to formulate precise, objective rules to cover the many complexities of a pursuit, it is, nonetheless, vital for an agency to develop a comprehensive policy governing the conduct of officers while in the midst of a vehicular pursuit.

As administrators and policymakers carry out their task of relating policy to issues of liability, they must also understand the many areas inherent in a well encompassing policy. Departmental orders or directives should become a standard part of every law enforcement organization. Specific departmental orders and directives form the administrative foundation upon which the organization rests. Without a firm foundation, eventually an organization will become a target for liability and negligence suits. The administrative foundation of a department must specify the parameters of organizational behavior through policies, procedures, and rules or
regulations. Authority, responsibility, and duties of each rung of the hierarchical ladder is contained in departmental policy (Carter, 1986).

In light of the recent trend of litigation against police departments, it is imperative that each department, no matter how small, have a precise, written, comprehensive, and substantively strong policy. Administrators and policymakers must be aware of the differences in terminology of the specific directives contained in the composition of the policy. Policy, objectives, procedures, rules, general orders, special orders, memoranda, and written directives are each unique entities unto themselves, and each provide a small portion of the larger departmental directive.

As per policy development, any law enforcement agency should have in effect a vehicular pursuit policy inclusive of any elements pertaining to deadly force or potentially hazardous forcible stop techniques. The omission of even a single element pertaining to the safety of the pursuing officer, suspect, pedestrians, or innocent third parties has far reaching 4th and 14th Amendment consequences. Deadly force and negligence suits can have devastating financial repercussions for law enforcement agencies, not to mention the personal and career toll placed upon an officer or victim of a pursuit gone awry.

A failure to cover certain elements in a pursuit policy serves to increase the danger factor inherent in any pursuit and raises the stakes on the gamble with human life, property, and the possibility of negligence and liability claims.

Some of the earliest research in police vehicular pursuits was often sensational lacking the strict scientific methodological guidelines that direct current scholarly endeavors. One of the earliest research projects in the field was conducted by the Physicians for Automotive Safety (1968). Unfortunately, this study was utilized more in courts of law by unscrupulous attorneys seeking monetary rewards for their clients than by scholars seeking a serious study of the police role in society. Many years and research projects later, modern scholars would begin to appreciate and understand the importance of police pursuits in the larger realm of law enforcement and policing.

While many arguments espoused by proponents and opponents of vehicular pursuits remain emotionally charged, many scholars and legislators have acknowledged the importance of this specific law enforcement function. Despite evidence to the contrary, some scholars and community leaders maintain that police pursuits pose too many inherent risks to the general public and innocent bystanders. Were it not for police pursuits, many suspects would be let loose on an unsuspecting public. In a 1993 study of police pursuits in the State of Michigan, Payne reported that the majority of pursuits were initiated for speeding (30.5%) followed by other traffic violations (24.9%) and suspected felony crimes (24.3%). Upon apprehension of the suspect, Payne found that 34.5% of the pursuits resulted in an arrest involving a felony; 33.1% involved a charge of fleeing and eluding; and 14.4% involved drunk driving charges.

In an earlier study by Alpert and Dunham (1988) of the Metro Dade Police Department and the Miami Police Department, it was discovered that out of a total 952 pursuits, 47% (n=305) of apprehended suspects were arrested for traffic violations, and 48% (n=314) were arrested for felonies. Were it not for the practice of police vehicular
pursuits, dangerous felons would be free to continue with their criminal acts. Charles, Falcone, and Wells (1992) obtained results in their study of pursuits indicating that 95.9% of all officers interviewed voiced approval for pursuits. They also found that 76.3% of officers indicated that they believed that the danger to the public would increase if their department were to halt all pursuits while 85.4% maintained that crime in general would increase (Charles et al., 1992). Finally, Britz and Payne (1994) observed that, “An overwhelming majority of respondents (96%) supported the notion that more offenders would attempt to elude police if such a policy were implemented” (p. 117). Thus, it would seem, as far as the officers themselves are concerned, the law enforcement tactic of vehicular pursuits is highly supported.

Regional Variations

Some theorists have espoused the idea of a nationwide pursuit policy. Although the chances of this actually occurring in the near future are remote, it is, nonetheless, a topic worthy of consideration.

Due to the vast expanse of the United States, the effort to standardize vehicular pursuit policies is ultimately doomed to failure. It is an exercise in futility. The United States is a country of differing geography, population densities, and cultures. What is appropriate for one state could prove to be highly inappropriate for another. For example, what would be successful and appropriate in the megalopolis of the eastern seaboard would not be necessary or even desirable in a large, sparsely populated western state.

A densely populated region covering a small geographic area is in need of a highly articulated pursuit policy detailing various potentially hazardous pursuit tactics. In efforts to apprehend fleeing suspects while maintaining safety for the general public, a detailed, comprehensive policy is a must. Although the policy serves merely as a guide to officer discretion, it, nevertheless, offers some protection against foolhardy tactics and aids the officer in choosing a safe, effective course of action.

Conversely, in a sparsely populated region covering a large square mile area, an intensively detailed policy is, in all likelihood, not necessary. While the policy should be comprehensive enough to allow for dangerous tactics and maneuvers, it is not necessary or desirable for an organization to create a pursuit policy that is so profoundly detailed that it tries to cover every possible scenario an officer could experience. This simply creates added anxiety on the part of the officer as he or she tries to commit unessential information to memory.

The culture of a specific area is also a factor that must be considered when broaching the topic of vehicular pursuit policies. The culture of the eastern portion of the United States is one of long-standing accommodation to matters pertaining to law and public administration (Johnson, Aldrich, Miller, Ostrom, & Rhode, 1990). This is where American government was born. Citizens and law enforcement officials are accustomed to the requirements of bureaucracies and administration. As stated previously, it is in this relatively small geographic area with a dense population that an intensively detailed pursuit policy would be most appropriate. As the population density increases so, too, does the opportunity for danger to arise during the course of a vehicular pursuit. A more comprehensive pursuit policy could bring an added measure of safety to an already dangerous situation.
Nevertheless, a comprehensive vehicular pursuit policy is a must for any and all law enforcement agencies; however, the form this policy is to take can vary considerably from department to department. If the policy contains all of the relevant safeguards pertaining to high-speed driving and dangerous tactics such as ramming, roadblocks, shooting, or boxing-in, it would probably suffice for that area. As in any other area, the policy serves to guide officer discretion and protects the agency and officer from unsubstantiated claims of liability and negligence.

In a study by Hicks (2001), written vehicular pursuit policies of state police agencies across the nation were compared and analyzed based on their respective inclusiveness and comprehensiveness on a variety of factors. Due to the vast differences existing across the United States, a thorough examination of state police policies provides some insight into the applicability or feasibility of a nationwide pursuit policy. Difficulties with providing an appropriate level of comprehensiveness in a national policy have already been discussed. State police policies are the best representation of police practices in vastly differing regions nationwide.

Due to the fact that police pursuits involve both tactical as well as administrative elements, each of the statements included in the state police policies were divided into administrative and operational factors. Table 1 outlines the factors gleaned from Hicks’ analysis of state police written vehicular pursuit policies. A thoroughly comprehensive policy would contain all of the administrative and operational factors listed.

### Table 1
**Police Pursuit Administrative and Operational Factors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative</th>
<th>Operational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mission Statement</td>
<td>1. Initiate Pursuit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Safety Caveat</td>
<td>2. Notify Dispatcher/Supervisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Definitions</td>
<td>5. Tactical Considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Authority to Pursue</td>
<td>6. Jurisdictional Considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Statutory Duties</td>
<td>7. Pursuit Driving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Seriousness of Offense</td>
<td>10. Shooting from Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Role of Dispatch</td>
<td>11. Unmarked Car/Motorcycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Requirement of Supervisor to Monitor</td>
<td>12. Boxing-In</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Role of Supervisor</td>
<td>13. Heading Off/Passing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Supervisor at Termination Point</td>
<td>15. Roadblocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Debriefing</td>
<td>17. Passengers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Role of Pursuing Officer</td>
<td>18. Tire Deflation Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19. Off Road Pursuit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20. Termination of Pursuit/Reinstating Pursuit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21. Aerial Assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hicks, W. L. (2001).
It is important to note that the vast majority of state agencies’ pursuit policies contained references to safety. It is pertinent to state here that of the nation’s 50 state police agencies, only 47 were willing to participate in this study due to a variety of legal concerns raised by the respective administrators. The administrative element of Safety Caveat was contained within the text of 47 (100%) of the agencies’ policies. Discontinuance of Pursuit, which can also relate to the safety of officers, third parties, and suspects, was included in 41 (87.23%) policies. Pursuit Restrictions also pertaining to safety-related functions during a vehicular pursuit was included in 45 (95.74%) of the state policies. Seriousness of Offense, which can pose 4th Amendment issues, was contained in 40 (85.11%) of the state policies. Finally, Training, which can increase safety during a pursuit and limit officer and agency liability, was included in only 13 (27.66%). It can be seen from the above simple frequencies that the majority of state police agencies had elements pertaining to safety included within the text of their respective written pursuit policies.

When analyzing the operational elements, safety was again the primary consideration. The elements of Intentional Collisions, Shooting from a Vehicle, Boxing-In, Heading-Off/Passing, Paralleling, Roadblocks, and Speed were believed to pose the most danger to the pursuing officer, suspect(s), and general public. These factors also pose important 4th and 14th Amendment liability risks for a department. While safety has been emphasized by the inclusion of the majority of administrative elements serving to diminish the potential dangerousness of a pursuit, many operational elements serving a similar function failed to be included in many state policies. It was observed that only 30 (63.83%) of the state agencies contained the element of Intentional Collisions in their pursuit policies. The factor of Shooting from a Vehicle was included in 29 (61.70%) of the policies. Boxing-In was included in 12 (25.53%) of the state policies. Heading-Off/Passing was contained in 12 (25.53%) of the policies. Paralleling was included in 12 (25.53%) of the policies; Roadblocks was contained in 36 (76.60%); and Speed was included in 20 (42.55%). Finally, Termination of Pursuit was included in 46 (97.87%) of the state policies.

Regional analyses can shed even more light on the possibility or feasibility of a national pursuit policy. It was observed that state police agencies of the Northeast and Midwest regions of the United States have the most comprehensive written pursuit policies of any areas of the nation. These two regions of the nation are home to large urban areas with high population densities. More comprehensive written pursuit policies are a necessary feature of police operations in highly congested areas. Safety of the motoring public is essential as is the protection of patrol officers and law enforcement agencies from unsubstantiated claims of liability or negligence.

It was also observed that the Mountain and Pacific region of the nation failed to include many of the administrative factors in their written pursuit policies. It must be remembered that these two regions of the nation do not have the population density or large urban areas that are found in the Northeast and Midwest. Intricate or thoroughly comprehensive written policies might not be required of police officers patrolling primarily rural territory. While safety of the general public is always essential to effective and efficient police operations, a highly detailed written policy is simply not required to enhance the safety of the citizenry in sparsely populated regions.
In an effort to gain additional insight into the consequences of liability and negligence risks for law enforcement agencies, Hicks (2001) divided the operational factors into two categories: (1) contextual and (2) active. This distinction was based primarily upon the nature of the respective factor. Contextual operational elements were those factors inherent in the surrounding environment of the pursuit. These elements did not contain any potentially dangerous forcible stop techniques or driving maneuvers. Characteristics of the circumstances surrounding the pursuit, such as Initiate Pursuit, Notify Dispatch, Specifics of Pursuit Conditions, Jurisdictional Considerations, Unmarked Car/Motorcycle, Passengers, Off Road Pursuit, and Aerial Assistance, were all considered contextual operational elements. All other operational elements were grouped under the active category. These elements contained all forcible stop techniques and potentially dangerous maneuvers.

It was observed that the pursuit policies of all of the state agencies contained 62.32%, an average of 6.02, of the active operational elements. The vehicular pursuit policies of states in the Pacific region contained 56.92%, an average of 2.85, of the active operational elements. Policies of states in the Northeast region included 64.34%, an average of 7.08. Policies of agencies in the Mountain region included 56.04%, an average of 3.92, and policies in the South region contained 61.54%, an average of 6.77. Finally, the states in the Midwest region included 72.78%, an average of 9.46.

It can be observed again that the state agencies of the Pacific and Mountain regions have the least comprehensive written policies of any region in the nation. Although the argument can be made that highly detailed written policies might not be necessary, or even desired, when analyzing administrative factors, it is a different story altogether when active operational elements are concerned. Factors inherent in a vehicular pursuit containing any reference to safety should, by necessity, be included in the written pursuit policies of any law enforcement agency. While an all-encompassing nationwide pursuit policy might not be a necessary condition for safe and effective law enforcement, elements associated with safety need to be included in any written pursuit policy. This serves to protect the general public, the pursuing officer, the suspect, and the department as a whole.

Results indicated that the written pursuit policies of the state agencies contained 64.44%, an average of 6.25, of the contextual operational elements. The vehicular pursuit policies of states in the Pacific region contained 47.50%, an average of 2.375, of the contextual operational elements. Policies of states in the Northeast region included 67.05%, an average of 7.375. Pursuit policies of agencies in the Mountain region included 69.64%, an average of 4.875, and policies in the South region contained 65.91%, an average of 7.25. Finally, the states in the Mountain region included 72.12%, an average of 9.375.

As is evident in the description of the work conducted by Hicks (2001), each region has its own distinct law enforcement needs. While a uniform, national pursuit policy might not be required to satisfy every legal need to provide safety to the general public and protection from the unnecessary danger so often associated with pursuit conditions, some general policy reform might be beneficial to all parties concerned. While some rural states do not require a highly detailed or intricate written policy, improvement in areas such as dangerous forcible stop techniques might provide agencies with added protection from risks of liability or negligence. Additional
training for patrol officers is also one method by which to increase safety and add a small measure of protection from unnecessary risks of liability or negligence.

Factor Analysis

In addition to basic descriptive statistics, a factor analysis was conducted in an effort to determine the most important element included in any pursuit-related policy. In the factor analysis of the administrative elements, six factors were extracted in a Varimax Rotation utilizing a Kaiser Normalization. Factor loadings on each of the administrative elements are shown in Table 2.

### Table 2
Factor Analysis of the Administrative Elements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Legal</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Compliance</th>
<th>Restrictions</th>
<th>Roles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1. Mission Statement</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.802</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Discontinuance of Pursuit</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.609</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Noncompliance</td>
<td></td>
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It should be noted that the element of Safety Caveat was not included in the factor model. This element had zero variance, and, therefore, would not fit into any factor analytic model. Due to its zero variance, it was decided to remove the element from the larger model and create a separate component entitled “Safety” specifically for this single element.

After a review of the individual factor loadings, several primary components became clear. The components were named according to the nature and purpose of any particular element. For example, the factor loadings for Component 1 were highest on the following elements: Definitions, Role of Dispatch, Requirement of Supervisor to Monitor, Role of Supervisor, Supervisor at Termination Point, Report Requirements, and Debriefing. This component was referred to as “Roles” due to the characteristics of each element loading under this component. Each element loading under Component 1 had some reference to the role the person in question was to play according to departmental regulations. All other components were...
named according to their nature. The administrative elements can be grouped according to the following categories: Roles, Restrictions, Mission, Compliance, Legal, Training, and Safety.

While exploratory factor analysis cannot determine any precise causation, deduction combined with the information provided by the mathematical mock-up can offer guidance in determining which elements dominate. Administratively, the elements pertaining to Safety were, by far, the most included of any element. This element had zero variance in the factor model. Thus, Safety should be preeminent in any written pursuit policy. This element could be considered the most important administrative element.

When trying to determine which factors should be included in a highly comprehensive written policy, an examination of the factor loadings would certainly be helpful. The elements should appear in a written pursuit policy in the order of importance indicated by the factor loading model; therefore, elements dedicated to Safety should be of paramount importance in a written policy followed in order by Training, Legal, Mission, Compliance, Restrictions, and Roles.

**Legislative Analysis**

In an effort to lessen the exposure of law enforcement organizations to claims of negligence and liability, several states have devised the strategy of implementing legal standards to be included in a vehicular pursuit policy. If a law enforcement agency is to retain statutory immunity in a court of law in suits alleging liability or officer negligence, certain specified elements must be included in the vehicular pursuit policy. Recently, this trend has been expanding nationwide as state legislatures realize the monetary gain inherent in limiting police liability. Apart from monetary considerations, the increased safety factor from a more comprehensive policy is also a public relations boon for both the agency as well as the legislators themselves.

As the trend of statewide pursuit policies continues to be accepted, the importance of safety is never so evident. Each state bill or law outlines the necessity for a pursuing officer to balance the importance of apprehending the suspect against the risks to the public, themselves, and the suspect. As the statewide policies are designed to limit a department’s exposure to claims of liability and negligence, an emphasis on safety is logical. If the risks to the public or the officer outweigh the necessity to apprehend the suspect, then continuing with the pursuit is not justified, and further pursuit action should be terminated.

Currently the states of California, Minnesota, and Connecticut have implemented legal standards dictating essential elements to be included by the law enforcement organization in their respective states. In 1985, the State of New Jersey created the New Jersey Police Vehicular Pursuit Policy to be used as a statewide standard for all departments within the state. This standard was revised in January 1993 and again in September 1999, but the state legislature has yet to specify the necessity that this standard be implemented into actual law. It is important to note that the definition devised by the New Jersey Task Force is used by the majority of state agencies in defining a police pursuit.
In 1997, the State of Connecticut enacted House Bill No. 5186, An Act Concerning Legislative Task Forces. This bill established a task force similar in duty to that of New Jersey. This task force consisted of two members appointed by the Speaker of the House, two appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, one appointed by the majority leader of the House, one appointed by the majority leader of the Senate, two appointed by the minority leader of the House, and two appointed by the minority leader of the Senate. The task force was assigned to “study the feasibility of a standardized, unified police pursuit policy within the state” (p. 1). The report from the task force was to be submitted no later than January 1, 1998, to the joint standing committee of the General Assembly. Again, the bill stated the importance of safety in the task force report and the possibility of a statewide, uniform pursuit policy.

The State of Minnesota in Minnesota Statute § 609.487 (1999a) legally defined the variety of terms and conditions existing within the scope of a police vehicular pursuit. This statute brought legal denotation to terms such as peace officer, motor vehicle, fleeing an officer, death, and bodily injury among others. In February 1999, the Minnesota House of Representatives introduced a bill requiring the Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Board to adopt “a statewide model policy governing the conduct of police pursuits of fleeing suspects and requires state and municipal law enforcement agencies to adopt local police pursuit policies in conformity with the state policy” (Minnesota House of Representatives, 1999). This bill also created two new programs for distributing tire deflation devices and driving simulators, along with monetary appropriations to be used for these programs.

Later in that same year, the Minnesota House of Representatives placed into law Minnesota Statute § 626.8458 (1999b) requiring that, “By July 1, 1999, the board shall adopt a new or revised model policy governing the conduct of peace officers who are in pursuit of a vehicle being operated in violation of section 609.487” (p. 1). The bill stated that an agency’s pursuit policy must include a statement describing the philosophy of the model policy—namely that the safety of all persons involved in or by a police pursuit is of primary importance. In addition, the policy needed to “balance the risks of the pursuit to the public and peace officers with the consequences of failing to pursue” (p. 1).

The Minnesota statute detailed the necessity of including potentially hazardous pursuit tactics; the need to notify dispatch; and responsibilities of the supervising officer, pursuing officer, and back-up officers. Jurisdictional considerations, report writing, and training were also specified in this statute.

In 1999, the State of California also took steps in placing into law a model policy for use in vehicular pursuits. California Penal Code § 13519.8 (2000) established guidelines for that state’s model pursuit policy. The bill associated with this statute stated that, “The Commission shall implement, on or before November 1, 1994, a course or courses of instruction for the training of law enforcement officers in the handling of high-speed vehicle pursuits and shall also develop uniform, minimum guidelines for adoption by California law enforcement agencies for response to high-speed vehicle pursuits” (p. 1).

Similar to the Minnesota statute, the California Code stated that the guidelines to be established should include numerous factors inherent in a police vehicular
pursuit including the following: initiation of the pursuit, driving tactics, speed limits, blocking, ramming, roadblocks, communications, air support, termination of pursuits, and environmental conditions. Also included in this model policy was the necessity for adequate training in the proper conduct of a vehicular pursuit. In addition, a safety caveat was included indicating, “... the need to balance the known offense and the need for immediate capture against the risks to officers and other citizens of a high-speed pursuit” (p. 1).

California has recently developed a bipartisan bill, SB 219, which would ultimately establish new standards for police vehicular pursuits. This new bill would require police agencies to adopt formal administrative procedures in the instance of any automobile collisions occurring as a result of any police pursuit (State of California, 2003). In addition, the State of Wisconsin has recently implemented Act 88, requiring more detailed reporting of all police pursuits, increased training for recruits, increased the penalty for fleeing and eluding, and the creation of a law enforcement pursuit standards council (Witczak, 2003). According to Wisconsin Act 88, an increase in the pursuit training required of new police recruits will serve the multiple purposes of increasing the safety of all pursuits, making officers more aware of the consequences of pursuits, and increasing the public’s awareness of the penalties associated with fleeing and eluding a law enforcement officer (Witczak, 2003).

Currently, the statewide policies that are in effect are still too young to have been tested in the long-term benefit of establishing a uniform policy within a state. If the benefits of statewide pursuit policies are to be reaped, an extensive analysis of the occurrence of accidents, injuries, fatalities, and property damage must be completed. Only upon a determination of whether the risks posed by police vehicular pursuits can be ascertained will the true effectiveness of statewide pursuit policies be understood. If statewide policies decrease exposure to liability and negligence for a department in conjunction with improved safety considerations for the officer, suspect, and general public, there is little doubt that more policymakers, legislators, and department commanders will begin to work in conjunction to implement additional uniform, statewide policies.

While the debate regarding the development of a nationwide pursuit policy continues, there are other possibilities that have been proposed to make vehicular pursuits completely unnecessary. In September, 1997, a proposal was introduced to the Senate regarding the development of a wireless Vehicle Intercept communication technology aimed at curbing the need for officers to pursue fleeing suspects (Congressional Record, 104th Congress, 1997; Eisenberg & Fitzpatrick, 1996). This device is designed to identify the fleeing suspect’s automobile using a combination of the vehicle identification number and speed, ultimately disabling the car and preventing the need for the officer to pursue. The Vehicle Intercept device will operate at 260-470 MHz and will automatically retrieve the vehicle identification number and speed of the suspect’s automobile. The pursuing officer will then provide the dispatch officer with the necessary data. The dispatch officer will then query a database to locate the suspect’s car, sending an encrypted key to the criminal’s automobile, thus resetting the engine’s RPMs to 800, bringing the vehicle to an idle state.

This system, while still in the design and prototype stage, is intended to prevent abuse by the general public through a requirement of a multi-user interface and
128-bit security encryption. The device will stop the suspect’s vehicle while allowing all nearby vehicles freedom from any ill affect. This new technology will prevent suspects from engaging in high-speed flight from police. While there are critics who voice concern over the effects of a “Big Brother” government, the increased safety factor associated with such a technological advancement in law enforcement might quell any uneasiness regarding such a project.

Conclusion

As the trend of statewide pursuit policies continues to be accepted, the importance of safety has never been so evident. Each state bill or law states the necessity for pursuing officers to balance the importance of apprehending the suspect against the risks to the public, themselves, and the suspect. As the statewide policies are designed to limit a department’s exposure to claims of liability and negligence, an emphasis on safety is logical. If the risks to the public or the officer outweigh the necessity to apprehend the suspect, then continuing with the pursuit is not justified, and further pursuit action should be terminated.

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Bibliography


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Physical Conflict Resolution: An Analysis

H. Anthony Semone, PhD, Forensic and Police Psychologist, The Police Policy Studies Council

Introduction

Policies governing police officer use of force explicitly recognize that any use of force by an officer must be reasonable, necessary, and proportional to the level of threat or resistance posed by a subject. The field commonly known as Defensive Tactics (DT) grew out of the need to provide officers with the means by which to secure the compliance of physically resistant or threatening subjects in the presence of a threat that is not resolved by officer presence and/or verbalization but that does not merit deadly force.

Any use of force by an officer in a confrontation with a subject is potentially fraught with legal liability, especially when it can be shown that the use-of-force protocol gave insufficient attention to the many factors involved in physical confrontations. In addition to legal and medical considerations, if an officer “loses it” in a physical confrontation with a subject and the outcome as to the subject is seen by the trier of fact as unreasonable, unnecessary, or disproportionate, then all parties to the confrontation will be adversely affected. Hence, a defensive tactics protocol must pay explicit attention to the psychological factors involved in any use of physical force by an officer in a confrontation with a subject.

This article will provide a psychological analysis of one approach to subject/officer conflict called Physical Conflict Resolution (PCR), a comprehensive system for resolving conflict between an officer and a subject in situations in which officer presence and/or verbalization have been insufficient but deadly force is not authorized. It will be shown that PCR uniquely addresses the psychological factors that a use-of-force protocol must understand in order to develop a usable defensive tactics system. The four psychological factors that demand critical attention in the development of any use-of-force protocol are as follows:

1. The dynamic anatomy of physical conflict
2. The interaction between the psychological factors of paradox and change and their joint effect on liability
3. The neuropsychological variables involved in learning complex skills
4. The relationship between training content, body alarm reactions, and officer response

The Dynamic Anatomy of Physical Conflict

The very act of physical confrontation by one individual in relationship to another individual enhances the likelihood of physical conflict. So, the very act of an officer’s enforcing the law creates a context in which further escalations in behavior on the part of the subject are potentially likely. Why is it the case that officer/subject contact is the breeding ground for escalating physical confrontation? A psychological
analysis of physical conflict shows that four critical variables are involved. These four factors account for subject resistance and might be regarded as “The Anatomy of Physical Conflict.” These factors are (1) imposition of officer will, (2) potential for “loss of face,” (3) symmetrical escalation, and (4) vicarious identification.

A psychological analysis of officer/subject contact shows that the subject of such a contact has a reasonable expectation that the officer will seek to take charge (i.e., to impose his or her will upon the subject). Obviously, the strength with which the subject has that belief will vary as a function of the extent to which there may be legitimate knowledge on the part of subject that he or she has (e.g., a warrant outstanding, was the named actor in a violent episode, and so on). The subject offering insufficient resistance to the officer, however, also risks loss of status, perceived competence, and freedom itself; and these three losses comprise an unendurable “loss of face.” We know that fear of loss of face stimulates those neuronal systems intimately associated with fear, anger, and rage. Excitation of these mid-brain systems activates a countervailing behavior from the subject, the purpose of which is to forestall the loss of face.

Of course, the officer cannot “lose face” either. So, what ensues is a “fight,” or, more technically, a symmetrically escalated transaction, and the intensity of the fight is a direct function of the degree of loss anticipated by both combatants. For the officer who is without the requisite tools with which to resolve the conflict successfully, the specter of agency liability looms large! And, given that such “fights” rarely take place except in contexts in which witnesses are available, liability risks increase as a function of the extent to which such bystanders regard the officer’s use of force as unreasonable, unnecessary, disproportionate, and officer-initiated.

It is this author’s opinion that this phenomenon of bystander appraisal constitutes a significant source of vulnerability for officers and agencies alike. It is called vicarious identification, and it is the process by which observers of an event place themselves in the event as if they were the recipients of the actions in the event. This process is also known as “vicarious learning” or “modeling.” Witnesses to a fight, to the extent to which they perceive themselves to be similar to one of the combatants, will identify with that combatant. So, even though not directly involved in the fight, such identification with the combatant will serve to involve them vicariously or indirectly as if they were in the fight and as if they were, in fact, the combatant(s) with whom they most closely identify.

Now, since officer use of force takes place within a social, cultural, and political context, it is reasonable to assume that the observers of the use of force will embody various aspects of that context. The net effect of perceived identity with one (or more) of the combatants is to enhance the degree to which observers will respond on the basis of their own perceptions of the incident either to join in the fight on the side of the combatant(s) with whom they most identify, or to serve as witnesses in some subsequent legal proceeding against the combatant(s) with whom they have most negatively, vicariously identified. Do we recall the tragedy of the Rodney King fiasco?
Paradox, Change, and Liability

Given the ever present possibility, indeed, probability, of so-called vicarious identification, it is requisite in this author’s view, that any approach to officer use of physical force to forestall aggressive subject physical confrontation must make use of interventions that, on their face, appear innocuous to bystanders, but that still have the physical effect(s) ordinarily associated with more “strenuous” uses of force. This requirement is particularly important given that some samples of subjects amplify their aggressive behavior in the presence of what they perceive to be officer-offered weakness.

This dynamic is relevant! Unless the officer, over and above command presence, verbal authority, and so on, is able to articulate and effect a significant, physical outcome as to the resistance by the subject, there will be the highly likely outcome of symmetrical escalation in force. Under these conditions, officers find themselves in their usual predicament: between a rock and a hard place! They must present themselves as being in charge when viewed from the perspective of the subject, yet be seen as accommodating and passive when viewed from the perspective of the bystander—the precise definition of “between a rock and hard place,” or, more technically put, a paradox.

No one wants to change. In fact, it is commonly known that what is most characteristic of change is its resistance to change; the more pressure to change, the greater the opposing force designed to ensure resistance. From a psychological perspective, resistance to change is embedded in any interpersonal context. It is even seen in contexts in which someone would voluntarily present him- or herself to be changed. Even here, there will come a time in that process when resistance to that change will be forthcoming.

In these contexts, there is little question but that sheer force can and does overcome the offered resistance, albeit with a potential price to pay—there is no such thing as a “free lunch” for officers. In this context, the astute and well-trained officer recognizes that forceful, confrontational control tactics are often required in the service of assisting subjects with “changing”; that astute officer also knows that such change may be at the risk of enhanced subject resistance, and, if done poorly, increased officer/agency liability.

Clearly, any use-of-force protocol requires that it be seen by the officers implementing it as so substantively effective that the officer has no reservations about employing it in all those contexts in which it is justified. Similarly, such use of force must be demonstrable as to such effectiveness in order for it to have officer credibility. Thus, any use of force will have value to the extent to which its principles allow for both a direct impact upon the subject and a paradoxical presentation to the bystander. It will appear innocuous to potential witnesses, while to the subject, it will feel overwhelming. To the extent to which this paradox can be incorporated into a use-of-force protocol, then to that extent will the officer, subject, and community be well served, as a consequence of which liability is likely to reduce.

Physical Conflict Resolution (PCR) Defined

PCR developed from 20 years of interaction with police in operational environments with constant feedback from officers to trainers. It is a “paradoxical” use-of-force protocol designed to enable an officer or team of officers to “impose their will”
on a subject in such a way so as to minimize loss of face; reduce the probability of symmetrical escalation; bring about the successful resolution of the encounter; and enable an “observer” of that use of force to regard it as reasonable, necessary, and proportionate to the threat evidenced by the subject. As such, PCR is the behavioral equivalent of “verbal judo.” Within this context, PCR presupposes that there are no rules for lethal force confrontations; the officer is armed and the opponent may be armed; and the officer is in a multiple-adversary environment. PCR addresses the unpredictability and variability in officer/subject confrontations, not by characterizing itself as a new pseudo-scientific system, but rather by emphasizing the continuity of training across disciplines.

Yet it is precisely the absence of continuity in training across disciplines that characterizes many current approaches to use-of-force training. The absence of continuity and commonality essentially requires the officer to approach each use-of-force discipline with little transfer of learning between one area and another. For example, an officer who has the role of sniper on an ERT will be taught how to maintain the requisite amount of calm relaxation, often over extended periods of time and variable weather conditions. That same officer, however, will likely be taught weapon retention, disarms, and retrieval techniques that are violent, ballistic, strength-based interventions. Moreover, when handgun proficiency is the subject matter, the officer learns to adopt some stylistic shooting position limited in usefulness to a static training range.

There are obvious liability, economic, and safety benefits that would accrue to individual officers as well as to departments if a training protocol could be employed that would maximize transfer of learning across the entire use-of-force spectrum. This training protocol, to maximize transfer of learning, would obviously have to be principle-based, rather than cluttered with learning discrete techniques. As a principle-based system, the protocol would have to establish or reconfigure the priorities for officer behavior in a confrontation. If a set of least common behavioral denominators (LCBDs) could be identified, and if these LCBDs were sufficiently central to all officer uses of force, then, explicitly teaching these LCBDs would enhance transfer of learning across the widely variable contexts in which officer use of force is potentially required. As a direct result of such a principle-based use-of-force system, officers would then only be required to learn the basic principles underlying the many uses of force in order to apply some given use of force depending upon the nature of the confrontation and the department’s use-of-force protocol.

PCR – The LCBDs

Within this context, PCR can be seen as a systems approach to officer use of force in which the LCBDs of a confrontation involve four primary, elemental officer responses: (1) Posture and Balance, (2) Use of Breathing, (3) Relaxation, and (4) Movement. PCR teaches not only that each of these dimensions characterizes every officer/subject contact, but also that each of these factors underlies every use of force an officer might need to employ within the context of that confrontation. In other words, if an officer has the requisite posture, has learned how to breathe so as to maintain the requisite level of relaxation and balance, and has learned to move appropriately in relationship to the kind and level of threat offered by the subject, then the particular tactic, tool, and/or technique the officer employs as a response
to the subject’s behavior will dictate itself as a function of the unique characteristics of that particular confrontation between that particular officer in that particular context with that particular subject.

How it is that a particular technique can “dictate itself” or “develop” out of and be used in a given confrontation may not be easily understood, especially given the history of “technique-based training.” Apart from the consideration that technique-based training induces in an officer a rigid and inflexible response to confrontation, such training blatantly ignores the dynamic, ever-changing topography of confrontations. Successfully coordinating one’s activity within the context of a dynamic, potentially lethal confrontation demands of the officer that he or she be able to operate in a multi-dimensional environment. Such environments demand flexibility of response, yet flexibility is incompatible with rigidity. Posture, use of breath to maintain relaxation and balance, and employing appropriate movement in relationship to the threat provides the foundation upon which the officer can acquire the single most critical component of any confrontation, namely, tactical advantage.

As is known from the work of John Boyd, if an officer is able to “get within” the “operating cycle” of the subject, that officer will be acting “temporally in advance” of the subject, and, hence, be able to dictate the course of the confrontation. It is precisely in the officer’s ability to maintain his or her posture, or position in space, to use breathing to maintain relaxation and balance, thereby mitigating the effects of possible cognitive disruption and loss of rationality, that the officer’s movement(s) will be in temporal and spatial advance of the subject: action beats reaction. As a consequence, the officer will be able to dictate the nature and course of the “transaction” with the subject, and, with this tactical advantage, he or she will be more likely successful in resolving the conflict with that level of force deemed reasonable, necessary, and proportionate.

To accomplish the goals of successfully resolving physical conflict, PCR is constructed with explicit recognition of the need for instructional and tactical synergy: what is taught in training must closely approximate what is likely to be experienced on the street. In addition, the PCR course of instruction incorporates an instructional design that takes advantage of the knowledge obtained from brain imaging work as this knowledge relates to human learning, or, so-called Brain-Based Learning.

**PCR as a Brain-Based Learning Protocol**

In sharp contrast to basic stimulus-response learning theories, or even the purportedly “more advanced” forms of stimulus-organism-response theories, brain-based learning is “a comprehensive approach to instruction based on how current research in neuroscience suggests our brain learns naturally. This theory is based on what we currently know about the actual structure and function of the human brain . . . (and) . . . it provides a biologically driven framework for teaching and learning.”

The core principles that inform and guide brain-based education, particularly as they relate to PCR, are as follows:

- The brain is a parallel processor. It can perform several activities at once.
- The brain perceives whole and parts simultaneously.
Information is stored in multiple areas of the brain and is retrieved through multiple memory and neural pathways.

Learning engages the whole body. All learning is mind-body: movement, foods, attention cycles, and chemicals modulate learning.

Humans’ search for meaning is innate; the search comes about through patterning, and emotions are critical to patterning and drive our attention, meaning, and memory.

Meaning is more than just information.

Learning involves focused attention and peripheral perception.

We have (at least) two types of memory: (1) spatial and (2) rote.

We understand best when facts are embedded in natural spatial memory.

The brain is social. It develops better in concert with other brains.

Complex learning is enhanced by challenge and inhibited by ego.

According to Spears and Wilson, the teaching strategies that emerge from these principles are as follows:

- Orchestrated immersion – Learning environments are created that immerse students in the learning experience.
- Relaxed alertness – An effort is made to expose the student to fear while maintaining a challenging environment.
- Active processing – The learner consolidates and internalizes information by actively processing it. Information is connected to prior learning.

Surprise/Startle/Fear and the Brain

PCR, precisely because it is a brain-based learning protocol, uniquely addresses the issue of surprise/startle/fear that is potentially present in all confrontations. PCR addresses these factors using an instructional strategy crafted so as to “inoculate” the officer against the deleterious effects of surprise or startle reactions. It is hypothesized that “surprise” or “startle” responses can automatically elicit an amplified response from mid-brain neural systems thought to be associated with the so-called body alarm reaction complex. Obviously, any use-of-force training protocol must include training components designed to counter any such effect. PCR incorporates two training protocols designed to cope with the potential for exacerbated sympathetic nervous system activity: (1) conscious manipulation of the Respiratory Sinus Arrhythmia (RSA) and (2) in situ desensitization.

While it is beyond the scope of this article to extensively elaborate upon the topic, consciously programmed “breathing protocols” are routinely employed by individuals to mitigate pain (Lamaze method), induce relaxation (meditation), countervail panic episodes (largely induced, interestingly, by hyper-ventilation), and induce altered states of consciousness (hypnosis, Yoga). Breathing has also been shown to be instrumental in influencing heart rate variability (HRV), an index arguably related to PNS/SNS balance. There are data showing that cognitive competency can be enhanced, academic performance can be improved, and blood pressure responses can be controlled by consciously managing the pattern of one’s respiration cycle. The officer simply needs to “breathe through” the SNS activation.
If an officer can manage fear produced by startle or surprise by breathing, the officer is much more likely to be able to control the potential deleterious effects thought to follow surprising or startling events. As a result, the officer can remain well ahead of the adversary in the OODA cycle, and, despite the potential lethality of the confrontation, remain in a tactically advantageous position relative to the subject.18

In addition to managing RSA, the ability to avoid being surprised and startled by a confrontation can also be developed by means of exercises and drills that focus upon exposing the officer to as many as possible of the contextual variables the officer is likely to face in a confrontation. For example, in a recent training academy class for a nationally recognized state police agency, trooper recruits were required to “fight each other” in a boxing match. The academy instructors reasoned that, since at some time or another a trooper might well be in an actual physical fight with a subject, the trooper would be better equipped to cope with the emotional correlates of such a confrontation if he or she had already experienced being in such a fight.

While this agency protocol might be thought of as crude, the reasoning behind such an exercise is sound, for it has long been known that simple exposure to a threatening stimulus can have the effect of reducing the extent to which such an event can adversely impact the participant. In fact, protocols for the treatment of anxiety-related disorders explicitly acknowledge the importance of two factors in reducing emotional responses to stimuli regarded as threatening: stimulus presentation within the context of a contemporaneously developed relaxation response.19 Critically thinking LEO trainers, however, have long known on the basis of information obtained from many years of being on the streets, that familiarity with potential stressors reduces the extent to which an officer will be detrimentally affected in the presence of such stressing stimuli.

In this context, there is a recent commentary20 hypothesizing that the probability of officer survival in a confrontation is enhanced as a function of training the officers in so-called “adaptive expertise.”21 Adaptive expertise is defined as entailing . . .

a deep comprehension of the conceptual nature of the problems the officer encounters (e.g., understanding the dynamics and differing profiles of assaultive behavior). Skills must be developed in an organized but flexible structure. That is, the officer must continue cognitive activity in the face of emergency conditions in order to enable him or her to register the level of threat encountered as well as changes in the circumstances.22 (emphasis added)

The ability to maintain cognitive activity is crucial to officer survival because it allows an officer to detect pre- and concurrent incident indicators, the aggregate of which permits the officer to gauge his or her use of force relative to the level of threat posed by the subject within the overall context of the potentially confrontational event. Clearly a training program for officer use of force must revolve around a protocol that enables the maintenance of rational thinking, and the maintenance of rational thinking in a physical confrontation can only come about by exposing the officer to the myriad variables associated with any given officer/subject confrontation. As Blum notes “variability, ambiguity, and inconsistencies need to be inserted into the (training) task to force the trainee to stretch his or her learning
to a level of competence that permits . . . [him or her] to rapidly respond to difficult or unanticipated events.”

**PCR – Summary and Conclusions**

In summary, there appears to be substantial justification for considering PCR as a “state-of-the-art” training protocol, the utilization of which allows for greater reasonable use of necessary force in ways regarded as proportionate to the resolution of the inherent conflict potentially present in any officer/subject contact. PCR has this capability for several reasons:

- PCR recognizes the complexities involved in all efforts by officers to change the behavior of subjects. In this context, PCR plainly understands that paradox, change, and liability are intrinsically interwoven.
- PCR is a systems and principle-based approach, not a protocol involving the teaching of discrete techniques to handle the complexity of officer/subject confrontation. PCR is a Brain-Based Learning system that emphasizes the critical importance of training and tactical synergy, a goal achieved by teaching from a Principle of Continuity of Training Across Disciplines.
- By teaching officers from a principle-based framework, PCR provides officers with the opportunity to develop “Adaptive Expertise,” as a consequence of which officers learn to adapt to the myriad stressors of a physical confrontation.
- Because officers are explicitly taught how to manage the psychological impact of physical confrontation (by means of RSA manipulation and in vivo desensitization to those stressors), officers’ ability to “stay ahead” of the reactionary gap is enhanced.
- As a result of “staying ahead” in the reactionary gap, officers are more able to engage rational neural systems, allowing them to be better able to employ requisite levels of force to manage the confrontation.
- Given that officers are more able to manage the confrontation from a rational perspective, given a well-developed use-of-force protocol, officer and subject safety increases, and officer and agency liability decreases.

As can be seen clearly from the Appellate Court decision cited at the beginning of this article, officers, agencies, and subjects are increasingly at both legal and personal risk as a function of “having failed to train properly.” Who would have thought 2 years ago that an action for allegedly having failed to train within an ADA accommodation context would have been necessary? Well, the precedent has been! And, PCR provides a comprehensive system of intervention for law enforcement officers that, if adopted, would allow officers the means by which to resolve physical conflict with an increased likelihood of being able to do so peacefully. In so doing, the mutual goals of officer, subject, and community safety can be met.

Physical Conflict Resolution or PCR is being brought to the law enforcement community under the auspices of Ken J. Good, Director, Strategos International LLC. Mr. Good and his adjunct teaching staff offer the following training options and teaching materials:
An intensive 5-day Instructor Certification Program
Refresher training
Comprehensive and detailed Instructor Manual
Instructional Video Set (soon to be released)
Demonstrations to departments, scheduled by appointment
LE video and written testimonies available

PCR is currently taught at several regional training academies, NYPD Emergency Services Unit, and various SWAT units throughout the country.

PCR was a featured course at this year’s IALEFI annual training conference.

Acknowledgments

My many thanks to the following men who have generously contributed their critical commentary on this article: Tom Aveni, Frank Borelli, and Preston Covey, PhD.

Endnotes

1 243 F. Supp 2d 232: a recent use-of-force case involving a civil suit brought against a borough and several agencies for “failing to train these officers resulting in the death of (decedent). The alleged noncompliance with the training requirements of the ADA . . . occurred . . . when the Defendant policymakers failed to institute polices to accommodate disabled individuals such as (decedent) by giving the officers the tools and resources to handle the situation peacefully. p. 5 (emphasis added.)


6 To verify this assertion, one need only attend any training class and note the student-offered resistance to learning new material.


8 PCR is not a sport martial art system. It is also not a set of “one size fits all” manipulations, nor is it a long list of techniques, as might be seen in a major department’s “ground fighting” system.

9 “A danger inherent in limiting training methods to procedure training is that the habits developed by experienced officers are used as a mental model from which the officer generates his or her expectations regarding the encounter. Mental models that apply past habits are likely to impede the officer’s ability to correctly integrate the currently relevant information necessary to maintain officer safety within unusual tactical encounters. Training must, therefore, provide a conceptual
model that assists the officer in understanding of both how and why things work.”


Spears, A., & Wilson, L. Available online at www.uwsp.edu/education/celtProject/innovations/Brain-Based%20Learning/brain-based_learning.htm


Nolan, R. Heart rate variability. Available online at www.thoughtecbnology.com/nolan/html

Obviously, if the officer begins the entire transaction with the subject in a state of relaxation, with breathing already being consciously manipulated, the officer’s posture will have the necessary musculoskeletal flexibility needed for a potential confrontation, and the officer will enter the transaction with the ability to remain appropriately attentive to the presence of critical incident pre-cursors.


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Solution-Oriented Policing: Application in Practice

Randy Garner, PhD, Associate Dean, College of Criminal Justice, Sam Houston State University

We have now had more than two decades to consider the phenomena called community policing. Many have touted it as a return to the distant past. Others have considered it the wave of the future. Still others, spend their energy and efforts trying to define what this concept involves. The search for the end-all definition appears to consume some academics and practitioners.

While there is certainly nothing wrong with seeking a definition, there should not be a paralysis of action simply because the “ultimate” description may be elusive. As with most things in life, the definition or even the actual meaning can vary by the unique circumstance, location, or agent involved. My response to those who suggest that community policing cannot easily be precisely defined is “so what.” I am equally doubtful that we could reach consensus on what defines policing, in general, and any attempt to define community is certainly destined for failure. (The “community” in which I spent my youth, is certainly not the same “community” that I see today—despite retaining the same name on the city limits sign.) I once conducted a study (Garner, 1997b) that asked over 100 police chiefs to describe and define community policing. As you might guess, I got as many answers as participants. Interestingly, this exercise also asked for definitions of traditional policing as well. The responses were equally varied. Community-oriented policing (COP), as traditional policing before it, can be many things to many people and many communities; it can be a noun and a verb.

As long as the goals of community policing efforts are understood (something that is not always easily achieved), the particulars of the definition can be addressed based on the unique application to the community being served. At a fundamental level, COP may best be described as something other than a program, although several programs may fit within the COP umbrella. COP is often described as much more of a philosophy, a way of thinking. It is a recognition that the members of the police force alone are not responsible for the community. The police cannot solely be responsible for crime and social disorder; the community must be involved. The belief that the police are an omnipotent power that can singularly handle crime is a myth perpetuated in the past era of policing.

The philosophy of community policing is one that finds the community and those that serve the community in a role of coresponsibility in assessing and addressing crime and social disorder. The resultant partnership may be in one of many forms; there is not one correct version of COP, just as there is not one form or version of management or leadership. We might possibly borrow from the realm of situational management that fits resources and management style with the circumstance for more effective results. Maybe we should consider the concept of situational policing—fitting the appropriate response to the circumstance. The true key is an awareness that the partnership—in whatever form—must exist.
Unfortunately, many agencies look at community policing as a particular program or a cluster of programs or activities. Police agencies tend to ascribe to one of three general categories of community policing: (1) Community policing as an individual assignment where an individual officer is identified as the community policing officer; (2) Community policing as a specialized function or division within an agency, and, much less frequently, (3) Community policing as a universal departmental philosophy (Garner, 2002). When assessing community policing as anything less than a philosophy—a new way of thinking about solving police-community issues—the temptation is to focus on a program or particular method.

Bicycle patrols, crime prevention programs, drug resistance programs, etc. are not, in and of themselves, community policing; they are programs. They may exist because of political issues, perceived need, or simply because there was an opportunity for funding. They may or may not be aligned with solving an identified problem; however, if the analysis of the community’s needs identifies that these or any program or activity is a sound solution to a recognized problem, then it becomes a tool in the solution-oriented policing arsenal. This is not to suggest that programs created without careful analysis cannot be useful. There are a whole host of psychological reasons why a particular program or event can address perceived, if not real, problems. Furthermore, if the neighboring community has a well-publicized drug resistance program and my community does not, I may begin to question why we are not receiving the same benefit—regardless of whether a cost-benefits analysis would support it.

Once police-community issues are identified, the idea of using what may sometimes be atypical strategies to address these issues becomes salient. Too often those of us in policing continue to do what we always have done—whether it is effective or not. Such typical responses are routine and do not require us to exceed our comfort boundaries. Unfortunately, they may also, ultimately, be ineffective. We need to view these chronic topics with new eyes. Several years ago, I came up with the term solution-oriented policing (SOP), a term I still favor today (Garner, 1997a). It clearly places the emphasis on the most important aspect of the police-community interaction: solutions. It communicates that the ultimate goal is to provide a sound solution to identified problems.

So What Is Solution-Oriented Policing?

Unlike the “symptom-treatment” approach that is so prevalent, SOP is an appreciation that the solutions to certain community-police issues are often best addressed through unique approaches or novel thinking. Rather than debate definitions or provide routine responses, SOP focuses on the solution-seeking process. It involves assessing the root cause of particular circumstances (not what may be presented as the problem, but ferreting out the true issue of concern), employing critical and creative thinking in assessing potential solutions (considering everything from the obvious to the outrageous), implementing a solution-oriented response, and evaluating the degree of success achieved to see whether the solution strategy might be improved. The goal is for every officer and member of the community to be oriented toward “solution-seeking thinking,” SOP not only addresses issues that have been identified but strongly encourages officers to offer solutions to potential concerns before they manifest into something bigger: proaction, not just reaction.
One of the biggest problems with implementing SOP is overcoming officer/community resistance or stagnation. New approaches to solving current and future issues require a great deal of commitment and effort. A culture of consistency and complacency is inconsistent with the SOP philosophy. One of the best “cures” for this concern is success. When moving toward something new, skepticism is an expected and natural occurrence (Oliver, 2000). In fact, it is human nature to resist moving to an unknown; however, with each success, no matter how small, the pall begins to fade. In working with police agencies all across the country, I have witnessed the phenomena time and again. When a novel solution proposed by a few forward thinking officers resolves a chronic community or crime issue, others become more interested, and the desire to participate substantially increases. It is not always easy. One cannot overcome years of practice and culture overnight.

Another potential difficulty in implementing SOP is the hesitancy to suggest or implement truly innovative solutions. Frequently, the proposed solution may be one that can assuage the identified issue, but a more innovative, bold approach could achieve even greater results. Too frequently, the solutions are really little more than variants of traditional police practices (Clarke, 1998). There are often a large number of potential solutions for any given issue; what is required is the creativity and dedication to reach into an ever-growing toolbox of unique solutions.

**SOP Successes**

In 2002, I created a specialized SOP training program for police officers with the help of numerous content experts including police officers, community representatives, training directors, psychologists, and academicians. The central focus of this 3-day training—which was followed by a 1-day booster session 4 months later—was to expose officers to skills and tools that helped them become solution-seeking thinkers. There was a heavy emphasis on active participation and creative solution-seeking activities. The training consisted of elements from a number of areas and disciplines, including social psychology, criticism management, creative thinking, and methodological assessment (also see Garner, 2003, 2004). The results of this study found that participants enjoyed the new challenge, expected to utilize the skills they had learned, and left the training with a greater appreciation for the SOP approach and a substantial number of innovative solutions to many community issues. The follow-up study revealed that not only were the participants more engaged in solution-seeking activities, but their successes fostered increased interest from others in their respective agencies. In other words, the “seeds” of the SOP training were affecting others who had not yet received the instruction.

Some of the more innovative solutions offered included the following:

- Using CPTED to restructure parking areas to reduce assaults among patrons of two diverse alcohol/entertainment businesses (a country-western and a Hip Hop club)
- Using “oldies” music piped over a parking lot loudspeaker system to reduce the congregation of teens and the associated trash, vandalism, and fighting
- Using nuisance abatement laws to seize drug-infested properties
- Working with an area chemical plant to stagger the work shifts of certain employees to ease congestion and reduce accidents
• Working with community volunteers to remove graffiti within 24 hours, thus denying the “benefit” of this activity
• Redesigning picnic areas and activity stations in a community park reducing the amount of vandalism.

Of course, there are many other examples. Often, the goal of the creative solutions made the undesirable activity more difficult, more risky, or less rewarding or increased the ways in which individuals could more easily comply with rules or follow the law without excuse.

Summary

SOP is a philosophical approach to dealing with police-community issues that stress creative solution-seeking thinking and strategies. To be truly effective, SOP must have the administrative support and nurturance to be successfully implemented. It requires that we move from a reactive, program approach in policing to a philosophy that recognizes that solutions to certain community-police issues are often best addressed through unique approaches or novel thinking. It involves a methodologically sound process of assessing the true root-causes of situations, employing critical and creative thinking, implementing a solution-oriented response, and evaluating success. The SOP philosophy encourages officers to proactively offer solutions to potential areas of concern before they develop into larger issues. Nothing breeds success like success; and the SOP approach has been shown to not only effectively address police-community tribulations but also to elicit greater solution-seeking activities among officers and community members.

Bibliography


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Dr. Garner began his law enforcement career in 1976 and has worked in all divisions and levels of command. He was appointed as the chief of police for a Houston-area agency in the mid-1980s where he was active in a variety of local, state, and national law enforcement organizations. Dr. Garner was one of the founding members of the Houston-Harris County Chiefs of Police Association.

Dr. Garner is an honors graduate of both the FBI National Academy (139th Session in 1984) and the Southern Police Institute (66th Administrative Officers Course, University of Louisville in 1981). He received certification as a forensic hypnotist from Texas A & M University in 1981 and was licensed as a Texas polygraph examiner in 1983. Dr. Garner has authored a number of publications and has been honored to receive several teaching excellence awards.
Community Policing in a Diverse Society

Ben Brown, PhD, Criminal Justice Department, The University of Texas at Brownsville

Introduction

Although the United States has always been a racially, ethnically, and culturally diverse nation, over the last few decades, the extent of the nation’s diversity has increased substantially. For example, whereas blacks have historically been the largest minority in the United States, Hispanics are now the largest minority in the nation (U.S. Census Bureau, 2003). In addition, the United States is home to millions of immigrants from all over the planet. Analyses of U.S. Census Bureau data indicate that there are currently more than 32 million immigrants residing in the United States, with an average of roughly 1.5 million new immigrants arriving each year. In short, more than one out of every ten U.S. residents is an immigrant (Camarota, 2002; Schmidley, 2003). Furthermore, although immigrants have historically been concentrated in major metropolitan areas such as Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York, over the past couple of decades they have formed thriving communities in sparsely populated regions of the country. Case in point, there are well-established enclaves of Hispanic immigrants scattered throughout small towns in Arkansas, Kansas, and North Carolina (Benson, 1999; Richard, 2004; Yeoman, 2000, 2001).

As the U.S. populace continues to metamorphasize, it is essential that police officials adjust their policies, practices, and tactics to accommodate the changing needs of the populace. While the conventional approaches of increasing minority recruitment and hiring bilingual personnel are a good place to begin, meeting the needs of a diverse population also requires that police officials familiarize themselves with the norms, values, morals, and customs of the people they serve. In addition, serving a diverse society requires that the police interact with immigrants and minorities in a respectful fashion and seek input on local problems from immigrants and minorities. Finally, it is the responsibility of the police to help educate immigrants about U.S. laws and the role of the police. There is no better means of achieving these goals than for the leaders of a police department to implement a strong, department-wide, operational policy built upon the fundamental tenets of community policing.

Community Policing: Tailoring Tactics to Serve the Citizenry

At its core, community policing is composed of two elements: (1) quality relations between law enforcement officers and the citizenry and (2) concerted problem-solving efforts among law enforcement officers and local residents that focus on identifying and eliminating the root causes of crime and disorder in the community (Community Policing Consortium, 1994). Beyond these two elements, there are no standards for community policing programs, and any attempt to create a national standard for community policing programs would be an exercise in futility. Indeed, the very concept of community policing requires that the tactics utilized by a department be tailored to meet the specific needs of the local community.
Consider, for example, the differences between Chicago and Miami. Despite the fact that Chicago and Miami are both sizable metropolitan areas with racially/ethnically diverse populations situated on major bodies of water, there are numerous climatic, cultural, geographic, and demographic differences between the two cities, which means that the police in each city will have to contend with a unique set of problems. For instance, whereas the police in both cities have to contend with drug-related crime, there is no doubt that drug smuggling is a greater problem in Miami than in Chicago because of Miami’s coastal location and proximity to Latin America. Similarly, while the police in both cities have to deal with gang-related crime, there are no reports to indicate that the gangs in Miami are as deeply entrenched and powerful as the gangs in Chicago (e.g., the Nation and the Folks). It would thus be absurd to expect that any policing tactic, inclusive of a community policing program, that is effective in one city would be equally effective in the other city. In addition, owing to neighborhood differences, a policing program that is effective in one area of a city be ineffective in another area of the city. For example, no one should expect that the tactics the Chicago police use to maintain order along the Magnificent Mile would be effective in the city’s public housing projects.

Moreover, even in small towns, the residents of different neighborhoods may encounter distinct crime-related problems. Consider, for instance, Charleston, Illinois, a city located in the rural central eastern region of the state, which is home to fewer than 21,000 people, the majority of whom (approximately 95%) are white and almost half of whom are university students. Given the small size, rural setting, collegiate atmosphere, and racial/ethnic homogeneity of the city, it would not be unreasonable to expect that the residents all share the same basic concerns about crime and disorder. Empirical research conducted in Charleston, however, shows that the denizens of the different areas of the city encounter different crime-related problems. Specifically, the residents in the Northern neighborhoods in Charleston are more than twice as likely as residents of every other part of the city to be concerned about drug dealing and the safety of their children (Benedict, Brown, & Bower, 2000).

In sum, the extent and nature of crime varies not only between cities but also within cities, and while the differences in crime from one neighborhood to the next are most extreme in major metropolitan areas, there are still neighborhood differences in crime within small towns. Thus, given the fact that no two cities or neighborhoods are identical, there is no reason to expect some level of uniformity in community policing programs. The creation of an effective community policing program requires that the police analyze the problems of the local populace and then tailor their programs and tactics to meet the specific needs of the people they serve, which means that each community policing initiative will be unique.

Community Policing in a Diverse Society

The first step in the task of creating effective community policing programs in the increasingly diverse society in which we live is the development of quality relations between local officers and the people they serve. Although research on public attitudes toward the police consistently indicates that the majority of U.S. residents view the police favorably, this field of research also shows that blacks and Hispanics are more likely than whites to view the police in a negative fashion (Brown & Benedict, 2002). Moreover, there is a growing body of evidence that suggests
that many immigrants do not trust the police and are hesitant to contact the police for assistance (Davis & Erez, 1998; Lee & Ulmer, 2000; Menjivar & Bejarano, 2004; Walker, 1997). One problem is that immigrants often have a limited command of the English language and are reluctant to contact the police due to concerns about making themselves understood. Another problem is that cultural beliefs (e.g., reporting a rape will bring shame to the family) may prevent some immigrants from contacting the police to report crimes. An additional problem is that many immigrants are undocumented and are unaware of the different responsibilities of municipal police officers and federal immigration agents. Thus, they are hesitant to contact the police for fear of being deported.

Yet another problem, and perhaps the greatest impediment to the creation of close ties between police officers and immigrants, is that many immigrants are from nations wherein the police are not to be trusted. Thus, many immigrants have no concept of the police as trained professionals charged with the task of enforcing the law in a fair and impartial manner. Given that roughly one-third of all immigrants in the United States are from Mexico, let us examine the quality of police services in Mexico as an example. As documented by Vanderwood (1970, 1981), the police in Mexico have a long history of wanton brutality, corruption, and criminality; and despite numerous efforts to reform the police in Mexico, officers continue to engage in crimes ranging from bribery to murder (Davis, 2003; Macias & Castillo, 2002; Weiner, 2002). In fact, the practice of bribing the police in Mexico (i.e., *la mordida* which, roughly translated, means “the bite”) is so common that officials in Mexico City installed surveillance cameras at intersections in an effort to catch police officers who stop drivers for the purpose of demanding bribes (Schiller, 2003). Not surprisingly, many people in Mexico are hesitant to call the police for assistance due to their fear that they will be victimized by the officers who respond (Davis, 2003; Reames, 2003; Thompson, 2000).

In short, there is little doubt that the majority of immigrants from Mexico have a deeply ingrained belief that police officers are brutal thugs whose primary objective is lining their own pockets at the expense of the citizenry. Moreover, considering the quality of the justice systems in developing nations (e.g., China, Guatemala, Russia, and the list goes on), there is little reason to suspect that immigrants from such nations have any concept of professional law enforcement. Despite the fact that policing in the United States is of a fundamentally different nature than policing in developing nations, it would be naive to expect that immigrants from developing nations arrive in the country ready and willing to abandon all their beliefs and knowledge pertaining to the police.

It is therefore the responsibility of the police in the United States to reach out to immigrant communities and explain their job to local residents whose past experiences with the police may have been less than pleasant. As no single tactic will be appropriate for all departments, it would be irresponsible to outline a specific agenda for police administrators to follow, but a few suggestions worth consideration are as follows:

- Offering citizen police academies taught in languages other than English
- Establishing police ministations in neighborhoods with large immigrant populations
• Assigning bilingual officers the role of community-liaison officers and then utilizing local churches, schools, and businesses in immigrant communities to introduce the community-liaison officers to the residents

Once the police begin developing programs to accommodate the needs of immigrants, police spokesmen and public relations officers should make it a habit of contacting local print, radio, and television news providers (especially non-English news providers) to ask that positive interaction between officers and immigrants be publicized.

Next, in the process of establishing a rapport with community residents (of all races/ethnicities and nationalities), it is essential that the police work with the residents to identify and eliminate the causes of crime and disorder in the community. The specific methods for accomplishing this task, however, will vary from one community to the next. As previously discussed, the United States is a diverse nation wherein each community is faced with its own unique set of problems. Thus, the methods for reducing crime and disorder will also vary from one community to the next, and it is up to the police throughout the nation to work alongside local residents to ascertain the nature of vicinal problems and then develop effective means of containing such problems. To provide a possible scenario, Yeoman (2000, 2001) reported that Hispanic immigrants in North Carolina are often targeted by street criminals specifically because immigrants tend to carry cash and are fearful of contacting the police to report incidents of victimization.

In such a case, one option would be for the police to encourage immigrants to report all crimes to the police in order that the police may find some pattern of criminal activity and increase patrols in the areas where the robberies most commonly occur. The problem with this approach is that by increasing aggressive patrols in neighborhoods with large immigrant populations, the police may also be put in the position of unnecessarily harassing many immigrants, which, in turn, would reduce cooperation with the police. Suppose, for example, that some of the perpetrators of the robberies are Hispanic and the police get a description of one of the perpetrators. It is doubtful that the description would contain many useful details. A more likely scenario is that the description would contain ambiguous information about a young Hispanic male with a medium build and dark hair. Thus, in the process of stopping, questioning, and arresting possible suspects in the area, the police would inevitably alienate many decent, hard working, law abiding Hispanics. A more effective solution in this case might be for police officials to meet with Hispanic community leaders and try to coordinate efforts with local banks to help immigrants set up checking or savings accounts. The primary reason that immigrants often carry large sums of cash (thereby making themselves targets for criminals) is that they are unable or unwilling to establish bank accounts. Hence, by means of encouraging immigrants to deposit their hard earned dollars in the local banks, police officials could help reduce the victimization of immigrants and simultaneously form positive ties with them.

Obviously, the aforementioned scenario and solution is but one example of community-oriented problem-solving efforts involving the police and immigrants. Owing to the diversity of the U.S. populace, the nature and extent of crime will vary from one city to the next, which means that the police must devise crime reduction and order maintenance tactics on a case-by-case basis. Whereas corporations (e.g.,
Coca Cola, Dell, McDonald’s, Wal Mart, etc.) can create a single business model that can be implemented nationwide, there is no single model of crime control that will be effective in all places and at all times. Thus, the police must gain the trust of local residents and work with them to identify the nature, cause, and extent of crime and disorder and then jointly develop effective means of reducing the problems.

Community Policing in Post-September 11th America

While the threat posed by terrorist activities is greatest in developing nations such as Columbia where there are no clear distinctions between drug traffickers, rogue paramilitary organizations, insurgent guerilla groups, and so called “narcoterrorists” (Bibes, 2001), the events of September 11th clearly demonstrated the horrifying capacities of terrorist cells operating in the United States. Indeed, the difference between Ahmed Yousef’s 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the kamikaze attacks on the World Trade Center by Al Qaeda operatives in 2001 vividly showed how far terrorist groups have advanced in less than a decade. The attacks on the World Trade Center not only made it clear that the United States is vulnerable to attacks from within its borders, but also that the nation is the primary target of many Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. Given that all of the terrorists involved in the September 11th attacks were men of Middle Eastern origin, it is no surprise that U.S. law enforcement agents and counterterrorism officials have concentrated their investigative efforts on men of Arab descent.

The problem with the investigation of the events of September 11th is that, rather than seeking the cooperation of Middle Eastern immigrants and Arab-Americans in a respectful fashion, federal law enforcement agents (aided by municipal police authorities) began questioning and then arresting persons of Arab descent in an arbitrary fashion. Making matters worse, the detainees were subjected to prolonged periods of incarceration during which time they were verbally and physically mistreated by correctional authorities (Fine, 2003). Obviously, this is not the best means of winning the hearts and minds of the demographic group who are in the best position to provide law enforcement authorities with information pertaining to activities of Middle Eastern terrorist cells.

Granting law enforcement officials greater authority to tap phones, secretly search private residences, surveil Islamic gatherings, and detain suspects for extended periods of time may result in a few arrests of active terrorists, but in the long run, such tactics will do little to prevent terrorist attacks and a great deal in terms of fostering hostility toward U.S. authorities, which, in turn, may only encourage people to aid terrorist groups (Brown, 2003). As documented by Lyons (2002), what is most needed to effectively combat terrorism in the United States is effective partnerships between the police and persons of Middle Eastern descent. Indeed, if law enforcement authorities “expect Arab-Americans and Islamic-Americans to share information, perhaps at great personal risk, it is incumbent on us to insist that our policing efforts first treat them with respect, protecting their liberties and dignity” (Lyons, 2002, p. 537; also see Albini, 2001). In short, community policing is not only essential in terms of increasing public safety, but it should also be considered an essential component of an effective homeland security program (Community policing more, 2002).
Conclusion

As the United States becomes an increasingly diverse society, it is imperative that the police adapt to the changes in the population. In the event that any portion of the populace does not trust the police, the ability of the police to enhance public safety will be reduced. Regardless of whether the problem is a string of residential burglaries, prostitution, curbside drug sales, interstate drug trafficking, street gang activity, or international terrorism, the police will depend upon the citizenry to report suspicious activities and crimes and provide information about the suspected perpetrators. In addition, the police must depend upon local residents to help identify the root causes of crime and disorder. It is thus imperative that the police and the populace work together in a mutually respectful fashion, and in order to do this, it is necessary that the police understand the norms, values, and cultures of the people they serve and that the entire populace understands the role of the police. In a diverse society, there is no better means of achieving this goal than the development of strong community policing programs that center on quality relations between law enforcement officers and the populace.

References


Community Policing and America’s Youth: A Basic Police-School Partnership Plan That Works

Steven Rogers, Detective/Sergeant, Nutley, New Jersey, Police Department

*Education has in America’s whole history been the major hope for improving individuals and society. –Gunnar Myrdal*

In the latter part of the 20th century, the image of the police suffered like at no other time in American history as a result of three factors:

1. The criticism of police conduct on a grand scale after highly publicized criminal cases revealed police misuse of power.

2. Hollywood movies characterized the police as an enemy of the people, highlighting police abuse and corruption.

3. American law enforcement agencies failed to develop national public relations campaigns designed to counter the bad press and false impressions created by the media and movie producers.

Unfortunately, these three factors, which have historically resulted in the erosion of police community relations, continue to exist today, in spite of the support given law enforcement after 9/11/2001.

The one group of citizens most affected by the erosion of police-community relations is America’s youth.

It is no secret that an overwhelming number of America’s youth, especially those young people who reside in inner cities, have negative feelings toward the police.

In the late 1990s, the Nutley, New Jersey, Police Department was feeling some negative impact by the youth in their community as a result of the global problems police were facing with regard to police-community relations.

It was apparent to police officials that the highly publicized Rodney King case, and racial profiling cases throughout the nation, was impacting how the people from their community, especially young people, were feeling about their “neighborhood cop.”

To address the global negative images of the police from a local level, the Nutley Police Department, conducted a survey of high school students in an attempt to find out how they felt about the Nutley Police Department.

Police officials believed that the results would reflect how young people felt about the police “globally” as well as “locally.”
Of the 9th to 12th grade participants in the survey, 447 were male, and 437 were female. The following questions were asked, with the noted results.

1. How would you rate the Nutley Police Department? Consider response time to incidents, crime rate, police youth relations, and police attitude toward the youth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Male Response</th>
<th>Female Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>05.5%</td>
<td>02.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. What factors most influenced your rating as answered in question 1?

Both males and females responded as follows:
- Poor: Negative contact with police, poor police attitude toward youth
- Fair: Various forms of both negative and positive publicity
- Good: Police performance, police visibility, low crime rate
- Excellent: Positive contact with police and all factors enumerated in the good category

3. Do you have any specific complaints about the police?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. How do you think the police feel about you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feeling</th>
<th>Male (%)</th>
<th>Female (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police do not like youth</td>
<td>67.7%</td>
<td>71.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police like youth</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Have you ever had contact with a police officer?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Male (%)</th>
<th>Female (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>71.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Are you afraid of the police?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feeling</th>
<th>Male (%)</th>
<th>Female (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>75.8%</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Complaints about police specifically focused on police attitude and behavior when in contact with the youth. A large number of young people described some cops as being “mean and rude.”

Police learned that this image of the “mean and rude” cop had something to do with the media and news images of the police on a global level; however, and perhaps most importantly, the image the youth had of the police had much to do with some officers the youth had come in contact with on a local level.

Of 884 students surveyed, over 70% admitted having limited contact (negative and positive) with the police. Not one student complained of excessive use of force,
police brutality, racism, profiling, or prejudice exhibited by Nutley police officers. Most students agreed that the police treated them fairly.

Complaints about negative police behavior and attitudes toward young people, however, were more the “rule” than the exception.

What was perplexing to the police officers conducting the survey was that on one hand, the students agreed that the police treated them fairly; yet on the other hand, they complained about negative police attitude and behavior.

In further discussions with the youth, police found that their complaints were in fact legitimate but not widespread. Nutley police officials identified what the problem was with regard to this global image of their police officers.

After further research, Nutley police officials found that a small number of officers with communications problems projected a negative image, which, in the eyes of the youth, permeated the entire department and profession. These very few officers were reinforcing the Hollywood and media image of the “bad cop.”

Nearly 70% of the youth expressed a belief that the entire department, and the profession as a whole, had a negative image of the youth and that in some cases, the police were not looked upon as a friend.

After the survey was completed and analyzed, police established a Police-School Partnership Program with the objective of strengthening police-youth relations though seven components (listed below). In addition, the officers who projected the negative images were counseled and trained in communication skills.

**Goals of Police School Partnership Program**

1. Increase student awareness and respect for the legal process and law enforcement.
2. Demonstrate the role of police officers in the community.
3. Present a realistic image of the police officer, including the “human component.”
4. Help students develop an understanding of the concept of justice.
5. Open lines of communication between the police and the students.
6. Promote awareness and respect for the diverse cultures in the community.
7. Create and promote violence reduction and conflict resolution methodologies between the police and the youth and the youth among themselves.

Parents, teachers, police officers, the board of education, businesses, churches, and civic group leaders participated in this program. Its impact transcended the classroom onto the streets of the community.

When all the goals and objectives of this partnership were accomplished, police reported that the contact with the youth in the community was more positive than before the partnership was created.
Additionally, instead of the youth referring to their local police in negative terms, the word on the street and among the youth in the neighborhoods was that the cops were “cool.”

A significant lesson learned by police was that they were able to overcome the negative global images projected by the media and Hollywood, by projecting a positive attitude towards the youth of their community on a local level.

This partnership has proven that winning the hearts and minds of the youth, at no cost to the taxpayers, reaps a big savings in police community relations.

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The Fourth Era of American Policing: Strategic Management

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Kasey A. Tucker, University of Toledo

Introduction

A contemporary historical retrospect of American policing frequently evolves into the identification of three eras of policing: (1) political, (2) reform, and (3) community problem-solving eras. These eras allow for a conceptual classification of the changes that have evolved in the policing process and are routinely represented in current policing textbooks describing distinctions in police behavior since the beginning of American policing. The roots of these era classifications can be found in an essay presented by Kelling and Moore (1988) to Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government’s Executive Session on Policing. These classifications are not without controversy. At the time the essay was presented, critical opinions by scholars and practitioners resulted in a subsequent publication revealing this debate (Hartmann, 1988). Much of the debate focused discussions about police departments and the way they operated, suggesting they were too dissimilar to be all grouped together for the purposes of defining three eras. Kelling countered these positions by noting that his essay . . .

. . . was my attempt, on the basis of a lot of experience in many police departments, to get way back from the occupation and take a long view, through binoculars. I suspect when you do that, you see if differently from somebody who worked inside the field for a long period of time. This long view identifies what I consider to be the central tendencies of the occupation. (p. 8)

Since Kelling and Moore’s paper was published, the discussion of these eras has entered the lexicon of academic and practitioner thought to the point that it appears in law enforcement text books (Cordner & Sheehan, 1999), course syllabi (Erpelding, 2002), and even on web pages of many police departments (Yonkers, 2003, para. 2).

This article attempts to take the essay and observations of Kelling and Moore in 1988, and carry the timeline into the early 21st century. Since this essay was published, law enforcement has not existed in a vacuum. Many changes have occurred, which would suggest perhaps a fourth era has evolved. As Kelling and Moore noted in the opening sentence of their essay, “Policing, like all professions, learns from experience. It follows then, that as modern police executives search for more effective strategies of policing, they will be guided by the lessons of police history” (p. 1).

Methodology

This article attempts to use as a basis, the historical premise of Kelling and Moore and their classification of policing into the political, reform, and community-problem solving eras. Based upon this categorical assumption, this article takes the premise of evolving strategies of policing and suggests that law enforcement has continued to
evolve over the past 15 years. In this evolitional process, some behavioral changes in law enforcement have occurred, which suggest that perhaps American law enforcement has evolved into a fourth era—strategic management.

When Kelling and Moore presented their essay in 1988, they stated that a shift was beginning to occur toward what they identified as the community problem-solving era. This was about 10 years after Goldstein’s ground-breaking observations in *Policing a Free Society* (1977) and *Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach* (1979). At this point, it was Kelling and Moore’s position that the community was going to play a crucial role in crime reduction; however, much of the discussion about the community problem-solving era involved the implementation of foot patrol, with the evidence presented in the Flint, Newark, and Houston experiments. These experiments involved using foot patrol, which ultimately impacted the fear of crime.

At the same time, in the literature, the terms community problem-solving and community policing were being used almost interchangeably (Moore, Trojanowicz, & Kelling, 1988, p. 1). It is clear at this point in the literature that no clarification of concepts was identified. At the same time, in a separate article, Kelling (1988) presented yet another variation on community problem-solving and community policing, which he termed problem-oriented policing. A historical review of these articles seems to suggest the terms philosophy and strategy were being intertwined as well, almost to the point that the concepts became vague and also interchangeable.

Five years later, Goldstein (1993) observed . . .

Under the rubric of community policing, progressive police administrators and interested citizens have been working hard for more than a decade to design and implement a form of policing that better meets the demands on the police in the 1990s. Within these circles, the term “community policing” has been used to embrace and intricately web together initiatives that have been advocated for modern day policing . . . The downside of this new-found popularity is that “community policing” is widely used without regard for its substance . . . Indeed, the popularity of the term has resulted in its being used to encompass practically all innovations in policing, from the most ambitious to the most mundane . . . With such varied meanings and such broad expectations, the use of “community policing” creates enormous problems for those seriously interested in bringing meaningful change in the American police. (p. 1)

This article indicates that by 1993, Goldstein was observing that police and elected officials were using community policing as a label for virtually any program they developed. This is clearly not how Goldstein intended the term community policing to be used. Again, this ambiguity caused confusion and a lack of an occupation-wide consensus on the relationships between and definitions of community problem-solving, problem-oriented policing, and community policing.

**Distinctions and Trends**

Shortly after the publication of Goldstein’s 1993 paper, newly appointed New York Police Department (NYPD) Police Commissioner William Bratton requested weekly one-on-one crime statistics briefings from each borough in NYPD. It quickly became
apparent that NYPD couldn’t provide such information because they didn’t have timely crime statistics. The only data available was about 3 months old. Responding to this, Deputy Commissioner Jack Maple, Chief Patrick Kelleher, Lieutenant William Gorta, and Sergeant John Yohe directed NYPD precincts to generate weekly crime statistics. This led to the eventual computerization of the weekly crime data in New York City and allowed for a comparison of 1993 and 1994 data. The computer-generated comparison data that was assembled into a COMPSTAT (compare statistics) book. Initially this data was used as an indicator of effectiveness in the individual precincts, but the process didn’t end there. The process continued to evolve with the linking of data, the generation of crime maps, and weekly strategy meetings. The weekly strategy meetings between the commissioner, borough, and precinct commanders projected the crime data onto maps to look for patterns and trends in complaints and arrests. Besides quantitative data, qualitative data in the form of reports on community quality-of-life conditions were collected and reported. The mantra for this practice became acting quickly on timely and accurate crime analysis (Silverman, 1999).

In 1995, Kelling observed . . .

Participation in the three-hour, twice-weekly meetings is mandatory for all 76 precinct commanders, super-chiefs, deputy commissioners, and borough chiefs. In the department’s high-tech command and control center, the operational “guts” of the NYPD during riots or other calamities, a lectern beneath a huge projection screen looks out over tables arranged in a U. A placard to the left of the screen lists the “4 Steps to Crime Reduction” in bold print: “Accurate & Timely Intelligence, Rapid Deployment, Effective Tactics, Relentless Follow-Up & Assessment.” To the right hangs the slogan, “We’re not just report takers; we’re the police.” Along the sides of the U sit a dozen or so precinct commanders and the detective lieutenants from the borough that will be the focus of this particular meeting. At the end of the U, Chief of Detectives Charles Reuther, Chief of Patrol Louis Anemone, Chief of Narcotics Patrick Harrnett, Chief of Organized Crime Control Martin O’Boyle, and Deputy Commissioner Maple (specially appointed by Bratton and known by everyone to be one of his closest and most loyal sidekicks) face the speaker at the lectern. Around the sides of the room sit or stand representatives of schools, district attorneys’ offices, and the parole department, along with heads of NYPD special units and support staff. Outside observers fill out the standing-room-only space. Maple runs the meetings: whether he is sick, hoarse, or simply exhausted from being called out in the middle of the night, the show will go on. (para. 39)

The strategies employed the following timeline:

1. Getting guns off the street (March 7, 1994)
2. Reducing youth school and street violence (April 6, 1994)
3. Driving out drug dealers (April 6, 1994)
4. Stopping domestic violence (April 26, 1994)
5. Reclaiming public spaces (July 18, 1994)
6. Reducing auto-related offenses (February 19, 1995)
7. Stopping corruption and building NYPD integrity (June 14, 1995)
8. Reclaiming NYC roads (November 29, 1995)
This practice of computer-generated crime data and comparing statistics suggested a convergence of police management, technology, strategy, and community involvement. It appeared to be more than just community policing; it was, in fact, strategic management. It is tempting at this point to turn the discussion to a criminological focus about cause and effect of crime, and what caused the great reduction of crime in the 1990s, but that is not the focus of this article. This article seeks to observe a phenomenon occurring in American law enforcement of a strategic movement, which indicates a public administration slant to the discussion. It is interesting to anecdotally look at what happened to the crime rate in New York City during this time, and Silverman provides an interesting look into an assessment of the NYC crime rate during the time that COMPSTAT was implemented. From 1994 to 1998, he states, “overall rates for murder, rape, robbery, felonious assault, burglary, grand larceny, and motor vehicle theft plunged 50.5 percent” (Silverman, 1999, p. 6). Silverman further notes the reduction of these crimes accounted for “. . . more than 60% of the national decline . . . New York can justifiably claim to be the major force driving down the nation’s crime rate” (p. 6).

The evidence suggests that the management processes used in the COMPSTAT practice have been present in policing since 1994 and throughout the political, reform, and community problem-solving eras of American policing. There appears to be a transformation occurring in policing that is separate from the other eras—the emergence of the strategic management era. This era provides for the coordination and management of personnel and equipment resources in response to the feedback by the computerized crime data and mapping process.

One problem with strategic management research is that most of the focus is on NYPD’s COMPSTAT process because it is the most scrutinized. It is important to understand that while NYPD’s experience has the highest visibility, there are other cities with similar programs, generating similar changes in police patterns of behavior. Henry (2002) notes that, besides NYPD, the COMPSTAT paradigm has been implemented in New Orleans, Birmingham, Trenton, Stanford, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Houston as well as various cities in Europe and South America; all indicate similar results (pp. 305-307). Additionally Minneapolis, Minnesota, was labeled “Murderapolis” in 1996, when a COMPSTAT-style program called CODEFOR (Computer Optimized Deployment Focus On Results) was implemented, resulting in a dramatic drop in all Part I Crimes. In 2002, William Bratton was hired as the Chief of Police of Los Angeles, California, with the intent to bring a COMPSTAT-style management program to the LAPD. Henry also suggests that the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) adopt a COMPSTAT-style program referred to as FEDSTAT (p. 310).

In looking at strategic management as the new era, criteria should be adopted to evaluate its effectiveness, as was the case with the other three eras. Kelling and Moore gave the following criteria in their essay, The Evolving Strategy of Policing (1988): legitimacy and authorization, the police function, organizational design, external relationships, demand management, principle programs and technologies, and measured outcomes.
Legitimacy and Authorization

The community problem-solving era drew from the legitimacy and authorization of the two previous eras, political and reform. Evidence of this can be seen in Kelling and Moore’s observation, “There is renewed emphasis on community, or political, authorization for many police tasks, along with law and professionalism” (1988, p. 11).

The literature review of COMPSTAT seems to identify the political, professional, and community components as essential to the process. The process uses organized and strategic coordination of personnel and equipment resources in response to the focused political and community needs, while implementing professional level assessments with available management techniques and technology. Just like the conductor is essential to the proper functioning of the orchestra, strategic management is necessary to determine and guide the action taken by police in response to assessed political and community needs.

The Police Function

As Moore, Trojanowicz, and Kelling (1988) observed, “The core mission of policing is to control crime. No one disputes this” (p. 1). Strategic management of the personnel involved and the allocation of all resources with clear and specific initiative indicates one of the great strengths of this process. Just like the military asks the civilian leadership to clarify its goals and to provide the political and military objectives before the deployment of forces, police personnel benefit from similar clarification. Policing in the 1970s and 1980s talked of a variety of wars on various criminal behaviors; when there does not appear to be an end to the war, the troops begin to feel demoralized, and it suggests things are out of their control. It could be said that lack of clarity and demoralization were an issue with the traditional police officer resistance to community policing. Perhaps the personnel involved did not see results; there was no end game plan (or exit strategy). They felt demoralized and that circumstances were beyond their control. To illustrate this point, Kelling (1988) observes many of the frustrations with the traditional role of the police officer in his article entitled “Police and Communities: The Quiet Revolution.”

The police function then becomes a matter of encouraging officers to resume the crime fighter role and to pursue criminals. This pursuit is coordinated and more surgical in nature than in the past, with a strategy that is built on a consensus provided by real-time crime data (that is analyzed in high-level strategy sessions) and implemented using a variety of tactics. The effectiveness of officer efforts is then carefully monitored to determine whether goals are being met; the necessary feedback is assessed, and the appropriate changes are made.

Organizational Design

Traditional community policing has focused on empowering the beat officer to solve problems. With the experience of the late 1980s and early 1990s fresh, NYPD considered it . . .

unfair and unreasonable to expect beat cops to disentangle and successfully address entrenched social problems whose solutions have confounded social
scientists and criminal theorists for years. Despite their best efforts and, in many cases, their skills and expertise, beat-level police officers simply cannot muster the organizational resources needed to attack these problems. (Henry, 2002, p. 25)

The COMPSTAT paradigm reduced the focus on the beat officer and placed more responsibility on the precinct commander (Henry, 2002). Bratton considered the precinct commander to be at the appropriate level of the organization (to be close enough to the street) to quickly respond to problems yet sufficiently be in control of personnel and equipment resources and to adapt the allocation of these resources to particular hot spots or crime patterns in a planned (strategic) manner.

Therefore, the strategic management process seemed to involve the empowerment of middle management in a decentralized organizational design to balance need and the allocation of resources.

**External Relationships**

As mentioned earlier, strategic management suggested a convergence of police management, technology, strategy, and community involvement. This is underscored by the first step of crime reduction: “Accurate & Timely Intelligence” (Kelling, 1995, para. 39). Kelling and Moore (1988) observed that “community policing relies on intimate relationships between police and citizens. This is accomplished in a variety of ways: relatively long-term assignment of officers to beats, programs that emphasize familiarity between citizens and police . . . , revitalization or development of Police Athletic programs, educational programs in grade and high schools, and other programs.” The key word that keeps surfacing in Kelling and Moore’s account is relationship between police and the community. Strategic management takes the association between the police and community and then uses it as an association to gather accurate and timely intelligence for crime strategy development. This means that there must be a formal information collection scheme in place to give structure to the timely intelligence needs of strategic management. Such a system must collect, organize, and provide hot spot and pattern analysis. The community must play an active role in providing intelligence; therefore, the community problem-solving linkages are a source of intelligence information.

**Demand Management**

Kelling and Moore (1988) noted that in community problem-solving, the “. . . major portion of demand is decentralized, with citizens encouraged to bring problems directly to beat officers or precinct offices” (p. 12). There is a subsequent push to directly engage the community as a replacement for 911, except in true emergencies. With strategic management, it is critical that if citizens are diverted from 911, some method is put into place to collect their information, so it can be converted to the timely intelligence needed for further strategic management. Central to this data collection is the Management Information System (MIS), which includes computer-assisted dispatch, calls for service, and self-initiated data. This data is then analyzed for troublesome or recurring hot spots and crime patterns (McDonald, 2002). This use of real-time crime data, coupled with adjustments in patrol deployment and tactics, places the greatest resources in the area with the biggest problem or pattern,
armed with the latest intelligence gathered from analysis of the data. This supports the second step of reducing crime: “Rapid Deployment” (Kelling, 1995, para. 39).

**Programs and Technologies**

In their discussion of the community problem-solving era, Kelling and Moore (1988) identified the following programs: “foot patrol, information gathering, victim counseling and services, community organizing and consultation, education, walk-and-ride and knock-on-door programs, as well as regular patrol, specialized forms of patrol, and rapid response to emergency calls for service. Emphasis is placed on information sharing between patrol and detectives to increase the possibility of crime solution and clearance” (p. 12). As methodologies have evolved, a wealth of information has been collected. The ability to sort and organize data on a large scale has been made possible by the introduction of sophisticated computer hardware and software, which can take a piece of information and operationalize it, rather than relegating it to a “dead” paper police records unit. This technology was not readily available to police departments when Kelling and Moore’s article was written in 1988. Silverman (1999) provides some insight into the groundbreaking use of technology in his endnotes:

[NYPD Deputy Commissioner Jack] Maple eventually approached Detective Yalkin Demirkaya, who headed the Command and Control Center. The computer-savvy Demirkaya worked with a software program called MapInfo. Demirkaya explained to Maple that it would take about $1 million for system design, MapInfo software, geocoding, and high-speed modems for each precinct. Each precinct would be able to upload crime data to its borough, which would then transmit information to the COMPSTAT office within the chief of patrol’s office. Demirkaya developed the system, and the technologically sophisticated COMPSTAT process was born . . . The project completely transformed precincts’ manual crime tracking methods, equipping each precinct with a state-of-the-art computer system to analyze crime trends. (pp. 223-224)

The technology that separates the strategic management era from the community problem-solving era is the computer technology, software, and networks that allow the integration of real-time crime information and intelligence into the daily decisions of police administrators. Administrators have the organizational authority to allocate and reallocate resources to hot spots and/or trends, rather than placing enhanced crime reduction on unstructured open communication between patrol officers and detectives. This merging of organizational authority with real-time deployment of resources to hot spot or crime trends is necessary and supports the third step in crime reduction: “Effective Tactics.”

Additionally, it is interesting to observe that within the literature, there appears to be a shift away from the term *program*, toward the word *strategy*. A program is “an intermediate plan that covers a broad set of activities” (Higgins, 1994, p. 10). Programs are normally items that are funded in budgets and are focused on establishing or maintaining organizational activities. Tying the term *program* to budgets suggests that a program is primarily an administrative term. Conversely, “a strategy is a comprehensive plan or action orientation that sets critical direction and guides the allocation of resources for an organization to achieve long-term
objectives” (Schermerhorn, 1996, p. G-8). The term strategy is tied to goal and objective achievement, which suggests strategy is it is an operational term. Therefore, the term strategic management identifies the real-time operational use of resources to actively achieve crime reduction objectives.

**Measured Outcomes**

Kelling and Moore (1988) linked outcome measures to quality of life and citizen satisfaction. Strategic management includes these issues and further focuses on crime frequency and holding commanders accountable for crime rates in their areas of responsibility. In 1995, Kelling discussed the fourth step of crime reduction: “Relentless Follow-Up & Assessment” (para. 39). Within COMPSTAT and other strategic management programs, it is not enough to look at your crime statistics at the end of a quarter, semi-annually, or annually. Hot spots and trends are assessed weekly or bi-weekly, and effectiveness of resource deployment is discussed at meetings attended by the head of the agency and all command personnel. Additionally, strategies and tactics used previously are assessed for effectiveness. Formerly targeted crime frequency is a very important variable in this assessment.

**Conclusion**

In explaining the criteria Kelling and Moore used to divide the history of policing into three eras, their desire was to identify changes in specific strategies in the history of law enforcement (Hartmann, 1988). Using technology to process a large amount of intelligence, moving law enforcement administrators and command personnel from administrative roles to operational roles, and developing active operational strategies to attack the crime hot spots and patterns appear to have been instrumental in fairly dramatic reductions in the crime rates where ever implemented.

This article has provided a brief overview of the change that has been occurring in American law enforcement over the last decade and made the argument for a fourth era of policing: strategic management. Strategic management builds on the strengths from the political, professional, and community problem-solving eras as identified originally by Kelling and Moore.

**References**


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The Importance of Intergovernmental Collaboration in Preventing School Violence in America

Timothy J. Griffin, MA, Investigator, Mount Prospect Police Department

Introduction

School violence has progressively become a nettlesome problem for school administrators, law enforcement officials, parents, and children in the United States. The issue has created highly publicized media attention, raising concerns about the safety of our nation’s schools in the eyes of parents, teachers, school administrators, law enforcement officials, and politicians. School, law enforcement, and community officials have had to pull together through collaborative partnerships to combat school violence, create successful prevention programs, and develop new policies and procedures to ensure the safety of our nation’s children. As a result of these collaborative partnerships, many school districts and municipal police departments have implemented interlocal agreements to place sworn local police officers in the schools.

The issue of school violence is relatively recent in the United States. School violence was first observed in August of 1966, when a student at the University of Texas (Austin) brought a footlocker full of hunting rifles to the campus clock tower deck and began opening fire on random citizens, killing 14 and wounding 31 others. Although this incident was at a university, issues of school violence generally involve elementary and high schools. American schools were once considered one of the safest places for children, but after local schools began witnessing a series of spree killings since 1996, the consensus on school safety has changed. One of the most highly publicized incidents occurred at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, on April 20, 1999. In this incident, two students brought a slew of weapons and explosives into the school and opened fire, killing 12 students and 1 teacher and wounding 23 others, before taking their own lives (Fagin, 2003). Other recent highly publicized incidents of school violence include the following (Ardis, 2004, p. 133):

- On February 19, 1997, a school shooting in Bethel, Alaska, left the principal and one student dead.
- On October 1, 1997, a school shooting in Pearl, Mississippi, left two students dead.
- On December 1, 1997, three students were killed at a school in Paducah, Kentucky.
- On March 24, 1998, four young girls and a teacher were killed during a shooting in Jonesboro, Arkansas.
- On March 5, 2001, two students had their lives cut short during a school shooting in Santee, California.

These incidents and many others prove that school violence can take place at any school, at any time in the United States, and prevention efforts must be taken.
School violence has been defined as an unacceptable social behavior ranging from aggression to violence that threatens or harms others. This definition goes beyond the highly publicized incidents of mass bloodshed to include acts such as bullying, threats, and extortion. In realizing the definition of school violence, it becomes obvious that school administrators, law enforcement officials, and the community hold the responsibility of addressing this antisocial behavior through collaborative efforts. In this volatile environment, no one agency holds the key; rather, teamwork stands as the definitive methods for achieving success (Hoang, 2001).

In response to the increasing rate of youth violence, legislatures in Washington and the president of the United States have become involved. The United States Department of Education reports that Goal 7 of the Goals 2000: Educate America Act, was adopted by Congress and signed by President Clinton in March 1994. Goal 7 states, “By the year 2000, every school in America will be free of drugs and violence and will offer a disciplined environment conducive to learning. No child or youth should be fearful on the way to school, be afraid while there, or have to cope with pressures to make unhealthy choices” (Hester, 2003). In a report released later in this decade by the Department of Justice, however, a national survey reported 22% of students still admitted to being afraid of being attacked at school; 9% reported having experienced violent crimes while at school; and 2% are estimated to bring weapons or other objects to school for protection. Additionally, the Department of Justice reported that three million violent crimes or thefts occur on or near school property each year. Of all the crimes reported in the United States, 14% of all assaults and 8% of all rapes occur on school campuses (Grona, 2000).

One of the most popular methods initiated by the federal government in the furtherance of reducing school violence has been through the use of the Office of Community Oriented Policing (COPS) grant funds. This grant provides funding for local law enforcement to implement programs to bring full-time police officers into the school, commonly known as School Resource Officers (SRO). The goal of these programs is for local law enforcement officers to be enabled to practice community policing in the school setting and provide three primary purposes to the school that they serve: (1) law enforcement, (2) law-related education, and (3) law-related counseling. According to a 1999 COPS study, they also satisfy the needs for students, staff, and parents to feel safe (Ramey, 2004).

The COPS office has recently announced that they have awarded almost $715 million to more than 2,900 law enforcement agencies to fund over 6,300 school resource officers through the COPS in Schools (CIS) Program. Additionally, COPS has dedicated $21 million to training COPS-funded SROs and the school administrator in the partnering school districts to work more collaboratively through the CIS program. This collaborative partnership encourages the use of community policing strategies to prevent school violence and implement educational programs to improve student and school safety (USDOJ, 2004).

In addition to the COPS Grant, the United State’s Department of Education has provided several school violence prevention grants under the Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities Act (SDFSCA). These grants can be used for an array of violence prevention programs, including SRO programs. Also, the State of Illinois has funded grants for SRO programs from the Illinois Violence Prevention Authority.
(IVPA), which was created after the Illinois Violence Prevention Act of 1995 was passed.

In an interdisciplinary approach, this article will define and explore the evolution of school resource officer programs in the United States, identify the stakeholders involved in American school violence and SRO programs, and explain how these stakeholders function in collaborative partnerships in effort to prevent school violence. This article will also examine how these interlocal collaborative relationships apply to the U.S. Federal System; explore the funding issues of SRO programs including an analysis of the IVPA, CIS, and SDFSCA grant programs; and identify the state and federal requirements associated with each grant. Finally, this article will demonstrate a model to understand these collaborative relationships in context of the participants’ governmental power and authority levels and identify the need for further research of SRO interlocal agreements.

The Definition of a School Resource Officer

The Center for the Prevention of School Violence at the North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, a research institute of North Carolina State University, has been undertaking research initiatives on SRO programs since 1994. Acting Center Director Joanne McDaniel (2001) cites that during the “Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative” in 1998, the Departments of Education, Health and Human Services, and Justice provided the following federal definition of an SRO:

A career law enforcement officer, with sworn authority, deployed in community-orientated policing, and assigned by the employing police department or agency to work in collaboration with schools and community-based organizations to: (a) address crime and disorder problems, gangs, and drug activities affecting or occurring in or around an elementary or secondary school; (b) develop or expand crime prevention efforts for students; (c) educate likely school-age victims in crime prevention and safety; (d) develop or expand community justice initiatives for students; (e) train students in conflict resolution, restorative justice, and crime awareness; (f) assist in the identification of physical changes in the environment that may reduce crime in or around the school; and (g) assist in the developing school policy that addresses crime and recommend procedural changes. (pp. 2-3)

For the purpose of this article, SROs will be referred to as sworn full-time municipal police officers assigned to work in a local public school on a full-time basis.

The Evolution of School Resource Officer Programs

The first School Resource Officer program dates back to the late 1950s. According to the National Association of School Resource Officers (1997), the first SRO program was started in Flint, Michigan. This program began with the overall goal of improving the relationship between the local police and area youths. This practice of having a full-time officer in the schools was determined to be a great success as the officers served as both teachers and counselors. The Flint Michigan program became a model for SRO programs throughout the country. These programs flourished in the 1960s and 1970s, slowed down in the 1980s, and gained huge momentum in the late 1990s after a series of highly publicized incidents of school violence occurred.
Today, SRO programs are continuing to grow in numbers, with issues of funding, responsibility, and training remaining to be standardized (Girouard, 2001).

In a study conducted on the issue of school violence and the school administrator’s response in 1999, it was discovered that 27% of U.S. schools have implemented SRO programs (Sheley, 2000).

**Stakeholders**

There are numerous stakeholders involved in the issue of school violence. These stakeholders include school administrators, parents, police officials, community leaders, and students who are all concerned about drugs, the possession and use of weapons, gangs, assaults, and even murders that have occurred on school campuses across the United States (Johnson, 1999). One could argue that all of society is a stakeholder in school violence; school violence can and has occurred in local schools in various types of communities that reflect all segments of society. For the purpose of this article, I am going to focus on police officials and school administrators, as they are most involved in interlocal agreements through which SRO programs are arranged.

Municipal police officials are charged with the duty of crime control and public safety in the various communities they serve. They are accountable to the communities who employ them, operate under the authority of their state, and enforce the local ordinances of their community and the laws of their state. Police officials are also charged with the duty to honor and protect citizens’ rights as delineated in the United States Constitution. The issues of violence in the community, including school violence, are issues for which community members hold the police accountable and expect them to take a proactive stance in the reduction of violence and public safety (McCamey, Scaramella, & Cox, 2003).

School officials are under control of their local school district government. The school districts are autonomous although they operate under many state educational requirements. They are charged with the responsibility of providing children with a safe and orderly environment that is conducive to learning (Ramey, 2004). School officials have the moral and legal duty to preserve the safety and well-being of their students, as well as protect their constitutional rights (Essex, 1999). Like law enforcement officials, school administrators are accountable to the communities they serve. The issue of school violence can raise the following two questions: (1) How can law enforcement officials prevent crime, promote safety, and satisfy the mission of crime control in the local public schools? and (2) How can school administrators promote a safe, healthy, learning environment for children and prevent them from being victimized while at school? The answer is simple. School safety issues can be drastically reduced by law enforcement and school officials collaborating to place law enforcement officers inside a school on a full-time basis, otherwise known as SRO programs. This collaborative arrangement is a “win-win” for all of the stakeholders involved, as schools and children will be safer. In examining school violence from this perspective, one can show that law enforcement and school administrators are interdependent of each in accomplishing the goal of maintaining school safety.

This type of collaborating relationship is what Russ Linden (2003a) refers to as “High Stakes” collaborating. High stakes collaborating is when people “pull together” for a common purpose when the “stakes” are too high to allow the current problem to
In this situation, the stakes of school violence and the safety of children are far too serious for school or law enforcement officials to turn a blind eye. Linden elaborates on this topic by providing four “insights” on how and why people collaborate when the stakes are high, such as in the issue of school violence:

1. People usually work best together when they have a common project, product, or program that involves high stakes.
2. Crises tend to clarify the goal, the objectives, and the priorities.
3. People’s capabilities often count far more than rank during a crisis.
4. Many crises create incredibly close bonds because there’s a common challenge or enemy. (Linden, 2003a, pp. 110-113)

These four insights are especially meaningful in police-school relationships, as both parties have the common priority of providing the “product” of safety for children. They also have an interest in reducing school violence and showing their respective communities that they have taken the necessary steps in the attempt to prevent school violence.

In recent decades, most municipal law enforcement officials have restructured their agencies to operate under community policing models. Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1998) defined community policing as a philosophy and an organizational strategy that promotes a new partnership between people and the police in their communities. The concept of community policing is based on the premise that both the police and the community must work together as equal partners to identify, prioritize, and solve contemporary problems such as crime, drugs, fear of crime, social and physical disorder, and overall neighborhood decay, with the goal of improving the overall quality of life in the area. By partnering with schools and implementing SRO programs, law enforcement officials are furthering their goal of operating under a community policing model to solve law-enforcement-related issues.

School – Police Collaboration

Collaboration is defined by Agranoff and McGuire (2003) as a purposive relationship designed to solve a problem by creating or discovering a solution within a given set of restraints (p. 4). Linden (2003a) states that collaboration occurs when people from different organizations (or units within one organization) produce something together through joint effort, resources, and decisionmaking and share ownership of the final product or service (p. 7). Bardach (1998) defines collaboration as any joint activity by two or more agencies that is intended to increase public value by their working together rather than separately (p. 8). In a community policing “toolkit” developed to assist law enforcement and community partnership efforts, Rinehart, Laszlo, and Briscoe (2001) list the following six reasons for community policing collaborations:

1. Accomplish what individuals alone cannot.
2. Prevent duplication of individual or organizational efforts.
3. Enhance the power of advocacy and resource development for the initiative.
4. Create more public recognition and visibility for the community policing initiative.
5. Provide a more systematic, comprehensive approach to addressing community or school-based crime and disorder problems.
6. Provide more opportunities for new community policing projects. (Section 1, pp. 1-5)

As school and law enforcement officials meet, develop school resource officer programs, and reduce school violence, they are collaborating to develop a violence prevention program for the common purposes of protecting children and ensuring public safety.

**Horizontal Collaboration and Interlocal Agreements**

The type of collaboration conducted interlocally between school districts and municipal police departments to implement SRO programs is what Agranoff and McGuire (2003) refer to as horizontal collaboration. The concept of horizontal collaboration describes when two local governments interact, either formally or informally, to develop policies, strategies, or programs, that require various types of resources that neither has the capacity to produce on its own. In this setting, neither government agency possesses the power to determine the strategies of the other, and each agency official is responsible to the public for the outcome of the collaboration, creating interlocal interdependency. In the school violence prevention scenario, both the schools and the police are interdependent of each other in the reduction of violence at schools and the implementation of SRO programs. Also, the school and police administrators are accountable to the public in instances of school violence, encouraging them to collaborate about this issue.

Thurmaier and Wood (2002) describe interlocal agreements as service-delivery instruments for local governments. These instruments assist local governments in providing specialized services that they could not offer their communities without contracting with another local government. The authors further explain interlocal agreements as exchange networks between two or more local governments in which there are dependencies among them for the exchange of resources. In terms of law-enforcement-related issues, interlocal agreements can reduce the levels of uncertainty in emergency and crisis situations. Interlocal agreements between schools districts and police departments for SRO programs are usually formal written contracts.

**Sharing of Control**

Angela Eilers (2002) from the University of Minnesota conducted a study of children and families with “high needs” in which she explored school-linked collaborative services and systems change among local agencies. The study linked schools with three other public agencies—(1) public health, (2) law enforcement, and (3) human services—to provide social services to “high-needs” populations. The collaborating parties agreed that there were current inefficiencies with each of them going it alone to provide services. In an effort to improve services, they agreed a good strategy would be to integrate their services, tighten the safety net for these families, and use a collaborative mechanism at the local level. Unfortunately, this example of collaboration was unsuccessful, and the efficiency of services was not improved. Eilers states that this program failed because of the involved agencies’ lack of capacity for systems changes within their organizations. In other words, the concept of collaboration sounded great, but the mindset of doing things “they way we always done it” didn’t change for the involved agencies’ administrators. Eilers
refers to systems change as a devolved authority or decentralization, a redistribution of power in an effort to improve public services. Eilers concludes that it may be prudent to assess an institution’s capacity to change authority at the beginning of collaborative ventures. Additionally, collaborators should determine whether shared authority would be best based upon the expertise of the involved agencies or for the best outcome of the “problem” or “program” that the parties chose to collaborate about in the first place.

This example provides necessary lessons for school and law enforcement officials collaborating to implement SRO programs. As law enforcement officers have historically had the authority to carry out their missions of crime control and public safety the best way they see fit, and school officials have had the autonomy of operating their schools in the best way they see fit, issues of authority need to be determined at the onset of an SRO program. In following from the above example, law enforcement and school officials can best operate with shared authority, removing bureaucratic models of control and trusting each other to make the appropriate decisions about school violence prevention from their area of expertise.

Power and Authority

In addressing issues of governmental authority in coordinating efforts between local agencies, Jennings and Ewalt (1998) cite that hierarchy and authority are likely to be of little use in setting priorities, settling disputes, or facilitating interaction. In addition, they state that “turf protection” is a common barrier to interagency coordination as well as separate missions, competing legal mandates, distinct constituencies, and competition for resources. The authors state, that coordination is successful, however, when the agencies have shared needs and interests and can meet those needs through informal agreements and coordination among the other agencies. By collaborating with others and agreeing to making mutual adjustments when necessary, as opposed to remaining loyal to systems of hierarchy and authority, agencies can be successful in collaborating to solve their problems. O’Toole (1997) elaborates that administrators should not assume that they possess authority in the collaborative setting, as delegating directives may actually weaken the partnership and the overall project. Meier and O’Toole (2003) add that public managers often operate in networked settings in which the success of a program is often necessitated by some form of collaboration with parties over whom they exercise little formal control.

In addition, Linden (2003b) points out that the police department’s crime-control-orientated mission isn’t easily blended with the service orientation of the public schools. Turf issues are tough with these groups, as they each may have major concerns about losing autonomy, identity, and resources when they’re asked to collaborate. Kellam (2000), in a study on community and institutional partnerships for school violence prevention, states that a collaborative relationship means a sharing of control. Kellam elaborates that successful programs may require a long process of trust building and negotiation as partnerships resolve differences in philosophies, principles, values, work histories, strategic interest, and vision. In addressing issues of power, the partners need to examine the issue in the beginning of the relationship and correct any inequalities of power, as well as be sure to speak with one another rather than for one another. Again, law enforcement and school officials need to remain focused on the issue of reducing school violence and accommodate each other when necessary to realize that goal.
Funding

The area of funding methods for SRO programs is largely underrepresented in the literature. Future research needs to be conducted on the funding of SRO programs to determine what type of funding arrangements are most effective in implementing SRO programs. I am aware, however, that most SRO programs are funded by the school districts, although some municipalities share or split the cost, while others provide SROs to the schools at no cost to enhance their community policing initiatives. The funding of SROs involves the intergovernmental concepts of bargaining and negotiation between school districts and municipalities. Although most SRO programs are locally funded, some are funded by state and federal grants that will be reviewed later in this article.

Trust and Regulatory Control

Rinehart, Laszlo, and Briscoe (2001) cite trust as being fundamental in developing collaborative working relationships between law enforcement and the other community partners. The authors model trust in the collaboration setting as the core of the relationship with the following components: stakeholders, shared vision, expertise, teamwork strategies, open communication, motivated partners, means, and an action plan forming a whole. Linden (2003a) describes trust as the glue that holds collaborative ventures together, and without trust, people will not work or take risk together to accomplish their collaborative goal. Trojanowicz and Bucquieros (1998) state that trust provides a foundation that allows the police and the community to collaborate and that it must be based on mutual understanding and respect.

In the situation of SRO programs, there are no regulatory agencies that affect these programs. The SRO remains an employee of the local police department and ultimately answers to the chief of police, while working in partnership with his or her assigned school’s administration. Without regulatory control, trust becomes an important factor in this type of interlocal agreement (Thurmaier & Wood, 2002). Without trust between the school, police administrators, and the SRO, the collaborative effort to reduce school violence will most likely not succeed. In the next section, I will examine SRO programs in the scheme of the U.S. Federal System.

The U.S. Federal System and SROs

The 10th Amendment of the United States Constitution states that any power not delegated to the federal government or prohibited to the states, is reserved to the states, respectively, or to the people. Policing was not mentioned in the Constitution as a federal power, so it has been considered a local matter (Fagin, 2003). Similarly, education was not delegated as a federal power, thus, creating another responsibility for the local and state school districts. As school violence is the responsibility of the local school districts and the local police, the issue remains a local problem that requires a local intervention. Provan and Milward (2001) elaborate that as a result of the recent devolution movement in the United States, the importance of dealing with problems at the local level has been reinforced. When public services such as law enforcement, public safety, and education are kept at the local level, often community-based networks such as SRO interlocal agreements, are the most logical, effective, and efficient mechanisms to handle local problems.
Like other local issues that have received an abundance of negative media publicity, however, the state and federal governments have become involved, linking SRO programs to the American system of federalism. Politicians and the media have defined school violence as a national problem that requires a national response after focusing their attention on school violence and the ease with which youths obtain weapons and drugs and bring them into schools (Grona, 2000). In the next section, I will examine how many school and law enforcement officials accomplish collaboration and implement SRO programs through the use of state (Illinois) and federal grants as well as explore the requirements that accompany each of these grants. These grants provide school and law enforcement administrators with an excellent opportunity to fund desired SRO programs without losing their autonomous powers to tailor these programs as they deem appropriate.

The Illinois Violence Prevention Authority (IVPA) Grant

The Illinois Violence Prevention Authority (IVPA) was established by the Illinois Violence Prevention Act of 1995. This act created the first state agency dedicated to violence prevention in the United States. The IVPA was created with the intention of preventing violence in Illinois through a collaborative public health and public safety approach. The IVPA has defined five main goals in an attempt to follow the mandates listed in the 1995 Act:

1. Develop and implement a statewide plan for violence prevention.
2. Fund local and statewide anti-violence programs.
3. Coordinate existing violence prevention initiatives, and encourage collaborative projects.
4. Evaluate and provide technical assistance for violence prevention planning.

The IVPA raises funding through a cooperative effort with the Illinois Secretary of State’s Office. In Illinois, vehicle owners can purchase special violence prevention license plates for a cost slightly higher than the standard Illinois license plate. The monies generated go to the IVPA for violence prevention programs. Between January of 1996 and September of 1998, the IVPA raised over $2 million from the sales of these license plates and began distributing funding for innovative violence prevention programs throughout the State of Illinois. The IVPA continues to raise revenue through the sales of these license plates and has continued to fund violence prevention programs through the use of grants. For the purpose of this article, I will examine their School District Grants Program and show how it can be used to fund an SRO program.

In 2005, the IVPA will continue offering grants to school districts that support school safety and violence prevention activities. Unfortunately, this grant is currently only available to school districts that received this grant in 2004. This grant is not specifically an SRO grant but has been used by some Illinois school districts to fund SRO programs. In order to be eligible for this grant, the school district must propose a school safety and violence prevention initiative within one of the following four funding areas:

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1. Building security
2. Violence prevention and intervention
3. Crisis management
4. Teacher/staff training

Regardless of which type of violence prevention initiative the school district proposes, it must collaborate with at least one community-based organization to implement the proposed activity. Many Illinois school districts have utilized this grant by collaborating with their local law enforcement agencies and implementing SRO programs.

Once recipients receive this grant, the IVPA conducts ongoing evaluations of the violence prevention program to ensure that the program is achieving its goals. Additionally, the IVPA provides technical assistance to recipients, such as assistance in the creation of the interlocal agreement between the school district and the police department in the implementation of an SRO program (see www.ivpa.org for further information). This state-level grant provides an excellent opportunity for school districts to implement SRO programs.

The COPS in Schools Grant

The United States Department of Justice (USDOJ), Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), currently offers the only SRO specific grant offered from the federal government. As stated earlier in this article, the COPS in Schools (CIS) grant has awarded almost $715 million to more than 2,900 law enforcement agencies to fund over 6,300 SRO programs across the country. The CIS grant is a specific categorical grant solely for the purpose of preventing school violence and implementing educational programs to improve school and student safety (USDOJ, 2004).

The origin of the COPS office dates back to September 13, 1994, when President Clinton signed the Violent Crimes Control Act of 1994. With signing this Act, President Clinton pledged to add 100,000 local police officers across the country through the use of the COPS grant program. The purpose of the grant was not only to aid local police departments in obtaining additional officers but also to push local police departments towards a community-oriented policing philosophy as described earlier by Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1998). Specifically, the purpose of the Act as provided by the U.S. Department of Justice (2003) is as follows:

- Substantially increase the number of law enforcement officers interacting with members of the community.
- Provide additional and more effective training to law enforcement officers to enhance their problem-solving, service, and other skills needed in interacting with members of the community.
- Encourage the development and implementation of innovative programs to permit members of the community to assist law enforcement agencies in the prevention of crime.
- Encourage the development of the new technologies to assist law enforcement agencies in reorienting the emphasis of their activities from reacting to crime to preventing crime.
In 1998, after a White House Summit on School Safety, President Clinton announced the CIS program to hire community-oriented policing officers to work in America’s schools. The CIS program is intended to provide assistance to law enforcement agencies to build collaborative relationships with schools and use community policing efforts to combat violence and fear of crime in schools by deploying officers as SROs. Unlike the IVPA grant, this grant provides the funding directly to the law enforcement agency as opposed to the school district. Since 1998, the CIS program has successfully assisted 2,900 law enforcement agencies implement SRO programs nationwide (USDOJ, 1999).

As with most federal categorical grants, the CIS grant has several requirements that must be met if the local law enforcement agency accepts funding. The CIS grant provides a maximum federal contribution of $125,000 over a 3-year period per officer. Any additional cost must be met with local funds. The funding is for salaries and benefits of additional SROs hired to work in primary and secondary schools; however, funds can be used to employ newly hired entry-level officers who will fill vacancies left if a veteran officer is assigned to the school. The SRO must devote at least 75% of his or her time working in the assigned school in addition to the time the officer would have spent in the school prior to the CIS grant. In order to receive funding, agencies must prove they have a law enforcement authority to work in the partnered school identified in their application. Additionally, law enforcement agencies must prove that they have a financial inability to implement the SRO program without federal assistance (USDOJ, 2004).

In addition to the basic requirement of the CIS grant listed above, the Cops in Schools: Grant Owners Manual provided additional mandates. The manual covers 50 pages of requirements, and to list them all would go far beyond the scope of this article; however, some of the additional key requirements are as follows:

- Only actual cost for the additional officer (salary and benefits) may be allowable—any additional grant funds not used will be de-obligated to the agency and must be returned to the COPS Office.
- Overtime pay and equipment cannot be funded with CIS grant money.
- The grant money must add to the department’s staffing levels over the period of the grant requirements.
- The CIS officer must remain in his or her assigned position at the school during the 36-month grant period and for at least one full budget-cycle after the grant has expired.
- The selected SRO and school administrator must attend a CIS training workshop; cooperate with routine and non-routine monitoring by the COPS Office including site visits, grant reviews, and complaint reviews; prepare quarterly financial status reports; and complete CIS progress reports annually.
- Additionally, at the conclusion of the 36-month grant period, the recipients must prepare a final financial status report and a final progress report. They must also submit a retention plan certification form.

This grant provides an excellent example of the federal government’s tendency to get involved in local issues that become part of the political agenda and provide federal funding to the local governments to address important issues, while pushing federal requirements and mandates upon the grant recipients. Agranoff and McGuire
(2003) would refer to local governments that collaborate with their state or the federal government as vertical collaborators. This type of vertical collaboration can also be categorized as information-seeking and adjustment-seeking. In using the CIS grant example, local law enforcement agencies seeking to acquire facts and requirements of the CIS grant would be information-seeking; whereas, if the local law enforcement agency sought to negotiate any of the above requirements in the best interest of accomplishing the goals of its program, then it would be engaged in what the authors refer to as adjustment-seeking vertical collaborative management. Even with the numerous requirements of this grant, the CIS program is an excellent instrument for local law enforcement agencies to become partnered with their local schools, implement SRO programs, and attempt to reduce school violence in their community. In the next section, another federal intervention effort will be examined, this time through school violence prevention grants offered from the United States Department of Education.

The Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools Grants

The U.S. Department of Education (USDOE) has also taken a proactive stance on school violence and has been providing funding to the local and state school districts in furtherance of that stance since July 2002. This funding became available after President Bush signed the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001. This Act reauthorized the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965. This Act was developed to assist every child in America achieve academic success. It is premised on four concepts of education reform: (1) accountability, (2) use of science-based programs, (3) parental and community involvement, and (4) local decisionmaking.

Title IV, Part A of the ESEA is the Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities Act (SDFSCA). This Act is considered a critical piece to President Bush’s national effort to ensure academic success for all students as it provides schools with grant money for violence prevention programs that create safe learning environments. Although not specifically an SRO grant, these formula grants provide for a variety of activities assisting the recipient schools with preventing violence; combating youth drug use; and assisting schools and communities create a safe, disciplined, and drug-free environment that support student academic achievement.

One of the main differences between this grant and the COPS grant is that this grant is paid to the states that are responsible for dispersing funds down to the local school districts, based upon a predetermined formula. The most important feature of the SDFSCA grants is that whatever program the local education agency uses to prevent school violence and drug use must meet the U.S. Department of Education’s Principles of Effectiveness. The USDOE’s Principles of Effectiveness are based on a series of requirements about the program including whether or not it is an effective program based on scientific research. Although there is an array of programs that meet the requirements for federal funding, I am going to focus on the use of this grant to implement SRO programs.

Section 4115 (b)(VI) of the Safe and Drug Free Schools Act list, “the hiring and mandatory training, based on scientific research, of school security personnel (including school resource officers) who interact with students in support of youth drug and violence prevention activities under this part that are
implemented in the school,” as an appropriate program for grant funding under the Principles of Effectiveness standard.

In addition to the requirement that the program must be an effective program based on scientific research, like the federal COPS grant, the SDFSCA grants also are accompanied with federal requirements placed on the accepting recipients. Some of the additional requirements are as follows: Recipients must provide a needs assessment that objectively shows the need to incorporate their program, must provide for performance measures, identify risk factors, consult with parents about what type of program is most appropriate in furtherance of their goals, and complete periodic evaluation reports. Now that I have reviewed the concept of SROs, their role in the U.S. Federal System, the interlocal collaborative agreements that create these programs, and the state and federal funding available for these programs, I am going to examine how SROs fit into an appropriate intergovernmental relations “model.”

The “Donor-Recipient” Model and SROs

Agranoff and McGuire (2003) present six “models” in an attempt to explain the different ways local government officials partake in collaboration. These models include their jurisdiction-based management, abstinence, top-down, donor-recipient, reactive, and contented model. For the purpose of this article, I am going to apply the donor-recipient model to the collaborative agreement developed to create SRO programs. Specifically, I will apply this model to both the interlocal agreements of SRO programs (locally funded) as well as SRO programs that are funded through the use of state or federal grants.

The donor-recipient model described collaborative management that is either moderate or high in terms of the frequency with which governments seek to act collaboratively. This model usually applies best to vertical collaboration of local governments but can be applied to some horizontal situations. The model involves actors who are either grantees or grantors in the collaborative system, as opposed to actors who are in control and are at the top of the system. It implies that the collaborators must rely on each other for the purpose of their collaborated program, and it involves degrees of mutual, two-party control. The donor-recipient model also suggests that there is a process of a shared administration that occurs during the carrying out of the collaborators’ task to achieve their goals.

The donor recipient concept was first introduced by Jeffrey Pressman (cited in Agranoff & McGuire, 2003, p. 59) in 1975 in Federal Programs and City Politics. Pressman noted that any federal partner is dependent upon the actions of others to achieve its objectives. Although the recipient may need money, the federal partner could not carry out its goals without the local assistance. Also, the donor may not have the time, the inclination, or even the authority to intervene in the recipient’s jurisdiction. Pressman concluded that the “donor and recipient may need each other, but neither has the authority to control fully the actions of the other. Thus, the aid process takes the form of bargaining between a partly cooperative, partly antagonistic, and mutually dependent set of actors” (p. 60). Additionally, Richard Elmore in 1985 suggested that the donor-recipient models are most successful when the donor allows the recipient to incorporate local decision-making, discretion, and autonomy to carry out national goals while meeting local needs (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003, p. 60).
The donor-recipient model applies well to the collaborative efforts that local school districts and municipal police departments partake in to reduce school violence. Since there are no laws, mandates, or requirements for school districts and police departments to collaborate and create SRO programs, their willingness to do so is solely voluntary. In this voluntary collaborative relationship, both parties share in control and authority as described in the donor-recipient model. Either party can cancel the program and cease collaboration at any time. This model is best explained when the municipal police department is considered the donor, and the school district is considered the recipient, and they exist in a two-party control environment. In this voluntary arrangement, the police are the donor to the school as they provide the sworn officer to the school, making the school the recipient. Assuming they are both interested in preventing school violence and implementing SRO programs, however, the police and the school become interdependent of each other in order to accomplish this goal. Without the collaborative agreement, neither the school nor the police department would be able to deploy a sworn police officer into the school in effort to prevent school violence and promote a safe learning environment for children.

This model can also apply to the situation in which the SRO program is funded by a state or federal grant. In this situation, the grantor becomes the donor, or grant provider, and the recipient becomes either the police department or the school district, depending on which one is receiving the grant. Other than the change in funding and the recipient’s responsibility to comply with the requirements of the grant, the collaborative arrangement between the school and the police is the same as described above. The only difference is that if the parties agree to accept the grant, they may not be allowed to terminate the program if so desired without either seeking an adjustment from the donor or risking being sanctioned for failure to comply with the grant requirements. Either way the program is funded, the donor recipient models provide an excellent example of how different government agencies become dependent on each other and how they sometimes must collaborate and share power with one another in order to achieve their goals.

**Conclusion**

SRO programs are a vital necessity in combating school violence at the local level. School district and law enforcement officials need to continue to collaborate on this issue in an attempt to ensure the safety of America’s children while they are at school, as well as provide a safe learning environment in which children can succeed. Future research needs to be conducted about these interlocal agreements, specifically in determining what budgetary systems are most effective in order for these programs to be more prominent in our society. Law enforcement and school administrators must continue to put “turf issues” aside and share in the excellent results of SRO programs, as these administrators are accountable to the public to make these programs work and prevent school violence. Hopefully state and federal grants will continue to be offered to combat this social problem, relieving the local communities, police departments, and school districts of the burden of funding these programs, and enabling them to protect our nation’s public schools for years to come. As crime and violence in America continues, it appears SRO programs will most likely continue to be a permanent fixture in many of our nation’s public schools.
Bibliography


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A Police Lieutenant’s Role in the Police Organization: Challenges and Opportunities for Change

Thomas E. Engells, BA, MS, Field Operations Commander, University of Texas at Houston Police Department

Introduction

Success is a term that has diverse and often situational dependent definitions. Any success realized within an organization can either enable or obstruct that organization’s future endeavors. Success also can be deftly used to confirm the vision articulated by the leadership and then wielded as a tool to prepare the organization for future challenges. In administration, irrespective of any formal organization typology—public, private, or nongovernmental—success is achieved and best replicated within a mission-focused organization populated with leaders, managers and supervisors, who are both trained and educated to achieve goals while understanding and performing their roles in a dynamic environment.

Effective and adaptive role performance within an integrated organization is not just happenstance; it requires careful planning and implementation. In this article, I will argue for the improved middle management skills within patrol administration. The study of this issue has uncovered a variety of subordinate topics including the effectiveness in policing, leadership credibility, and unique administrative and regulatory requirements found in policing. The primary question examined is . . .

How can a police lieutenant be best prepared for his or her role in progressive police agencies in the early 21st century?

The answer(s) to this question will serve more than an academic purpose. This research can contribute to the revision of the policies and practices that guide and structure the selection, training, education, and professional development of both incumbent and future lieutenants throughout the spectrum of law enforcement agencies in the United States.

Review of the Literature

Policing in the modern age, 1850 to present, has been buffeted by waves of structural reorganization. Often these administrative design actions mirrored the broader and general trends within American public administration as a whole, ranging from municipal civil service movements in the late 19th century to community-oriented/customer-oriented outlooks in the late 20th century. The structure of a police organization is important to this research question for it is the context in which police lieutenants work and perform as middle managers.

Public police organizations in the United States, regardless of their size or location, share a basic functional role in society. These organizations, in partnership with individuals and community groups, work together to breathe life into the
constitutional protections of the people of the United States. The paradox facing all public police organizations is the necessary and daily balance of freedom and order in the context of a constitutionally based government.

Police organizations are controversial because the police are controversial. Police protect or fail to protect, control or fail to control, provide or fail to provide a host of ill-defined services, always under the color of force and as agents of the state. Force and its exercise, irrespective of the popularity of the state, are certainly provocative and ensure the police will always be controversial (Langworthy, 1986).

Justice services, to include police, courts, and corrections, are major budget expenditures at all levels of government—from rural sheriffs departments to public universities. As effective public administrators, police executives must seek to maximize the effectiveness, efficiency, and value of the police, while carefully integrating the public’s expectations into the organizational mission.

Efficiency was the theme of the “professional” age in policing (1950-1990); this age also brought about the realization of organizational bureaucratization within policing. That bureaucratization of policing, often attributed to the tireless advocacy of Chief August Vollmer of Berkeley, California, was a conscious choice of public administrators when they faced the widespread politically partisan inefficiency that was the reputed hallmark of policing in the early 20th century. Max Weber, the renowned German sociologist, is widely regarded as the architect of modern organizational theory. Weber proposed that bureaucracy was scientifically based and an efficient organizational model.

In Weber’s view, the provision for qualified career officials, the structured hierarchy, and clear role-based specification of duties and procedures made for precision, speed, clarity, consistency, and reduction of costs. In addition, the strict delineation of duty and authority of career officials and specification of rights and procedures by rules support the principle of objective performance of duties without “regard for persons.” Duties would be performed and clients treated with consistency and without favoritism or purely personal motives. (Rainey, 1991)

Although the actual costs of bureaucratization may often be overstated, a phenomenon that Goodsell (1983) has labeled as the Grand Bureaucratic Myth, this efficiency effort did impose a real cost to the communities served. Goodsell maintains that this myth is pernicious and generally baseless, remarking that “The gap between bureaucracy’s conceptual image and the actual performance constitutes not merely a few degrees of disagreement but a nearly inverse contradiction.” In police departments, the achievement of the bureaucratic model of organization resulted in, “. . . clear separation of police officers from their broader environment, making a police department a tightly knit, highly disciplined, autonomous force for goodness and public safety in society” (Zhao, 1996, p. 6). Police administration textbooks and journals are replete with the theory of, and justification for, such bureaucratization. A representative example can be found in Sheehan and Cordner’s (1989) discussion of the police organization, in which they write . . .

Just as the chief has total authority over the entire department, officers in high-ranking positions have more authority than do those in lower ranks,
captains generally would have more authority than lieutenants; lieutenants, more authority than sergeants . . . As a good administrator would; the captain should delegate authority to the lieutenant, spelling out in writing specifically what the lieutenant is to do.

The realization of higher levels of organizational efficiency via bureaucratization also produced intricate, if not nearly Byzantine, organizational structures with high degrees of specialization. Langworthy notes in his study of police organizational structures in the 1980s that police organizational comparisons must include hierarchical and occupational differentiation, administrative overhead, and functional differentiation—the classic attributes of bureaucratization as outlined by Weber.

A unique aspect of bureaucratization within policing has been the retention of the trappings of paramilitarism. The military roots of the civil police can be traced directly back to Peele’s London Metropolitan Police in the early 19th century. To greater or lesser degree, the visible paramilitary characteristics of the civil police organizations have weathered the numerous reorganizations of the last 150 years. The unique uniforms, clear insignia of agency affiliation, clear and visible designation of ranks, and formalism of interpersonal relations across the ranks remain as the visible hallmarks of American policing, from small cities to large urban areas. This distinctive paramilitary aspect of the police organization reinforces the critical importance of the lieutenant’s role, for the lieutenant is a linchpin in the paramilitary model.

As bureaucratization was realized within policing, the understood and often stated organizational goal was efficiency. That efficiency was most often measured using the popular performance metrics of response times to emergency calls, often calculated to the second; the total number of calls for service processed; apprehension statistics; and traffic citations. These admittedly indirect productivity measures were subsequently used for comparative and crude benchmarking studies by both police and nonpolice management analysts (Sparrow, Moore, & Kennedy, 1990). These indirect measurements of police effectiveness have prompted some, both within and outside policing, to ask whether the measurements were meaningful in any substantive sense. Members of the public served by the police gradually became suspicious of both the goal and the performance metrics used in policing. Coupled with those suspicions, the nation in the 1970s experienced a trend in the critical reexamination of government operations at all levels, to include the public police (Duncan, 2000). A new paradigm was conceived for the public police. In this conceptualized organization, police hierarchy would be decentralized, and paramilitarism would be displaced by a greater participatory form of police employee interaction: “. . . primary orientation of police agencies should shift from that of being a narrowly focused ‘crime fighter’ to that of being an approachable and trusted partner in the community effort to maintain the general quality of life in the local jurisdiction” (Winkel, 1988, p. 185).

**Community Policing Model**

That new paradigm has been referred to as community policing, problem-oriented policing, and neighborhood policing. While each of these labeled programs is slightly different in actual practice, all share the commitment to restructuring the
organization and redesigning the actual work performed by the police; this role reorientation is more than just some new tools, emphasis, or structure. The core concept within community policing is the redefined functional role of the police within society.

Community-policing requires a change in the philosophical orientation of police officers, rather than simple adoption of a new set of practices or techniques. Because these changes are an essential ingredient in community-policing . . . if police administrators are to play an effective leadership role . . . it is essential that they be familiar with the changing attitudes and perceptions of the officers they supervise. (Riley, 1999, p. 620)

That change is especially challenging to those who had invested years and careers in perfecting the bureaucratization of the police (i.e., police lieutenants). The community-policing movement essentially rocked the foundations of modern policing and sent waves of concern throughout the field.

That change is especially noticeable in university policing. While the uniformed “watchman” style was common, if not universal, in the immediate post-war years on campus; today, that “watchman” style is nearly extinct in university policing. Those basic changes arose from an evolution of expectations by society and the specific communities served by those police agencies. Jackson (1992), outlined a comparison of the three types of police organizations: (1) the professional model (bureaucratized police), (2) community-oriented model (the new paradigm for police), and (3) campus police (a unique admixture of the previous two models found at many progressive campus law enforcement agencies) (see Table 1). Jackson’s point is that the police role within university settings is unique; neither community policing nor the professional policing model can be successfully transplanted to campus. In no small sense, the unique demographics of the university community and its special policing demands makes the direct application of a previously successful municipal, county, or state policing model impossible.

For the last 20 years, police academics and practitioners have grappled with the idea of community-oriented policing. The professional journals and practitioner-based associations have engaged in rancorous and prolonged debates among both practitioners and scholars about what community policing is, how it is defined, and the accurate measures of its actual implementation (Hunter & Barker, 1993). Several years of labor have been invested in qualifying and quantifying the community policing model, yet even today, there is no universal acceptance of a definition of the community policing model. A useful conceptual definition of community policing has been used by Zhao, Lovrich, and Gray (1995):

Such a broadened role [community policing] would entail finding a variety of means for reducing the fear of crime and fear of disorder. In addition, as for individual police officers and associated law enforcement personnel, they are encouraged to move beyond the old obedience-focused role of receiving orders to one of active contribution of their ideas for better provision of public service in a participatory, work group problem-solving and community involvement-oriented organizational environment. (pp. 153-154)
### Table 1
Comparison of Three Policing Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Traditional Law Enforcement</th>
<th>Community Policing</th>
<th>Campus Policing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police Mandate</td>
<td>Control of crime:</td>
<td>Crime control as a means of community order, peace, and security</td>
<td>Law enforcement and disciplinary action as a means to ensure campus order, peace, and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>response time, deterrence,</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>apprehension</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Law enforcement crisis</td>
<td>Prevention as well as reactive policing</td>
<td>Preventive as well as reactive policing</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Authority</td>
<td>Authority from law</td>
<td>Authority from society, community granted through law</td>
<td>Authority primarily from faculty, staff, and students; granted through regulations and law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agency of the criminal justice system</td>
<td>Agency of the university administration and community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Role</td>
<td>Legally defined/limited by</td>
<td>Socially defined, expanded role</td>
<td>Environmentally defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>law</td>
<td>Legal and social agencies</td>
<td>Legal, educational, and social agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distinct and separate</td>
<td>One of a number of agencies of order</td>
<td>Peacekeeping/education professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>Address crime only</td>
<td>Address crime and social problems that affect crime</td>
<td>Address crime and environmental problems that affect crime</td>
</tr>
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<td>officers/professional</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>crime fighters</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Community/Police Relationship</td>
<td>Passive role</td>
<td>Active role</td>
<td>Active role</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supportive adjunct to</td>
<td>Shared responsibility for crime and social order</td>
<td>Shared responsibility for crime and social order</td>
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<td></td>
<td>police</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Community as a client</td>
<td>Community member, community as a client</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Deputy Superintendent Ramsey, Chicago Police Department, noted in a Conference on Community Policing Strategies . . .

. . . community policing will not work in an environment of top-down decision-making. Instead, a contemporary organization is needed which supports the core processes of a police department and allows for bottom-up decision-making. (Conference Report, 1997, p. 5)

He stated that the following changes must be made. First, the organizational structure must be decentralized, flattened, and streamlined. Second, the organizational culture must change, but he realized that this would take several years. Third, the concept of community policing must be institutionalized in the department so that every officer is doing community policing, not just community policing officers assigned to
a specialized unit. Fourth, non-patrol roles must be redefined including movement toward generalization and removing specialized units.

The late Robert Trojanowicz, an early and ardent advocate of community policing, defined community policing as, “... a philosophy of full-service personalized policing where the same officer patrols and works in the same area on a permanent basis from a decentralized place, working in a proactive partnership with citizens to identify and solve problems” (Trojanowicz, 1994). This community policing model would require a change in management practices, noting that community policing is client-oriented service delivery aimed at improving accountability and effectiveness by focusing on problem solving. Such a reorientation would have significant impact on both the organizational structure and the actual practices of police managers.

**Police Middle Managers**

Police leaders are actively engaged in change, to a greater or lesser degree, based upon the specific agency, community, and police executive involved. The progressive agencies within the field have been grappling with the transition to some degree from the professional bureaucratic to the community policing models for nearly a decade. The challenges faced are significant, for the transition to the “new paradigm” resets the basic relationship between the police department and government, the personal/professional relationships within the ranks of the department, and, most importantly, the relationship between the individual officer and the citizen served. Vito and Kunselman (2000) find that, “Government middle managers are singled out as enemies of change. They typically resist efforts to decentralize authority and establish participatory management. The assumption is that if such changes are implemented, middle managers fear the loss of their power position within the organization.” (p. 316)

Policing is a unique setting within public administration, for it is a uniformed service in which authority is distributed by rank; yet unlike many other aspects of public administration, there is no regular distribution of police personnel in the ranks. Bayley (1994) notes that, “In all countries except Japan, about 75% of police are at the lowest rank” (p. 69). The rank structure found in the United States when compared to other western democracies has the simplest hierarchy, generally seven ranks (see Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Table 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Typical Rank Structure of American Police Agencies</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
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Police lieutenants are unquestionably police leaders, but what do they actually do within the nearly 18,000 police agencies within the United States? Sayles (1993) maintains that the role of the middle manager, both in the public and private sector is somewhat demoralizing, “Almost without exception, managers perceive their role as maintaining the status quo—keeping output high and their boss’s anxieties low” (p. 28). While this is a simplistic view, it is possibly an accurate statement of a middle manager’s actual role within most organizations. In a review of the role of police lieutenants, Geller and Swanger (1995) note that middle managers have

. . . historically focused on control and evaluations in organizations. The leadership role, seen as more important and as a visible position, is left to the chief executive officers or frontline supervision. Middle managers traditionally don’t inspire, act creatively or lead change. They simply manage the system. . . . As roles and companies change to keep pace, middle managers are truly caught in the middle. (p. 127)

In the professional police organization model, the achievement of bureaucracy within policing, the lieutenant’s role was specific:

. . . in policing during the past 50 years . . . [the role of mid-management] has been to extend management into the day-to-day operations of police departments by standardizing and controlling both procedures and officer performance. As such . . . lieutenants have been the leading edge of the control functions of police departments (Kelling & Bratton, 1993). In that same vein, Bayley (1994) described the role of lieutenants, “. . . [they] function primarily as auditors who monitor conformity to rules rather than as problem solvers who use resources to accomplish organizational goals.” (p. 9)

The state of current police management talent is and has been a concern throughout the nation. While some have concerns about the ability of the middle managers to assume a greater leadership position in the transition to community policing, others have an ongoing concern about their abilities to perform their current responsibilities. In their examination of strategic management in policing, Moore and Stephens (1991) noted that police leaders seem to subscribe to one of the two images of police management. The first is the stewardship image, in which the organization is seen as a well-developed machine that needs nothing more than routine maintenance to keep functioning. The executive should protect his or her organizational autonomy and budgetary stream, while reassuring his or her officers that advancement and promotion will be rewarded to those who behave. The other image of police management is that of the police commander. Such commanders believe, “. . . the organization knows the right thing to do, but it must be made to do the right thing by the force of the manager’s oversight and commitment” (Moore & Stephens, 1991, p. 106). Yet neither image is quite satisfactory.

Neither the “steward” nor the “commander” feels responsible for broad strategic thinking about how the organization’s . . . [value] to society can be maximized. They both think that the answer to that question has been given. Neither imagines significant changes in operating procedures or administrative relations that characterize the department. . . . In short, neither stewards nor commanders are inclined to risky, strategic changes in mission and operations of police agencies. (Moore & Stephens, 1991)
Development of a Police Lieutenant

Undeniably, the middle manager performs a critical role in any organization. Sayles (1993) assessed that role as follows:

Typically middle managers are more mobile and more informed than their non-managerial and supervisory subordinates. Both their organizational position and their experience should have given them contact with a wide range of specialists in other functions and in staff roles. Many times these lateral peers (or almost peers) control critical authorizations. They are thus able to engage in direct negotiations with people who can make needed changes in work parameters. (pp. 244-245)

For such a critical role in the organization, one would expect a thorough and standardized preparatory course of study, yet haphazard training and education is the far more common pattern. Bayley (1994) notes, “Generally, police promote officers and then train them for their jobs, rather than training and then promoting them because they possess the skills needed. . . . Rank structures ensure that people are appointed to jobs regardless of their demonstrated competence.” In Texas, the Commission on Law Enforcement is tasked as the regulatory and licensing agency for Texas peace officers. In regards to formalized supervisory/management training, the commission requires the following:

A peace officer appointed to the officer’s first supervisory position must receive in-service training on supervision as part of the course provided for the officer during the 24-month period after the date of appointment. (Texas Occupation Code, Section 1701.352)

In practice, such regulatory compliance is achieved through a single first-line supervisory training course, (usually 40 hours in duration), which is attended by individuals promoted to the rank of sergeant. There is no state training requirement for those promoted to lieutenant, a rank in which the responsibilities and role as a manager are clearly different from a first-line supervisor.

The training and education of managers and executives in the government service is not uncommon, and several organizations can provide such necessary training to lieutenants. On the federal level, the Office of Personnel Management in conjunction with the Senior Executive Service provides ongoing training and education on the five executive core qualifications that are expected of those executives: (1) leading change, (2) leading people, (3) results-driven, (4) business acumen, and (5) building coalitions/communications. While these critical skills and talents are relevant for all managers and executives, this managerial training is restricted to federal civil servants eligible for appointment to the Senior Executive Service and is generally inaccessible to police lieutenants.

On the national level, police managers and executives can enroll and attend the University of Louisville’s Administrative Officer’s Course. This 12-week course at the Southern Police Institute is “. . . [a] comprehensive managerial development program [that] provides instruction in leadership, administrative management, personnel issues, organizational behavior, current issues in law enforcement, problem solving and administrative law” (Vito & Kunselman, 2000, p. 319). The
course does, however, require significant commitments in terms of time and money; the course includes 12 weeks in residence training in Louisville, Kentucky, and costs approximately $8,000 not including salary and allowances.

On a regional level, the state of Texas offers a competitive admission based Leadership and Command College course through the Bill Blackwood Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas. That course is a comprehensive management course divided into three in-residence modules; each module is hosted by a participating university within Texas. Each of these 3-week modules has a specialized theme (management principles; political, legal, and social environment for policing; and law enforcement administration), and the graduates are well versed in the technical skills and theory of leadership and command in modern policing. The course is financed by the state through criminal fines, and the participant officers incur no cost to attend. The actual burden borne by the students is the three, 15-day absences from their departments. Similar state programs are found across the nation from California to Georgia.

At a local level, the Certified Public Manager (CPM) program is available at several universities throughout the nation. This course, unique among the other noted management courses, most fully addresses a major deficiency identified by Gaston and King (1995) in their work on management development and training in policing. Their research indicated that the police middle ranking officers who were studied acknowledged, “... the potential benefits to be gained from learning about managerial practice and training found in organizations outside the police service... there could be greater involvement of trainers with experience from a wide range of organizational settings...” (p. 22). The CPM course is accredited by the National Certified Public Manager Consortium and consists of a seven-track program: (1) personnel administration, (2) managing quality, (3) organizational communication, (4) public finance, accounting, and budgeting, (5) productivity and program evaluation, (6) information systems for managers, and (7) an applied project. The course is reasonably priced at approximately $5,000 and often involves little travel time.

Campbell’s (1997) work on human resources development activities’ impact on career development and professionalization of peace officers suggests, “Law enforcement needs to adopt a model for its human resources activities from the professions rather than the trades... TCLEOSE should develop more career specific curriculum... there is a paradigm shift in policing. The field needs problem solving officers who have developed capacity to think critically” (p. 8). Human resource activities of the professions include mid-career training and education to better prepare the students to succeed at the challenges faced at the senior and leadership levels of their chosen professions. Any of these managerial courses would better prepare the lieutenants to serve their communities. Completion of such coursework would provide the incumbent or prospective lieutenant a confident understanding of the theoretical and operational problems in the field as well as the tools, techniques, and practices used to successfully address them.

**Conclusion**

The research question’s answer is found in a series of challenging professional educational experiences at recognized public and private sources. The benefits to
be realized by educated and skillfully trained lieutenants are numerous for the sponsoring agency. First, exposure to challenging professional education may reignite within lieutenants the desire for development of his or her subordinate staff. In addition, progressively trained lieutenants may be better able to resolve the array of administrative and operational problems they encounter on a daily basis. Finally, today’s lieutenant is tomorrow’s chief executive; an investment in professional development can be best viewed as a capital investment by the agency that will improve the organization’s technical depth and organizational resilience. Patrol administration is an ongoing challenge at agencies throughout the nation; to effectively surmount that challenge, we should seriously reconsider the role and expectations of the middle manager as well as the educational preparation for that position.

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Texas Occupation Code. Section 1701.352


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What Are the Other Cops Thinking? Police Officer’s Attitudes Toward Misconduct in Peers

Pete Mittleman, EdD

Introduction

Criminal justice continues to take a pounding in the media and by the public because of officer misconduct. Unfortunately, this is nothing new. Since the inception of modern law enforcement, officers have been accused of aberrant behavior. Many theories offer explanations about why this occurs, but few address why officers allow it to continue. The point of this article is to evaluate the attitudes of inservice officers toward misconduct of other officers.

In 1829, British Home Secretary Sir Robert Peel recognized that the poor quality of the police watch system contributed to the urban social disorder. In an effort to relieve a lawless city besieged by crime, Peel persuaded Parliament to pass the Metropolitan Police Act for the purpose of reorganizing and improving London’s force. The ultimate success of Peel’s reforms proved profound, and they would come to revolutionize the field of policing into an honored and respected profession (Anderson, 2001). Peel’s fundamental principles for law enforcement organization are easily recognized today. “Perhaps the most thought provoking of Peel’s fundamental principles were those regarding personal character: the securing and training of proper persons is at the root of efficiency; good appearance commands respect; no quality is more indispensable to an officer than a perfect command of temper; a quiet determined manner has more effect than violent action” (Anderson, 2001, p. 77).

As the history of virtually every police agency attests, policing is an occupation that is rife with opportunities for misconduct. Policing is a highly discretionary, coercive activity that routinely takes place in private settings, out of the sight of supervisors, and in the presence of witnesses who are often regarded as unreliable. A study that measured police integrity in 30 police agencies across the United States was based on an organizational/occupational approach to police corruption. Researchers asked officers for their opinions about 11 hypothetical cases of police misconduct and measured how seriously officers regarded police corruption, how willing they were to support its punishment, and how willing they were to report it (Klockars, Ivkovich, Harver, & Haberfeld, 2000). The survey found substantial differences in the environments of integrity among the agencies studied. The more serious the officers considered a behavior to be, the more likely they were to believe that more severe discipline was appropriate, and the more willing they were to report a fellow officer for engaging in that behavior. Klockars et al. concluded that the ability to measure environments of integrity in police agencies holds great potential for academic studies of police and for practical police administration. Such measurements have direct implications because each of the propositions of an organizational/occupational theory of integrity implies a specific administrative response, and an administrator can take specific actions to deal with problems.
Herman Goldstein (1975) proposed that contemporary theories of police corruption are based on four organizational and occupational dimensions:

1. **Organizational Rules** concerns how the organizational rules that govern corruption are established, communicated, and understood.
2. **Prevention and Control Mechanisms** are the wide range of mechanisms that police agencies employ to prevent and control corruption.
3. **The Code** informally prohibits or discourages police officers from reporting the misconduct of fellow officers.
4. **Public Expectations** is the influence of the social, economic, and political environments in which police institutions, systems, and agencies operate.

In recent years, incidents of unethical behavior by members of the law enforcement community have embarrassed America’s police officers, the vast majority of whom are hardworking, honest, and dedicated men and women. “Can the police be trusted to police themselves?” McCarthy (2000) suggests that police agencies should implement ethics and integrity training into every training activity: “The International Association of Chiefs of Police Education and Training Committee, the IACP Image and Ethics Committee, and the IACP Training Unit have long recommended that ethics and integrity training be integrated into every training module” (p. 43). While it is important for officers to attend specific courses on ethics and integrity, it is equally vital that consideration of relevant ethical issues be incorporated into each training program. Ethics and integrity should not be considered a once-a-year program. Officers who engage in unethical activities can cause a great deal of harm to themselves, their departments, and their communities. No police executive, however diligent, can prevent every incident of police misconduct. Clearly, there are steps police chiefs can take to minimize the risk and impact of officer misconduct on their watch.

Administrators play a direct and powerful role in both the prevention and promotion of misconduct. An important requirement for stopping corruption is for administrators to have the courage to acknowledge they have integrity needs. Trautman (2000) developed a Continuum of Corruption. Phase One, **Administrative Indifference Toward Integrity**, serves as the initial breeding ground for future misconduct with the following agency operations being the most sensitive to integrity-related indifference: quality of recruitment and hiring, perceptions that discipline and/or promotions are unfair, disgruntled field training officers, and supervisors who treat people with a lack of respect. In Phase Two, **Ignoring Obvious Ethical Problems**, leaders who are not committed to integrity can be categorized into three levels according to their behaviors: (1) supervisors who don’t devote resources to enhancing ethical standards, (2) supervisors who intentionally look the other way and ignore acts of indiscretion, and (3) supervisors who “cover up” misconduct rather than admit the truth and attempt to rectify the situation. In Phase Three, **Hypocrisy and Fear Dominate the Culture**, Politics and hidden agendas may govern a department; therefore, if one wishes to survive he or she is forced to abide by unwritten rules of internal politics. Finally, in Phase Four: **Survival of The Fittest**, most employees do whatever it takes just to survive. A long tradition of ignoring misconduct convinces employees that leaders want misconduct covered up, rather than exposed or corrected. The code of silence is both condoned and privately encouraged. There is an unwritten priority to “keep corruption out of the newspapers” at all costs (Trautman, 2000, p. 68).
In 1992, then-mayor David Dinkins appointed an official commission to investigate police corruption in New York City. The commission found that corruption flourishes because of a police culture that exalts loyalty above integrity; because of the silence of honest officers who fear the consequences of scandal more than corruption itself; because of hostility and alienation between the police and the community in certain precincts; and because for years the police department abandoned its responsibility to ensure the integrity of its members (Champion, 1998).

The increasing volume of case law pertaining to police malpractice, along with larger settlements and verdicts, demands that agencies review their academy training standards. Articles written by attorneys now instruct future litigants on how best to assess the merits of a police misconduct case for their plaintiff-clients (Martinelli & Pollock, 2000). Most of these future lawsuits involve claims of excessive force, false arrests, and unlawful searches. Plaintiffs need only demonstrate that the agency’s failure to discipline a repeat offender was a discernible act of indifference by policymakers or administrators. Police executives do their officers and their communities a disservice when they fail to provide ethics and integrity training and do not make clear the consequences an officer will suffer when he or she falls short of expectations. They also make themselves and their departments liable in the event that an officer violates the rights of a citizen.

When an officer or group of officers violates a citizen’s rights, the best way to defend the department against a “deliberate indifference” allegation is to provide clear evidence that the department trained, supervised, and disciplined officers in accordance with the mandates of the law, the U.S. Constitution, the Oath of Honor, and the IACP Police Code of Ethics. Police departments should adopt a case-law approach rather than one that depends solely on philosophical rationales for ethical decisionmaking. There is a great need to specify and personalize the abstract concept of “doing the right thing.” For instance, trainers discussing “conduct unbecoming an officer” can cite disciplinary rulings that uphold the terminations of employees who engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior, used police authority for personal gain, or made false or misleading statements.

The police street culture and the police management culture are in conflict with each other, especially in large departments (Bartolias & Braswell, 1997; Crank & Caldero, 2000). This conflict between diverging cultures has largely replaced the tightly knit and unified police departments of the past. Bartolias and Braswell offer three reasons for this separation: (1) recruiting new chiefs from outside police departments, (2) federally funded programs leading to better educated officers and leaving the “old guard” feeling uncomfortable, and (3) affirmative action mandates resulting in the increased hiring of women and minorities.

One would be hard pressed to produce credible evidence to suggest that policing has not become more professional over the past several decades. It seems equally unreasonable to suggest that the entire field of policing is corrupt and permeated with graft. Several explanations are offered by Byers (2000) as to why corruption exists. The “Rotten Barrel Theory” suggests that unethical and illegal behavior not only occurs at the individual officer level but is also pervasive enough within a police department that unethical conduct may be traced to top administrative officials. The “Rotten Apple Theory,” rather, suggests that there are a few rotten apples in a police department, and inappropriate behavior is isolated to a few individuals.
An additional form of police misconduct has also been identified. In addition to the “Rotten Barrel” and “Rotten Apple” theories, there may also be a “Rotten Group Theory.” Small groups of officers in Miami, New York, and Los Angeles (to name a few) protected and assisted each other in criminal activities rather than the traditional patterns of police corruption that involve just a few isolated individuals or the system as a whole. Whether unethical behavior is systematic, small group, or individual, one cannot deny the importance placed on the intellectual process that allows for such conduct to take place. The authority given to police to protect our belongings and persons is unmatched by any other profession. Unethical or illegal behavior results when a law enforcement officer makes a conscious decision to abuse authority or wield power that is not appropriate to the situation. What is fundamental to unethical behavior by police is the conscious decision to abuse authority or power and circumstances; peer pressure socialization, loyalty, and individual psychology are secondary in their ability to explain the behavior. While most actions that are considered corrupt are also crimes, not all offenses committed by an officer constitute corruption. A police officer who drives while intoxicated, abuses a spouse, or uses illegal drugs is not necessarily corrupt (Gaines, Kappeler, & Vaughn, 1999). Crimes committed by officers without the misuse of authority are no different than crimes committed by anyone else.

Predicting excessive force or any police misconduct remains difficult when the precursors to misconduct or marker behaviors are not easily recognized by non-clinicians in field settings. When police engage in deviant acts, their behavior is not only hypocritical, it is a precondition for further and perhaps more serious forms of police misconduct. This means, in essence, that some deviant behaviors may have a corrupting influence on the police (Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998). Arnold (2001) suggests using an Early Warning System (EWS) to recognize aberrant behavior at its onset. Most law enforcement professionals are aware of the use of profiling in solving criminal cases. While the use of criminal profiling is increasing and providing successful results in many complex cases, it requires specialized training and experience in the field of behavioral science. A weakness exists using this type of profiling in the area of police misconduct—the crime has already occurred. The goal in using some type of behavioral profiling for police misconduct is to allow the supervisor to recognize early indicators or precursors to misconduct before the problem behavior occurs. Arnold suggests modeling police EWSs after those used in school systems. The uses of EWS are helpful in identifying problem behavior in officers; however, it is vital that the signs are recognized. Signs include behavior like poor performance, hostility and anger, unnecessary risk-taking, increases in use of force, and insubordinate conduct. The difficulty for law enforcement supervisors and managers is the lack of research data that provides a clear picture as to which particular behavior patterns lead to future misconduct. Law enforcement supervisors and managers must utilize every tool at their disposal to seek out and discern conduct that signals or even hints at the potential for problem behavior.

Confusing the issue of identifying “right vs. wrong” for police is “noble cause corruption.” This occurs when police know their methods are suspect but feel the ends justify the means. Delattre (1996) stated that what is fearful are the officials who believe that their ends always justify or excuse their means or who give up in despair but remain in office nonetheless. Violations of the law or disregard for public safety and property on the part of an officer are intrinsically wrong; they are self-defeating in that they instill in the public mind a like disposition. The employment
of illegal means, no matter how worthy the end, is certain to encourage disrespect for the law and its officers (Close & Meier, 1995).

A view seldom discussed is Positive Deviance. Innate characteristics of police work, such as the duty and opportunity to perform heroic feats coupled with environmental conditions that make those feats possible, allow officers to routinely deviate positively from the norm of human behavior (Adler & Adler, 2000). Maybe less extreme but still as problematic is the question of where we want American police to fit in society. There has been a real or perceived shift of police loyalty from political bosses to the law itself (Pollock, 1998). Part of this transformation involved the idea that police were crime fighters, professional soldiers in the war on crime—a concept that implies objectivity, professional expertise, and specialized training. This role de-emphasized the social service role and ultimately led to policing characterized by detachment from the community instead of integration in that community. As police officers drift away from the community and see themselves as an army of occupation rather than as partners with the community, there develops an unwanted detachment and impersonal delivery of service. There is a tendency for officers to think in terms of “the mission” rather than “the neighborhood.” In Racially Biased Policing: A Principled Response, Fridell, Lunney, Diamond, and Kubu (2001) listed a recommendation that could be extrapolated to most police work:

The chief executive should direct an audit of the agency mission and value statements, code of ethics and all policies, procedures and practices to ensure they consistently reflect a commitment to integrity, justice, protection of human rights, and unbiased performance of duties. The audit should be embedded in the ongoing professional standards or quality assurance processes in all agencies, regardless of size. (p. 37)

Perhaps Goodman’s (1998) acronym of ETHICS sums it up best. She lists Environment, Training academy, Home life, Individual beliefs, Citizens, and Stress as the integers or parts that influence an officer’s decision to behave ethically or not, which brings us to the case in point: much speculation has been offered about how officers are viewed and how they view themselves, but how do they view each other? In 1994, Barker and Carter reviewed an earlier study by Barker in which officers rated what other officers would do in general ethical situations. As one might expect, there was general tolerance for minor transgressions, but as the scenarios grew more severe so did officers’ decision for punishment. There was a distinction between “clean” and “dirty” money forms of corrupt behavior. It appeared that the presence or absence of a human victim and the nature of the material gain are important variables in assessing the risk potential and reinforcement received from the peer group.

In summation, several theories have been advanced about police officer misconduct. In 1976, Thomas Barker developed and administered a questionnaire to a medium-sized police department inquiring about officers’ tolerance for misconduct by other officers (Barker & Carter, 1994). As one might expect, officers’ objections to misconduct increased with the severity of the offense, but only 43 respondents were interviewed. The present study asks similar questions, but the responding sample has been increased to 154 officers.
Methodology

A data collection form (See Appendix) was developed asking officers, “How often do you think other officers in your department would report another officer for performing the following acts?” Officers were asked to answer always, sometimes, rarely, or never to 15 different incidences of general officer misconduct. Questionnaires were given to 170 officers, but 16 forms returned were incomplete and not tabulated. The officers were not randomly selected but were members of classes sent to a police-training center for inservice training. All of the officers were already assigned and enjoying careers of various lengths. Responses from 126 white males, 19 African American males, and 9 white females were tabulated.

Results

Barker organized questions in an ascending order of seriousness, and the present study does also. I have chosen to call my groupings “strata.” The following list is used to compare the two studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barker</th>
<th>Present Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption of Authority</td>
<td>Stratum #1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kickbacks, Opportunistic Thefts</td>
<td>Stratum #2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shakedowns, Protection of Illegal Activities</td>
<td>Stratum #3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Fix, Misdemeanor Fix,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felony Fix, Direct Criminal Activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rank-and-file officers do not take some acts of misconduct very seriously. Even though it is expressly against written directives, officers saw little wrong with taking free meals or receiving free or discounted services. Only 2%, 3%, and 19% respectively felt those actions would always be reported; 45%, 25%, and 13% felt they would never be reported. The next stratum of incidences received more disapproval from officers. Items such as “theft of property,” “tipping off a drug dealer,” and “receiving money to not write a ticket” received an average of 54% “always would be reported.” In contrast, only an average of 9% of officers surveyed felt those activities would never be reported. The last series of questions concerned the more “serious” offenses such as “reducing charges for a reward,” “committing a burglary,” and “committing a robbery.” Officers felt strongly about these actions with an average of 64% stating that they would “always” be reported, and only 9% feeling they would “never” be reported.

Discussion

The demarcation is clear between the three types of questions: officers are more tolerant of some misbehavior than others, and the more serious the infraction, the more officers felt it would be reported. This study varies from Barker’s work in that the questions were worded differently in an attempt to erase any ambiguities. A larger sample was selected in an effort to attain a more adequate cross section of a
department. Of course, the location and point in time of data gathering is different also. A disturbing trend was noted in the data that is significant. A comparison of Barker’s “corruption of authority” category and the present study’s “first stratum” is favorable in that both generations saw little impact in the misconduct, and mostly felt that the actions would rarely or never be reported. After that, the opinions began to significantly diverge. In Barker’s “direct criminal activities” category, officers showed a clear attitude for disapproving wrongdoing in that 75% of officers felt those activities would “always” be reported and 11% felt they would be reported “sometimes.” In the present study, “Stratum #3” responses showed that officers felt that even this “serious” misconduct would “always” be reported just 64% of the time and “sometimes” just 18% of the time. In Barker’s “opportunistic misconduct” category, officers felt the actions would be reported “always” 61% of the time but that number slipped to 54% in the present study.

Table 2
**Misconduct “Always” Reported**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barker’s “Always” Reported</th>
<th>Present Study’s “Always” Reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Stratum</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Stratum</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Stratum</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3
**Misconduct “Always” Reported Including “Race” Variable**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>African American</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stratum 1</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratum 2</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratum 3</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It would appear that officers felt less intolerant for misconduct in 2002 than they did in 1976. Today’s officers also question the actions of their peers in that they felt their peers would report misconduct less than a comparison sample in 1976.

Barker did not use race as a variable in his 1976 study. The present study quantifies results by race with some interesting results. African American police officers seem to have less faith in other officers than police as an entire group. Lower percentages of “always” responses were received in Strata 2 and 3 and only slightly more in the Stratum 1 (11% compared to 8%).

In the category of misconduct “never” being reported, African American officers were more skeptical of their peers and felt that misconduct would more likely never be reported than white officers in each stratum and overall.
Table 4
Misconduct “Never” Reported

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stratum</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>African American</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stratum 1</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratum 2</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratum 3</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

Inferences drawn from this article are as follows:

- There is a demonstrated tolerance among officers for misconduct by the officers.
- There is more tolerance presently than in the past.
- There is a lessening expectation that officers will report misconduct.
- Additional research is necessary to explain officers’ attitudes and develop intervention techniques.

Why are the findings in this article significant? The differences could be explained in that officers (and the current times in general) have become more tolerant in their acceptance of misbehavior. Officers could be demonstrating an inurement toward corruption in corporate America or showing skepticism toward criminal justice administrators’ ability to ferret out and punish misconduct. Some of the gross examples of misconduct portrayed by the media may have a chilling effect on officers’ willingness to step forward with allegations of aberrant behavior by peers. The results of opinion surveys may be tenuous in that the recency of experience may have an over-weighting impact on responses. Also, some officers may seek to “tone it down” or “shock” researchers with their answers. This article concerns misconduct by police officers and not by any particular subgroups. Data on African American police officers is included in this report because the data was collected, available, and presented another view.

References


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Appendix

We are gathering information on officers’ reactions to conduct by other officers.

Question: How often do you think other officers in your department would report another officer for performing the following acts? Remember, we are not asking what you would do but how often you feel another officer would act. The results of this survey will be tabulated and the questionnaires destroyed.

Your gender: M F (circle one).  Your race: B W O (circle one).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taking free meals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving free or discounted services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking free liquor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving money to not write a ticket</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving goods or services to not write a ticket</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft of property</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft of suspect’s property</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking of found property</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tipping off drug dealer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tipping off a Saturday night poker game</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing misdemeanor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charges for a reward</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing felony charges for a reward</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committing a burglary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committing a robbery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committing an assault</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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Police Training in America: Looking at Our Past to Plan a Better Future

Michael A. McMorris, PhD, Associate Professor, School of Criminal Justice, Ferris State University

Introduction

Four years into the “New Millennium” and to no one’s surprise, there are familiar problems confronting the police profession. Clearly, the issue of citizen complaints about police misconduct has been one of those consistent problems for many decades (Walker, 1997); however, it seems that now, more than ever, citizens are charging the police with brutality, corruption, racial discrimination, and racial profiling (McMorris, 2002). Adding to these complaints is the constant deluge of negative imagery depicting police officers. These images are beamed across millions of television sets, displayed on movie theater screens, and discussed within the walls of academe and training institutions. At the center of this controversy are the men and women who risk their lives, on a daily basis, only to be stereotyped, vilified, and aligned with the brutality and corruption perpetrated by a very small percentage police officers. The police, in America, represent more than 18,000 agencies consisting of more than 695,358 sworn officers (Walker & Katz, 2002). Although they are members of society, their professional status often supersedes how citizens view them, how they view themselves, and how they view others. If history has taught us anything, it’s that our perceptions about people, places, and things can be quite different than reality.

As historians and social scientists debate the impact and importance of the police in American society, one might consider the following seven questions: (1) How are police officers selected?; (2) How are the police socialized?; (3) How does the police subculture impact police training and police behavior?; (4) What is the impact of police discretion on policing and the way society is treated?; (5) How has the media impacted crime and justice issues and the police?; (6) Does Hollywood’s version of corrupt and brutal police officers appeal to real-life police officers and society in general?; and (7) What are citizens’ perceptions and attitudes about the police? This article discusses these issues and provides a brief review of the history of police in America. It also provides recommendations to improve police training.

Historical Overview of the Police in America

The police profession, in the United States, had a rather interesting beginning. America’s philosophy behind policing was copied from the model set forth by English law. Specifically, America followed the path set by Sir Robert Peel, England’s Home Secretary. In 1829, Peel, who was a critical thinker, was credited with being the founder of the London Metropolitan Police (Walker, 1999). Peel is also considered to be the “father of modern metropolitan policing.” Peel’s model introduced three elements to policing:

1. Mission – crime prevention (Preventing crime is better than responding to it later.)
2. Strategy – to deter crime by employing constant visible police patrol in fixed beats
3. Organizational Structure – employing a paramilitary style, including uniforms, rank designations, and the authoritative system of command discipline

According to Bayley (1985), the essential elements of modern policing are that they . . .

. . . are public because they are a public agency charged with maintaining public safety; they are specialized because they have a primary duty of law enforcement and crime prevention; and they are professional because they are full-time paid employees. (p. 23)

Modern police forces were first established in the United States in the 1830s and 1840s, in cities such as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, etc. (Walker, 1999). Interestingly enough, Walker (1999) also asserted that America’s first modern police forces were probably the slave patrols. This is an institution found to be unique to the United States. Walker (1999) further points out that Charleston, South Carolina, had about 100 officers in 1837 and was far larger than any northern city police force. Their primary duty was to guard against slave revolts and to capture runaway slaves (p. 22).

The police in America fall under the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government. They are charged with enforcing the laws enacted through legislation and derived from court decisions. Since its birth, American policing has been plagued with many problems, including corruption, allegations of brutality, political influence, discriminatory enforcement practices, and indifference towards minority groups (Albanese, 2001).

Police Recruit Selection

The selection process involved in placing new recruits is very tedious and tends to be fraught with legal issues (Purpura, 2001). Typically, police departments follow a “civil service” process used to select and screen their personnel. These processes, although keeping in line with recommendations of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), tend to be more involved and more stringent than in the past.

It’s very common that the selection process of most police agencies includes some combination of the following: written examinations, preliminary background investigation, a medical examination, physical agility tests, oral interviews, a polygraph examination, a final background investigation, psychological examinations, and drug screening (Barkan & Bryjak, 2004; Purpura, 2001). Some municipalities use a team approach when selecting their civil servants (e.g., representatives from the police department, personnel, human resources, affirmative action, city manager, or mayor’s office). Using this approach has eliminated the appearance of corrupt past practices, such as nepotism and payoffs, as was the case in 19th century New York. According to Walker (1999), during the early 19th century, a $300.00 payment to the “Tammany Hall Political Machine” was the only requirement for appointment to the New York City Police Department. Today’s use of the “hiring teams” serves as a system of checks and balances, in an effort
to ensure a fair and equitable process, thereby avoiding any potential lawsuits (McMorris, 2002).

**Shortcomings of Police Recruit Selection Processes**

Cory (1979) reported that police departments nationwide integrated immediately following World War II. However, only in the late 1960s and early 1970s had the number of minority police officers began to approximate the percentage of minorities within the nation’s population. Although this fact alone does not diminish all of the efforts made to hire minorities officers, on a smaller basis, providing citizens with a more visible minority presence was good for police-community relations (McMorris, 2001a).

Clearly, the process of selecting police officers is a difficult one, to say the least. Walker (1999) asserted that the basic problem with police recruitment and selection processes is that police departments are using crude, outdated instruments; they’re only set up to screen out applicants who are obviously not qualified, but they don’t screen in the applicants who will be the best police officers (p. 305). In furtherance of this position, after reviewing psychological examinations given to LAPD applicants, the Christopher Commission (1991) concluded that the initial screening process identifies obvious social misfits; however, it cannot test for more subtle abnormalities, which may predispose an individual as ill-suited to be a police officer, such as poor impulse control and the proclivity towards violence. Moreover, citizens who are selected to become police officers are very conservative and homogenous. In fact, according to Gaines, Kappeler, and Vaughn (1997). . .

Before citizens can become police officers they must pass through an elaborate employment selection process, and in order to be selected for employment, they must demonstrate that they will conform to a select set of middle-class norms and values. These selection processes use physical agility tests, background investigations, polygraph tests, psychological tests, and oral interviews, to screen-out applicants who have not demonstrated their conformity to middle-class norms and values. Many of the selection techniques used to determine the adequacy of police applicants have little to do with the applicant’s ability to perform duties associated with police work. (p. 32)

In short, even the application process lends itself to ensuring that a cohesive group will be selected. In fact, Maguire, Pastore, and Flanagan (1996) asserted that because of the traditional selection process utilized in policing, both in the past, as well as today, the majority of police officers are white, middle-class males. Matza (1969) contended that a consequence of this practice is that selected police officers are unable to identify with people who are not exhibiting their own middle-class values, beliefs, and behaviors. Consequently, their judgment as to who is suspicious, who needs to be controlled, and who is in need of police attention is impacted.

**Socializing the Police Recruits**

The process of socialization is practiced in every profession, sports team, religion, political group, club, organization, neighborhood, and in each gender. Each group has a specific process (either formal or informal) it uses to socialize its members. The level of influence that each group has on its members surely differs, predicated
on an infinite number of variables—too many to name. Socialization of the police, however, takes place in a very powerful and equally secretive subculture.

How are the police socialized? To what extent are they socialized and controlled by their subculture? These are questions that are still being asked more than 175 years after England’s Sir Robert Peel developed the first modern system of policing known to the world. Peel’s Model of Metropolitan Policing required police recruits to live together, learn together, and work together (Schmalleger, 2001a). It was thought that the closeness of the group would serve to develop a sense of unity, esprit de corps, and professionalism. Peel’s model is still widely followed in police departments throughout the world.

Police academy training initially serves to socialize the recruits with the intention of shaping their minds and modifying their behavior so that it conforms to that desired by the police profession. Arguably, there is no civilian group that truly depends on the socialization and control over its members more than that of the police. Police officers exercise a great deal of authority in our society. In fact, no other group of individuals has the ability to impact the lives of people as do the police. It is under this authority that police officers exercise their unparalleled discretionary powers (i.e., the ability to take life and to restrict one’s freedom of movement by taking one into legal custody). It is because of this awesome authority and the responsibility that accompanies it, that the police must be fully and effectively trained and socialized (McMorris, 2002).

In today’s society, police officers are formally socialized in the police academies that train them and informally by the veteran officers that serve as their field training officers. In this respect, they receive a continuous reminder that they are part of a unique and special group. In discussing the training and socialization of police officers, Cosner (1980) noted that . . .

Socialization for the police recruit includes both the adoption of normative modes of police behavior and the extinction of certain other behaviors which were appropriate for his previous civilian roles. In learning the new role, the police recruit undertakes a complex process of learning which includes more than just knowledge and skills. He will also learn a system of attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values. The most important learning related to perception concerns the identification of role relevant reference groups and a sensitivity to their expectations and evaluations. (p. 200)

According to Bahn (1984), police recruits are a homogeneous group when they enter the police academy. Then, the academy refines the cohort again by weeding out those recruits who do not conform to the demands of paramilitary training. Bahn (1984) further noted that . . .

Police recruits soon learn, that the way to survive in the academy . . . is to maintain a low profile and by being one of the group, acting like others. Group cohesiveness and mutuality is encouraged by the instructors as well. The early roots of a separation between the police and the public is evident in many lectures and classroom discussions. In “war stories” and corridor anecdotes, it emerges as a full blown “us-them” mentality. (p. 392)
According to Van Maanen (1997) . . .

. . . the main result of training is that the recruit soon learns it is his peer group rather than the “brass” which will support him and which he, in turn, must support. For example, the newcomers adopt covering tactics to become proficient at construing consensual ad hoc explanations of a fellow-recruit’s mistakes. Furthermore, the long hours, new friends and ordeal aspects of the recruit school serve to detach the newcomer from his old acquaintances. In short, the academy impresses upon the recruit that he must now identify with a new group: his fellow officers. (p. 94)

The Police Subculture

It is the “us vs. them” mentality that is at the forefront of some of the problems that have followed the police profession, throughout its history. Unfortunately, this mentality persists today. In general, the “us vs. them” mentality is commonly referred to as a world-view. The concept of a world-view refers to the manner in which a cultural group sees its place in the world and its role and relationship to the world (Benedict, 1934; Redfield, 1952, 1953). More specific to the police profession, the police world-view has been described as a working personality. According to Skolnick (1994), the police develop and use cognitive lenses to see situations and events as a distinctive way to view the world. According to Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert (1998), . . .

To the police, the world is seen as composed of insiders and outsiders—police and citizens. Persons who are not police officers are considered outsiders and are viewed with suspicion. The we/they police world-view is created for a variety of reasons: the techniques used to select citizens for police service, the normative orientation police bring to the profession, an exaggeration of occupational danger, the special legal position police hold in society, and the occupational self-perception that is internalized by people who become police officers. (p. 89)

Additional information, on the police subculture, by Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert (1998), provides three Ethos of the Spirit of the Police Subculture:

1. Bravery – It’s central to the social character of policing. Peer acceptance is not afforded the new officer until he has proven himself in a dangerous situation. This is because the subculture wants to know how the new officer handles himself.

2. Autonomy – Police serve as gatekeepers for the criminal justice system. They have the authority to decide who to arrest, when to arrest, and when to use force. Attempts to limit police autonomy are viewed as undermining by officers.

3. Secrecy – The code of secrecy may be the result of the officers’ fear of losing one’s autonomy and authority to exercise police discretion. The desire to protect one’s coworkers from disciplinary action and being accused of making improper decisions can promote the development of the code of secrecy (p. 98).

According to Carter and Radelet (1999), police socialization has three distinct parts:

1. The police academy represents the first overt process of socialization. It is in the academy that the new recruits learn the language, cultural norms, and associated
factors . . . [that] create the socio-behavioral infrastructure for policing. These factors eventually lead to the development of attitudes and behaviors consistent with other police employees.

2. After the academy, recruits are assigned a Field Training Officer (FTO) for a period of between 2 weeks to 6 months. The FTO monitors the progress of the new recruit and makes recommendations for additional training, acceptance onto the force, or dismissal. The on-duty behaviors of the FTO are also part of the socialization experience.

3. After successful completion of the FTO program, the new officer is usually on probation for a period between 6 to 8 months. The new officer must modify his or her behavior to conform with that of his [or her] supervisor (pp. 168-169).

According to Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert (1998), understanding the different perspectives on how the police personality and behavior are developed, within the subculture, is very important. Goldsmith and Goldsmith (1974), offered that the police culture can be viewed as being comprised of four dimensions:

1. Occupational – considers the unique . . . job-related factors that affect and condition the police to behave in certain ways
2. Psychological – focuses on police self-identity and personality development
3. Political – considers the relationship between the police community and the policy-making authorities of the agency and society at large
4. Social – addresses the police officers’ social organization and subculture norms and the nature of police solidarity (p. 247)

Early Police Training in the United States

According to Walker (1999), in the 19th century, personnel standards for police officers did not exist. The men selected received consideration primarily based upon their political connections. Men who had bad health, no education, and criminal records, were often hired as police officers. Only a few police departments offered their recruits any formal preservice training. New police officers were merely issued badges, batons, and a copy of the department’s rules before being sent out on patrol duty (Walker, 1999, p. 24).

According to Walker (1977), Cincinnati created a police academy in 1888; however, it was disbanded after only a few years. New York City created the School of Pistol Practice in 1895 but failed to offer any additional police training until 1909. Although police training was then offered officially, a 1913 investigation found that the academy did not administer any entrance exams and that all of its recruits were automatically passed (Walker, 1977).

During the early 1900s, in an effort to establish professionalism in policing, reformers such as Richard Sylvester and August Vollmer, through the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), advocated raising personnel standards that would mandate minimum recruitment standards of intelligence, health, and moral character (Walker, 1999). These standards persist to this day. Market changes, however, didn’t begin to impact police training until the late 1950s. It wasn’t until then that states began to develop laws requiring preservice training for all police officers.
In 1959, California and New York were the first two states to adopt this mandatory training requirement (Walker, 1999). Moreover, a study conducted by the IACP, which surveyed 4,000 police departments found that 85% of all officers had received no preservice training (President’s Commission, 1965).

**Present-Day Police Training**

At the present time, all states have a Police Officer Standards and Training (POST) Commission that sets mandatory minimum requirements for training; however, there is a great deal of variety in the academies nationwide. Some states require 3 weeks, while others require 16 weeks (Berg, 1990).

Moreover, until the late 1950s, police training was the responsibility of the respective municipalities and a few colleges and universities (Roberg, Crank, & Kuykendall, 2000). The amount of training hours ranges from 400 to more than 1,000 hours, especially in the western United States (Thibault, Lynch, & McBride, 1990).

The requirements of Ethics in Policing, Interpersonal Skills, and Conflict Mediation/Civil Dispute speak to a level of understanding by law enforcement administrators, that having a standard of behavior that includes the ability of police officers to communicate and deal with the public are very important components of police training and the police service (Michigan Commission on Law Enforcement Standards, 2002). This requirement also demonstrates an effort to alleviate any communication barriers that might exist between the police and society on a very fundamental level (McMorris, 2002).

**Shortcomings of Police Academy Training**

According to Walker (1999), there have been great improvements in police academy training; however, there are still important subjects that are not being addressed, such as discretion, the use of informants, and ethics. After conducting an experimental training program for recruits dealing with crime victims, the Detroit Police Department ascertained that crime victims did not rate the officers who received the training any differently than they rated those who did not. Furthermore, it was revealed that all recruits developed different attitudes after being on the streets for one year; they had significantly less positive attitudes toward the public (Lurigio & Rosenbaum, 1992).

According to Blakemore, Barlow, and Padgett (1995), although most police departments have introduced timely training topics, such as race relations, human relations, and cultural diversity, the content of these areas has gone unchanged since the 1960s. Moreover, they tend to perpetuate negative stereotypes about ethnic and racial minorities, while focusing on individual officers as opposed to emphasizing the policies of the department as a whole. This is a major issue, especially for minorities (McMorris, 2001b).

In 1991, in the wake of the Rodney King police beating, The Christopher Commission wrote that although the quality of instruction at the LAPD Police Academy was generally impressive, its current curriculum only provided for 8 hours of cultural awareness training. Furthermore, it wrote that no more than 90 minutes was devoted to any ethnic group. Finally, it wrote that much more training on cultural
awareness is essential. The requirement that police academies provide cultural awareness training is not a panacea to the problems between minorities and the police. Any recruit who has been raised in an ethnocentric environment, may listen to and take part in academy training; however, there is no guarantee that the recruit will be receptive to adopting what he or she has learned, especially if the training presents ideas that are contrary to what he or she has been taught or experienced in his or her personal life.

Moreover, as is the case with any training, the manner in which the material is presented, as well as the person presenting it, can have an impact on whether or not the material is perceived as actually possessing real value. For example, if the training instructor downplays or discounts training material by saying, “Well troops, I hate to put you through this, but I’ve been told that I have to include this diversity training in your curriculum. I know that it’s unnecessary, but I have to follow orders. So, just bear with me, and we’ll get through this, with as little pain as possible.” By openly criticizing the training material, the instructor demonstrates his or her own bias and disdain. Consequently, the recruits might also resent the material being taught; therefore, cynicism and bias may be internalized and replicated by the recruits. Moreover, if the recruits have inherent biases, learned from being socialized in biased homes and by negative images perpetuated in the media, those biases may be nurtured and validated by the training instructor.

**Police Discretion**

Police officers have a great deal of authority. They, unlike most other professions, have the ability to alter lives by deciding whether or not to use deadly force when performing their duties. In fact, within a split second, a police officer can alter a citizen’s entire existence, based upon how he or she exercises the authority given to him or her with regard to discretion. Clearly, the ability to negatively impact a person’s life, under the authority of the law is a powerful tool, hence, the concept of police discretion.

Overall, the police have a level of authority that makes their job perhaps the most powerful of all jobs in both the public and private sectors. Police officers are given the authority, by law, to take away a person’s constitutional rights when they are enforcing the law. Moreover, they are given the authority to take away a person’s life, if need be! This is an awesome level of authority, unmatched by any other government representative, with the exception of the military (in wartime).

During the course of performing their duties, the police are afforded a great deal of discretionary powers. This discretion cannot be taken lightly. It is the power that is entrusted to all police officers. It comes with the trust and the blessing of the people. According to Schmallager (1999), police discretion is defined as the exercise of choice by law enforcement agents in the disposition of suspects, in carrying out of official duties, and in the application of sanctions. “The police make policy about what law to enforce, how much to enforce it, against whom (selective enforcement), and on what occasions” (Davis, 1975, p. 62). Again, with this level of authority, the police are head and shoulders above all other public servants. Along with their discretionary powers comes a great deal of responsibility.
According to Davis (1971), discretion is defined as “an official action, by a criminal justice official, based on that individual’s judgment about the best course of action” (p. 4). A special feature of discretion in policing is that the lowest ranking employees (patrol officers) exercise the greatest amount of discretion (Walker, 1999). Moreover, according James Q. Wilson (1973), “in policing, discretion increases as one moves down the organizational hierarchy” (p. 21).

Walker (1999) stated that police officers are the most important decision makers in the criminal justice system. They are the “gatekeepers” who determine most of the workload of the system when they decide whether or not to make an arrest. Discretion is not confined to the police. It pervades the criminal justice system. For the most part, Lafave (1965) argued, “It is helpful to look at the total criminal justice system as a series of interrelated discretionary choices” (p. 9). Furthermore, Walker (1999) stated that the administration of justice is essentially the sum total of a series of discretionary decisions, from arrest through prosecution, trial, sentencing, and parole release.

According to most experts, police discretion by itself is not a problem, and in fact, it often serves useful functions (Davis, 1975). The real problem is uncontrolled discretion, which, according to Walker & Katz (2002), can lead to the following undesirable results:

- Denial of due process
- Denial of equal protection of the law
- Poor police-community relations
- Poor personnel management
- Poor planning and policy development (p. 248)

**Media’s Impact on Beliefs About Crime and Justice**

Anyone with access to media (e.g., newspapers, television, radio, Internet, etc.) can be influenced as to how they think about and treat other people. According to Surette (1992), the media affects beliefs about crime and justice in two ways: (1) Newspapers affect views about crime and (2) television affects fear of crime. In a study by Gerbner and Gross (1980), it was revealed that the media are homogenizing society and influencing heavy television viewers’ perceptions of the world. Furthermore, it was found that heavy television viewers were more likely to “think like” the media. Moreover, viewers’ “mean world” view meant that the viewers’ attitudes about crime victims, suspects, and possessors of power were influenced by their viewing (Gerbner & Gross, 1976). Moreover, television viewing elicits irrational policy support, which leads to increased public acceptance of police violence (Surette, 1998).

According to Russell (1995), most individuals report that the media serves as their primary source of crime information. Considering the research, one might deduce that police officers, who are members of the larger society and who are mostly middle-class white males, derive their attitudes, beliefs, and values from being socialized, just as all people are, by work groups, schools, churches, and the media. Police officers are susceptible to the same types of prejudices, fears, and influences that all people are. The major difference, however, is that police officers are in a position to act out their displeasure and disapproval of those people who are different than they are, with the authority and discretionary latitude afforded their position.
Hollywood’s Past and Present Images of Motion Picture Law Enforcers

The images that Hollywood presents to the public, regarding law enforcement officers, have varied throughout the years; however, it has been very clear that the consistent image of choice has been that of the brutal and often corrupt police officer. A review of the 77-year history of Academy Award winners, for Best Actor include the following: Rod Steiger (1967) for his portrayal of Chief Bill Gillespie, the racist police chief in rural Mississippi, in the movie, In the Heat of the Night; John Wayne (1969) for his portrayal of the drunkard Marshall Rooster Cogburn, in the movie, True Grit; Gene Hackman (1971) for his portrayal of the arguably racist, clearly brutal cop, Popeye Doyle, in the movie, The French Connection; and Denzel Washington (2001) for his portrayal of the corrupt, brutal, and homicidal police drug-squad supervisor, Alonzo, in the movie, Training Day (Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, 2004).

These award winning images of super-macho, racist, corrupt, brutal, and homicidal cops, as offered by Chief Gillespie, Rooster, Popeye, and Alonzo are deeply entrenched in the fabric of society’s perception, and arguably, to a great extent, its preference, of the male law enforcer. Interestingly enough, these male images are in stark contrast to the award winning female law enforcer images recognized by the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences (2004): Jodi Foster (1991) won the Best Actress award for her portrayal of the sensitive, intelligent and inquisitive FBI Special Agent recruit, Clarice Starling, in the movie, The Silence of the Lambs, and Francis McDormand (1996) won the Best Actress award, for her portrayal of the sensitive, intelligent, and probing Police Chief Marge Gunderson, who also happened to be pregnant, in the movie, Fargo.

It is clear that, at the very least, society prefers to see and reward very different images of male and female law enforcers. Although this point has been made with the winners of several Academy Awards, it is also important to study the images portrayed and rewarded on a more accessible media outlet—television.

Hollywood’s Past and Present Television Law Enforcers

For the last 30 years, the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences (2004) has been presenting its best and brightest members with the Emmy Award. During this time, actors winning the award while portraying law enforcement officers, in the category, Best Actor in a Drama Series include the following: Telly Savalas, as Kojack (1974); Robert Blake, as Baretta (1975); Peter Falk, as Lt. Columbo (1976, 1990); Daniel J. Travanti, as Captain Francis Furillo, in Hill Street Blues (1981, 1982); Carrol O’Conner, as Chief Bill Gillespie, in In the Heat of the Night (1989); Dennis Franz, as Detective Andy Sipowicz, in NYPD Blue (1994, 1999); Andre Braugher, as Detective Frank Pembleton, in Homicide: Life on the Street; and Michael Chiklis, as Detective Vic Mackey, in The Shield (2002).

During the same 30 years, the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences (2004) reports that Emmy Award winners for Outstanding Lead Actress in a Drama Series, while portraying law enforcement officers include the following:

As indicated above, during the last 30 years, the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences has awarded some 18 Emmys to actors/actresses who starred in leading roles while portraying law enforcers. Moreover, the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, has awarded some six Oscars to men and women who have starred in leading roles as law enforcers. Although some might argue that these facts only prove that America has a host of great television and motion picture stars, it must pointed out that police officers, and other law enforcers, do watch television and attend the movies. Consequently, it may be possible that they were inspired to pursue careers in law enforcement, just as I and many others were, as a result of our favorite police characters we followed in the movies or on television. Unfortunately, some of those characters have been and are corrupt, brutal, racist, homicidal, and either insensitive or indifferent to the needs of the public that they serve.

According to Miller (2003), because of the violence and salty language of the cable television police drama, *The Shield*, more than 4.8 million viewers helped to make its March 2002 premier episode the most watched drama in basic cable history. This show is loosely inspired by the late 1990s corruption scandals in the Rampart precinct, in Los Angeles, California. The show’s star, Michael Chiklis, who won an Emmy in 2002, is quoted as saying, the show “has broad appeal not because we favor one side or the other but because we represent them truthfully” (Miller, 2003, p. 16). According to Miller (2003), *The Shield* has a fan base that ranges from ultra-liberals to archconservatives, and there are even cops who are rabid about the series.

This and other police dramas tend to depict police in a very negative light, although some would argue that the television shows and movies that present these images to us are only proving that “art imitates life.” I would assert that we may be observing “life, imitating art, imitating life . . .” each time we read about corrupt, brutal, and homicidal law enforcement officers, who follow the images that they see on television and at the movies. According to former NYPD Police Commissioner, William Bratton (2000), . . .

The glorification of the type of policing practice by Detective Andy Sipowicz on *NYPD Blue*, where the end always justifies the means, cannot be tolerated. This role model must be changed. Policing is not entertainment. It is real. It is complex. It can be a matter of life or death. (p. 34)

**Public Attitudes About the Police**

As we begin to truly question how the public views its law enforcers, we must also remember that the police are often the most needed, yet least wanted people, in the circumstances and situations that arise in our lives (McMorris, 2002). It’s been very clear that racial minorities have had a long and difficult relationship with the police, and although great strides have been made in the improvement of police-community relations, there is still a very long way to go. A study of the “Confidence in the Police,” conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2001) illustrates this point. This study revealed that according to demographic characteristics, some 10% of white, 19% of black, and 16% of nonwhite respondents stated that they had very
little confidence in the police. In a study of the race/ethnicity of civilian complaints against the NYPD, it was revealed that whites made 16.6% of complaints; blacks made 52.5%; Latinos made 26.3%; Asians made 2.1%, and “other” made 2.5% (NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board, 2002, p. 48).

A very personal appeal to hold the police accountable for their actions comes from Earl G. Graves, Sr. (2004), the chairman, editor, and publisher of Black Enterprise Magazine. Graves writes, . . .

All families pray that their loved ones do not fall victim to a drunk driver or street assault when they are out at night . . . Black families must also pray against a deadly encounter with the police. I am a former member of law enforcement in New York, yet my wife ad I have always counseled our three sons that the police are not necessarily their friend and are to be avoided at all costs. Now, our children must pass the same counsel on to our grandchildren. The truth is, those sworn to protect them can at any time become a deadly threat. (p. 10)

Although there are many volumes of literature citing instances of police misconduct and complaints against the police, by citizens, it is important to note that the ills that permeate the police profession represent only a small number of officers who misuse their discretion and authority, violate the public’s trust, and commit crimes. It is very easy to become influenced by negative imagery that depicts the police as out of control thugs. It’s even easier to give up on those who are paid to protect and serve; however, that is not a logical option. Clearly, in an effort to control this type of counterproductive behavior, the re-education of current officers and the proper education and training of new police recruits stands to be a logical start.

**Recommendations for Law Enforcement Trainers**

In an effort to protect the reputation and future of American law enforcement, the following recommendations are offered:

- Training academies must recognize and counter the negative images of law enforcement officers, as depicted in the movies and on television, by including discussions of these characters and their behaviors, as well as the real-life consequences that officers will face when they violate department polices and the law.
- Because policing is still predominately white and male and because many new recruits are females from culturally diverse backgrounds, cultural misunderstandings can negatively impact the academy training environment. Academy trainers, therefore, must realize this fact and prepare themselves to deal with it (Jurkanin & Sergevnin, 2004).
- Police trainers should solicit the assistance of researchers to conduct studies of their recruits on a regular basis in an effort to ascertain the changes in recruit perceptions regarding issues relative to serving the public and enforcing the law.
- Police trainers should regularly attend professional conferences to update their knowledge base, share their successes, and receive assistance with correcting their failures.
• Police recruiting, selection, and training must be based on the needs of the communities being served.
• Police trainers must continue to remind their recruits that they are public servants and that everyone in the public that they encounter is not a criminal.

Conclusion

Although the information contained in this article is not intended to be a panacea to the problems impacting law enforcement training, it is asserted that a firm understanding of what we have done, and are doing currently with police recruits, must be taken into serious consideration before we begin to challenge our police trainers to train them. It is only then that we can truly begin to address our current state of training dilemmas.

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A Prospectus of the Integrated Police Use-of-Force Training System in Minnesota

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Introduction

“Since 1988, nearly 700 law enforcement officers throughout the country have been slain in the line of duty; another 629 have been killed in duty-related accidents; and more than 600,000 officers have been assaulted” (DeSarno, 1998). Whether they have paid the ultimate sacrifice by giving their lives, have sustained pain and suffering, or have been assaulted or injured, the men and women of law enforcement deserve our honor and respect.

In a speech given during a law enforcement memorial ceremony in Clarksburg, West Virginia, on May 14, 1998, James V. DeSarno, Jr., Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division, illustrated the debt we owe the men and women of law enforcement. “One way to show respect to these brave men and women is to provide our officers with the tools and the training necessary to ease their burden and better protect their lives as they protect the lives of the citizens of our nation” (DeSarno, 1998). With that goal in mind, I want to better train police officers to make the correct use-of-force decisions in the rapidly changing and dynamic circumstances surrounding use-of-force encounters.

Background

In 1989, the Minnesota Legislature directed the Minnesota Police Officer Standards and Training Board (POST) to impanel a group of subject matter experts in police use-of-force issues. This was in response to several high-profile police use-of-force incidents. This panel was directed to study police use-of-force encounters in Minnesota and compelled to develop learning objectives for training police officers in the use of force. Accordingly, this group of subject-matter experts found that previous police use-of-force training was problematic in that officers were trained in the highest liability issues, such as the application of deadly force but not in the lower level force options (State of Minnesota, 1989). This group recognized that officers rarely use deadly force and commonly use lower level force options to resolve confrontations. Other than the initial physical training they received in a skills development course, most officers seldom get any further training in verbalization, chemical aerosol, unarmed tactics, or impact weapons. Setting a precedent in law enforcement training, these subject-matter experts created a series of learning objectives mandating annual use-of-force training for police officers in all aspects of the use of force, not just firearms training (State of Minnesota, 1991).
Problem
The implementation of mandated use-of-force training was long overdue for most officers. Most law enforcement administrators, however, viewed the learning objectives as intrusive and imperious. To gain the acceptance of these administrators, the panel of subject-matter experts reconvened and revised the learning objectives in August 1990 (State of Minnesota, 1991). This revision provided police departments with substantial flexibility in implementing these objectives. Most police departments developed ad-hoc blocks of instruction to fulfill these training requirements because the learning objectives were organized categorically. While ad-hoc training is effective in training individual components, it fails to assimilate the individual components into an integrated system. Adoption of an integrated use-of-force system allows officers to properly choose and appropriately exercise the degree of force necessary to control a force encounter. Inadequate training may cause officers to use force when it is not appropriate. Conversely, inadequate training may create uncertainty and hesitation on the part of officers in circumstances that may increase the potential for danger to themselves and the public. Failure to incorporate an integrated approach in use-of-force training creates the potential for excessive use-of-force complaints and criminal and/or civil legal action.

Purpose
The purpose of this article is to provide an effective alternative to ad-hoc use-of-force training—an integrated police use-of-force training system. For use-of-force training to be effective, officers must be trained to rapidly assess and competently manage force encounters. Officers must be able to escalate or de-escalate their use-of-force choice based upon the actions presented by their adversary.

Scope
The goal of this article is to illustrate the need for realistic and effective use-of-force training for Minnesota’s law enforcement officers. The end result will better prepare officers to protect and serve the public using integrated techniques that are operationally effective, administratively feasible, and judiciously defensible.

Discussion
Legal Standards Surrounding Use of Force
Society grants police officers the authority to use force when necessary as part of their official duties. Standards governing police use of force are set by departmental policy, state law, and federal law. According to John C. Hall, JD (1992), of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Training Unit, “Making appropriate decisions regarding the use of deadly force is the most critical challenge confronting law enforcement officers” (p. 25). In discussing the legal standards surrounding use of force, I will present the federal legal standard as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. For the purpose of this article, I will not examine Minnesota State Law or individual department policies. Minnesota Laws pertaining to use of force and deadly force were constructed using federal criteria.
Federal Law

Federal law employs two sets of legal standards governing police use of force and deadly force: (1) the law sets the legal criterion dictating when police officers may use force against another person and (2) the law provides civil and criminal recourse for individuals who claim that their civil rights have been violated.

In interpreting the law, the United States Supreme Court has written, “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigative stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it” (Hall, 1992, p. 24). In an attempt to provide guidance in force confrontations, the Supreme Court has ruled that whether an officer acted in a reasonable manner is to be judged “... from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight” (Hall, 1992, p. 24). The Court also recognized that “police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation” (Hall, 1992, p. 24). The Supreme Court has instructed that the following specific factors must be considered when evaluating an officer’s use of force:

- The severity of the crime at issue
- Whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others
- Whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight

This interpretation provides the foundation for state law and department policies regarding police use of force. In summary, police officers may only use force when it is necessary and reasonable.

While the Constitution provides guidance when the government may deprive an individual of “life, liberty, or property,” our founding fathers expressed concern about government intrusion in people’s lives. Police officers are visible symbols of that governmental power. In 1886, after Congress passed the 14th amendment to the Constitution, Title 42, U.S. Code, Section 1983 was enacted. Section 1983 provides a means by which an individual can seek civil redress in either state or federal court against any law enforcement officer who deprives that person of a constitutionally protected right while acting under the protection (color) of law. In addition to civil remedies, criminal penalties exist to punish those who use excessive force or otherwise violate the civil rights of others. These sanctions are meant to discourage and punish unlawful acts by those acting under the “color of law.”

Force Options

In order to compare and contrast an integrated use-of-force training system with ad-hoc blocks of instruction, the use-of-force options available to police officers must be defined. Typically, use-of-force instructors draw upon the Confrontational Continuum® to provide officers with a tool that allows them to assess which force option to use during a force encounter. A force continuum normally includes a variety of force options available to police officers during force encounters as included in the following list:
• Verbalization Skills
• Escort Compliance
• Pain Compliance
• Mechanical Control
• Impact Weapons
• Deadly Force

In order to explain these force options, the following definitions have been provided.

**Verbalization Skills**

Verbalization consists of not only the spoken word but includes the officer’s body language and tone of voice. As illustrated below in Table 1, the communication model divides the message conveyed to the receiver into the following three categories: body language, tone of voice, and spoken word.

**Table 1**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication Model</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Body Language</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tone of Voice</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoken Word</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Albert Mehrabian (1980).

Most of the messages we send to each other are through our nonverbal expressions of body language (55%). Officers must use body language to enhance their command presence and establish control during a force confrontation.

**Escort Compliance**

Escort compliance is a low-level compliance procedure, which is nonthreatening and nonviolent. The purpose of escort compliance is to remove a subject from an area when that subject may present a threat to the officer or the public. This technique is performed by the officer closing the distance between him or her and the subject, grasping the subject’s arm, and escorting the subject from the area. Although from a physical standpoint, escort compliance is perhaps the most commonly employed technique by police officers, it is potentially dangerous for the officer. To apply the escort technique, the officer moves toward the subject, decreasing the time the officer has to react to an aggressive act and physically places his or her hands on the subject’s arm.

**Pain Compliance**

Pain compliance techniques are tactics applied to a subject; the intent is to create pain and discomfort. These techniques take the form of manipulation of joints, execution of pressure point tactics, or application of a chemical aerosol irritant spray. Compliance results from an effort on the part of the subject to relieve the discomfort. Pain compliance is used in circumstances in which it would be too dangerous to
attempt to escort the individual. On those occasions in which escort is inappropriate or ineffective, pain compliance is an acceptable and often effective procedure.

Mechanical Control

When the aforementioned techniques have been tried or deemed inappropriate, mechanical control techniques are applied. Mechanical control is a punch, kick, stun, or throw. The use of mechanical control has a higher potential for compliance but also has a higher potential for injury of the subject. As a result, mechanical control is employed only in those circumstances in which the preceding levels of force would prove to be inappropriate as a result of the subject’s behavior or ineffective as a means of control.

Impact Weapon

When mechanical control fails or would be inappropriate, the use of an impact weapon is required. The most common impact weapon is the baton; although, other objects could be utilized as impact weapons (e.g., flashlights or radios). The baton is an intermediate level of force, which bridges the gap between the use of hands and fists and the use of deadly force.

Deadly Force

If the intermediate force option of the baton is inappropriate or ineffective, deadly force may be required to stop the subject. Although a number of instrumentalities can be employed to cause death, for the law enforcement officer, the most common form of deadly force is the firearm.

An officer determines a force option based upon the amount of resistance received from the subject. As the subject’s resistance increases, the officer’s response must increase appropriately to maintain subject control. Confrontation is not a 50/50 proposition for the officer. The goal of the law enforcement officer during a confrontation is control of the subject. The amount of force used by an officer is dependent upon the resistance of the subject, the officer/subject factors, and the totality of the circumstances. Each technique the officer employs during a confrontation must be evaluated in terms of its likelihood to gain control compared to its likelihood to cause damage. Those techniques, which offer a high degree of control and a limited potential for injury, are the preferred options (Parsons, Bechthold, & Luther, 1996).

When evaluating techniques, a final consideration must be made to ensure officer safety. An officer must maintain the ability to either disengage or escalate in response to the dynamics of the confrontation. Techniques that tie the officer to the subject increase the risk to the officer. Techniques must allow an officer to escalate to a higher force option in response to a subject’s threat. According to Brian Arnspiger (1996), a law enforcement trainer in Burbank, California, “Police officers may be thrust into any point on the continuum without warning. Proper training provides them with the skills necessary to make and implement appropriate decisions that consider the safety of both officers and subjects, as well as the constantly changing conditions” (p. 1).
As illustrated by the Confrontational Continuum®, officer/subject factors and special circumstances are relevant factors that influence an officer’s course of action during a confrontation. A disparity in the age, gender, physical size, fitness level, or skill level between the officer and the subject may mandate that an officer use more or less force to control the situation. Additionally, a subject in close proximity to a firearm or other weapon creates an increased danger to the officer that must be dealt with immediately. An officer who is injured, exhausted, grounded, disabled, or placed in imminent danger would be justified in his or her escalation of force.

Realistic and Effective Use-of-Force Training

Confrontations are dynamic. They rapidly evolve and may escalate into proportions that will catch the ill-trained officer unprepared. Force confrontations are ugly. Will we ever be able to forget the 90-second videotape of Rodney King being beaten by Los Angeles police officers? To prevent excessive force accusations and lawsuits, law enforcement instructors must train officers when to use force, how to use force, and how much force to use. Police officers must be trained to win confrontations—physically, mentally, and emotionally.

Effective use-of-force training must incorporate thorough training in each of the force options that an officer’s department allows. Frequently, departments spend most of the time training officers in the most litigious area of use of force—deadly force. Additionally, because firearms training requires officers to use fine motor skills, which demand hours of practice to attain competency, most departments spend most of their training time and dollars enhancing an officer’s shooting skills. Realistically, officers are more likely to use one of the lower force options during a confrontation than use deadly force. As illustrated in Table 2, officers are more likely to use lower force options in 97% of force encounters (Garner & Schade, 1996, p. 31).

Table 2
Type and Frequency of Force Options Used During Confrontations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Option Used During Confrontations</th>
<th>% Time Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verbalization Skills – Escort Compliance – Pain Compliance</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical Control – Impact Weapons</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deadly Force</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to Larry Brubaker (1993), an FBI training coordinator, “The greatest key to officer survival in a deadly force encounter is using role-playing exercises during training” (p. 72). Agent Brubaker’s research studied 40 officer-involved shootings in Minnesota between 1980 and 1989.

To be successful during “real-life” encounters, officers must be trained in and be allowed to practice all of the force options available to them. Adding realistic training techniques through role-playing exercises or scenario-based education provides the officer with the tools necessary to choose the proper force option. Once an officer has experienced the controlled stress induced during a realistic training scenario, the officer is better prepared to face a similar confrontation on the street.
In the traditional method of use-of-force training, an officer can only respond with the specific force mode that is being trained at the time. That officer is tested and evaluated only on the individual skill being performed; for example, if baton training is the block of instruction being trained, then the only force option that is trained, tested, and evaluated during that training session is the baton. If firearms is the block of instruction being trained, then only deadly force decisions are incorporated into the training. Even though officers may know other techniques, they are prohibited from using them in this traditional training method. Officers trained in this compartmentalized fashion will be unable to make a smooth transition from one force option to the next when faced with a violent confrontation.

Accordingly, Major William Everett (1991), standards coordinator for the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, predicts, “If the only tool given to a carpenter is a hammer, then every job given to that carpenter will require a hammer and a nail.” The corollary drawn from Everett’s analogy is when you limit the force options you provide for your police officers, each force encounter will dictate the choice your officers are allowed to select. Law enforcement administrators must provide officers with the proper tools and training to manage confrontations. Accordingly, use-of-force instructors need to educate and train officers for real-life encounters, providing realistic training that places officers in simulated true-to-life, frequently occurring circumstances. Training officers holistically using an integrated use-of-force system provides officers with the following benefits:

- Improves an officer’s ability to make decisions and use proper judgment under stress
- Increases an officer’s ability to understand the legal implications in using force
- Optimizes an officer’s ability to escalate or de-escalate the degree of force used
- Improves an officer’s ability to operationalize laws, regulations, and department policies

Effective use-of-force training gives officers the confidence to manage confrontation within the boundaries of necessity and reasonableness. Officers must be trained to rapidly assess the confrontation, quickly choose the proper force option, and promptly apply the force necessary to control the subject. Anything less will impede an officer’s ability to react instinctively, reasonably, and legally within the guidelines of the law and department policy. The primary responsibility of police officers is to protect and serve the public. Officers trained in an integrated use-of-force system will be better prepared to achieve that goal.

**Recommendations**

To protect the lives of the citizens we serve, police officers must be trained safely, effectively, and realistically. Officers must operate within the guidelines set forth in department policies, state law, and federal law. Additionally, to reduce the risk of civil litigation and excessive force complaints against law enforcement agencies and officers, appropriate and effective use-of-force training must be provided to our police officers.

Law enforcement administrators must provide their officers with a full tool belt—a tool belt that will allow officers options to confront the escalating, rapidly changing dynamics of confrontation. Successful management of confrontation
takes more than just the belt full of tools; it requires training in those tools. This involves recognizing when a hammer will not work and a screwdriver is necessary instead. In other words, our police officers must be provided with a variety of force options and the training to perform those options. I believe that the following list of recommendations is essential for officers to be successful physically, mentally, and legally during a force encounter:

- Law enforcement administrators must provide their officers with a variety of force options for use during force encounters.
- Law enforcement instructors must implement a Confrontational Continuum® as part of their training on use of force.
- Frequent use-of-force training must be conducted to assure the officers are competent in each of the force options as provided by their department.
- Officers must be trained in an integrated use-of-force system allowing the officer to rapidly escalate or de-escalate the degree of force necessary during a confrontation.
- Use-of-force instructors should be holistically trained and competently trained to instruct every area of use of force.
- Use-of-force training must be safe, dynamic, and realistic to be operationally effective, administratively feasible, and judiciously defensible.

We must provide our officers with realistic and effective use-of-force training, based upon the type of threat level encountered by the officer. Our officers must be trained and prepared to rapidly assess and competently manage force encounters. They must be able to escalate or de-escalate their use-of-force choice based upon the actions presented by their adversary.

Only then can we be assured that we have given our officers the tools to physically, emotionally, and legally manage the dynamics of use-of-force encounters.

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**Selected Statutes**


Minnesota Statutes Annotated: 626.8452

Jeffrey Luther began his career with the Minnesota Department of Public Safety, Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, as a special agent in 1983 after serving as an emergency paramedic, deputy sheriff, and a patrol officer. Since that time, Jeff has performed various investigative assignments, including narcotics, internal affairs, background investigations, complex criminal investigations, and death investigations.

Jeff was assigned to the Training and Development Section in 1990, where he served as a senior special agent, acting as second in command of the training unit. For 10 years, Jeff managed the Firearms / Use of Force Instructor Program, Tactical Training Program, and Forensic Pathology Specialist Program.

In 2001, Jeff was promoted to the position of Special Agent in Charge; he is responsible for Homeland Security, Commander of the Tactical Team, and BCA Building Security.

Jeff graduated from the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota, with a master’s degree in leadership, management, and education in May 2004.

Complementing his BCA responsibilities, Jeff is the past president of the Association of Training Officers of Minnesota and serves as an instructor trainer for Armament Systems and Procedures, Inc.
Misconceptions Regarding Policing Models

Michael L. Patterson, Assistant Chief, College Station, Texas, Police Department

Introduction

Community policing is often characterized as a paradigm for policing that should supplant the professional model. The model is suggested as a panacea to many of the problems that plague police. It is offered as a better method for providing police services through better communication with the community. This article challenges this assertion by suggesting that a community policing approach is not always a better method of policing. Many police departments that claim to operate in a community policing model actually employ a mixture of the professional and community policing models to provide the services their citizens want. Indeed, they never really stopped using the professional model but instead added community policing as an additional tool rather than a new model of operation.

It would be nearly impossible for an officer to operate in a purely community policing model. One reason is because an officer answers to several groups, including the citizens of the beat he or she patrols (through citizen contacts and input), the citizens of cities or counties (through city or county ordinances and elected governing body input to the department), the citizens of the various states (through state laws and constitutions), and the citizens of the United States as a whole (through the Constitution and federal laws). Making matters more complex, anyone who is a member of the smallest group (citizens in a beat) is by default a member of the other groups. To address all of the priorities of these various groups, there is a need to approach issues by means other than community policing. If there is a doubt that an officer does not answer to any of the larger groups, observe what happens when an officer takes an action that violates the constitution of the United States, whether supported by citizens on the beat or not.

Furthermore, there are competing groups (e.g., the American Civil Liberties Union versus the National Rifle Association or pro-life versus pro-choice) that vie for conflicting approaches or goals. Even noncompeting groups—Lion’s Clubs, Chambers of Commerce, and neighborhood associations—often demand that different issues, sometimes conflicting, be addressed. More so, almost everyone is a member of more than one group. There are numerous times the police have to balance their experience, or professional knowledge, as to what action would be appropriate (professional model) with what is desired by these different groups (community policing model).

This article is broken down into three parts. The first part defines the professional and community policing models. The second part identifies two basic approaches, reactive and proactive, and argues that both the professional model and the community policing model use both of these approaches. The third part demonstrates how it would be almost impossible for any department to operate using exclusively either a professional or community policing model.
Definitions of the Professional and Community Models of Policing

The first problem with identifying what model of policing a police department is using is defining the models. The professional model has the advantage of age and has its roots in the model put forth by O. W. Wilson in his book, Police Administration (1950). In The Compstat Paradigm, Vincent Henry (2001) quotes Wilson as saying there is “one best way” to apply police services. This involves a strong centralized command system that bases deployment on workload analysis and the ability to answer calls in the most efficient manner with the resources available. This clarity of definition makes for an attractive picture when trying to address numerous problems put forth by citizens, each demanding that their particular problem be given the highest attention. By using a scientific method to establish deployment and priorities, police avoid the appearance of favoritism.

There are several traits that are commonly understood to belong to the professional model. One is that an officer is assigned a beat, and he or she is responsible for the calls for service in that beat. The officer is also responsible for preventing crime in that beat by randomly patrolling the area so that anyone thinking of committing a crime may run the chance of being caught. Officers may also have “directed patrols” of various forms when a particular problem has been identified, and direct actions are taken to prevent or correct the problem. These actions vary depending on the circumstances. Additionally, for most departments, initial reports of criminal offenses are taken by a patrol officer.

The professional model is also identified as separating crime issues from other social issues. This model encourages officers to identify and isolate their tasks. It encourages officers to think of themselves as primarily crime fighters. It is assumed that officers do not want to become social workers or representatives of other governmental departments; they signed up to fight crime. They do not want to hear that a problem is complicated and that there are several factors (many of them outside the realm of police work and beyond their ability to deal with directly) that affect how a problem comes to be. They want to single out and focus on the things in which they are experienced and use the techniques they were trained to use. The strength to this approach is that indeed officers are not trained in performing social work and, perhaps, should not try to do so. With this approach, social work is left to the agencies that are responsible for that duty.

The professional approach also has a tendency to operate in a very centralized and hierarchical manner. Chiefs and commanders tell their subordinates, who tell their subordinates, who tell line officers what to address. This has at least the appearance of doing the will of the people; a citizen calls an elected official who calls the city manager who tells the chief of police on down to the street officer. In reality, though, the professional model has a good measure of autonomy. Often, the police get to identify what should be considered most important and receive the most attention. This can be a hit-or-miss proposition in terms of addressing the citizens’ needs.

A further trait is that this model tends to be rule-based and reaches its most efficient (and usually effective) point when it controls the act of every officer. If a department has strong, central control of officer behavior, then it follows that the behavior of the officers is what the administration intended. Some may identify this approach...
as supporting civil rights violations, but this is not the case if officers follow one of the things they are sworn to do in the first place—defend the Constitution of the United States. The strength (and weakness) here is that the department tends to operate independently of outside influences since operations are controlled through policy rather than direct citizen input. This centralized form of command helps to inhibit corruption. If policies are set up right, then political influences tend to have a much lesser effect on the acts of a department.

This can also be a weakness. By having a strong, centralized command, the needs of different neighborhoods can be overlooked. One area may have a problem with burglaries while another area may be worried about traffic violations. All the while, the department has placed an emphasis on generic centralized problem identification, which includes neither burglaries or traffic violations. The community policing model, on the other hand, does not claim to have “one best way.” The Texas Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics Program (TELEMASP) (Hoover, 2003) identifies several forms of community policing. These include community resource officers, problem projects, school resource officers, D.A.R.E.® officers, foot patrols, store front offices, and bicycle patrols. The variety of methods used to practice community policing demonstrates the lack of a clear definition of what community policing really is. For example, “store fronts” are offices usually located in high-density areas that allow officers to be accessible to the community. “Problem projects” is another name for problem-oriented policing (POP), a method of problem solving often using Scan, Analyze, Respond, and Assess (SARA) model (Eck & Spelman, 1987). There is one theme that does appear in all of the forms of community policing, as stated in the TELEMASP bulletin: “Community policing has as its foundation the concept that police agencies establish numerous linkages to communities, however defined, and tailor programs to citizen desires” (Hoover, 2003, p. 2). A similar definition by the Community Policing Consortium (1994) states, “Community policing consists of two complementary core components, community partnership and problem solving” (Chapter 3, p. 1). Each of these definitions emphasizes inclusiveness and participation of the public in guiding the actions of the police but allows for wide latitude on how that is accomplished. A quote from John Dewey (1927) is relevant here, “The man who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches and where it pinches, even if the expert shoemaker is the best judge of how trouble is to be remedied” (p. 364).

Thus, despite a consensus for a general definition of community policing, implementation methods are varied. To add confusion to the issue of defining community policing, there are three basic models that the TELEMASP Bulletin identified that are used to put community policing into practice in a patrol division: (1) “overlay,” (2) “every officer,” and (3) “beat team” models (Hoover, 2003, pp. 5-7). In the “overlay” model, a department assigns specialist officers to engage in “structured community contact” and “problem solving.” In the “every officer” model, it is assumed staffing levels are “sufficient that officers can not only meet the responsibilities for responding to calls for service and proactive enforcement, but also engage instructured community contact and problem solving” (p. 5). In the “beat team” model, “A group of officers is assigned to a geographic subdivision with 24/7 responsibility” (p. 6). This team is responsible for all the services in that area, including patrol services, detective services, community contacts, and problem solving. Other crime prevention models are also possible.
Simplifying the two models may help to bring the core differences into focus. In its purest form, the professional model relies upon scientific analysis of deployment strategies and an independent review of priorities. In other words, the police (or some other authority) will know what strategies to take to have an overall reduction in crime and establish what criteria to use to judge effectiveness. A purely community policing model would operate at the other end of the spectrum. Officers operating in this model would rely upon the community they serve to decide what to prioritize. Neither of these are anywhere near the reality of how departments have to operate.

In reality, the professional model has to deal with public pressures to address crimes that are not very prevalent in an overall crime rate, often at the cost of not having time to address crimes that are more prevalent. The overall crime rate may suffer, but the public is much happier to have crimes they consider important resolved. For example, a department operating in a professional model can have a neighborhood apply enough political pressure to have a criminal mischief problem addressed at the cost of dealing with more serious crimes.

In terms of community policing, there are times that the public cries out for a solution that is not an acceptable action for officers to take. I was once in a community meeting in which the citizens in a neighborhood wanted the police to “get tough” with some drug dealers operating in that neighborhood. I asked how would the police identify who to “get tough” with. The police knew some of the dealers, but how would they select others not so well known? I pointed out that if the police were to do that, there was a chance an innocent person could be targeted. They saw the potential for abuse and agreed that it would not be a good course of action. This example points out that there is a balance between the desires of the community and professional judgment.

**Reactive and Proactive Approaches**

There are two basic approaches to police work: (1) reactive and (2) proactive. The reactive approach “reacts” to incidents and seeks solutions; the proactive approach attempts to deal with problems before they come into being. Each approach has their place in either model, and deciding which one is correct is based upon the situation at hand. It is not that one approach is better than another; it is more a matter of finding which one is appropriate for the task at hand. In other words, neither approach is a replacement for the other; both should be considered appropriate methods of policing. It is often the case that many problems are not solved by solely using one approach or the other. Other factors not directly related to solving the problem, such as political pressure, complicate the situation.

If we are not careful, we could fall into the trap of seeing the professional model as reactive and the community policing model as proactive. This is not the case. The difference is what actions to prioritize. The professional model is premised upon the principles that a police department should . . .

- Operate relatively independent of local neighborhoods.
- Receive its direction from the laws enacted by the various governing legislative bodies.
Employ scientific models (for example, patrol allocation models).

Obtain peer guidance regarding best practices. The community policing model also uses these principles but differs in that it looks to the community, usually defined as local neighborhoods, to find out what activities should be prioritized. Both have the capacity to be proactive or reactive.

For example, an officer operating under either model is using a reactive approach when answering a call for service. The officer goes to the call and attempts to find a solution to the problem. If the officer is observant, he or she might notice a similarity to other calls and think about how to deal with a pattern that indicates an emerging problem. The officer using the professional model would look to a supervisor, other officers, or professional literature for a solution. An officer using the community policing model would use these same sources but would also look to the residents in that area to find a solution.

Note that the end result in this example seeks the same solution. The officer using either model wants to address an emerging problem that has been identified. This is not always the case when one policing model is predominant in a department. For example, in a community policing model, the citizens might give that particular problem a lower priority than the officer or his or her superiors. What may seem like a big problem for the entire city might not affect the beat the officer is patrolling and thus makes it less of an issue to the citizens there. On the other hand, the citizens may acknowledge that this is a problem they want to be addressed but only after some other problems they have identified are dealt with. They may want the department to focus on another issue that is a bigger problem in their area.

If a department is using the professional model, the need to address a particular issue is balanced against response needs (calls for service) and other issues facing that department. If there is a bigger problem city-wide, the officer may be directed to focus on issues that are not as important to those living in a particular neighborhood.

Which Model Prevails?

It is the point of this article that in reality, neither should prevail. Both the professional and community policing models use both approaches (reactive and proactive), and there is an appropriate time and place to use either one. It is a contingency question. Both models have strengths and weaknesses that help identify which one has the potential for greater success in any particular situation. For example, an immediate problem, such as a rapidly developing crime series, dictates that we use a professional model. We would not ask citizens to decide whether this is a priority. Citizens expect a quick response for certain problems no matter how well we perform under a community policing model. The professional model offers a better method of providing that response. On the other hand, the professional model can overlook long-term and/or alternative solutions from outside sources. An officer using a community policing approach is free to find other methods outside the realm of traditional responses.
Conclusion

The whole-hearted support for community policing has been a well-intentioned attempt to overcome the isolation, or at least perceived isolation, that arose from the professional model. As public servants, we are obliged to respond to the needs of our citizens. The problem is balancing each citizen’s personal needs and wants from the overall good for the general public. Community policing has served that purpose well and should not be abandoned; however, neither should we claim that we have totally abandoned the professional model. Aspects from both models are appropriate, depending upon circumstance. Each model has its time and place. To claim one or the other is a “better” method is to deny how the police really operate.

References


Michael L. Patterson, has been a peace officer since 1976. He worked as a deputy sheriff at Brazoria County Sheriff’s Office and as a police officer at Texas A&M University before joining the College Station, Texas, Police Department as a patrol officer in 1978, where he has risen to the rank of assistant chief. Mike graduated with a BS in police science from Sam Houston State University in 1975 and received his MA in philosophy from Texas A&M University in 2004. He is a graduate of the FBI National Academy, 136th Session.
Creating Critical Thinkers: Interactional Approaches to Police Instruction

William P. Bloss, PhD, Associate Professor, Criminal Justice, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina; Curriculum Coordinator, South Carolina Police Corps

Significant changes have occurred in policing with the advent of community policing. Dilulio (1992) suggests that a new paradigm has emerged that affects the function of the criminal justice system. The new model emphasizes the role of police as facilitating secure and restored communities using methods other than complete reliance on traditional arrest responses. Others have argued that community policing itself has caused a paradigmatic change in police operations (Pelfrey, 1998).

The police literature is replete with rancorous debate about the merits of community-oriented policing (Alpert & Moore, 1997; Klockars, 1988; Mastrofski, 1988; Roberg & Riechers, 1990). In spite of this discourse, numerous police organizations have adopted a philosophy that improved effectiveness may stem more from genuine community partnerships than from traditional crime control practices (Kelling, 1988). There is persuasive evidence that policing is undergoing a paradigmatic transition in its approach to community safety, apprehension of offenders, and response to community demands (Pelfrey, 1998). This transition involves more than simply pursuing the origin or cause of community crime problems (Goldstein, 1990). It is about a change in ideology regarding what constitutes effective policing. Several commentators have stressed the need for agencies to engage in systemic organizational change rather than merely using public relations programs in promoting their transition to community policing (Kelling & Bratton, 1993; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1998).

If, in fact, a police organization is intent on adopting problem and community-oriented policing practices, then it is incumbent upon them to effectively prepare personnel to implement these methods (see Birzer, 2003). At the core of this preparation is the need to develop officers with a penchant for critical thinking, analysis, and problem-solving in the community setting. To effectively equip police recruits to perform these tasks, trainers must diversify their focus, approach, and method. One of the greatest challenges in outfitting police officers with community and problem-oriented policing skills is changing the conventional crime control focus of police training (McLaughlin & Donahue, 1995).

This article proposes the implementation of interactive and cooperative learning and teaching approaches that are more conducive to developing the critical thinking and problem-solving skills demanded by community and problem-oriented agencies. It posits that traditional rote knowledge-based techniques alone are incapable of preparing recruits for the demands of the new policing ideologies. The “problem-based” critical thinking training model advocates changing the manner in which recruits are taught and evaluated. These changes include the recognition that recruit adult learners possess multiple intelligences and engage in the learning process.
with considerable diversity. In making a transition to a critical thinking approach, trainers must alter their orientation regarding how they view effective student performance, task completion, and competency. What are proffered are formulae that call for a change in recruit training ideology, instructional methods, and evaluation approaches. Each of these is predicated upon an “adult-learner” model that relies on andragogical (adult-centered) interactive and cooperative teaching methods.

**Role of Training and Academic Education in the Transition to Community-Oriented Policing**

Facilitating the transition to community-oriented policing hinges on effective training. Zhao, Thurman, and Lovrich (1995) found that police administrators considered training the cornerstone of the implementation of community-oriented policing. Specific community-oriented policing training content has also been found to positively contribute to recruit acceptance and understanding of its principles (Cheurprakobkit, 2002). Hence, training plays a pivotal role in preparing recruits not only for the police profession but moreover, for effective community and problem-based policing (Berg, 1994; McLaughlin & Donahue, 1995).

Following the 1967 assertion by the Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice that a better educated officer was the solution to improved policing, the uneasy relationship between police training and academic education was aggravated (Buerger, 2004, p. 27). Both have labored to show their differences in teaching and learning, and in so doing have created a pecking order between police training and criminal justice education.

In spite of this dispute, a rational extension of critical-thinking-focused recruit training is recognizing some of the educational attributes of college academics in preparing the next generation of community police officers. In their policy research on college education and policing, Carter, Sapp, and Stephens (1989) found that police executives considered college-educated officers better communicators, decision makers, and overall performers. These same respondents, however, stated that the officers with higher education were more likely to question superiors and become transient. Considerable support has emerged for recruiting college-educated individuals for police service (Bloss, 1999; Pynes, 1994). Though it can be more challenging to retain them, some have argued that college-educated recruits are more effective officers because of the attributes of academic education (Carter et al., 1989; Sharp, 1995; Vodicka, 1994). Several studies have suggested that college-educated police officers demonstrate better performance and job satisfaction (Dantzker, 1993; Carter & Sapp, 1989; Kappeler, Sapp, & Carter, 1992; Tyre & Braunstein, 1992). Conversely, others have argued that college education contributes little to police on-the-job effectiveness (Buckley, 1991; Worden, 1990).

Berg (1994) asserts that police training and education are distinctively different. Training focuses on skills; whereas, education is more theoretical, conceptual, and value-laden. To train effective critical thinkers for the police occupation, academy training should draw from both training and educational perspectives to meld the best attributes of both. Baro and Burlingame (1999) advocate integration between traditional police training and the traits of a college educational milieu. Haley (1992) attributes much of the advancement of modern law enforcement education to the integration of learning and teaching principles from both camps. In the same vein,
Buerger (2004) offers a police training solution that integrates both the element of conceptual learning found in academic settings and the knowledge-based experiential learning that exists in training academies. Sufficient evidence exists for the differences and merits of each approach (see Stachnik & Sullivan, 2001). Bayley and Bittner (1997) argue that the demands of police practical experience and analytical learning are not incongruent. They hold that police patrol officers maximize their effectiveness by melding experiential learning in the field with critical thinking stating “if patrolmen acted like automats most of the time, then there would be little scope for learning” (p. 115).

Training Recruits as Effective Critical Thinkers

The most effective method for training adult learners to become effective critical thinkers is an integrated approach that draws from the best of police training and academic education (Beurger, 2004; see Charles, 2000). This requires not only changes in curricula but more importantly, in learning and teaching approaches. The strategy advocated here contains three requisite parts: (1) Training police critical thinkers requires the adoption of an “adult-learner” andragogical training method, (2) Instructors must utilize diverse and cooperative teaching approaches that foster critical thinking and problem-solving more than rote “intellectualization” (Bloss, 2000a; Bloss, 2000b), and (3) Instructors must be prepared to evaluate competence and skill mastery in a manner that comports with the development of critical thinkers.

An inherent part of the emerging community policing ideology is community problem solving by line police officers (Clarke, 1998; Goldstein, 1990). Among those organizations ascribing to community-oriented policing, this ideological transition has placed critical demands on officer training. Heretofore, agencies have prepared recruits for police service by training them in conventional knowledge-based crime control techniques. Although these methods continue to be valuable in overall recruit training, they fail to adequately prepare the emerging generation of problem-oriented police officers (Bloss, 2000b; McLaughlin & Donahue, 1995). In fact, Geller (1997) asserts that traditional policing agencies have “serious learning disorders” because they believe that allowing line officers to engage in critical thinking and street-level decisionmaking would undermine organizational discipline (p. 4). Effective training of recruits, who are expected to engage in street-level problem-solving, hinges upon the ability to teach them practical critical thinking skills. The assumptions that recruit training that focuses predominately upon mundane knowledge acquisition applications will inevitably provide trainees with necessary critical thinking and problem-solving skills is fallacious. These practical skills are acquired through careful curricular design, lesson plan development, and instruction that is designed to prepare officers trained in problem-solving.

Conceptual Origins of Problem-Based Training

The notion that a community policing approach contains numerous demands for problem investigation, analysis, and solution goes back to the inception of the community-oriented policing model (Goldstein, 1990; Spelman & Eck, 1987). Goldstein’s (1979) seminal work called for a problem-solving approach to modern policing. In fact, Goldstein’s subsequent efforts outlined various strategies for, among other things, police problem-solving in the community (Goldstein, 1990). Others such
as Spelman and Eck (1987) outlined specific models for police problem-solving (e.g., SARA model). Both of these initiatives provided a scheme for developing a problem-solving critical thinking approach to the resolution of community problems by police. In the 1990s, the Police Consortium, Police Executive Research Forum, and others developed several approaches to problem diagnosis and solution implementation (see generally Police Consortium, 1999). The result is that heuristic models such as Spelman and Eck’s (1987) Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment (SARA) approach have become conventional and are widely utilized in instruction.

As Clarke (1998) noted, problem solving in problem-oriented policing often misses the target altogether. It is important that the students learn how to identify the correct dimensions of the problem to be effective (Epstein, 1999). Otherwise, their analysis and solutions are prone to be misguided or faulty (Bloss, 2000b).

**Tenets of Traditional Police Training**

Traditionally, police recruit training similar to other vocations, has dwelled on a teacher-centered, competency-based approach to learning and teaching (Birzer, 2003). This meant that students were molded to perform designated competencies stemming from certain identified tasks.

A plethora of police job task analyses have led to training curricula and instructional methods that are designed to teach recruits to perform these specific competencies. Although there are both statutory and regional differences among police curricula, the dominant focus continues to be on developing and evaluating known competencies. In spite of the demise of the dominance of crime control policing (Pelfrey, 1998), the majority of the measured competencies continue to be oriented toward crime control methods and tactics.

There is no denial of the importance of many of these hands-on crime control tasks; however, many conventional training environments devote a disproportionate amount of attention to these tasks at the expense of training in needed areas (Birzer & Nolan, 2002; Charles, 2000). What is advocated here is to devote more training time to critical thinking and problem-oriented tasks. Police research suggests that the majority of a police officer’s work time is devoted to tasks such as resolving interpersonal differences among citizens or completion of paperwork rather than arrest functions (see Langworthy & Travis, 1994; Meese, 2000; Memory & Aragon, 2001).

In an effort to prepare recruits for crime control tasks, traditional police training approaches focus on conventional methods of learning, teaching, and evaluating student performance in these areas. In addition to being teacher-centered, traditional police teaching methodology has a two-fold focus—(1) utilization of immersion techniques (Johnson, 2000) and (2) rote learning processes (e.g., memorization, repetitive or rote competency performance, etc.). Although there are appropriate applications for these learning/teaching techniques, they cannot dominate in a problem-based critical-thinking training model.
Learning Approaches for Training Critical Thinkers

Learner-Centered Cooperative Approach

A problem-based police training model, designed to develop critical thinkers, must not only be learner-centered but must implement strategies to foster student-directed learning. Such learning/teaching techniques require student ownership of their individual learning. A learning approach that targets learners must embrace interactive and cooperative learning as a central feature. It is incumbent on the instructor to utilize teaching techniques that involve the learner as a direct participant; methods of learning, teaching, and evaluating must be grounded in that perspective.

The critical thinking model reflects a commitment to training multiple-intelligence learners and preparing them to become “emancipatory adult” learners (Hammond & Collins, 1991, p. 14). The approaches utilized in this model foster independent critical thinking, learning, and problem-solving, all of which are necessary to properly equip community-oriented police officers.

Recognition of Multiple Intelligence Learners

If the learner is centrally located in the learning process, instructional methods must be devised to comport with this perspective. One of the most important aspects is the recognition that individual students learn through multiple intelligences (Gardner, 1983). As noted in Figure 1, Gardner (1983) asserts that individuals are products of eight interdependent intelligences: (1) linguistic, (2) logical-mathematical, (3) spatial, (4) bodily-kinesthetic, (5) musical, (6) interpersonal, (7) intrapersonal, and (8) naturalistic. These various intelligences act in concert with one another as a thinking system (Checkley, 1997). The interactive multiple intelligences equip an individual with various skills and abilities. In teaching critical thinking, Johnson (2000) contends that reliance on one-dimensional I.Q. norm-referenced approaches are ineffectual (p. 37).

Figure 1
Gardner’s Multiple Intelligence Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intelligence Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic</td>
<td>Ability to engage in verbal communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logical-Mathematical</td>
<td>Ability to engage in mathematical reasoning or perceive number patterns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial</td>
<td>Ability to perceive and transform the visual-spatial images</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodily-Kinesthetic</td>
<td>Ability to engage in and control physical action and movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musical</td>
<td>Ability to recognize and express musical forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal</td>
<td>Ability to perceive and appropriately respond to other people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrapersonal</td>
<td>Ability to perceive and discriminate one’s inner emotions and thoughts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalistic</td>
<td>Ability to recognize and classify features of the natural world</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because of the interdependency of multiple intelligences, effective learner-centered teaching must utilize a plethora of methods designed to involve the individual’s entire “intelligence system.” Perkins (1986) described learner intelligence as consisting of three components: (1) power, (2) knowledge, and (3) tactics. Power stems from an innate cognitive ability (e.g., attention span, perception, etc.). Background knowledge is a fundamental requisite and integral component of effective intelligence. Tactics operationalize the knowledge allowing the learner to utilize various cognitive strategies and thinking skills to employ the intelligence. It is in the area of learned thinking skills that a critical thinking model becomes most effective by systematically training the learner to use acquired thinking tactics. According to Johnson (2000), the ultimate goal in the development of thinking skills is to acquire “automaticity” in information processing (p. 4). Once learners have achieved automaticity, then they can focus on meaning and engage in higher levels of thinking (Grant, 1988; Hammond & Collins, 1991). Police training environments have historically been effective in contributing to the students’ knowledge base through various immersion and rote learning techniques. The shortcoming in this approach is that unlike a critical thinking approach, it alone will not adequately prepare the student for analytical thinking skills.

**Instructional Approaches for Training Critical Thinkers**

Unlike general thinking skill development that is dependent upon power and knowledge (see McPeck, 1990; Perkins, 1986), critical thinking requires the tactical ability to organize, analyze, and evaluate information (Johnson, 2000). Once the critical-thinking learner has acquired an adequate knowledge base to enable automaticity, then he or she must be taught systematic critical-thinking skills. Johnson (2000) posits that problem-based critical thinking can be taught to the learner as a thinking skill if it is compartmentalized and taught explicitly as a cognitive strategy. As indicated in the conceptual models in Figure 2, police problem-based critical thinking can be taught to recruits if a systematic approach is developed for learning critical-thinking skills. Once a systematic scheme of teaching critical skills is developed, police content instruction that is domain and/or task-specific can be implemented. This model approaches critical thinking and problem-based law enforcement training as a holistic approach that targets the cognitive processes of the learner. As such, the methods used in instruction, learning, and evaluation are crucial.

**Figure 2**

**Conceptual Critical Thinking Skill Models**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Processing Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perception → Short-Term Memory → Long-Term Memory → Automaticity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Critical Thinking Model**

Background Knowledge + Automaticity = Critical Thinking

**Critical Thinking Process**

| Information → Organize → Analyze → Evaluate |

Adapted from Johnson, A. (2000).
Teaching Critical Thinking Skills to Police Recruits: A Cooperative Method

Among the three conventional teaching modes of thinking skills—(1) stand-alone, (2) immersion, and (3) embedded—the most preferred method for developing critical thinkers is the embedded approach. This approach promotes cooperative or participatory learning in a content and context-specific domain. Acquisition, internalization, and transfer of thinking skills consist of several elements in the instructional process. As noted in Figure 3, processing and use of thinking skills stem from the systematic instruction in critical thinking. Using an embedded method, acquisition of thinking skills enables the student to process information beyond mere inert knowledge and infuses thinking skills that enable the manipulation of ideas, connection and association with independent information, and deepening of learning.

Figure 3
Elements of Critical Thinking Skill Instruction: Acquisition and Transfer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Methods &amp; Applications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>Direct Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guided Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internalization</td>
<td>Application Practicing to Facilitate Automaticity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer</td>
<td>Usage of Thinking Skill Beyond the Learning Context</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Perkins, H. (1986).

The ultimate goal of teaching critical thinking is to achieve knowledge automaticity, which will lead to the ability to transfer the skills beyond the learning environment for usage in critical analysis in the field (see Bayley & Bittner, 1997). As Fyfe (2001) states “training goes beyond the classroom” (p. 336). According to Johnson (2000), critical thinking skills include 11 functions or abilities (pp. 46-48). These functions, represented in Figure 4, can be combined by the thinker to create a systematic approach to problem-solving and critical thinking. In light of the diversity of potential critical thinking functions, instructors must teach using a systematic approach to critical thinking to maximize the student’s ability to acquire problem-solving skills.

Not only is it necessary to teach a specific critical-thinking process using organization, analysis, and evaluation, but the curriculum and instruction must be structured to facilitate these processes. At the macro level, curricular training philosophies must be attuned to a critical-thinking orientation. This view should be a common theme throughout the curricular design, content, and instruction. At the micro level, it is incumbent on training instructors to teach recruits to be critical thinkers and problem-solvers using a process approach.
The critical thinking method does not rely solely on a conventional lecture format. In order to orient the student toward critical analysis, the instructor must proactively facilitate student interaction and feedback. This andragogical model requires complete participation by teacher and student alike. As such, creative instructional methods that immerse the student in an interactive and cooperative learning process must be employed. Traditional rote learning mechanisms, such as memorization or patterned feedback, fail to invoke the types of student critical-thinking processes sought to be developed. Hence, the instructor must devise an integrated learning/teaching approach that requires the student to utilize a variety of neuro-learning processes. Although traditional instructor lecture can play a role in this participatory approach, this model relies more on analytical synergism whereby the student is utilizing both deductive and inductive thinking. Since the overall goal is to develop critical thinkers, discussion, case study, and problem/solution development correspond with the desired learning goals better than some other conventional techniques.

Martorella (1990) refers to this type of processing as learning relational concepts in which the student synthesizes a complex notion whose “meaning stems from a comparison or a relationship between objects or events” (p. 158). These teaching techniques compel the instructor to involve the student and stimulate complex and critical thinking processes in the learning experience. Unlike nonparticipatory teaching methods, these approaches directly involve the students and provide them interactive feedback. Together, these techniques create a holistic neuro-sensory approach by requiring the student to engage in mental organization, critical thinking, written and oral communication, and problem-solving. In short, these strategies promote active, as opposed to passive, learning in which the instructor and the student must be involved in the learning enterprise.

Patterned after the Royal Canadian Mounted Police model, Weinblatt (1999) indicates that adult learner problem-based training has been adopted at several police training sites. This model uses structured scenarios, case studies, or devised problems in the instructional process to enable students to learn not only practical applications but effective critical-thinking skills (see also Bayley & Bittner, 1997). Traditional
lecture-only teaching, with rote competency evaluation, has limited application in a problem-based approach to developing critical thinkers (Charles, 2000). As Meese (2000) indicated “most important in the [community-oriented policing] approach is the tone inherent in the revised training” (p. 308). Most conventional police subject matter can be presented in such a way to promote critical thinking.

In terms of teaching techniques, instructors should consider the importance of cooperative participatory learning and utilize applications that will foster critical thinking. As indicated in Figure 5, various nonlecture methods can be used to promote critical-thinking instruction. Various interactive teaching applications can be effective in enhancing learning by multiple intelligence adult learners.

**Figure 5**

*Cooperative Instructional Methods*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instructional Methods</th>
<th>Benefit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Class Presentation</strong></td>
<td>Promotes organizational and oral communication skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students either individually or in groups present topical subjects in class.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Class Discussion</strong></td>
<td>Promotes analytical thinking skills and facilitates problem-solving strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students participate in opposing viewpoint debates or problem-solve by building consensus.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socratic Questioning</strong></td>
<td>Promotes critical thinking and enables participants to engage in problem and solution recognition with immediate feedback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor or student lead questions on critical issues posed in class to prompt discussion.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Bloss, 2000a, 2000b

In addition to utilizing various cooperative teaching techniques, critical thinking can be promoted through the method of assignments used. Again, performance measurements are not the most effective way to develop critical thinkers. Contrary to memorization strategies, participatory and interactive assignment methods allow the student to embed, integrate, and transfer information in use of problem-solving skills. As indicated in Figure 6, cooperative assignment strategies can promote and encourage critical thinking and practical application much more effectively than typical noninteractive approaches.

Although not all task-specific police skills effectively lend themselves to nonobjective or nonperformance evaluation, many subjects are able to be evaluated using several subjective evaluation schemes. Again, the objective is to develop, facilitate, and reinforce critical-thinking and problem-solving acuity and ability. As indicated in Figure 7, several quasisubjective evaluation methods can be used in the problem-based learning/teaching approach.
**Figure 6**

**Cooperative Assignment Methods**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignment Methods</th>
<th>Benefit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research Exercises</strong></td>
<td>Develops research skills to investigate available information on any topic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students investigate and research assigned issues using electronic or document sources.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Writing Assignments</strong></td>
<td>Promotes organizational, analytical, synthesis, and writing skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students develop and communicate findings in select topics.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Case or Scenario Studies</strong></td>
<td>Facilitates problem-solving and analytical skill development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students are given written or practical fact situations to critically analyze and formulate solutions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community Projects</strong></td>
<td>Enables students to analyze and develop practical solutions to realistic community problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students interact with select members of the community to identify practical problems facing citizens.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Bloss, 2000a, 2000b

**Figure 7**

**Cooperative Nonobjective Evaluation Methods**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Methods</th>
<th>Benefit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Essay Written Responses</strong></td>
<td>Develops written communication skills and provides a forum for idea transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A variety of essay-style evaluation items can be used</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Written Case or Research Topic Analyses</strong></td>
<td>Enables students to develop research, organizational, analytical, and written reporting skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several types of case analyses, problem statements, or court case briefs can be utilized as quasisubjective evaluations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oral Presentation</strong></td>
<td>Facilitates the development of advanced or oral communication skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An array of class presentation, group discussion, and debate leadership evaluation criteria can be developed to measure oral communication effectiveness.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Development</strong></td>
<td>Develops organizational, consensus building, problem-solving, and task completion skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation criteria can be developed to measure both the efficacy and process of a community problem-solving student project.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Bloss, 2000a, 2000b

These quasisubjective evaluation methods may be more effective and sensitive in measuring student cognitive and critical-thinking processes than conventional objective approaches. Since much traditional law enforcement POST evaluation methods are objective, instructors should rely on a combination of several of these methods. A critical consideration in the use of any of these quasisubjective methods is that value-free quantifiable measures of evaluation be developed whenever possible.
The goal is to measure and evaluate learning processes, as well as student skill mastery. To that end, discriminating evaluation strategies should be developed that transcend rote feedback on objective test items. Not only is moving beyond evaluation methods that tacitly advocate rote functions crucial, but more importantly, these methods should strive to facilitate the critical-thinking process.

An Effort at Synthesis

If police trainers are striving to mold recruits into critical thinkers, fundamental changes must occur in the training ideology. Both curricula and instruction must be modified to foster the creation of problem-solvers and critical thinkers as contemporary community policing demands. In order to effectively accomplish this, several principles must be adopted by training leaders and instructors. First, critical thinking skills are not innate, but rather, are learned. Hence in the context of domain-specific police subjects, critical thinking skills must be taught, reinforced, and used. In order to avoid inert knowledge (i.e., the student is unable to utilize the information), critical thinking must be incorporated into the learning/teaching enterprise as a process. In short, recruits can be taught to be critical thinkers using the proper methods. Since academic college environments utilize more of these critical-thinking methods than conventional police training, they can provide excellent models to emulate. More conceptual learning approaches, crafted in a police problem-solving format, can be effective in grooming critical thinkers. The merits of a melded approach, drawing from competency-based training and academic conceptual methods, have been promoted by many in recent years (Baro & Burlingame, 1999; Bloss, 2000a, 2000b; Buerger, 2004; Charles, 2000; Haley, 1992). These advocates contend that a “best of both worlds” approach can produce recruits adequately equipped as critical thinkers able to implement community and problem-oriented policing.

Understanding the critical-thinking learning process is crucial in modifying training to develop problem-solving abilities. Instructors must recognize the importance of learning, teaching, and evaluation involving multiple intelligence adult learner students. Cooperative, interactive, and participatory learning is the benchmark of critical thinking learning/teaching methods. Utilization of non-rote or non-competency measures is also important to the development and training of critical thinkers; therefore, police instructors seeking to create critical thinkers must modify the way they approach and deliver instruction to recruits. In summary, with policing shifting to problem- and community-oriented approaches, it is incumbent upon police trainers to make a paradigmatic shift in how they instruct recruits.

Conclusion

Challenges abound in the new millennium for American policing. In the midst of a paradigmatic shift in ideology, technology, and practice, police organizations are compelled to respond by selecting, hiring, and training officers to meet these demands (Bloss, 1999). Since the 1970s, police scholars have advocated a problem-oriented approach to policing that relied upon various analytical methods to resolve problems plaguing the community and the police profession. In spite of these exhortations and subsequent use of applied analytical methods, police training
has failed to prepare new officers for the demands of problem-solving. In order to properly prepare police trainees for the practical challenges of community problem-solving, police trainers must specifically create effective critical thinkers through modified curricula and instruction.

What is proposed here is difficult, given the nature and constraints of conventional police recruit training; however, adult learner, critical thinking, and group decision-making training are being utilized in industry, military, and law enforcement settings. Given the greater critical thinking demands placed upon this generation of community police officers, it is only appropriate that the police training community take the necessary measures to ensure their success.

References


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Drug Abuse Resistance Education®: To Continue or Not to Continue?

Larry T. Hoover, PhD, Director, Police Research Center, Sam Houston State University
Robert A. Sarver, III, PhD Candidate, College of Criminal Justice, Sam Houston State University

The Issue

The value of police participation in school-based drug education programs, and more specifically, the Drug Abuse Resistance Education® program sanctioned by D.A.R.E. America, is increasingly being questioned. Research on the long-term effectiveness of D.A.R.E., whether it results in a sustainable decrease in drug use among youth, is discouraging. Agencies debating continuation of participation need to consider the effectiveness evaluations, community and school district commitment, and potential benefits of the student contact engendered by such programs. A School Resource Officer (SRO) program, which may or may not include a drug education component, is a viable alternative.

The Program

Drug Abuse Resistance Education® is an educational program designed to prevent substance abuse and violence by educating children about the threats and consequences associated with such activities. It was designed for fifth graders, but an expanded curriculum is available for several grade levels. Taught overwhelmingly by law enforcement officers, the curriculum focuses on building self-esteem, taking responsibility for one’s behavior, resisting peer pressure, and making responsible decisions. The program claims to provide the additional benefits of offering the students the opportunity to gain a trustworthy adult friend, developing a positive attitude toward law enforcement personnel, and acquiring greater respect for the law.

D.A.R.E. programming originated with the Los Angeles Police Department. Now operated by D.A.R.E. America, Inc., the program is offered by innumerable jurisdictions within the United States and even internationally. The national cost estimates of offering D.A.R.E. range anywhere from $200 million to $700 million annually. In fiscal year 2000, the Department of Justice spent $2 million to support the training of new D.A.R.E. officers (Kanof, 2003). According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the federal government spent over $2.1 billion on illicit drug use prevention activities for youth in fiscal year 2000 (Kanof, 2003). The Department of Education has given states some $439 million in grants under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act, but there are no estimates of how much of that money went to fund D.A.R.E. programs.

of fear, increased order, citizen satisfaction with police services, as well as crime control.” Carter argues that the effects of D.A.R.E. contribute to all these outcomes. Research to date, however, fails to support the long-term effectiveness of the core program goal—reduced drug use among youth.

Research to Date – Discouraging Results

Doubt about the effectiveness of D.A.R.E. dates back nearly a decade. A 3-year meta-analysis (review of other studies) conducted by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in 1995 found that D.A.R.E. raises children’s self-esteem, polishes their social skills, and improves their attitudes towards police; however, the study also showed that D.A.R.E. does not have a measurable effect on drug abuse. Of course, as a meta-study, the NIJ study did not use original research. Only previously published studies were examined; however, the research reviewed had all reached the same conclusion: D.A.R.E. has no long-term effects on drug use (Elliot, 1995).

The General Accounting Office (GAO), the investigative arm of Congress, reviewed the effectiveness of D.A.R.E. as offered to elementary school children. The GAO released a report stating that six long-term evaluations done during the 1990s found “no significant differences in illicit drug use between students who received D.A.R.E. in the fifth or sixth grade (the intervention group) and the students who did not (the control group)” (Kanof, 2003).

Marjorie E. Kanof, U.S. GAO (2003), recently wrote, “The adverse effects of illicit drug use play a role in school failure, violence, and antisocial and self-destructive behavior.” Whether D.A.R.E. addresses the issue is, however, doubtful. Kanof’s office reviewed six long-term evaluations of D.A.R.E. The six evaluations are based on three separate studies in three states. The evaluations of the D.A.R.E. elementary school curriculum found no significant differences in illicit drug use between students who received D.A.R.E. in the fifth or sixth grade (the intervention group) and students who did not (the control group). Three of the evaluations reported that the control groups of students were provided other drug use prevention education. All of the evaluations suggested that D.A.R.E. had no statistically significant long-term effect on preventing youth illicit drug use. Of the six evaluations reviewed, five also reported on students’ attitudes toward illicit drug use and resistance to peer pressure and found no significant differences between the intervention and control groups over the long term. Two of these evaluations found that D.A.R.E. students showed stronger negative attitudes about illicit drug use and improved social skills about illicit drug use about one year after receiving the program. These positive effects, however, diminished over time; researchers refer to such a result as “decay.” Decay is the central issue with regard to D.A.R.E.

A Sample of Individual Studies

Meta-analyses are premised upon the validity of the individual studies reviewed. It is important to note the methodologies employed to assess D.A.R.E.’s effectiveness. We have included below a sample of the studies that have been conducted.

Typical of the research efforts was a study by Richard R. Clayton, Anne M. Cattarello, and Bryan M. Johnstone. They conducted a 5-year, longitudinal study that evaluates the effectiveness of the D.A.R.E. model emphasizing exposure during the last year
of elementary education. Twenty-three elementary schools in Lexington, Kentucky, were randomly assigned to receive D.A.R.E., and eight were designated comparison schools. Students (N=2,071) in the D.A.R.E. schools received 16 weeks of protocol-driven instruction, while students in the comparison schools received drug education as part of the health curriculum. All students were pretested during the 6th grade prior to delivery of the programs, post-tested shortly after completion, and resurveyed each subsequent year through the 10th grade. Three-stage mixed effects regression models were used to analyze these data. No significant differences were observed between intervention and comparison schools with respect to cigarette, alcohol, or marijuana use at 1- and 5-year post-program intervals. Significant intervention effects in the hypothesized direction were observed during the 7th grade for measures of students’ general and specific attitudes toward drugs, capability to resist peer pressure, and estimated level of drug use by peers. Over the full measurement interval, however, average trajectories of change for these outcomes were similar in the intervention and comparison conditions. Results are largely consonant with prior short-term evaluations of D.A.R.E., which have reported limited effects of the program and a general tendency for curriculum effects to decay over time (Clayton, Cattarello, & Johnstone, 1996).

Dukes, Ullman, and Stein (1996) assessed the long-term effectiveness of D.A.R.E. by contrasting 9th grade students who participated in the program in the 6th grade with others who had not been in the program. A follow-up survey assessed central D.A.R.E. concepts such as self-esteem, resistance to peer pressure, delay of experimentation with drugs, and drug use. Employing latent variables to represent the concepts, no significant differences were found between the D.A.R.E. participants and the control group.

Faine and Bohlander, Jr. (1989) summarized the results of an evaluation of the 1988-1989 D.A.R.E. effort across Kentucky. Assessment of the short- and long-term effects on students was investigated in three separate studies that drew primarily on questionnaire data. The first followed the attitude change of 437 students over a 2-year span starting in the 1987-1988 D.A.R.E. effort. A second analysis compared these same students to 437 matched students in other counties who had not participated in D.A.R.E., though they had received some drug education. The third study considered the short-term impact of the program among inner-city students (187 experimental subjects, 207 controls) in Nashville. In the first study, peer resistance—as well as attitudes toward drugs and the police—improved significantly from before to immediately after the program. One year after D.A.R.E., however, attitudes deteriorated among students in all types of schools. In the second study, comparison of D.A.R.E. students with non-D.A.R.E. students one year after the program showed few significant long-term differences. Finally, comparison of the short-term effects of D.A.R.E. among inner-city students showed no positive gains following program participation (Faine & Bohlander Jr., 1989).

Research since the NIJ and GAO reports regarding the effectiveness of D.A.R.E. has not been any more encouraging about its effect on drug use. Lynam, Milich, and Zimmerman (1999) examined the impact of Project D.A.R.E. 10 years after program participation in a Midwestern U.S. metropolitan area. Self-report questionnaires were completed at age 20 by 1,002 individuals who in 6th grade had participated in either D.A.R.E. or a standard drug-education curriculum. Few differences emerged between the two groups in drug use, drug attitudes, or self-esteem. In no case did
the D.A.R.E. group have a more successful outcome than the comparison group (Lynam, Milich, & Zimmerman, 1999).

A report by the Oklahoma Criminal Justice Resource Center (1998) evaluated D.A.R.E. in Oklahoma’s participating middle schools in 1996. Surveys of 799 D.A.R.E. students, 104 non-D.A.R.E. students, and 224 parents provided the data. D.A.R.E. training improved student interaction with law enforcement and did not adversely affect later drug resistance, but similarities in later drug use between participating D.A.R.E. students and non-participating students indicates that the program may not be as effective as hoped, possibly because of inadequate community follow-up support. The report suggested greater parental involvement.

Rosenbaum Delivers a Coup de grace

Finally, a significant randomized longitudinal field experiment was conducted by Rosenbaum and Hanson (1998) in order to estimate the short- and long-term effects of the D.A.R.E. program on students’ attitudes, beliefs, social skills, and drug use behaviors. Students from urban, suburban, and rural schools (N=1,798) were followed for more than six years, with surveys administered each year from 6th through 12th grades. Teachers were also surveyed annually to measure students’ cumulative exposure to supplemental (post-D.A.R.E.) drug education. Multilevel analyses (random effects ordinal regression) were conducted on seven waves of post-treatment data. The results indicate that D.A.R.E. had no long-term effects on a wide range of drug use measures, nor did it show a lasting impact on hypothesized mediating variables, with one exception. Previously documented short-term effects had dissipated by the conclusion of the study. Some D.A.R.E.-by-community interactions were observed: Urban and rural students showed some benefits; whereas, suburban students experienced small but significant increases in drug use after participation in D.A.R.E. (Rosenbaum & Hanson, 1998). The fact that suburban students actually increased drug experimentation confirmed the fears of critics that D.A.R.E. exposure generates curiosity where none might exist before. The Rosenbaum study is widely regarded as the coup de grace. Its site base was large; follow-up was extensive; and it reached 7 years into future behaviors. It confirmed cumulative evidence from individual site study efforts—there is no discernible effect of D.A.R.E. upon subsequent drug use.

Criticisms of the D.A.R.E. Curriculum

Research suggests that D.A.R.E. may need to be modified to fit the needs of particular groups of students. Kochis (1995) reviewed a study evaluating a suburban New Jersey township’s experience with D.A.R.E. in the 1988-1989 academic year. In cooperation with the state police, the township pilot tested the project in the health curriculum in one of its four elementary schools. The experimental and control groups each contained 50 9th grade students. Data sources included official police reports and school behavioral records. Only 12 criminal offenses were officially recorded, and there were no status offenses in either group. Eleven of the 12 offenses were committed by 5 males in the experimental group. Most of the offenses were property crimes. Thirteen experimental subjects and 15 controls experienced some form of school discipline. The researchers noted that a single program directed at all youths, rather than carefully individualized programs for appropriate participants, is marked for failure (Kochis, 1995).
LaFree, Birkbeck, and Campbell Wilson (1995) measured attitudes of adolescents in Albuquerque public schools in 1995 toward the Police Department’s D.A.R.E. program. The conclusion reinforces Kochis’ belief that there is a need for individualized focus. The sample of 1,052 6th graders, 497 9th graders, and 567 12th graders was questioned about school experiences, use of free time, patterns of alcohol and drug use, attitudes towards drug use, and attitudes toward the police. Among 6th and 9th grade students, evaluations of D.A.R.E. were highly related to attitudes towards the police. Among 12th graders, evaluations were most closely associated with patterns of drug use. Students with negative opinions about the police were also more likely to demonstrate problematic behaviors and/or attitudes. Programs offered in the 5th or 6th grade should, therefore, work on building a more positive attitude among students; however, the researchers noted that with older students, the police should focus more on those already using illegal substances (LaFree, Birkbeck, & Campbell Wilson, 1995).

In a meta-analysis of evaluations, D.A.R.E. was criticized for being insufficiently interactive. Results showed interactive projects to have a considerably larger impact on drug use than either non-interactive projects or D.A.R.E. (Ennett, Tobler, Ringwalt, & Flewelling, 1994). This is consistent with Falco’s analysis of the features of successful drug education, which includes the use of dynamic and interactive teaching strategies. Ennett et al. used meta-analytic techniques to review eight methodologically rigorous D.A.R.E. evaluations. Weighted effect size means for several short-term outcomes also were compared with means reported for other drug use prevention programs. The D.A.R.E. effect size for drug use behavior ranged from .00 to .11 across the eight studies; the weighted mean for drug use across studies was .06. For all outcomes considered, the D.A.R.E. effect size means were substantially smaller than those of programs emphasizing social and general competencies and using interactive teaching strategies. Ennett et al. concluded D.A.R.E.’s short-term effectiveness for reducing or preventing drug use behavior is small and is less than that produced by interactive prevention programs.

**Some Redeeming Value**

Although the research regarding D.A.R.E.’s long-term effect on drug use is universally negative, the news has not been all bad. Donnermeyer and Davis (1998) examined participation in school-based prevention education activities from a statewide sample of 11th grade students in Ohio. Forty two percent of subjects indicated that they had never been involved in a prevention education activity. Differences existed in mean number of activities by both gender and white/non-white status. Popular prevention education activities included participation in D.A.R.E. at elementary, junior high, and senior high levels; “Just Say No Clubs”; Quest; and Red Ribbon Week. Only a small proportion of youth participated exclusively in any one of these activities. An association existed between student participation in prevention education and level of drug involvement. Students in each activity had lower mean scores for drug involvement when compared to students who had never participated in a prevention education activity. Also, the lowest mean scores occurred among students who had participated in multiple prevention activities (Donnermeyer & Davis, 1998).

In 1993, Michele Alicia Harmon conducted a study that evaluated the D.A.R.E. program in Charleston, South Carolina, during the 1989-1990 school year.
A nonequivalent control group quasi-experimental design examined whether D.A.R.E. had an impact on outcome variables. Pre- and post-test surveys were administered about 20 weeks apart to 341 5th graders in the D.A.R.E. program and 367 comparison 5th graders. The program improved participants’ scores on attitudes toward substance use, assertiveness, positive peer association, association with drug using peers, and alcohol use during the past year. According to Harmon, future evaluations should emphasize randomized experiments and longitudinal designs.

Prior to the research cited above as the coup de grace, Rosenbaum, Flewelling, Ringwalt, and Wilkinson (1994) conducted a longitudinal study of D.A.R.E., which focused on police officers in the classroom. A longitudinal randomized experiment was conducted with 1,584 students to estimate the effects of D.A.R.E. on their attitudes, beliefs, and drug use behaviors in the year following exposure to the program. D.A.R.E. had no statistically significant main effects on drug use behaviors and had few effects on attitudes or beliefs about drugs. Significant interactions between D.A.R.E. and other factors (e.g., metropolitan status), however, suggest that some program effects varied across subgroups of the target population. This research provides a test of the comprehensive model of school-based prevention and helps to identify possible differential effects of this drug education initiative (Rosenbaum et al., 1994).

Reaction to the Research – A New Curriculum

D.A.R.E. America® claims to have made significant changes to the curriculum as a direct result of these and other criticisms aimed at the program. The new program is designed to dispel the myths that young people hold about drugs, explain how drugs affect thinking and behavior, and promote interaction with law enforcement. The revisions have been tested in pilot cities as part of a 5-year study D.A.R.E. is conducting to see whether the program is achieving better long-term outcomes. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation is funding the $13.7 million research effort, the “Adolescent Substance Abuse Prevention Study.” Zili Sloboda, adjunct professor at the University of Akron, is the principal investigator. The first set of findings from the study showed drug refusal and decision-making skills among students in the new program to be greater than for students in the control groups. Researchers will follow the students through the 11th grade, surveying them once a year.

Implications for Police Departments Continuing to Utilize D.A.R.E.

We cannot be encouraging about the viability of D.A.R.E. Research is overwhelmingly negative. Whether a police department continues the program is dependent upon several policy and perspective issues:

• First, D.A.R.E. should be assessed in terms of its new curriculum. The perceptions of teachers and D.A.R.E. officers regarding the “old” versus “new” is relevant. There should be an assessment to draw a value judgment on the likelihood that the revised program is sufficiently different to merit continued commitment.
• It is clear that D.A.R.E. is perceived as having effects that exceed drug use abatement. Without any doubt, it is an important medium to establish rapport between law enforcement and youth. One perspective of D.A.R.E. is that it is simply a “good excuse” for police to be in schools in a way that systematically
brings them into contact with virtually every child. That observation is not meant to have a cynical tone.

- Beyond establishing contact and rapport with youth, the presence of law enforcement officers may lead to discovery of crimes against children. Once rapport is established, children open up to officers; however, individual departments should document particular incidents in an attempt to validate the assertion.

- Regardless of the decision on continuation of D.A.R.E., many would encourage continued deployment of police officers to schools. While many agencies are dropping D.A.R.E., SRO programs are increasing. Should an agency decide to eliminate D.A.R.E., the officers currently assigned could assume the roles of SROs. (For a further discussion of the role of SROs, see Allen & Tronvig-Carper, 2004).

A decision by any agency to discontinue D.A.R.E. should be made only after careful consideration of all of these “productivity” issues. Other considerations include whether D.A.R.E. officers are badly needed in other police roles, how supportive the local school district is, and whether the community wants D.A.R.E.—regardless of discouraging national assessments. Very importantly, agencies should consider whether officers should be maintained in the schools as SROs. A compromise might be appropriate—with a conversion to an SRO model but retention of some drug education programming.

Bibliography


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Assessing the Need for Training

Rodney J. Merkley, Training Manager, Illinois Police Corps, Western Illinois University

Introduction

Many articles have clearly defined the procedural methods involved in assessing, developing, implementing, and even evaluating the many aspects of training courses. These articles have provided checklists (Cope, 2003); issues law enforcement leaders should consider pertaining to training (Nowicki, 2003); information on assessing training needs (Hobson & Mosser, 2002); and specific recommendations for a particular type of training course, such as firearms (Arnspiger & Bowers, 1996). However, what these articles have not discussed the actual of the need for training to resolve a performance deficiency or solve an identified problem? This article will highlight the considerations that trainers and administrators should consider before deciding on a training solution to a performance problem.

In a time of budget shortfalls, personnel shortages, and other conflicting priorities, law enforcement agencies should maximize the allotted training time for their officers. Officers attending training courses are not on patrol or working in other investigative capacities; therefore, another officer is required to fill the gap, or calls for service may suffer. If the officer is replaced by another officer on overtime, the agency is essentially paying two and a half times for one officer to attend a training course (the officer in the training course and the officer on overtime making time and a half).

Outside training consultants or agency administrators may quickly point to a training solution, but in many cases, additional training may not solve a performance problem. Training consultants adhering to these directives will spend more time and effort in developing and presenting courses, which equates to additional costs for the agency. The best course of action for a training consultant may be to assess the agency’s needs, resources, and current knowledge/skill base of the officer population and then provide an effective solution, which may or may not involve training (Willmore, 2003).

Steps in Assessing Training Solutions

There are a number of different strategies available for law enforcement trainers to determine whether training will rectify a performance deficiency or other problem. Mager and Pipe (1997) provide a logical and systematic method, which should be carefully examined and evaluated before settling on a training solution. The systematic procedures outlined by Mager and Pipe in their book Analyzing Performance Problems have been modified in the current document to pertain to several law enforcement examples. The purchase of this publication is highly recommended for a more in-depth review of their specific methodology.

For this article, four separate performance problems have been illustrated and applied to each of the steps suggested: (1) vehicle collisions/driver performance, (2) report writing, (3) unethical practices by officers, and (4) failing to arrest impaired
drivers. It is important to note that these problems are only hypothetical examples, and the following steps can be applied to a number of performance problems. Each performance problem will be applied against the following steps:

- Step One: Describe the Performance Problem.
- Step Two: Does the Problem Justify Intervention?
- Step Three: Are the Performance Expectations Defined?
- Step Four: Are Work Aids Being Utilized?
- Step Five: Are the Available Resources Sufficient?
- Step Six: Are the Officers Receiving/Giving Feedback?
- Step Seven: Training Solutions

**Step One: Describe the Performance Problem.**

**Vehicle Collisions**

Consider an agency with a high number of patrol vehicle collisions. Examine the collisions, and look for trends. If a vast majority of the collisions are caused in confined areas, such as alleyways, or while backing, this must be clearly defined. If training is the solution, the training should be tailored to specifically meet the described problem.

**Report Writing**

The amount of detail in a report could resemble a short novel containing a significant amount of irrelevant information. Particular or newly elected prosecutors may desire specific language or factors written into reports. In either event, the specific problem(s), if possible, should be clearly described.

**Unethical Practices by Officers**

The types of ethical dilemmas faced by officers are endless. An officer, group of officers, or department may be alleged to have engaged in unethical behavior, but without specific violations, the statement may carry little weight. Are officers receiving discounted meals, allowing fellow officers to commit traffic violations, or omitting certain facts from a report? Now the problem has been clearly identified.

**Failing to Arrest Impaired Drivers**

Another agency has stressed the necessity of aggressively removing intoxicated drivers from the roadways, but the number of intoxicated driver arrests has not increased. The problem is that officers have not increased the number of impaired drivers that are being arrested.

**Step Two: Does the Problem Justify Intervention?**

The first consideration in assessing any problem is to determine whether the problem is worth the time or effort of pursuing. If the problem is not worth pursuing (e.g., officers using blue ink versus black ink when no obvious results arise with the use of either one), training will only waste valuable and scarce resources.
Vehicle Collisions

Obviously, injuries sustained in vehicle collisions to the officer or community members, reduction in personnel, cost of replacement equipment, and subsequent lawsuits warrant an intervention. This particular problem should be moved to the next step.

Report Writing

This problem is worth pursuing due to subsequent problems in court, the image of the agency, and a variety of other factors. This performance problem warrants further investigation and should be revised in the next step.

Unethical Practices by Officers

The community perception of an unethical officer or department can be detrimental to the agency’s existence. If the practices are sustained, the problem should be aggressively pursued. This problem should be carried to the next step.

Failing to Arrest Impaired Drivers

Individuals injured and killed by impaired drivers is a serious matter. Additionally, if the agency has determined this to be a mission priority, the problem is worth pursuing and should be considered in Step Three. However, are there a significant number of impaired drivers available for arrest? If the number of impaired drivers is low or nonexistent, the mere officer presence and mission priority of the department may be an effective deterrent to the problem and not worth pursuing.

Step Three: Are the Performance Expectations Defined?

If officers have not been provided with expectations of their performance in performance appraisals, written memos, or other policy and procedures, the problem may be solved by providing such expectations.

Vehicle Collisions

There is little doubt that any agency will specifically prohibit an officer from electing to become involved in a collision. This issue should be examined in the next step.

Report Writing

Most officers have probably been taught at one time or another that reports should be grammatically correct without spelling errors. In addition, reports should contain all of the information relevant to the incident. Changes due to case law and/or new prosecutorial requirements must be made available through a memo or disbursed during roll call. If the problem continues, move to the next step. If the problem ceases, the performance problem has been solved and warrants no further attention.
Unethical Practices by Officers

Officers should be aware of their ethical responsibilities in regard to accepting gratuities, allowing fellow officers to violate the law, and writing complete and accurate reports. If officers have been allowed to receive discounted meals at certain restaurants, and the practice, while prohibited in writing, has previously been allowed or tolerated by the agency, the new expectations must be clearly explained.

Failing to Arrest Impaired Drivers

If the agency has already stressed the importance of removing impaired drivers from the road, the expectations upon the officer may have already been made clear; however, the manner in which an officer removes an impaired driver may not result in an arrest (e.g., drive the offender home, have a family member come to the scene and drive the individual home). If arrests are desired, this information must be disseminated to the officers.

Step Four: Are Work Aids Being Utilized?

The simplest form of a work aid is a checklist, template, or other measure to assist the officer in accomplishing his or her job tasks.

Vehicle Collisions

Officers typically check their patrol vehicle before and after their shift. Such a checklist could include checking various mechanical components (e.g., tire pressure, oil level, gauges, or other items). This would remind officers to check these items each time and provide a systematic method to prevent unnecessary collisions due to mechanical causes.

Report Writing

If a report must be written in accordance with several different elements, factors, or other characteristics, a checklist may provide the officer with a guide to ensure that his or her reports are completed as required under case law and/or prosecutor requirements. Different checklists could be designed for different types of offenses. The amount of information, supplemental documents, and language could determine the checklist content.

Unethical Practices by Officers

Cox, Campbell, and Mc Camey (2002) illustrate an ethical checklist issued by the Springfield (Illinois) Police Department to officers to use before acting:

- Is it ethical?
- Is it legal?
- Is it the right thing for the community?
- Is it the right thing for your agency?
- Is it within agency policy and procedure?
- Is it something you can take responsibility for and be proud of?
If you answered “Yes” to all of the questions, don’t ask permission, just do it! (p. 5)

When appropriate, officers can examine this list and take action accordingly.

**Failing to Arrest Impaired Drivers**

Officers may feel uncomfortable in completing the mountainous pile of documents required in a DUI arrest and, therefore, not make the arrest. A checklist would not only provide the officer with a listing of what documents are required but could also list how each of these documents must be completed to ensure a complete and accurate case.

**Step Five: Are the Available Resources Sufficient?**

Training may prove to be useless if the officer does not have the available resources to perform his or her duties. This may be a difficult challenge to overcome, as resources typically involve additional monetary costs.

**Vehicle Collisions**

An investigation into increased vehicle collisions may provide information suggesting that the patrol vehicle fleet is receiving infrequent preventative maintenance. This could result in mechanical failure and a subsequent collision. If the resources for this problem are adequate, proceed to the next step. This particular performance problem may not be applicable to this step.

**Report Writing**

If officers are completing their reports by hand, they may have adequate resources; however, the officers may desire word processing programs to complete reports. If the result of poor reports originates in the lack of word processors, providing personal computers may solve this problem. If the desire for computers is nonexistent, the typewriters are in working order, or officers prefer to handwrite reports, move to the next step.

**Unethical Practices by Officers**

Regardless of the lack of resources, unethical conduct should not be engaged in by the officer or permitted by the department. This particular component is not applicable to this section.

**Failing to Arrest Impaired Drivers**

Arresting impaired drivers requires a significant amount of resources: vehicles, personnel, time, and/or video equipment. An agency with a limited number of personnel may find an officer who arrests an impaired driver to be out-of-service for several hours, which shifts the burden of responding to calls for service to other officers. If the prosecutor requires an on-scene video of breath test refusals and the agency doesn’t use video cameras during impaired driving arrests, the lack of such equipment may be partially responsible for the low number of arrests.
Step Six: Are the Officers Receiving/Giving Feedback?

Officers need to receive feedback on their performance. Without critical and frequent feedback, officers may continue to perform unsatisfactorily or increase the number of inappropriate decisions. In addition, officers should provide feedback to agency administrators regarding problems they have encountered.

Vehicle Collisions

Feedback received from “officer at fault” vehicle collisions is typically in the form of disciplinary action. In this particular case, feedback is usually provided to the officer in question in written form and is abundantly clear. Officers should also be aware of the mechanical condition of their vehicle and should keep their administration informed. Consider the next step.

Report Writing

Has any entity informed officers of the specific deficiencies in their reports? Providing feedback of the exact grammatical and content requirements may resolve these problems without the use of training. If feedback has been provided and the problem persists, continue to the next step.

Unethical Practices by Officers

If the practice of allowing fellow officers to commit traffic violations has been widely accepted in the past and has now changed, this feedback must be conveyed to the officer. By the same token, the officer needs to inquire as to the specific language or content in each report. If the officer makes the assumption that omitting certain facts from a report is an acceptable practice without checking with senior officers, supervisors, or prosecutors, he or she may jeopardize the outcome of their cases.

Failing to Arrest Impaired Drivers

If the agency has already communicated the importance of removing impaired drivers from the road to officers, the expectations upon the officer may have already been made. The manner in which an officer removes an impaired driver, however, may not result in an arrest. If arrests are desired, this feedback must be passed along to the officers. This may resolve this particular problem; however, if officers are not observing a significant number of impaired drivers or are unable to recognize an impaired driver though an investigation, this information should be provided to the agency’s administration.

Step Seven: Training Solutions

Before settling on a training solution, it is important to determine whether or not the officer has previously received training on this subject, whether the skills are frequently used, and whether the officer previously performed the task to acceptable standards. Each of these questions may or may not result in a decision to provide training. When considering several officers, the trainer or agency must determine the best manner to rectify the performance problem across the board.
**Vehicle Collisions**

Since most officers have received some degree of driving training during their career and must possess a valid driver’s license, it is safe to assume that they have been exposed to the training in the past. The skills used while driving in reverse and in confined areas (e.g., alleyways), however, may require a significant amount of training relating to these specific areas. A refresher course focusing on these specific areas may be in order.

**Report Writing**

If feedback has been provided and punishments/rewards equitably applied and problems still persist, training may be a solution. If the problems have recently surfaced and the officer has written acceptable reports in the past, refresher training may be a solution. Training is an obvious recommendation if a new report format is being implemented or reports are being converted from print to a computerized format. Additionally, new court opinions may necessitate the need for general training to ensure compliance.

**Unethical Practices by Officers**

New developments or legislative changes to law enforcement practices, such as racial profiling or cultural sensitivity, may necessitate training. If training is a solution, consider incorporating practical examples and scenarios to ensure a number of different situations have been presented to the officer and the officer has a clear understanding of the correct responses.

**Failing to Arrest Impaired Drivers**

Are officers capable of recognizing impaired drivers? If they have not had training in the subject and are experiencing difficulty distinguishing between impaired and non-impaired drivers, training is in order. If officers have been trained in the past but have not used the skills on a frequent basis, refresher training may be a viable solution.

**Conclusion**

The examples mentioned in this article provide a limited application of several performance problems to a nontraining solution matrix. This is not a static procedural system but rather a tool to determine when training should be considered as a feasible solution to an identified performance problem.

There are several instances when training is mandated by the state board governing law enforcement training, state legislative bodies, or other entities. This process was not intended to overrule the decision to train in these instances. Similarly, there are training courses intended for the primary purpose of reducing potential liability. These courses should be mandated and presented as deemed appropriate by the individual agency.
It is important for trainers to realize the limitations on most training budgets and to consider nontraining solutions to performance problems. This will allow limited training budgets to select training courses that address the areas of greatest need.

References


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Small Town Policing in the New Millennium: Strategies, Options, and Alternate Methods, Robin Johnson, author and researcher; published in cooperation with the Illinois Institute for Rural Affairs, March 2000.

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Sexual Assault Investigation Series (three tapes) in cooperation with the Illinois Coalition Against Domestic Violence through a grant from the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, 1996.

1. Preliminary and In-Depth Interview of the Victim of Adult Sexual Assault

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