Community Policing
July 2004
The *Law Enforcement Executive Forum* is published six times per year by the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board’s Executive Institute. The journal is sponsored by Western Illinois University in Macomb, Illinois.

Subscription: $40 (see last page)

---

No part of this publication may be reproduced without written permission of the publisher.

**Disclaimer**

Reasonable effort has been made to make the articles herein accurate and consistent. Please address questions about individual articles to their respective author(s).
Table of Contents

Editorial .......................................................................................................................... 1
   Vladimir A. Sergevnin

Community Policing Partnerships
Building Foundations/Breaking Barriers: Improving Police-Community Partnerships ........................................................................... 1
   Natalie R. Pearl
   Robin A. Campbell

Community Building Measures: How Police and Neighborhood Groups Can Measure Their Collaboration ............................................ 19
   Brian C. Renauer
   David E. Duffee
   Jason D. Scott
   Steven Chermak
   Edmund F. McGarrell

Rethinking Gender and Community Policing: Cultural Obstacles and Policy Issues ................................................................. 39
   Susan L. Miller
   Jessica P Hodge

Cops in Action: The Chatham County Police Department’s Community Policing Program at Gateway Savannah .......................... 51
   Michael E. Donahue
   Don A. Josi

Horror Stories: Dysfunctional Practices in Community Policing ............ 71
   DeVere D. Woods, Jr.
   Marty Woods

Overcoming Resistance to Community Policing: The Potential Role of Recruitment and Selection .................................................... 91
   Larry M. Coutts
   Frank W. Schneider

Policing the Suburbs ................................................................................................. 103
   David B. Griswold
   Adam Dobrin

Civilian Review: Some Observations ................................................................. 111
   Charles E. Reasons

Community Policing Clearly Defined: The Seven Core Elements ........ 117
   Bruce L. Benson
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policing Abroad</td>
<td>Russian-American Law Enforcement Exchanges: What One Program Has Accomplished</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ronald R. Pope</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>A Comparative Study of Police Spouses’ Perceptions of Stress</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John W. Bolinger, William P. McCamey, Vladimir A. Sergevnin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Management Issues</td>
<td></td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Andrew Tolle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andragogy: What Police Trainers Should Know About</td>
<td>Adult Learners</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Michael L. Birzer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>Local Law Enforcement and Transnational Crime Preparedness</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gene L. Scaramella, Raymond Rodriguez</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Triad of Collaboration: Internet-Related Investigative Considerations Prior to the Computer Forensic Application</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Robert DeYoung</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Materials/publications are available through the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board Executive Institute.
Editorial

During the 1980s, policing in the United States went through a paradigmatic shift from “law enforcement” to community or problem-oriented policing. Law enforcement agencies have changed the priorities from “chasing the bad guys” to providing a safe, secure community. This shift was based on the assumption that the police alone cannot reverse the escalating cycle of violent street and drug-related crimes using traditional crime fighting approaches. The result was a complicated process of humanizing the police and “policising” the communities.

Community policing became a national phenomenon and gained support from the federal government with the creation of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and its substantial funding to assist local and state law enforcement agencies. Community policing has multiple interpretations among researchers and practitioners; however, it is universally viewed as the ability of law enforcement agencies to build partnerships with the public that will benefit law and order in general.

Interestingly, community policing is not something unique to our nation. In one form or another, community policing (e.g., neighborhood watch, educating the public on police matters, joint patrolling) are utilized by various political regimes from totalitarian to democratic.

Community policing has made great strides, but law enforcement agencies continue to experiment with new community strategies (e.g., integrating team policing, partnerships with citizens, foot patrol, etc.).

This issue of the Law Enforcement Executive Forum provides insights on the significant transition from the traditional police-community relations model to the community-based comprehensive approach. Several articles explain why and how the police must become more proactive in dealing with increasingly complicated social problems. This issue presents current research on a wide range of topics that impinge on the police-community relationship—police recruitment and selection, core elements of interaction, cultural obstacles, and, of course, police-community partnership and collaboration. Many of the articles in this issue reflect these important changes in policing and help to define and communicate them.

Vladimir A. Sergevnin, PhD
Editor
Law Enforcement Executive Forum
Building Foundations/Breaking Barriers: Improving Police-Community Partnerships

Natalie R. Pearl, PhD, Associate Professor of Criminal Justice, School of Public Administration and Urban Studies, San Diego State University
Robin A. Campbell, PhD, Policing and Change Consultant, United Kingdom

Introduction

There is a worldwide movement, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom, to engage in the practice of community policing (Bryne, 1989). Community policing offers a best practice approach to the delivery of citizen safety and can be thought of as the next step in the evolution of police practice (Center, 1996). The movement towards community policing, however, has been primarily incremental, and the administrative changes sought, by definition, have been fairly mundane. It is clear that despite best efforts, there remain significant tensions and differentials that impact the effective implementation of community policing. In order to successfully mitigate these barriers, it is necessary to examine systemic and structural elements of administration with police organizations and community agencies to allow them to envision true partnerships.

The increasingly common practice of community policing in the 21st century suggests movement toward a model of police-citizen coproduction of community safety. This coproduction precipitates the need to address inherent conflicts that exist between the theory and practice of community policing and between community policing and traditional models of policing that currently act to inhibit a true coproduction of citizen safety. The conflicts can be thought of as tensions between the needs of the community in its attempt to become a more active agent of the coproduction of its own safety and the needs of most police agencies to maintain their professionalism underpinned by current bureaucratic and power structures. These tensions can be thought of as the organizational foundations of this essay and, as such, provide a framework to explain, analyze, and suggest potential resolutions of the inherent differentials between the police and the community that currently inhibit the implementation of true partnership-based community policing.

Defining Community Policing

Community policing is designed to complete the circular evolution of policing strategies. The first component of the evolution is based on Sir Robert Peel’s seventh principle of policing, which emphasized the integration between community members and the police in that they are all equally responsible to protect the safety of the community. The only distinction made by Peel between ordinary citizens and police officers is that the police are paid to devote their full-time attention to duties that are the responsibility of everybody (Crutchley, 1979). Following Peel’s era of modern policing, came the rise of police professionalism characterized by officers patrolling large geographical areas in cars and attempting to respond rapidly to calls for service (Kelling & Moore, 1991). This reactive mode of policing meant that
officers spent more of their time with citizens who committed crimes, rather than with citizens who were interested in the reduction of crime.

Community policing, the latest advancement in the evolution of policing, necessitates that crime be understood within a community context. Within this community context, the organization of communities and neighborhoods, the nature of the environment, and the types of social interaction occurring in a community are examined in order to increase the understanding of crime. Community disorganization, a lack of effective informal social control in neighborhoods, environmental deterioration, and a tolerance for behavior that engenders fear among community residents are all seen as variables associated with crime in a community (Skogan, 1989). When the causes of crime are placed in a community context, it follows logically that the solution will also emerge from within a community context. The community-oriented policing paradigm broadens the traditional police mandate to include order maintenance, conflict resolution, problem solving, and the provision of a variety of other services to the community (Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994).

For the purpose of this analysis, community policing is defined as a philosophy that has at its core the innovative element of creating partnerships with agencies and community groups towards developing synergies that will improve the development of the coproduction of citizen safety. This has not necessarily been part of traditional, professional policing models. This perspective of community policing is focused on citizen-based action to inhibit and remedy the causes and consequences of criminal, disorderly, and other antisocial behavior (Sampson & Scott, 2000). Actions taken under the community-policing rubric are directed toward securing reductions in crime and the fear of crime in local communities (Board, 1996). Community policing is the police’s contribution to the wider social need for citizen safety, and it must be seen in the context of contributions from other agencies and individuals within the community.

Improving social justice must be considered the ultimate aim of the creation of police-community partnerships. When added to the important notion of crime control, social justice provides a more compelling rationale than that of crime reduction alone. Social justice expands the practice of policing and indeed the focus of the entire criminal justice system beyond the traditional attention paid to offenders and victims and extends it to incorporate the entire polity. “Social justice stresses the importance of public policies on education, heath care, social capital and corporate regulation” (Barak, Flavin, & Leighton, 2001, p. 247). For example, crime reduction can be and has been thought of as a stand-alone law enforcement goal for many years. In its latest iteration, crime control provides the basis for policies such as zero-tolerance and racial profiling. While these policies may, in the short term, reduce crime, they do nothing to accommodate the needs of the community and therefore may lead to greater tension between the police and the communities they serve. Ignoring the goal of improving social justice may seriously limit the efforts and resources committed to community policing services, particularly, the creation of community partnerships.

Police agencies in the United States and the United Kingdom are currently undergoing the transition from professional policing to community policing. During the transition period, as underlying values are brought to light and re-examined, tensions between the current paradigm and the emerging new philosophy
are expected to be at their highest. As the community-policing philosophy is implemented, tension arises between the behavior in which the police must engage in order to create partnerships with community groups and agencies (e.g., power sharing) and the desire of most police agencies to preserve the level of control that flows from maintaining a strong centralized hierarchical power base. For community policing to succeed, power must be devolved from the center to the patrol officer and from the patrol officer to the community. Information, resource allocation, and decisionmaking, therefore, must take place at the lowest possible level. The issues of power and control as they relate to police agency acceptance of community participation in decisionmaking are central to the implementation of community policing, the development of community safety, and securing social justice (Carr, 1998).

As important as community participation in community policing is, it is important to recognize that increasing community responsibility for the coproduction of community safety and implementing community policing are both means to a more essential end. That end is the creation of a police agency acting for and with communities as a mechanism for the promotion of social justice. The social justice paradigm requires more than simply the absence of crime and violence; it seeks to end “inequalities born of modernity’s social construction of difference” (Barak & Henry, 1999, p. 152). To promote social justice, criminal justice agencies, particularly police agencies, must recognize and incorporate the needs of the community and actively work to create equal partnerships as an antidote to the creation and maintenance of power differentials that have historically been the result of most police activity.

The next section of this article examines four emerging tensions using literature from the fields of criminal justice and criminology as seen through the lens of the strategic management literature. These tensions are based on power, culture, cognition, and political differentials that exist between the police and members of the community. The barriers that stand in the way of the creation of police-community partnerships will be considered in light of the strategic management literature and its ability to offer suggestions to police agencies.

Eyes and Ears: Examining Power Differentials

Organizational power can be defined by the ability to mobilize resources to achieve desired ends regardless of the needs, wants, and desires of other sections of the organization or other partner organizations (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 1999, p. 109). An organization that has consolidated its power, as most police agencies have done, is more likely to be able to overcome blockages and irritants in order to achieve its goals, but having power can also restrict rather than promote major change. Power can limit an organization’s capacity to transform because people in positions of power determine what is considered valid knowledge and consequently, valid action and whether or not calls for change from within or outside an organization correspond with their agendas.

This knowledge about benefits and disadvantages of power sheds new light on the traditional view of community participation in policing characterized by the ability of the community to act as the “eyes and ears” of the police (Rosenbaum, 1988). This view promotes the use of “Neighborhood Watch” programs, which
encourage community members to be on the lookout for occurrences of crime in their neighborhoods and to report illegal behavior to the police. This level of community interaction, while helpful to the police, maintains current power differentials between community members and officers. Community members, acting mostly as individuals and, therefore, without the power base of an organization, are seen as “helpers” of the police. Under this model, the agenda of what activities will evoke police response remains solely under the purview of the police agency and is not affected by the behavior of community members. No matter how involved community members choose to be under the “eyes and ears” model, they will never be in a position to share power with the police and, therefore, will not impact the definition of problems in their neighborhoods. Without true and complete partnerships characterized by the ability of the community to share in the definition of problems and the creation of strategies for their solution, policing in general and community policing specifically, will be unable to act as a mechanism for the promotion of social justice.

The “eyes and ears” model of citizen participation in community safety is overwhelmingly police directed. Ignoring attendance at parties and fairs put on by the police in many U.S. cities, most community participation comes from Neighborhood Watch organizations. Ironically, participating in Neighborhood Watch programs may actually increase residents’ fear of crime (Skogan, 1989). Given that Neighborhood Watch programs play on suspicion of one neighbor of another and bring together residents only for the purpose of limiting illegal behavior, it has been argued that these groups are not able to provide opportunities for group members to engage in any positive interactions or to form bonds that would be able to provide positive benefits. Without the creation of positive social bonds among community members, it is difficult to imagine that the creation of trusting bonds between community members and police will be possible (Grinc, 1994).

Without these bonds both within the community and between the community and the police, the promotion of social justice by police agencies will be limited. If these bonds can be created, community policing has the potential to take citizen involvement in community safety to the next level and provide an avenue for effective crime prevention and control through citizen action and police-community interaction. From the perspective of the community-oriented policing paradigm, citizens, businesses in the community, and other community agencies and organizations have a stake in re-establishing and maintaining order, creating a crime-free environment, and improving the overall quality of life. If power differentials can be overcome and power more equitably shared, individuals and organizations may come to be seen as the first line of defense against crime within a community policing perspective (Center, 1996).

In order for this to happen, organizations involved in developing community policing, with particular attention paid to police agencies, may need to redistribute power within the organization or be prepared to devolve power out to community-based organizations entirely. In designing cross-organizational processes or structures, fairness of design and who will benefit from the efficiency of the idea need to be questioned. Questions such as who may be disadvantaged and/or alienated must also be answered. Clarity as to the manner in which new processes or structures carry through entrenched patterns of organizational and social behavior and their impact upon power differentials is required.
Power issues need to be addressed when police officers are encouraged to get involved with neighborhood and community groups in order to diagnose and respond to problems as a way to reduce crime (Center, 1996). The emphasis on police involvement in community-directed concerns could act as the cornerstone for the promotion of true partnerships.

Finally, the issue of information must be addressed in the creation of police-community partnerships. In order to move toward the coproduction of citizen safety, the police must develop and cultivate trusting working relationships and partnerships with community leaders and other agencies so that information can be shared (Waller & Welsh, 1998). Sharing information with community groups is essential in the building of effective partnerships. A partnership cannot function properly if one of the participating entities holds all of the information, as information is a proxy for power. For their part, citizens must have trust and confidence in the police agency and the philosophy of community policing in order for them to fully participate.

Who Is Responsible?: Examining Culture Differentials

Efforts to make the community-oriented policing paradigm work demand a reassessment of who is responsible for citizen safety (Bryne, 1989). While police agencies will and should be held accountable for setting up joint solutions of community problems through partnerships with other individuals, agencies, and community groups, citizen safety itself must become the joint responsibility of police agencies, other community agencies, and citizen groups in the community. Shared ownership of efforts to improve public safety and quality of life are required to make the community-oriented policing approach work and to allow it to become a stepping stone on the path to improved social justice.

Shared decisionmaking about the nature of problems faced by the community and shared accountability for the solution of these problems is called for in the application of the community-oriented policing paradigm. Sustained commitment from both the police and community members is necessary to create safer communities and promote social justice. While shared ownership of community issues may be identified as a necessary precondition for the implementation of community policing, accomplishing this presents many difficult challenges.

Much of this difficulty can be seen through the lens of culture. Cultures are systems of agreed upon meaning that guide behavior (Berger & Luckmann, 1990). In making police-community partnerships work across organizational boundaries, as is necessary in the creation of partnerships to improve community policing, it is important to understand the culture that predominates in each of the partners’ organizations. Cultural differentials are manifested when there is a lack of fit between the cultures of the various organizations (i.e., when organizations have different systems of meaning).

Harrison (1972) identified four organizational cultural norms: (1) power, (2) role, (3) task, and (4) person-oriented cultures. A power culture is present when an individual or small group directs or manipulates the direction of the organization. A role culture exists when role boundaries, procedures, and rules drive and shape the organization. An organization can be said to have a task culture when preference
is given to expertise, skills, and qualifications. A person-oriented culture is one in which the organization meets the needs of the people within the enterprise by exploring ways to provide service to the members of its own community.

Typically, organizations combine more than one of the categories. The skill, therefore, is in the accurate reading of the cultures, the realistic interpretation of the intents and behaviors of others, and the avoidance of stereotypical thinking (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 1999). An understanding of the coexistence of cultures within an organization provides an opportunity to move from the current culture to a culture that is consistent with what has to be achieved.

For example, police agencies operate primarily as a role culture as they are constrained by rules and are generally resistant to change. When police maintain their role-based culture internally yet attempt to engage in community policing by partnering with a community-based agency that is task-oriented and highly willing to change, a strategic mismatch may occur. In order to implement cross-organizational community policing strategies, police agencies must understand, in depth, the cultures of their community partner organizations. Such detailed understanding and awareness provides a counterbalance to stereotypical thinking, improves trust, and offers the possibility of synergy between police and community-based organizations.

When multiple agencies work together, their goals may pull in different directions and compete for priority. Agencies and groups often have different cultures, values, and professional interests that act as a source of negative rather than positive tension, which is rarely confronted or resolved (Clark & Stewart, 1997a; Gilling, 1997). These tensions are especially keen in the complex organizational matrix of the criminal justice system in which agencies can become concerned about the blurring of organizational boundaries and functions. In addition, criminal justice agencies are often concerned with a potential lack of autonomy and resultant loss of power. In traditional interagency collaboration, the police are often the dominant or lead organization; therefore, any potential loss of power is most significantly felt by them (Trojanowicz & Pollard, 1986).

While it is true that the creation of partnerships is crucial to the successful implementation of community policing, it must be recognized that different agencies have different assigned functions. These functions will necessarily limit the extent to which cooperation between agencies may be properly and ethically extended. In addition, questions remain about how much autonomy is necessary for each agency to lose for the sake of the collective good and their willingness to lose it. For organizations to be truly in partnership, they must allow others to be decision-makers in their world, and they must be willing to lose some control (Trojanowicz & Pollard, 1986).

An Issue of Trust: Examining Differentials in Cognition

Although the community policing philosophy is founded on the tenet of community participation, relationship building between police agencies, community members, and other community-based organizations remains a complex undertaking. On the individual level, the development of true participation of the community in the creation of community safety has been and continues to be problematic. There
is an assumption in the community policing literature that community members are interested in participating with the police in new strategies to reduce crime. The first step in an examination of increasing citizen participation in community policing is a re-examination of the assumption that citizens want to be involved (Grinc, 1994). If community policing is seen by some members of the community as a way to co-opt citizen participation and as just another strategy to maintain current power differentials in the community, then the decision of most citizens not to participate is a logical one.

This issue of trust between the police and community members who potentially are willing to engage with the police in the coproduction of community safety can be examined through the lens of cognition. Since cognitive processes determine meaning, it follows that organizations and individuals will exhibit behavior that is guided by socially agreed upon meanings, which are in turn sanctioned as legitimate by social cognitive processes of those individuals and groups (Glass, Holyoak, & Santa, 1979).

Cognitive schemas are interrelated knowledge structures that people use to organize and make sense of social and organizational information and suggest implications for behavior (Abelson, 1981). Cognitive schemas and cognitive scripts play a critical role in the success or failure of strategic efforts like the building of partnerships between the police and the community.

Appreciation of the various cognitive schemas within police and community organizations and the temperament of their coexistence are crucial when seeking agreement on community safety strategies. Of particular importance in designing and enacting community policing strategies is the evolution toward consensual cognitive schemas and scripts. Without an understanding of the integrated conscious and unconscious consensual cognitive schemas and scripts that give rise to organizational culture, the implementation of successful community policing will be seriously hampered. Improved understanding of cross-organizational culture and cognition contributes to the ability of police and community agencies to work together to improve community safety.

As community policing attempts to engage community members in the fight against crime in neighborhoods, it is important to understand one element of the current state of the relationship between community members and the police. Due at least in part to cognitive differentials, community members and police tend to view the definition of problems from very different perspectives. Community members tend to view their concerns from a broad perspective and to identify problems that can be solved if police are willing to accept the role of deliverers of service (Bryne, 1989). When citizens tell the police of their concerns, the police tend to characterize the problems as petty and not in need of police attention. Problems such as vandalism, noise, and the presence of street people are priorities as defined by community residents that are not given high priority by the police. Police officers, on the other hand, are much more likely to identify problems that are solvable by the police in their role as law enforcers as opposed to their role as problem solvers.

In addition to the discrepancy in problem identification, both groups, police officers and community members, may see themselves as being more qualified to suggest solutions to identified problems. Very often, the solutions that are suggested must
be implemented by the police in conjunction with community members. These discrepancies in cognitive schemas may be the basis of the difficult nature of the relationship between police and community members.

Divergent points of view are not the only barrier to increased citizen participation in community safety. The historically strained relationship between poor and minority residents and police may lead to a diminished desire to cooperate with police among members of some communities (Skogan, 1989). As long as the police are seen as agents of state-sanctioned violence and as having no desire to make a distinction between law breakers and law-abiding residents of the community, there will not be much incentive for law-abiding citizens to cooperate with the police.

Where There's a Will, There's a Way: Examining Political Differentials

When police organizations attempt to make changes in the area of creating police-community partnerships, political realities are often ignored. Political feasibility is the single most important consideration in managing change. When complexity theory is applied to the social domain, it suggests that organizations undergoing change rely on a complex set of interrelationships between people that formal power barely recognizes and may find difficult to handle (Eden & Ackermann, 1998). As a result, political interaction can lead to the formation of coalition(s) around issues and dilemmas that can damage planned implementation of positive change. Three examples of important political differentials that must be overcome in order for the police to create meaningful partnerships are described in this section.

The first political reality that must be confronted in the creation of police-community partnerships is that community residents may refuse to participate in community policing efforts due to fear of retaliation from those who are the target of law enforcement efforts. One of the largest groups targeted by community policing efforts in the United States and the United Kingdom, drug dealers, have a justified reputation for taking retaliatory actions against perceived “snitches” (Gettleman, 2002). It is in the best interests of the drug dealers to ensure noncooperation with official police duties by fellow residents. Drug dealers can be thought of from a political standpoint as using violence and intimidation to create a nonvoluntary faction in the community that will oppose change. Neighbors of drug dealers are caught between fear of the dealers and their desire to stop illegal behavior. Grinc (1994) characterized the situation as a Catch-22; residents need to feel safe before getting involved with crime stopping activities, but police need residents to be involved in order to make the streets safer.

A second issue that can be raised in relation to the idea of political differentials is that in order for the community to put forth opportunities for partnership, the community must be self-defined as such. The very nature of modern communities may act as a barrier to participation in community policing by residents. In other words, we commonly refer to a geographic area as a community, even if its residents have very little in common. Geographical areas, rather than being characterized as communities, are more likely to be made up of people with divergent backgrounds; its residents are not likely to be motivated to participate in formal community organizations, and they may or may not have similar wants and needs (Sadd & Grinc, 1996). Many geographical areas, particularly inner city neighborhoods of
large cities in the United States, are made up of individuals who speak a variety of languages, creating even greater barriers to cooperation.

An additional concern when examining political barriers to community participation in community policing is the idea that neighborhoods that could benefit most from the implementation of community policing are neighborhoods that are most likely to be characterized by social disorganization (Sadd & Grinc, 1996). These neighborhoods are likely to have high rates of poverty, unemployment, and crime and to have poor educational systems. It is difficult to imagine that the police can overcome these intractable obstacles during the initial implementation stages of community policing (Sadd & Grinc, 1996).

Finally, there is no guarantee, in areas that do have community organization and community participation, that residents will feel represented by their community group leaders. This is a traditional political problem in that individuals and organizations that claim to speak for a wider group of individuals may or may not accurately reflect their views and values. This can lead to conflict among members of a single group and/or between multiple groups competing for the right to represent the community. It can also lead to ineffective community participation in crime fighting efforts.

The above-mentioned political barriers to police-community partnerships—fear of retaliation and strained relationships, lack of cohesive and organized communities, and unrepresentative community leadership—may lead to inaction on the part of community members. This lack of action and participation with “new” methods of policing may be misinterpreted as apathy by police officers working in those neighborhoods. When police officers feel that they are more willing to get involved in solving the problems of a particular neighborhood than are the residents of that neighborhood, they are likely to respond with hostility (Trojanowicz & Pollard, 1986). When neighborhood residents sense that the police are hostile toward them, the cycle of distance and distrust is renewed.

**Administrative Strategies to Build Partnerships: Overcoming the Differentials**

In order for the police and the community to come together to play their part in supporting social justice, the differentials described above must be managed. Partnerships between police and other agencies and community groups can only be productive if power is shared, various cultures and cognitions are identified and allowed to coexist, and clear strategies are put in place to deal with the political realities.

The management of the differentials—power, culture, cognition, and politics—provides a contextual basis for developing a strategic and systemic appreciation of police organizations and their partners, leading to improved community policing and the promotion of social justice. To allow for the reformation of policing philosophy to support the implementation of true community policing and the delivery of social justice, strategies must be developed to overcome the isolation of the police from the rest of the community. In other words, citizen distrust of the police must be replaced by police-citizen cooperative partnerships so that community problems can be identified and citizens can be enlisted in crime prevention efforts.
According to Clark and Stewart (1997b), what is necessary in order to address the “wicked issues,” or intractable problems, in creating true partnerships between police organizations and communities is an unconstrained learning approach in which the individuals involved in the organizations are prepared to think the unthinkable and accept the unacceptable. Awareness of the “wicked” nature of the problem is often associated with the fact that the problem cannot be fully understood by any one organization, never mind solved by it. In order to increase partnerships, organizations must develop the capacity to work across boundaries, both within and between organizations; they must cooperate, coordinate, and collaborate in order to secure commitments between agencies, organizations, and communities. No single individual, community, group, or organization has the capacity or expertise to holistically solve or provide whole systems solutions to such difficult issues as community policing, community safety, and social justice. Partnerships will come about when there is recognition of the need to generate learning through holistic thinking, rather than partial or linear thinking, that can encompass interaction between a wide variety of activities, habits, behaviors, and attitudes while embracing a willingness to work in new ways that completely break through current organizations, labels, and assumptions (Clark & Stewart, 1997b, p. 3).

As strategies are developed that will allow the police to integrate into the community, a balance needs to be struck between differences that rightly arise from the distinctive responsibilities of each profession and those deliberately engineered as a part of a desire to protect the organization from outside interference (Bellingham, 1999). Crawford (1997) argues that partnerships, especially in the criminal justice field, draw together diverse organizations with very different cultures, ideologies, and traditions, which pursue distinct aims and priorities through divergent structures, strategies, and practices; hence, it is not surprising that deep conflicts exist.

Conflicting interests and ideologies often compound underlying power, cognition, cultural, and political imbalances. Police agencies often have specialist knowledge and differential access to both human and material resources and therefore tend to dominate the policy agenda. This domination may lead to tensions based on control, information, political and social forces, capability, and finance. For example, the answers to questions such as the following must be properly and strategically managed: What sources of information are legitimate?; Which groups should be incorporated into the process?; Which interests should be excluded?; Which organization(s) should hold a dominant position?; Which groups should be consulted?; and Should outside agencies be given a direct input into police decisionmaking?

Successful resolution of the questions asked above will necessitate that active ownership and participation be incorporated in the way people behave. The management of cooperation depends upon understanding, recognizing difficulties, building and sustaining trust, commitment to collaboration, an internal culture of cooperation, clear processes, and an agreed upon architecture of joint working and public participation (Clark & Stewart, 1997b, p. 6).

This article argues that dealing effectively with the wicked issues of managing partnerships between the police and the community designed to improve community policing, community safety, and social justice requires that the identified
generic differentials within and across organizations, agencies, and communities be impacted. This requires collaborative corporate governance, strategic leadership, and strategic and operational management of change of the highest level across boundaries underpinned by constant reinforcing of leading, learning, and thinking that is both strategic and systemic.

**Corporate Governance**

The purpose of corporate governance is to ensure that corporate actions, assets, and agents are directed at achieving the corporate objectives established by the organization’s key stakeholders. For example, a private, for-profit organization has a mandate from its stakeholders to increase return on investment through the development of share price. To accomplish this, they exploit their distinctive competencies toward increasing profit by undercutting their competitors on price, quality, or both. For-profit entities may enter into strategic alliances with other firms to gain competitive advantage but only for the purpose of securing their own agendas and satisfying their stakeholder’s expectations.

For a police agency to improve the quality of community policing as a vehicle toward securing social justice, it is quite clear that competitive advantage against other partners in the criminal justice and wider public sector will not work. Indeed, as it has been argued above, no single agency will fulfill its objectives without the help of the communities they serve and the agencies with which they currently work or, more importantly, those with which they do not currently work. Collaborative advantage, not competitive advantage, is important here. In order to sustain collaborative advantage, each organization needs to operate at the optimal level with the necessary key skills and vision in order to move beyond stereotypical thinking and craft strategies that secure synergies for all. Each organization will have different skills that provide an opportunity for each to learn and help one another.

The manner in which each agency’s top team jointly discharges their leadership and management, changes responsibilities, and develops corporcracy where the strategy is owned and implemented is of vital importance. “Corporate Rain Dances,” in which members agree with the proposed policies for change inside the meeting but actively and/or passively work against them outside the meeting, cannot be tolerated. Creating successful change strategy is dependant upon the quality of the debate within the top team. This level of debate often requires management development to assist in securing, sustaining, and balancing transactional (managing the organization in a orderly way) and transformational (transforming the organization into a new entity) skills.

Using the management strategy inherent in a corporate governance structure can be useful for police agencies wishing to improve their ability to partner with community-based agencies. The ability of community groups to benefit from corporate governance is often underestimated. When skills are lacking, assistance should come from the agencies and organizations that have the power and the resources to provide them.
Strategic Leadership

Creating new paradigms for police-community collaboration requires a new vision of leadership. It has been argued that effective leadership is predominately a learned behavior rather than an innate ability. The necessary attributes can be learned within and across organizations focusing on specific generic behaviors that define what Kakabadse and Kakabadse (1999) call “Great Leaders.” These attributes include the following:

- Conviction to vision and craft the future
- Strength to surface sentiments
- Wisdom to manage their way through paradox
- Flair to engage in dialogue
- Discipline to communicate
- Passion for results
- Staying power and attention to detail

It is difficult to produce great leaders within organizations—never mind across organizations—who have the mindset dedicated to seeing the big strategic picture and are prepared to put the common good above individual successes. Great leaders who can take organizations to a new level by utilizing partnerships must see the future first and be able to take the rest of us from where we are to where we have never been. The time has come to identify a cadre of potential leaders from organizations and community groups so that they can develop together. This means that organizations that have more resources fund others to the mutual benefit of all. It means putting an organization’s best people in multi- and interagency projects to build up joint expertise and identify strategic opportunities.

Strategic Management

Strategic management is a method of reengineering an organization through continuous attention to the vision and mission of the people who comprise it. The outcome of strategic management is the creation of a vision, a strategic intent, or a framework in which strategizing can take place (Eden & Ackermann, 1998, p. 4). Strategic management is a proactive process of seeking to change an organization, its stakeholders, and the context or environment within which the organization seeks to attain its aspirations. Specifically, an organization can be improved by using strategic management to gain leverage using the individuality and distinctive competencies of the organization and its ability to adapt them to its environment. If police and other organizations wish to move to community safety by utilizing partnerships, they must have the distinctive competencies to deliver this.

In order for partnering organizations to operate at their optimal level, it is important that they have a systemic appreciation encompassing a deep understanding of themselves and of their systems with insights and clarity into their processes and interconnections. This can be an ever-expanding activity considering the processes within and interconnections between varieties of organizations. As such, a holistic systemic appreciation is over-ambitious and offers little practical help. It is unrealistic, if not impossible, to expect all of the organizations and groups involved in community safety to have a thorough, systemic understanding of themselves and others.
In creating improved community policing with its inherent need to construct partnerships with community organizations, a modified version of systemic appreciation can be more useful in opening up a more partial view on organizational life. Deepening appreciation then builds and adds content to the interpretation leading to more relevant choices for improvement in partnership building.

A modified systemic view can be focused upon such processes and interconnections concerning information sharing towards joint risk management across community safety partners. For example, police are considered “professional expert knowledge workers” who have knowledge that is valuable to others that they are often unwilling to share (Ericson & Heggarty, 1997, p. 73). A modified systemic view can provide an understanding of and raise questions about difficulties related to processes and interconnections within and between partners. This can provoke debate on the inner circle assumptions that prevent police from truly sharing their knowledge. Exploring and making explicit the processes leading to questioning inner circle assumptions provide the opportunity to move to greater and shared understanding.

The Four Ps of Operational Management

The last section of the article provides a look at the specific areas within police organizations that must be examined and changed in order to promote partnerships.

People

Trained, competent, and committed people will make the desired transformations a reality. Putting people, skilled with the necessary competencies, at the heart of corporate purpose is essential; however, equipping people with the most appropriate core competencies is not easy. In fact, a key concern within police and community organizations is the ability to identify the appropriate competencies that will maximize the potential for transformational change and for the creation of a learning organization designed to impact the identified wicked issues.

Planning

Strategic management as described above seeks to move an organization forward based on its mission and vision toward distinctive competencies and broad 3- to 5-year corporate strategies. Organizations must plan using a more immediate timeframe—namely an annual plan. As police and community agencies attempt to work collaboratively, they must plan together to not only identify joint strategies but to ensure that, on a daily basis, they work to redesign joint processes. If the planning and continuous improvement systems for the interagency working group are compatible, then the performance management will have more chance of producing a performance management and measurement system that is compatible and that can work together. This will assist the agencies that are attempting to work collaboratively to move closer to achieving their goals.

Performance

Organizations struggle with performance measurement and management. There are many approaches, from the complex to the relatively simple. It is generally
agreed that the measurement and management of performance needs to take into account performance indicators, performance standards, and performance process improvement indicators.

When organizations create joint strategies as a way to exploit collaborative advantage, they require the underpinning of process indicators (i.e., their joint processes are right and that they have the right indicators in balance and in place). For collaboration to be effective, there needs to be accountability. Accountability requires each of the agencies and groups to deliver on their part of the bargain. This is particularly important when the strategy requires a heavy investment of resources that community safety and social justice inevitably require.

**Process**

Although organizations are systems designed to serve customers, they can often act as a barrier to efficient and effective service delivery. It has been estimated that over 90% of the problems in organizations are not the fault of people but rather of the systems. Performance can be dramatically improved through attention to systems and the structures in which they exist.

There are five generally accepted organizational types: (1) the simple structure, (2) the machine bureaucracy, (3) the professional bureaucracy, (4) the divisionalised form, and (5) the adhocracy (Mintzberg, 1979). These five structures will be briefly defined as they relate to partnership building:

1. The simple structure supports classic entrepreneurial activity.
2. The machine bureaucracy supports a large manufacturing industry that tends to have power concentrated at the strategic apex.
3. The professional bureaucracy relies on the standardization of the skills of its workforce with people being given considerable control over their own world as distinct from the standardization of work practices as is found in the machine model.
4. The divisionalised form, as the name suggests, supports units organized in divisions that are necessary due to diversified products.
5. Adhocracy can be thought of as a structure of interacting project teams working together to develop continuous improvement.

Structure becomes important in developing partnerships between police and community organizations, as they are unlikely to share an organizational structure even when they are attempting to work together to solve community problems. In order to cope with the changing environments that partnerships require and in order to achieve synergy, organizations must be alert to the need to change their strategy and structure (Ansoff, 1965; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampei, 1998). For example, police organizations should, according to their competencies and attributes, be a professional bureaucracy and employ a learning approach to their strategy formulation. Due to strong accountability requirements related to the ability of the police to exercise the use of force, however, they are pulled to adopt a model that supports a centralized structure—namely the machine bureaucracy.

Within the police organization, there is a mismatch between an environment that is so complex that it requires street-level police officers to operate with a large degree
of autonomy and the imposed structural configuration that stifles such autonomy (Campbell, 1996). In the case of the creation of community partnerships, the machine bureaucracy under which the police operate is not suitable. It presupposes that the environment in which the officers operate will remain somewhat certain, and it does not provide the necessary opportunity for learning. Current police organizational structural configurations are not congruent with developing and sustaining community partnerships and are likely to perpetuate, rather than limit, the impact of power differentials within police organizations and between police and community partners (Lyons, 1999). Developing new configurations within the police organization to sustain community partnerships may provide the opportunities to break free from the machine bureaucracy straight jacket and move toward a professional bureaucracy.

**Conclusion**

Why should organizations and partnerships be prepared to examine and work on these issues? Because delivering community policing, community safety, and social justice can only be gainfully achieved by impacting the generic differentials identified in order to improve the creation and functioning of police-community partnerships. Organizational learning is learning that is supported by strategic thinking that sustains and develops the distinctive competencies that belong to the organization or group and a systemic understanding of how the organizations operate as systems individually and in connection with each other. Central to the development of organizational learning is understanding, reflecting, and negotiating strategy—in other words, standing back from everyday life, detecting emergent patterns of behavior, reflecting upon these, and redesigning ways of thinking and working. Learning is driven by the aim of drawing together the wisdom and expertise of individuals and setting the knowledge within the context of the culture, strategy, stakeholders, environment, and aspirations of the group. The concept of organizational learning is crucial to the implementation of community policing. Each partner involved in the delivery of community policing must manage their own learning and then seek to learn collectively and identify positive learning synergies between the organizations involved.

Often learning and evaluation have not as significant a role as they should in community safety, and what learning is captured is often kept within the individual organizations. In order for community policing, community safety, and social justice to be achieved, we must all be prepared to think outside the box, embrace new realities, understand each of the groups and organizations much better than we do at the moment, and have the courage to move towards where we have never been. Police organizations in particular are in a unique position. They have the power, the information, and the influence. They must be prepared to act as agents of social change by doing all they can to empower their partners so that together they can truly deliver community policing, community safety, and social justice.

**References**


Natalie R. Pearl received her PhD from the Heller School for Social Policy at Brandeis University in 1995. Since that time, she has been employed at San Diego State University in the School of Public Administration and Urban Studies and is currently an associate professor of criminal justice. Her research and teaching interests over the past 3 years have focused on the role of police in societies in which trust between the police and the community has been stressed or broken. Projects in this area include a police/community exchange between the San Diego Police and the Royal Ulster Constabulary funded by the U.S. State Department and a current project examining police-community relationships in the West African nation of Sierra Leone.

Robin A. Campbell holds BA and MSc degrees from the University of Ulster, an MSt degree from the University of Cambridge in applied criminology and police systems, and a PhD from the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow, Scotland. For 25 years, Robin was a member of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (now the Police Service of Northern Ireland) and retired holding the rank of chief superintendent. During his service, he held a number of operational and staffing and support roles, including police commander in a difficult policing environment, staff officer to the chief constable, deputy head of internal affairs, and internal management consultant to the change management team. In this role, Dr. Campbell designed the change processes, planning, performance, and programme management of the transformation of the police in Northern Ireland. Dr. Campbell is currently a police and change consultant working with the Sierra Leone Police.
Community Building Measures: How Police and Neighborhood Groups Can Measure Their Collaboration

Brian C. Renauer, PhD, Assistant Professor, Criminology and Justice Division, Portland State University
David E. Duffee, PhD, Professor, Associate Dean, School of Criminal Justice, State University of New York–Albany
Jason D. Scott, Research Scientist, Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government
Steven Chermak, PhD, Associate Professor, Director of Graduate Affairs, Department of Criminal Justice, Indiana University–Bloomington
Edmund F. McGarrell, Ed, PhD, Professor, Director of the School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University

Police and community residents share a common concern for maintaining safe, quality neighborhoods. It is assumed by practitioners and researchers that the police and groups in the communities in which the police work can “jointly produce” certain public safety outcomes, such as feelings of safety or fear, levels of disorder and crime, and levels of trust and cooperation. The research evidence on policing impacts, however, suggests that the police, even working alone, effect crime, disorder, fear, and satisfaction, for limited periods of time. This same research indicates that police alone cannot maintain those temporary improvements in communities unless something else occurs in the neighborhood. If we want significant, long-term results from police-community collaborations, getting that “something else” to occur should be a primary goal (Scott, 2002).

That something else that sustains a community over the long-term is known as “community capacity.” We think of community capacity as, “the extent to which members of a community can work together effectively, including their abilities to develop and sustain strong relationships, solve problems and make group decisions, and collaborate effectively to identify goals and get work done” (Mattessich & Monsey, 1997, p. 61). Another way of thinking about community capacity is the old saying about the hungry peasant, “give him a fish, and he is full today but hungry again tomorrow; teach him to fish, and he need never be hungry again.” Neighbors observing the police reduce crime is not the same as neighbors gaining experience in controlling crime with the police. Some things that the police do to reduce or prevent crime may promote dependency of the citizenry on the police and thereby reduce the strength of civic institutions, even if they have short-term positive effects on crime. Other things the police do to reduce or prevent crime may promote neighborhood resident experience in civic engagement that strengthens civic institutions and allows residents to solve other problems in the future. When police make this contribution to civic engagement, we can talk about police-community building. “Community-building” processes are community activities that build community capacity.

You may ask, “How can the police build community; our task is law enforcement?” Since 1997, the Police Community Interaction Project (PCIP) has been working to answer this question by identifying general processes of community building and then asking how the
police might be involved in such community processes (Duffee, Scott, Renauer, Chermak, & McGarrell, 2002). 1 PCIP has defined five major community-building dimensions in which the police are often active. These dimensions recognize different ways in which the police can interact with community groups that improve community capacity. These interactions are highlighted in the Appendix. The five community-building dimensions are interactions that police or neighborhood groups can strategically work to develop. Both police departments and neighborhood organizations may exert a degree of control over these interactions. They are also measurable interactions. Measuring community building can help immensely in planning, implementation, and assessment. This article reviews each of the community-building dimensions, illustrates the utility of measuring these dimensions (preferably by police and community groups), and provides some examples of how they can be measured.

There are considerable differences in attention to these police-community interactions across cities and among neighborhoods in a single city. The intensity of these interactions may ebb and flow over time. At some points, the interaction may be very intense, while at other times, the interaction is dormant or almost nonexistent. Discovering and measuring such variation in these community-building processes across cities and within a single city is very important for understanding how these processes relate to improved safety, quality of life, and citizen satisfaction. These processes are important for “measuring what matters” about policing (Langworthy, 1999). One goal of PCIP is to develop user-friendly measurement tools, so police departments and community groups can individually assess their interactions along these five community-building dimensions with modest or no help from researchers.

Dimensions of Police-Community Building

Steps to Improve Neighborhood Space

The first community-building process listed in the Appendix, Steps to Improve Neighborhood Space, is a set of interactions that occur between thousands of police departments and communities. 2 For example, police and district residents in Chicago hold meetings to prioritize problems in each beat and set up projects to work on each one. With the help of researchers from Northwestern University, they examined how often these projects are successful (Skogan, Hartnett, Dubois, Comey, Twedt-Ball, & Gudell, 2000). In an effort to reduce crimes often attributed to negligent tenants and landlords, coproductive efforts between the police and community groups in Seattle, Portland, Indianapolis, and other cities have developed training for landlords in screening tenants (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1995). Police in San Diego have developed problem-solving teams who work with residents, beat officers, and other agencies to identify specific problems, examine why they occur, and take steps to remove the causes of these problems (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1993). In some cities, the range of issues on which police and neighbors collaborate is narrow. Perhaps their primary concern is a single issue like neighborhood beautification or targeting drug houses. In other cities, police-neighborhood partnerships may involve coordination on multiple issues pertaining to crime, economic revitalization, education, and cultural awareness. Research has found that groups with broader agendas attract and retain more members and last longer.

Steps to improve neighborhood space often represent attempts to break the disorder-fear-crime cycle that Skogan (1990) and others have linked to neighborhood decline. Thus, for example, public housing residents in Spokane, Washington, worked with
the police, city officials, and local business owners to clean the streets, renovate and inhabit several abandoned buildings, and close the neighborhood to drug dealing and prostitution. Survey and observation data indicated that these changes to the neighborhood resulted in greater use of public space and reduced fear of neighborhood crime (McGarrell, Giacomazzi, & Thurman, 1999).

**Steps to Identify with Neighborhoods**

One of the most common recognizable developments in policing tactics over the past 20 years has been steps to identify with neighborhoods. Decentralizing police facilities, assigning beat officers to neighborhoods, utilizing geographically displayed crime data, and holding community meetings are all interactions that increase the recognition of neighborhoods as unique and deserving of individualized attention. Such strategies are often common components of a community- or problem-oriented policing strategy, although they may be used on their own as well. For example, in Spokane, police in several districts introduced “COP Shops” staffed by police and residents in some public housing complexes (McGarrell et al., 1999, p. 1). The Indianapolis Police Department realigned almost all beats so that officers were not responsible for parts of several neighborhoods but instead worked within one neighborhood or with all parts of two neighborhoods. In several places, locations of major roads hampered the realignment. Indianapolis officers were unsure about who should take ownership of the split neighborhoods and discovered residents complained about not knowing the police as well as where alignment was successful.

In Chicago, community meetings play a significant role in their Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS). There are monthly beat meetings in Chicago attended by beat officers and residents of those beats, who then discuss what is happening in the area and work to solve problems. The police district command staff in Chicago also meets monthly with district advisory councils. According to Chicago beat meeting attendance figures, the total accumulative attendance from 1995 through 1997 was more than 250,000 residents, and a citywide survey in 1998 reported that 14% of Chicagoans attended at least one beat meeting in the previous year (Skogan, Hartnett, Dubois, Comey, Tweedt-Ball, Gudell et al., 1999, pp. 17-18). The CAPS effort is certainly working to improve identification with Chicago neighborhoods although the actual collaboration in the meetings still needs improvement (Skogan et al., 2000).

**Steps to Encourage Resident Efforts**

The third community-building process listed in the Appendix, Steps to Encourage Resident Efforts, is critical to building community capacity and increasing civic engagement. Many departments have been spreading messages about the importance of community involvement and actively recruiting resident participants to assume active community roles. The Chicago Police Department and the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety trained thousands of residents across the city in the nature of “community policing” in that city and in problem-solving processes (Kaiser, 1996). Indianapolis Neighborhood Resource Officers in the West District provide neighborhood association leaders with letters of introduction and support that the leaders use in searching for contributions to neighborhood events from the business community. Residents in one Chicago neighborhood erected a lemonade stand on a block known for drug dealing. Extra police patrols on the block helped this effort by ensuring the safety of the stand operators. In Houston, as part of a national fear reduction program, the Houston Police Department organized a
resident organization in the Langwood neighborhood (Wycoff, Skogan, Pate, & Sherman, 1985).

Encouragement is not a “one-way” process; the active participation of neighborhood residents often encourages initial police partnerships and reinforces police and resident commitments toward working together. The Fairlawn neighborhood of Washington, DC, implemented citizen patrols as a deterrent strategy to address increased drug dealing. Local police provided protection for the early citizen patrols by walking with them and soon realized the perseverance among the Fairlawn Coalition members. Resident perseverance in turn bolstered police activities in the neighborhood, which ultimately improved police-resident communication over drug investigations and helped further a creative, problem-solving partnership (Weingart, Hartman, & Osborne, 1994).

**Steps for Resident Participation**

The practice of police-community “partnership” and “coproduction” would certainly need to involve Steps for Resident Participation, the fourth community-building process. In Birmingham, businesses seeking licenses or zoning approvals must obtain approval of the relevant neighborhood association, whose leaders are elected in an open vote of neighborhood residents. For the Englewood District in Chicago, a District Advisory Council was established by the Chicago Police Department and co-chaired by the police district commander and a local religious leader (DuBois, 1995). The Englewood Council’s agenda of issues focused on social and economic problems, and police contributed to this broader agenda of community development projects. Although vitally important for the development of trust and effective coproduction, building resident participation can be contentious. For example, in Lawrence, Massachusetts, citizens who were organized by the police department to participate in community policing grew frustrated when the only action the police asked of them was to call the police when they knew of suspicious activity (Bazemore & Cole, 1994). In the Marquette District of Chicago, in contrast to Englewood, the Advisory Council meetings were only open to members and special guests. Conflicts between African American and Hispanic members of the Council emerged and were not addressed. The Marquette Council focused almost entirely on crime issues, and when citizen members of the Council wanted to compare approaches to crime in different beats in the district, the police refused (DuBois, 1995). While meaningful resident participation is essential to building community capacity, agency attempts at limited or token avenues for participation can backfire.

**Steps for Coordinating Organizations**

The final community-building process listed in the Appendix, Steps for Coordinating Organizations, is an interaction widely recognized as important for effective problem solving. Multiple resources and expertise may be needed to address complex neighborhood problems. In San Diego, officers involved a large number of public and private agencies in solving specific problems (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1995). The Mayor’s Office in Chicago devised an information system by which to track follow-up by other city agencies on problems identified by the police and residents in beat meetings (Skogan, Hartnett, DuBois, Comey, Kaiser, & Lovig, 1999). Special police officers in Spokane worked with school officials to reduce problem
behavior in and around schools (Thurman & Bogen, 1993). Police in Fairfax, Virginia, coordinated referrals to drug treatment agencies (Baranyk, 1994).

In Indianapolis, former Mayor Stephen Goldsmith recognized that the city had many neighborhood organizations and leaders and a variety of public and private service providers, but there were few mechanisms for coordinating the activities of these groups (Goldsmith, 1997). Additionally, the neighborhood organizations were largely staffed by part-time volunteers with few resources for community-building activities. Consequently, he initiated the Front Porch Alliance (FPA), which created a support mechanism within city government to coordinate neighborhood groups, city services, and service providers and to provide training and technical assistance for neighborhood associations. FPA enabled the formation of the Indianapolis Ten Point Coalition, a group of inner-city ministers working with neighborhood leaders to address violence, gang activity, and youth crime. Modeled on a similar coalition in Boston, Ten Point was based on the premise that churches represented one of the strongest institutions within these neighborhoods and that they could contribute to community building by working together (Winship & Berrien, 1999). Ten Point became very active in a wide variety of activities including mentoring, vocational training and job placement, and intervening in neighborhood conflicts.

Given these processes, police-community partnership efforts could be characterized by one or all of the five community building steps. Stressing only one of the community building steps in police-community coproduction efforts may not generate increased community capacity and impact public safety, or they may cause only short-term impacts. More comprehensive coproductive strategies that address all five police-community-building steps are more likely to create long-term, sustainable community improvements.

Why Measure Police-Community Building?

Reason 1: To Better Understand the Process

Police organizations interact with a variety of individuals and organizations to identify and address important goals in arrangements increasingly known as “partnerships.” Partnerships sound good, but partnerships frequently overlook the importance of process or the assessment of how the partners worked together to achieve a goal or solve a problem. Measuring or recording the steps taken, the persons and organizations involved, and the resources contributed to identifying and addressing neighborhood problems provides valuable information for future police and citizen efforts in problem solving. Information on the process of how groups worked together to solve problems is akin to a roadmap. In order to get from point A to point B, it is more efficient to understand the processes used in the past to achieve that goal rather than having to improvise or devise a new route every time. Even asking partners to reflect on all the conceivable ways in which police and citizens can interact to coproduce public safety is a constructive goal because the reflection may help them avoid partial and token efforts. For example the citizen frustration and anger reported in the Lawrence, Massachusetts, case might have been reduced if police and citizens had examined a full range of options for citizen participation before implementing a program. In contrast, the relative success in Chicago is based in part on police and citizen groups doing their homework first and discussing what did and did not work in other cities.
Reason 2: To Validly Link Police-Neighborhood Activities with Outcomes

Evaluation research on crime prevention strategies is good at identifying whether a positive or negative outcome was produced but is not as effective in identifying the aspects of implementation that created the measured outcome. Unfortunately, evaluation research often spends too much effort getting an experimental design in place or measuring reliable outcomes and fails to provide a comprehensive examination of the quality or “dosage” of the strategy implemented. Implementations of crime prevention strategies do not always proceed according to plan and may vary dramatically across jurisdictions. For example, the interactions and activities occurring in community meetings involving police and residents are not likely to be exactly the same in every jurisdiction in a city, across cities, or over time (Renauer, Duffee, & Scott, 2003). Only by measuring the varied steps that police may take to build community can researchers better assess the types or quality of coproducitive activities that are more effective for improving public safety, satisfaction with police, or community livability. Measuring community building records the interactions that connect strategic ideals to measured outcomes. Measuring process as well as outcome allows groups to determine how they got results, so they can learn from success and failure.

The value of evaluation data on the process of coproduction proved crucial in the Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership (IVRP). The IVRP was a multi-agency initiative, including partnerships with a variety of community groups and neighborhood leaders, to reduce firearms violence. One strategy, borrowed from the Boston Ceasefire program that emerged involved face-to-face meetings with groups of probationers and parolees (Kennedy, Braga, & Piehl, 2001). The probationers and parolees would hear from both community members and law enforcement representatives about the concern with the level of violence in the community, sanctions available for illegal possession and use of firearms, and available services and opportunities. After several of these meetings, interviews were conducted with community members who had participated or attended the meetings. The community members were extremely positive about the meetings, believing that they signaled a real concern with levels of violence in their neighborhoods and for the lives of these young men attending the meetings. At the same time, they believed that the style of several of the presentations made by law enforcement officials was too confrontational and that many attendees were “tuning out” the message. As a result of this feedback from community members, the presentations were modified, and the community members became strong proponents of the meetings and of the IVRP generally (McGarrell & Chermak, 2002). Without assessing how the process of these face-to-face meetings with probationers and parolees was linked to their perceptions, it is likely attendees would have continued to tune out the message resulting in a negative project outcome.

Reason 3: To Aid Strategic Planning and Foster Continual Learning

Measuring community building improves our understanding of how police and communities interact and how such processes are linked to measured outcomes (Reasons 1 and 2) and provides valuable information for strategic planning and organizational learning. Measuring community building can establish a detailed “roadmap” of the interactions that connect problem identification stages to implementations of strategic interventions and measured outcomes. Police,
community groups, and researchers can share information regarding the qualities of successful and disappointing coproducutive efforts in order to replicate desired effects or modify implementations.

IVRP surveyed community leaders after 6 months about the strengths and weaknesses of these meetings, and probationers were surveyed to see whether they were taking advantage of the opportunities discussed. Law enforcement officers learned that they were not providing enough time at the meeting for community members to talk about their services, that there were no opportunities for community members to meet informally to encourage probationers and parolees to use the services, and that probationers were not taking advantage of any of the services offered. These results were used to refocus the meetings, as well as devise other strategies to provide information to probationers about services available (McGarrell & Chermak, 2003). Another example from IVRP involved a public education campaign intended to communicate a message of community intolerance of violence. These messages were relayed to the community using posters, billboards, and radio commercials. Following implementation of the campaign, interviews were conducted with individuals who had recently been arrested. Self-described gang members, who had been shown to be at high risk for being involved in firearms violence, were much more likely to report having seen these messages on city buses. This finding then helped target limited resources to the use of posters on buses as a vehicle of communication with individuals most directly affected by firearms violence (McGarrell & Chermak, 2002). In Chicago, meeting measures of the quality and amount of resident participation provide the police and community groups with information about what parts of the problem-solving process can be improved (Skogan et al., 2000). The lessons learned by IVRP and by the Chicago CAPS evaluation can be reiterated for local stakeholders and also can be shared with other jurisdictions and agencies seeking to use a similar strategy.

How Do You Measure Police-Community Building?

PCIP has devised three different measurement instruments. Each instrument measures the same five community-building dimensions but for different purposes, with different costs, and providing different levels of knowledge about community building. The choice of instrumentation for practitioners or researchers depends on the answers to three questions:

1. What are the goals and purposes in measuring the community-building processes?
2. What resources (e.g., money, time, technical skills, and energy) are available to explore these goals and purposes?
3. What degree of detail is necessary to meet the measurement goals and purposes?

Measurement Option 1 – Quick and Simple Assessment

This first measurement option, which we call the “case study protocol,” is likely to be most attractive to police departments and community groups for their own use because of its low cost and ease of implementation. The case study protocol is a paper-and-pencil assessment that asks informed individuals about different types of interactions that occurred among police-neighborhood groups in a specific
community. The protocol asks the person(s) completing it to think about how police, residents, and other organizations have interacted over a given time period. The greater the time period that respondents are asked to recall, the more memory decay may influence the accuracy of answers; however, we have found the use of a 2-year period to be feasible. The detail within the case study protocol requires that it be completed by someone who is deeply knowledgeable about police and community interactions. The level of detail about police-community building obtained with a case study protocol is weaker than the observational method (Option 3) but greater than a community survey (Option 2). The case study protocol can be used to quickly highlight critical planning and evaluation issues. It can be done on an ad hoc basis, either at the beginning of a planning period or initiative or after the completion of one, as process assessment.

The case study protocol can establish baseline data on the presence or absence of the five community-building processes described in the Appendix. For example, police departments or community groups can use the protocol to assess whether regular police-community meetings occur, what community issues are being addressed in an area, whether and what problem-solving steps are being used, whether residents are being recruited, and what organizations are being coordinated. Police administrators and neighborhood resource officers could also use the protocol for planning new initiatives because the questions within the protocol describe the range of interactions that can be initiated. For example, the protocol asks about various organizations with which the police are coordinating, including other law enforcement agencies, other criminal justice agencies, business associations, schools, etc. This type of accounting procedure may encourage the police to initiate new partnerships with community organizations that they have never worked with before. For each of the five police-community-building processes, the protocol provides examples of interactions/activities that have been attempted in real cities. The protocol essentially provides a checklist of interactions related to building community capacity that have been completed and identifies others that could be considered in the future.

The case study protocol also asks the person(s) filling it out to assess the dispersion of each of the five community-building processes across space, people, and issues in a community. For example, the protocol can be used to assess how many neighbors have access to the police sub-station, whether the entire neighborhood has permanently assigned officers, whether foot patrol is widespread or narrowly focused, and so on. Dispersion also relates to examining whether an interaction occurs across people. For example, the protocol asks the respondent to assess how representative the participants in a group meeting are of the area population or whether an initiative is attracting new resident participants beyond the usual neighborhood leaders. The protocol also examines how narrow or broad the police-community agenda is. Thus, the protocol is designed so that police, community groups, and researchers can examine how comprehensive, representative, or expansive a community-building process is in a neighborhood area.

Finally, the case study protocol can be used to examine what amount of an interaction occurred and its fluctuation over time. For example, one may find that the number of police encouragement messages to a neighborhood group about the importance of collective action was very high early on in an effort but did not occur later in the initiative. Or perhaps resident involvement in determining neighborhood issue
priorities dropped over time. Understanding fluctuations in interactions over time, which can be difficult to assess, is crucial for connecting an interaction with any measured outcomes. In terms of strategizing, it would be good for police and community groups to know whether intense involvement in one area of community building was important to positive reductions in crime or improved satisfaction or whether positive results could occur without such demanding attention to a particular community-building process.

Figure 1 presents case study data on the presence/absence of several variables measuring the steps police and residents may take to improve neighborhoods. The data illustrates how the case study protocol can be used to contrast community-building processes across seven different neighborhoods. The data used for Figure 1 is from case study protocols that were sent to the original principal investigators/evaluators who examined community policing in Spokane, Chicago, and Seattle. The following four elements were examined: (1) the breadth of improvement efforts (i.e., whether the effort was narrowly focused on a few issues or broadly focused), (2) whether police used problem-solving solutions to problems, (3) whether police officers were trained in problem solving, and (4) whether residents were involved in problem solving.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Narrow vs. Broad Focus</th>
<th>Problem-Solving Distinction</th>
<th>Training in Problem Solving</th>
<th>Problem Solving w/ Residents Involved</th>
<th>Improvement Score Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spokane - ROAR</td>
<td>Broad (2)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane - NRO</td>
<td>Broad (2)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago - Englewood</td>
<td>Narrow (1)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago - Rogers Park</td>
<td>Broad (2)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago - Morgan Park</td>
<td>Narrow (1)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago - Marquette</td>
<td>Narrow (1)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago - Austin</td>
<td>Broad (2)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Seattle</td>
<td>Narrow (1)</td>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data suggests that collaborative efforts between the police and residents to improve neighborhoods vary across these seven cases. Several of the case studies exhibited broad improvement efforts that focused on several crime, disorder, or improvement issues within the neighborhood; whereas, others tended to be more narrowly focused on one or two improvement issues. These cases also differed with respect to the degree to which problem-solving strategies were used to address these improvement issues. In the majority of the cases, the police utilized problem-solving solutions; however, there was considerable variation regarding the extent to which residents were involved in these activities. The collection of data across multiple neighborhoods in one city could assist in identifying where problem solving is taking place or where there may be a need for increased training and resident involvement in problem solving. If different neighborhoods use the same instrument, they can learn from each other.
Measurement Option 2 – Annual Survey

The second measurement option is a survey of neighborhood leaders. This survey is designed to assess police-community building across neighborhoods, through the perceptions of community leaders, on an ongoing basis. Thus, it is designed for citywide implementation on a regular basis by police, a neighborhood umbrella organization, or a partnership. The survey asks neighborhood leaders a series of questions designed to assess police-community interaction across the five community-building processes. Of the measurement options we propose, the survey is the most efficient PCIP measurement tool for examining cross-neighborhood comparisons. The survey is also capable of producing large sample sizes, which may be necessary for some kinds of analysis.

The survey data provides the least detail on community-building characteristics and dynamics but has the potential for the broadest coverage within and across cities. A cross-neighborhood record of community building is created with a single implementation of the survey. The dynamic nature of community-building processes should be assessed by repeating the survey at regular intervals (e.g., in conjunction with an annual assessment process). The survey is a relatively cheap method for measuring community-building processes, but the survey becomes more expensive (and more valuable) if it is implemented repeatedly over time, targets a large sample size, and uses telephone interviews rather than questionnaires. To implement the survey over time will require a strong commitment on the part of neighborhood organizations or police or both. Unfortunately, especially with mailed surveys, there may be a low response rate among resident respondents, unless all groups to be surveyed are committed to the process up front and see the value in using the data. Similar to the case study protocol, data is still dependent on the respondents’ knowledge and perceptions.

Information obtained from the survey could help police administrators assess how neighborhood leaders perceive levels of police-community interaction. It could also help administrators differentiate neighborhoods according to perceived levels of police-community interaction. The survey is equally as useful to neighborhood umbrella groups or coordinating councils because of its ability to differentiate neighborhoods according to perceived levels of police-community interaction. If utilized over time, the survey data can illustrate temporal changes in police-community building, which can be useful for strategic reassessments or linking community-building variation to measured outcomes.

A survey option for measuring police-community building was implemented by PCIP during the summer and fall of 2000 in Indianapolis. PCIP collected 143 block club and 83 neighborhood association surveys completed by the organization presidents. Figure 2 illustrates an aspect of police steps to identify with neighborhoods that was measured by the survey: perceptions of police accessibility to block or neighborhood residents. Police accessibility in Figure 2 is measured as the number of police organization levels (e.g., patrol, neighborhood, middle-management, upper-management) that the respondent reported as “very accessible.” It is not uncommon in the answers to this police accessibility question to find organizations who perceive none of the police officer levels as highly accessible (0 levels). Some neighborhoods, however, have high ratings of accessibility across multiple levels of the department, while other areas experience high accessibility.
in only one or two levels. Figure 2 illustrates there were only small differences between block clubs and neighborhood associations in perceived police accessibility in that city at that time. Police were generally not more accessible to neighborhood association leaders than to block club leaders.

Figure 2
Levels of Perceived Police Accessibility (Levels = None, Patrol, Neighborhood, Middle-Management, Upper-Management)

Measurement Option 3 – Regular Monitoring in a Community (Observation Protocol)

The third measurement option, the observation protocol, provides the most detailed and dynamic information regarding police-community building; therefore, it is the most complex, costly, and time-consuming tool. It is the measurement tool least likely to be utilized by practitioners and community groups unless they have considerable resources and assistance of trained researchers. The observation protocol assesses police-community building by recording events happening in or reported in community meetings where police and citizens interact to plan and report neighborhood improvements. Police and citizens often use community meetings as forums to discuss neighborhood issues, implement responses to neighborhood problems, and provide feedback on community initiatives. Community meetings are a logical place in which to measure levels of police-community building. The exact nature of the meeting might vary from city to city, depending on the kinds of resident organizations that are active.

Observations of community meetings provide the richest account of community building as it unfolds. The observation protocol can examine very specific questions, such as whether specific issues are more effective than others in organizing the community or whether specific organizations contribute to narrow or broad neighborhood agendas. For example, the observation protocol enables one to
examine whether police participation and decisionmaking only occur on crime-related issues or are nonexistent on neighborhood redevelopment issues. The other measurement tools ask those who are filling it out to generalize about their perceptions of police-community building. The observation protocol asks the observer specifically to code police-community-building characteristics/processes for each separate issue discussed at a community meeting.

Findings from the observations of police-community meetings in Indianapolis are illustrative of the value of expending the time and effort to collect this data. From July 1999 through June 2000, graduate student observers working for PCIP were present at all 26 community meetings in what is called the WESCO District of Indianapolis. The WESCO District is comprised of three neighborhoods, located in the West District of the Indianapolis Police Department (IPD). Observing meetings showed that neighborhood improvement issues, especially crime and disorder, were top concerns of community leaders and residents. Nearly 70% of the issues discussed at neighborhood meetings were concerned with efforts to improve neighborhood space.

The observational data also provides the opportunity to assess the interaction between community-building processes. For example, the data collected at the community meetings allowed us to examine who participated in raising specific neighborhood improvement issues, who made decisions about what should be done, and who has asked to respond to improvement concerns. It is interesting that a similar percentage of issues were raised by residents, police, and others (i.e., a category that includes nonvolunteer organizations and nonmunicipal police organizations in attendance at meetings). Residents raised 33% of neighborhood improvement issues, police raised 33%, and other officials raised 34% of neighborhood improvement issues. Residents would often attend meetings only in order to raise a neighborhood improvement issue.

There were interesting variations regarding who raised neighborhood improvement issues when we compared the types of improvements (i.e., neighborhood abuses or enhancements) that participating groups raised. These data are presented in Figure 3 and indicate that the police were more focused on raising issues about neighborhood “abusers,” such as responding to drug dealers and prostitutes, when compared to other groups. Residents were more likely to raise issues focused on the enhancement of neighborhood space, such as the need for neighborhood cleanups, a community center, and a local library.
The observation method not only examines who raises issues but also who helps to identify a neighborhood abuse or needed enhancement, which partners make decisions on how to achieve abuse and enhancement improvements, and who is to address such improvements. These additional aspects of participatory decisionmaking are illustrated in Figure 4. This data from WESCO indicates that when a neighborhood abuse issue was discussed at a meeting, the police contributed heavily to identifying the nature of the abuse, decided how the abuse should be addressed, and decided who should address the abuse concern. The police, however, were generally absent from decision-making processes involving neighborhood enhancement needs. Residents participated frequently in the identification of the enhancement, in deciding how to respond, and in deciding who should address an enhancement concern. It needs to be also noted, however, that the role of the residents in deciding what should be done in response to neighborhood improvement issues decreased as the discussion moved from identification of a concern to what should be done, to who should be responsible for a response. Moreover, other data (not shown) indicates that when residents were expected to have some responsibility in responding to an issue, they were often told by either the police or other organizations in attendance what their role should be. When residents were assigned responsibility for a task, residents determined what their role would be only 28% of the time. In contrast, when the other organizations or the police were assigned a role, they decided what their role was going to be over 80% of the time. Such data might suggest that residents could be more active in decisions about solutions and implementation and that agencies could do more to promote that involvement.
Discussion

The drive towards implementing police-community partnerships and coproductive strategies has outpaced our understanding of how and under what conditions police-community coproduction would create positive community outcomes (Duffee, Fluellen, & Renauer, 2000). It is the proverbial “cart before the horse” phenomenon, which is not uncommon to crime control strategies. The research of PCIP has attempted to take a step back and ask what types of interactive and coordinative processes between police and communities may produce more long-term or sustainable public safety improvements in neighborhoods. Our research suggests that sustainable, safe communities are characterized by community members who can work together effectively, and have the abilities to develop and sustain strong relationships, solve problems, and collaborate effectively to identify goals and get work done. We have identified five processes, which we call community-building processes that are related to creating community problem-solving capacity (see Appendix). Our research over the past five years has consistently confirmed that police departments around the nation engage in community-building processes. Moreover, the extent to which police departments engage in community building is measurable.

We recommend three measurement tools designed to capture levels of police involvement in community building: (1) a case study protocol, (2) an annual survey, and (3) regular observations of police-community meetings. The choice of a measurement tool depends on community goals and purposes in measuring community-building processes, available resources (e.g., money, time, technical skills, and energy), and the degree of detail necessary to meet measurement goals and purposes.

Measuring the extent to which police departments engage in these community-building processes is vitally important for furthering our understanding of the conceivable ways in which police and communities can interact to improve public safety. Ultimately, measuring police-community building will help to link police-neighborhood activities with outcomes, aid in strategic planning, and foster continual learning. Creating a “roadmap” of police-community interactions that increase the likelihood of positive community outcomes is critical but can only occur
if police, residents, researchers, and others take the time and resources to measure community-building processes.

Endnotes

1 The Police Community Interaction Project (PCIP) 1997-2002 has two broad goals: (1) To define (or identify) separate dimensions on which police-community interaction can be described and to advance the measurement of these dimensions and (2) To facilitate the use of measures of these interactions by both police departments and by neighborhood groups, rather than only by researchers. Research on these goals has included coding community policing case studies from numerous cities, observing community meetings, and surveying neighborhood leaders in Indianapolis (Duffee et al., 2002).

2 The term community in this report refers to a neighborhood. Our notion of a neighborhood is flexible enough to include collections of contiguous neighborhoods, which come together (or may be pushed together) to address certain neighborhood issues.

3 Decentralizing command or decisionmaking in police departments is an important parallel to the identification steps discussed here, but decisionmaking itself is an internal police characteristic. The identification steps are specific, direct ways of interacting with neighborhoods.

References


Brian C. Renauer, PhD, is an assistant professor in the Criminology and Criminal Justice Division at Portland State University. He specializes in community policing, community building, criminal justice policy evaluation, and urban theories of crime. Brian received his PhD (2000) from the University at Albany, State University of New York. Brian served as a member of the Police-Community Interaction Project (PCIP) research team. He is currently the principal investigator on a number of federal grants including an evaluation of the Project Safe Neighborhood’s strategy in Oregon and three Weed and Seed sites.

David E. Duffee, PhD, is a professor and associate dean in the School of Criminal Justice at the State University of New York at Albany. His interests include community change, community building, criminal justice theory, and criminal justice agency performance. He received his PhD (1974) from the University at Albany, State University of New York. David was the principal investigator for the Police-Community Interaction Project (PCIP) in the National Institute of Justice Measuring What Matters program. David’s most recent research project is entitled, Initiating a Continual Improvement Process in Residential Education Institutions for Youth. David is editor of Measurement and Analysis of Crime and Justice (Volume 4) in the National Institute of Justice series Criminal Justice 2000.
Jason D. Scott is a research scientist at Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government. His research interests include community policing, community capacity building, and social capital. Jason is a PhD candidate at the University at Albany, State University of New York. He recently served as project coordinator for the Police-Community Interaction Project (PCIP). He is currently a research scientist for the Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy at the Urban and Metropolitan Studies Program, part of the Rockefeller Institute of Government.

Steven Chermak, PhD, is an associate professor and the director of Graduate Affairs in the Department of Criminal Justice at Indiana University–Bloomington. He specializes in criminal justice administration, victims of crime, policing, sentencing, corrections, mass media and criminal justice, organizational theory, and criminology. He received his PhD (1993) from the University at Albany, State University of New York. Steven was a co-principal investigator for the Police-Community Interaction project. Steven has been a prolific researcher and publisher in criminal justice academic journals. He has also written books, including Victims in the News: Crime and the American News Media (Westview Press, 1995) and Targeting Firearms Violence Through Directed Police Patrol (Brookings Press, 2000).

Edmund F. McGarrell, Ed, PhD, is a professor and the director of the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University. He received his PhD (1983) from the University at Albany, State University of New York. His interests include communities and crime, criminal justice policy evaluation, and organizational theory. Edmund was a co-principal investigator for the Police-Community Interaction project. He is currently the principal investigator (with Tim Bynum) of an initiative sponsored by the National Institute of Justice whereby the School of Criminal Justice is providing training, technical assistance, and research in support of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN).
Appendix: Community Building Processes

1. **Steps to Improve Neighborhood Space** – The ways and extent to which organizations and residents act to reduce abuses in the use of neighborhood space or to enhance the appearance and quality of neighborhood space as a place to live.

   **Steps to Consider** – What are the *priorities* in space issues (e.g., crime, beautification)? Is the *range of issues* narrow or broad? Are problem-solving *processes* used to deal with the issues (e.g., SARA model)? Are *efforts* implemented to address improvement needs or only *discussions*? What *results* are obtained (positive, negative)?

2. **Steps to Identify with Neighborhoods** – The manner and extent to which a neighborhood is recognized as a unique place to be considered separately from other neighborhoods in the city by agencies making policies that affect the neighborhood or providing services to the neighborhood.

   **Steps to Consider** – *Decentralizing police service physically* through the use of precinct stations, district stations, mini-stations, sub-stations, etc. *Assigning officers* to particular neighborhoods. *Realigning officer beat boundaries* so that they are similar to neighborhood boundaries (depending on the size of neighborhoods). *Gathering and using neighborhood-specific information*, such as by mapping crimes geographically, or surveying citizens by neighborhood about their concerns. *Holding meetings* with neighborhood residents or groups.

3. **Steps to Encourage Resident Efforts** – The types and levels of activities to encourage residents in a neighborhood to contribute their efforts to concerted or collective action to improve the neighborhood.

   **Steps to Consider** – *Spreading a message* that instills or promotes a belief in collective action. The three elements of this message are (1) there are problems to work on or goals to achieve, (2) the residents in this area form a community, (3) collective action by community members may be effective in reaching goals. *Using the right forum* (e.g., broadcast media, news print, newsletters, informal conversation, formal meetings) for communicating that message to the intended audience. *Recruiting residents* to participate in activities. *Establishing* or helping to establish new resident organizations. *Suggesting particular tactics* for reaching objectives. *Providing training* in developing new skills or in running groups and organizations. *Providing support* such as material, facilities, funding, coordination or other assistance that might help the encouragement steps taken by other groups.

4. **Steps for Resident Participation** – The forms and degree of resident involvement and decisionmaking about the collective interests in a neighborhood.

   **Steps to Consider** – *Breadth of participation* across all members of a neighborhood: How representative are participants? What groups participate? The *size* of the resident group that participates. *Knowledge* by nonactive residents about what active residents are doing. The *phases of community action decisions* in which residents participate: *identifying issues; exploring options or alternatives; making decisions* about goal, means, and division of labor. Residents involved in *implementing action*. Residents involved in *assessing results*. 
5. **Steps for Coordinating Organizations** – The extent of coordinated interaction between two or more organizations concerning issues related to a specific geographic location in a city.

**Steps to Consider** – The number of organizations involved in coordinated effort about a neighborhood. The types of organizations involved in a coordinated effort. The range of types involved. Is this a broad effort including a variety of criminal justice, social service, government, business, resident, and other types of organizations or a narrow one involving only a few types? The frequency of organizational communication. The protocol for raising and conducting business among these organizations. Is this a formal or ad hoc coordination? The relative power and decision making patterns among organizations. The resources including material, personnel, and information that are contributed to a neighborhood project or to neighborhood improvement by the organizations.
Rethinking Gender and Community Policing: Cultural Obstacles and Policy Issues

Susan L. Miller, PhD, Professor, Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice, University of Delaware
Jessica P Hodge, MS, PhD Candidate, Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice, University of Delaware

Introduction

Gender issues complicate tensions inherent in making ideological and practical shifts from reactive, rapid response policing to proactive community-oriented models. Most police trainings and research, however, do not mention the centrality of the role that gender plays in their assessments of community policing. Gender has a profound effect in shaping officers’ responses to community policing models and images related to masculinity and femininity, which ultimately cast gender into the center of the community policing discourse. This article examines how gender shapes resistance, support, and circumvention of community policing models.

Policing is one of the most quintessential masculine professions, characterized by aggression, use of force, and power. In fact, the notion of “crime fighting” exemplifies the essence of police work in many people’s minds. Community policing, introduced in the late 1980s nationwide, challenges the masculinized ethos by prioritizing connections and cooperation between police officers and community members in addressing crime and other social problems. Thus, the goals of community policing are similar to traditional policing (e.g., fighting crime through deterrence and apprehension), but the ways in which policing is carried out varies tremendously.

No longer is the aloof, crime-control-oriented professional appropriate in community policing; rather, a more informal, relational, and conciliatory style of policing is encouraged. Roles that were previously denigrated as feminine and too “soft” or emotional for “real” police work have become the ideal qualities for community police officers to possess. Although both men and women can achieve this style, women may be more likely to be comfortable with this policing model given differences in gender role socializations and experiences. While much research suggests that women bring different styles and skills to their law enforcement responsibilities, it may be that the police occupation is too entrenched in its crime fighting ideology to embrace broader structural changes that challenge the macho culture. As such, the inability to “bend granite” (Guyot, 1979) may be most pronounced when evaluating job performances of male and female officers in a community policing context. This article explores the gendered nature of traditional police work and community policing through a review of the recent scholarship, as well as suggests policy recommendations to address the complications encountered by community police officers, particularly women, as they “do policing” within the masculine culture of police work.
Research on Women in Policing

Despite resistance to women’s entrance into policing on an equal basis with men, women have infiltrated every level of law enforcement, comprising approximately 13% of sworn officers at the municipal, county, and state level (Harrington & Lonsway, 2004). Women remain underrepresented, however, and their acceptance into the police structure and culture is marginal at best. This occurrence is not exclusive to police agencies within the United States; international studies have also found women to be underrepresented in police work (see Brown & Heidensohn, 2000; Harrington & Lonswick, 2004; Metcalfe & Dick, 2002). As Metcalfe and Dick (2002) discovered in their study of one large police force in England, women continue to be underrepresented in senior ranks. They found that men occupied almost four times as many higher level positions (e.g., sergeant).

Yet, research conducted on the effectiveness of female police officers demonstrates consistent records of success and equal effectiveness with men (Bell, 1982; Bloch & Anderson, 1974; Heidensohn, 1992; Horne, 1989). For instance, while both men and women on routine patrol use the same level of force (Worden, 1995), female officers are rarely perpetrators in cases of police use of excessive force and police brutality (Garner, Buchanan, & Hepburn, 1996; Lonsway, Wood, & Spiller, 2002). Female officers are significantly less likely to be involved in incidents of deadly force (Horvath, 1987) or corruption (Kappeler, Kappeler, & Del Carmen, 1993). In fact, studies suggest that women use less physical force (Grennan, 1987) and are better at de-escalating conflict and potential violence with citizens (Lonsway et al., 2002; Martin, 1980). Moreover, women receive more favorable evaluations and fewer complaints from citizens than their male counterparts, perhaps reflecting better communication skills used to finesse cooperation from community members and garner their trust (Lonsway et al., 2002).

Other research finds that female officers appear to hold less cynical attitudes about citizens and are more supportive of community policing efforts (Stanard and Associates, 1997; Worden, 1993). Finally, some argue that female officers excel in handling domestic violence calls in that they exhibit greater concern, patience, and understanding than male officers (Homant & Kennedy, 1985) and are more favorably rated by victims of battering (Kennedy & Homant, 1984). These evaluations of female officers’ performance indicate that women’s presence on the force may accomplish much in elevating standards of professional conduct as well as improving community-police relations. Thus, continued resistance to female officers may stem more from what women symbolize than from performance indicators (Herbert, 2001). In other words, if women can do the job as well as men, men’s resistance is an attempt to preserve the myth that police work is a job for men only (Hunt, 1984).

Research on Community Policing and Gender

The shift to community policing models redefines what constitutes police work. “Community-based policing requires police organizations to reconceptualize what is ‘real police work,’ changing the focus from individual ‘crimes’ to recurrent problems affecting order and public services” (Martin & Jurik, 1996, p. 62.) Whereas traditional models of police work primarily focus on reactive measures, community policing models concentrate on proactive measures (i.e., preventing crime before
it happens). To be proactive, community policing requires officers to build closer ties with community members. Through these contacts with community members, police officers can anticipate and resolve issues before they lead to serious crime (Birzer & Nolan, 2002; Walker & Katz, 2002).

Moreover, as Miller (1999) explains, “It is hypothesized that by increasing community members’ contact with police, suspicion and distrust between the two groups would decrease, citizen satisfaction with police would increase, quality of community life would be improved, and levels of fear would be reduced” (p. 4). Although there are many components to community policing that differentiate these models from traditional methods, the most common features are foot patrols, decentralization of power (e.g., drop-in stations), and the organization and participation of officers in community meetings and activities. In sum, community policing models emphasize social work activities that are absent from the more traditional methods of policing. As Miller asserts, “[The] image of the ideal community police officer has a social work orientation, a style that traditionally has been beyond the purview of acceptable policing” (p. 5).

With its emphasis on connection between police officers and their constituents, community policing reintroduces feminine constructs that have been traditionally devalued by the hyper-masculine police culture inherent in a crime control model of policing (Miller, 1999). Since women’s entrance into policing, they were viewed as unfit for the male job of “crime fighting” but tolerated in “softer” assignments involving interpersonal communication skills and informal conflict resolution tactics, such as handling women, children, and typewriters (Appier, 1998; Milton, 1972; Schulz, 1995). Community policing challenges these assumptions by elevating “feminine” skills such as empathy, caring, and connection, which historically were unacceptable by the male culture of traditional policing (Miller, 1999). For community policing to succeed, these denigrated skills must be repackaged so that adherents of traditional policing do not sabotage its potential for success. It is ironic that stereotypically feminine traits that once were used to exclude women’s participation from patrol, or to separate “real cops” from “office cops,” have been resurrected. The success of this resurrection, and with it community policing, depends on reshaping the unacceptable traits associated with femininity into acceptable traits associated with masculinity and “real police work,” so that “both men and women are able to deploy skills and talents in the ostensibly gender-neutral realm of community policing” (Miller, 1999, p. 95). Indeed, it may be necessary for recruitment strategies to target candidates from more diverse backgrounds, such as nursing, education, and social work (Harrington & Lonsway, 2004).

Recent research on community policing and gender in Indianapolis, St. Petersburg (Parks, Mastrofski, DeJong, & Gray, 1999), Madison (Miller, 1999), and Los Angeles (Herbert, 2001) demonstrates that police continue to resist community policing because they see it as antithetical to their masculinist self-image of aggressive crime fighters. These findings coincide with broader evaluations of community policing that reveal the biggest impediment to this new model is officer resistance (Greene, Bergman, & McLaughlin, 1994; Police Executive Research Forum, 1995; Sadd & Grinc, 1994; Sparrow, Moore, & Kennedy, 1990) or the creation of negative impacts on impoverished communities, such as in Nashville (Websdale, 2001). Herbert (2001) contends that “the rank and file resistance ... results significantly from the fact that community policing complicates entrenched gender dynamics” (p. 57). Calls
for service that do not involve tough action, bravery, or use of force are cavalierly
dismissed as “chicken shit” (Herbert, 2001) and “Mickey Mouse bull shit” (Miller,
1999) because of officers’ disparagement of what is perceived of as mere social work
(i.e., “soft” or “feminine” activities). In contrast, police scholars contend that the
bulk of police work entails peacekeeping activities, not active crime fighting, but
recognition of such order maintenance duties and service provision is never seen
as noteworthy (Banton, 1964; Bittner, 1967; Bittner, 1990; Manning, 1977).

Since community policing fosters cooperative connections between police and
citizens in a format that emphasizes peacekeeping and service provision, it stands
at odds with the images of the brave soldier, the heroic Western gunslinger, or
Dirty Harry and, in fact, is denigrated by male officers who equate such styles with
femininity (Clear & Karp, 1999; Herbert, 2001; Miller, 1999). Similarly, Herbert argues
that the introduction of complementary models of problem-oriented policing or
“zero tolerance” reinforces the traditional notion of cop-as-expert and can provide
a cover for officers who want to dodge community policing. Although ostensibly
these efforts seem to target specific community problems, what they really offer is a
way to assert that progress toward community policing goals is being accomplished,
while simultaneously reinforcing the professional/masculinist model (Herbert, 2001,
pp. 65-66).

In one of the most comprehensive studies about gender and community policing
to date, Miller (1999) found that efforts were made by (mostly male) officers to
routinely challenge efforts that appeared to reflect “feminine” versions of police
work. Male officers often asserted their masculinity by emphasizing the connection
of their roles as community police officers to traditional methods of law enforcement.
Male officers were also more likely to point out the “macho” work that they had
been involved in prior to becoming a community police officer. For example, Miller
found that male officers were eager to tell the researchers about their experiences
with units historically viewed as elite and dangerous (e.g., SWAT teams, drug and
gang squads, undercover details, and hostage negotiation teams). Moreover, Miller
discovered that male officers, unlike female officers, were quick to proclaim their
heterosexual identities: “The male NPOs deliberately wove some mention of their
heterosexual status into the interviews and fieldwork, usually offering information
about their female dating partners, wives, and children” (p. 106). Although female
officers did not assert their sexual identities in the same manner as men, they were
also concerned with their image as community police officers. Because women are
oftentimes perceived as “nurturers” and expected to be more emotional than men,
the female officers were averse to being essentialized as “perfect” for community
policing. Therefore, as the above discussion illustrates, in order for community
policing models to be effective, and for both male and female officers to be
comfortable in these roles, it is important that efforts are made to gender-neutralize
community police work.

**Lingering Questions, Future Research Ideas, and Policy
Recommendations**

Herbert (2001) suggests that one way to reform policing, or “champion” the popular
model of community policing, is to address or expand the narrow definitions of
masculinity and femininity that exist in the larger cultural context. This is necessary
since these images help to construct and justify the hyper-masculine police culture
that values crime fighting and denigrates the democracy inherent in community policing (Herbert, 2001, p. 68). Herbert, however, falls short at specifying how best to accomplish these goals.

On the other hand, Miller (1999) offers several policy recommendations developed from her research to help facilitate the transition from viewing community policing methods as “feminine” or “too soft” to a gender-neutral model that would encounter less resistance within the traditional masculinist culture of policing. The ensuing section briefly discusses a few of Miller’s policy recommendations.

- **Strive to Eliminate the “Split Force.”**
  Community policing efforts often fail because departments that have moved to this new model are described as having a “split force.” This occurs when some members within the department do not adhere to the new philosophy or are resistant to change. A “split force” can lead to an “us versus them” culture, particularly if patrol officers complain that community officers do not share in the responsibilities of “real” police work (see Pate & Shtull, 1994); therefore, it is imperative to develop strategies to strengthen and maintain connections between the two groups so that the division does not become detrimental to the success of the department. One such strategy involves regularly publicizing the work of the community officers. In doing so, patrol officers are aware of the changes being made by the community officers and their range of activities; in addition, the community officers are held accountable for their work within the neighborhoods.

- **Improve Integration of Community Officers with Routine Patrol Officers.**
  Another strategy to help transition from traditional policing to a community approach is to improve integration of community officers with routine patrol officers. Because patrol officers often do not see the work that community officers do, many of them believe that community officers are “skaters” (i.e., use the position to hide from doing work). Although some community officers do fit this description, the stigma would decrease if patrol officers were “educated” about the work that community officers do and if the two groups had more opportunities to work together to solve crime or neighborhood problems. Thus, better integration can be accomplished by developing more opportunities for teamwork. For example, the department might encourage patrol officers to participate in neighborhood activities that the community officer has organized, or the department can support troubleshooting meetings between the two groups in which they share problem-solving strategies. Another tactic to promote integration would be to create more opportunities for cross-training of patrol officers and community officers.

- **Make Community Positions More Rewarding.**
  Resistance towards community policing would decrease if these positions involved greater rewards for officers. In Miller’s (1999) research in Jackson City (a pseudonym), the structure of community policing was deliberately flexible so that a court appearance or scheduled meeting could be easily incorporated within a community police officer’s normal workday. By working flexible hours that coincide with the neighborhood’s specific needs, however, officers may feel that they are financially penalized if they lose their chances for overtime and holiday pay. Moreover, in their research on community policing in Brooklyn,
Pate and Shtull (1994) found that many officers stayed away from such jobs because of the lack of a clear reward structure. Thus, it stands to follow that if community officers received more public recognition of their accomplishments and more opportunities to display their skills, their innovations would not be downplayed vis-à-vis other units of the department. Creating ways to acknowledge accomplishments of community policing officers and rewarding stellar performances communicates institutional support and attracts more officers to the community positions.

- **Utilize Former Community Police Officers as Ambassadors.**
  Many former community officers reveal that the skills they learned and refined in their position have helped them perform better in their next job. Officers discovered that they were less skeptical about people, became more effective communicators, and were better able to use a problem-solving approach to understand situations and crises. Moreover, former community officers have found that the opportunities that they had to be creative and innovative have become a part of their current approach to policing and that they are better equipped to identify community resources and link residents with an area’s liaisons or social service providers. Because former community officers assert that the skills they developed in that role helped their subsequent job performance, it would be beneficial to highlight these officers as ambassadors to the rest of the department. In order to promote a better understanding of the roles of community officers, these individuals could share their experiences and knowledge with other officers. Not only would this provide other officers with a greater comprehension of what community policing is, but it would also challenge some of the uninformed, incorrect, and sometimes derogatory assumptions about community policing.

- **Recast “Feminine” Skills as Gender-Neutral.**
  To successfully eliminate the “feminized” stigma of community policing, the skills needed for these positions must be recast in a gender-neutral context. In other words, to reduce the stigmatized aspects of community policing, it is imperative to re-identify the skills needed to be an effective community officer without any semantic or perceptual connection to femininity or to womanly ways of “doing policing.” Although one kind of an ideal community officer is empathetic, nurturing, and expressive (traits often associated with femininity), men are more likely to accept the values of community policing if job descriptions include traits more typically associated with “manly” pursuits. One way of accomplishing this is to borrow from the ethos of the business world, a world strongly associated with masculinity. Male officers are more likely to be drawn to community policing if the job description includes qualities such as good leadership and communication skills, innovation, autonomy, and self-direction. When recasting these skills, however, it is important not to perpetuate gender stereotypes or to cast doubt about whether women are as competent as men to fulfill these roles.

- **Develop Inclusive Performance Evaluations.**
  Although it may be unintentional, performance evaluations often do not fully recognize the contributions of women to community policing. Given traditional gender-role expectations, women often do not get enough or any credit for their work because their efforts are seen as “natural” to their gender. For example, when
women in community policing situations express concern or handle interpersonal disputes of residents or families, it is expected, or perceived as nothing out of the ordinary. In other words, it is “a woman’s nature” to show empathy and to want to help others. Conversely, when male community officers express concern for members of their neighborhood or develop activities for children, they are viewed as superheroes. Since it is not expected of them (or their gender) to behave in such a manner, men are perceived as doing extraordinary work. It is, therefore, essential for superiors and administrators to be cognizant of the fact that performance evaluations may not fully acknowledge the work women do on a daily basis. This is crucial because it can have substantial consequences for the promotion process.

The policy recommendations as identified by Miller, as well as issues identified by others (e.g., Herbert, 2001), need to be addressed so that community policing models are not sabotaged without a real opportunity to be successful. If not addressed, discontent will not only continue among community and routine patrol officers but also between men and women within these roles. Without the support of rank-and-file officers, regardless of gender, community policing becomes the “fad” that many critics of this new method of policing claim it to be (Brown & Heidensohn, 2000). Consequently, community policing methods turn out to be nothing more than mere rhetoric, or political jargon, used to appease concerned constituents.

**Conclusion**

Relegating women to community-centered and victim-focused work was “not only the norm historically but also served to emphasize differences between policemen and policewomen to the detriment of the latter” (Brown & Heidensohn, 2000, p. 98). Under community policing models, police are expected to be enthusiastic about developing qualities that foster trust and connection with the residents they serve, yet these qualities are associated with “femininity” and not with masculine crime-fighting. Engaging in “emotional labor” in order to improve social relationships means that it will be difficult for community police officers to succeed in the eyes of their fellow officers who value fast action and force. This has a greater impact on female community police officers, for it makes it even less likely for them to achieve street credibility or acceptance by the informal officer culture (Fielding, 1994).

As Miller (1999) asserts, however, “Challenging police departments to be proactive and introspective seems compatible with their drive to be dynamic institutions that possess a mandate for a new kind of policing” (p. 223). As Miller (1999) further explains, it is necessary for departments to be aware of the diverse assumptions, interpretations, and consequences that exist for male and female officers; in addition, “police administrators need to anticipate that benefits accrue differently for different officers because of gender, race, and sexual orientation” (p. 223). As discussed in the policy recommendations, there are several measures that administrators and supervisors can take to reduce the conflict between community police officers and routine patrol officers. Moreover, as suggested, there are strategies that can be utilized by departments to reduce the “feminizing” of community policing roles. Since community policing differs from the traditional methods of police work, officers must learn new skills and adopt new techniques in order to be successful in their new positions. Hence, as Birzer and Nolan (2002) suggest, “If learning strategies among police officers can be identified, it would assuredly place police executives
and trainers in an advantageous position when implementing the changes required under the philosophy of community oriented policing” (p. 253).

Accordingly, until community policing can be made more androgynous, it is important to not essentialize women as “perfect” for community policing roles. Because community policing is often perceived as “soft” police work (i.e., not aggressive crime fighting), women are in danger of being stigmatized and constrained to community policing roles. As Schulz (2004) explains “…if in the future policing were to shift away from this community orientation, aligning women too closely with this style could provide ammunition for opponents of equality, particularly those who continue to believe that women’s place in policing should be determined by gender—by women’s sphere” (p. 491). Moreover, some scholars assert that all actions are “gendered” and that the lack of women in criminal justice professions results from societal gender stereotypes that confine women to selected interactions and expectations (see Martin & Jurik, 1996). In sum, it is not only important for efforts to be made to gender-neutralize the police work of community policing, it is also imperative for cultural expectations to change so that women and men are not constrained to discrete roles with limited opportunities.

**Bibliography**


**Susan L. Miller** is a professor in the Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice at the University of Delaware. She received her PhD in criminology from the University of Maryland. Her research interests include gender and crime as well as criminal justice policy related to domestic violence. She has written *Crime Control and Women: Feminist Implications of Criminal Justice Policy* (Sage, 1998), *Gender and Community Policing: Walking the Talk* (Northeastern University Press, 1999), and a forthcoming book on victims’ policies and politics (Oxford). She is currently exploring the issue of battered women arrested for domestic violence offenses.

**Jessica P Hodge** is currently working on her PhD in the Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice at the University of Delaware. She received her master’s degree in correctional administration at Western Oregon University. Her research interests include crime, law and society, and gender.
Introduction

No doubt, the concept of community policing has been riding a tidal wave of popularity for several years now. Community policing, universally praised but often ill-understood, springs from a simple premise: citizens work with the local police to reduce crime rather than respond to it. Conventional law enforcement assumes crime is a fact of life; the role of the police is to respond quickly and, whenever possible, arrest the perpetrator. Community policing, on the other hand, attempts to stop crime before it happens by creating an ordered environment. It employs obvious ideas, such as putting more officers on the streets, to complex solutions like New York City’s highly effective computer-aided crime statistics system (Lehrer, 1999).

The true practice of community policing may well provide solutions that change a community, once written off as too dangerous to patrol, into a productive, safe neighborhood. It may well provide information previously not available on perpetrators of crime, gang members, and drug dealers, and it may well change the quality of life for both the police practitioner and the public.

Another consistent theme within community policing, which is also based in this cooperative effort between the police and the community, is problem solving. Problem solving is closely associated with the decision-making process between the citizens and the police in the community policing paradigm (Goldstein, 1990; Scott, 2000). The problems indigenous to a neighborhood community or business district are defined, and solutions are generated to solve the causes of the crime or public disorder, rather than the symptoms. This problem-solving process can be a collaborative effort between the citizens and the police, or it can be conducted solely by the police officer in the course of his or her duties. “A problem-oriented approach,” as Eck and Rosenbaum (1994) explain, “does not start with a tactical solution to a problem and seek to apply it to all occurrences of the problem. Instead, it begins with the peculiar circumstances that give rise to the problem and then looks for a situational solution” (p. 9).

An additional aspect of community policing is the use of standard police tactics, such as patrols, arrests, and use of specialized units, in a slightly different manner. It entails redistributing police sources, directing an excessive amount of resources toward particular problems, and dispersing the criminal element from a particular community. By taking high-quality, standard police practices and procedures, the police flood a high-crime area in hopes of disrupting the entrenched criminal
element. The goal is to drive out the cause of crime and replace it with some type of program to keep the community free of crime and disorder (Greenburg & Gordon, 1989). This type of policing is usually directed at highly visible elements, such as open-air drug markets and street prostitutes, but can be directed toward less visible crimes, such as motor vehicle thefts and thefts from motor vehicles (Clarke & Goldstein, 2003).

The important standard when implementing and utilizing a community policing program is to put something in place of the criminal element. Common sense dictates that when the police remove themselves, the criminal element will simply return. This, then, necessitates using community programs and problem-solving cooperation with the members of community to determine what will and will not work. These three components then become components of an integral web known as community-oriented policing. The present study describes one agency’s attempt to integrate this concept within a high-profile community business district.

Literature Review

The dominance of the community policing movement is reflected not only by the growing body of literature on the topic but also by the resounding endorsement of it by national police research organizations and by the proliferation of community policing in practice (Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994, p. 3). Several factors have combined to serve as the impetus for this reorientation of the police role. For example, the results of traditional police practices [e.g., the isolation from the public, the ineffectiveness of police as crime fighters, and research that has called into question Wilson’s (1968) police management principles] led many police executives and academics to call for a new approach to policing (Skolnick & Bayley, 1986).

In practice, community policing represents a significant decision by the police and the community to change the pattern of interaction that has characterized their relationship in the past. The potential for change can range from very nominal to complete changes in the organization of the department. For some departments, community policing is simply a public relations strategy consisting of a small COP section within the department and new door and fender stickers. Indeed, in recent years, community policing in its many forms has become so much the catch phrase of police managers and politicians that it is the rare chief, sheriff, or other law enforcement agency head who would admit that his or her department is not practicing it. As reported in a recent issue of Community Policing Exchange, . . .

[s]urveys done by the Police Executive Research Forum and the National Center for Community Policing in conjunction with the FBI confirm that roughly two out of three police agencies in major jurisdictions report that they have adopted some form of community policing or plan to do so in the near future. If that sounds too good to be true, at least in part, it is; the NCCP/FBI research showed that three out of four police agencies that claim to be doing community policing do not allow the community a voice in identifying, prioritizing and solving problems. (Community Policing Consortium, 1995, p. 1)

And just what does it mean? Increasingly, there is the recognition that community policing can represent a rather fundamental change in the orientation of the police department. Some maintain that community policing is simply “old wine in new
bottles” and that the professional model is too deeply entrenched to result in any substantive change in how policing is accomplished (Sykes, 1986). On the other hand, some departments recognize that organizational change, in reality, represents a rather fundamental reorientation of how they are attempting to perform their mission in the community.

Today, what community policing means may depend largely on the identity of the speaker or writer describing it. To one law enforcement manager, community policing may equal police public relations and little more. To others, it may refer to a completely new outlook on law enforcement in which local citizens work in partnership with “their” officers to solve crime or disorder problems of mutual concern. Therein lies the problem: The catch phrase “community policing” is widely used with little regard for its sum or substance, and precisely what constitutes community policing varies from one organization to the next. Political leaders and, unfortunately, many police administrators lock onto the label for the positive images it evokes but often fail to invest in or understand the concept itself.

Indeed, the popularity of such terms as “community-based” and “problem-oriented” policing have resulted in their being used to encompass practically all innovations in policing, from the most enterprising to the most routine. Indeed, advocates of these policing innovations have continued to express disappointment with projects reported in their names (Clarke, 1998; Reed & Tilley, 2000; Scott, 2000; Scott & Clarke, 2001). With such broad expectations, the use of community-oriented policing creates enormous problems for those seriously interested in bringing about meaningful change in traditional American police techniques.

One reaction to this dilemma is to press for a simplified definition, to seek consensus on a pure model of community-involved policing. The pressure toward simplification is joined by well-intentioned practitioners who, understandably, want to know in specific detail, what they are supposed to do. Nonetheless, there exists some common ground upon which an understanding of community policing can be built.

First, community policing is a philosophy or perspective for an entire law enforcement operation or organization. It is not a separate, distinct, specialized police unit. It also requires a diversity of approaches ranging from vehicle patrol to foot beats and from information-gathering to hard-nosed enforcement. It can be all of these things and a good deal more. Lastly, community policing is a partnership between the police and the community—an interactive relationship based on the cooperative ideal of working together on solving problems of crime, fear of crime, and disorder, thereby enhancing the overall quality of life in their neighborhoods.

The decision to initiate a community-policing program represents a recognition by both the police and the community that the previous patterns of interaction have not been effective in confronting the crime and disorder problems that the community faces. In the fall of 1998, the Chatham County Police Department contracted with the Armstrong Atlantic State University Public Service Center to conduct an evaluation of the department’s community-oriented policing program to assist businesses in the Gateway Savannah commercial business district to reduce the incidence of motor vehicle theft and theft from motor vehicles. The program consisted of a number of community-based and problem-oriented police activities that the department believed would reduce these offenses.
Historical Background

The principal strategies upon which traditional American law enforcement are based are changing. Historically, police work meant maintaining order. A few decades ago, the United States consisted of a large number of immigrant communities, socially separated by custom and language. Immigrant workers were often poorly educated. Reports of police battles with bar-hopping laborers were not uncommon. Arrests were infrequent, but “street justice” was often imposed through the use of the “billy club” or “blackjack.” In these historical settings, the watchman style of policing was appropriate, and many citizens expected it (Wilson, 1968).

Over time, however, American communities changed. From shortly after the turn of the century until the 1960s, the legalistic style of policing became dominant (Reid, 2000). Two-way radios replaced call boxes, and the motor vehicle replaced the traditional “foot-patrol.” That style of policing and professionalism had isolated officers from the community. Police crime prevention activities were little more than a public relations function to improve the community’s image of law enforcement. Minorities, who were under-represented among the police, viewed them as occupation troops (Mann, 1993). A legalistic response like an arrest could ignite a whole neighborhood and lead to a riot—and still does in communities where reform programs have not been thoroughly implemented.

The decade of the 1960s was one of unrest, fraught with riots and student activism. The Vietnam War, civil rights concerns, and other burgeoning social movements produced large demonstrations and marches. The police, who were generally inexperienced in crowd control, often found themselves embroiled in tumultuous encounters with citizen groups. The police came to be seen by many as agents of “the establishment.” Only after the riots leveled Watts in Los Angeles and Newark, New Jersey, did it occur to the government in general, and the police in particular, that a totally new approach was needed, one that reached out and made the police part of the community. Research revealed that the cornerstones of modern police operations were, by themselves, ineffective. The legalistic style of policing began to yield to the newer “professional” style.

Since that time, crime prevention officers have played a critical role in educating the public and stimulating their participation in standardized programs, such as Neighborhood Watch, Operation Identification, and Security Surveys (see Garofalo & McLeod, 1989). Even so, most law enforcement administrators continue to view these police activities as auxiliary and tangential to “real” police work; for this reason, police crime prevention programs never have received the status or the resources needed to function adequately (Rosenbaum, 1994). Thus, if crime prevention activities are to receive the attention they deserve, they are unlikely to do so through these traditional roles. Such attention is more likely to come as a result of some fundamental changes in the definition of “real” police work.

Although the history of modern police reform and innovation is characterized by a sequence of failures and false starts, there is some reason to be optimistic that such changes are beginning to take shape. Such change is commonly referred to as “community-oriented policing”—an umbrella term for a wide variety of community-based police activities that share a common set of principles or values (Murphy & Muir, 1984), coupled with the wisdom of power sharing and decentralized
decisionmaking (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990). A second innovation that has been widely endorsed by the American and British police is “problem-oriented policing”—a more prescribed approach to addressing neighborhood concerns through the identification and analysis of specific problems, followed by the development, implementation, and evaluation of specific solutions (Goldstein, 1990; Scott, 2000).

Research over the past 30 years has highlighted the limitations of traditional police “beat patrol” practices. Armed with evaluation data, researchers have challenged the crime-control effectiveness of random motorized patrols (Josi, Donahue, & Magnus, 2000; Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, & Brown, 1974), rapid police response to the crime scene (Cahn & Tien, 1980; Kansas City Police Department 1977; Spelman & Brown, 1984), criminal investigations (Eck, 1983; Greenwood, Chaiken, & Petersilia, 1977), and traditional crime analysis (Gay, Beall, & Bowers, 1984). In essence, considerable time and effort have been expended to improve police management and efficiency, but the fundamental approach to policing has, in large part, remained the same: responding to and investigating individual citizen calls for service in a reactive fashion (rather than seeking to identify and address community problems) and treating local citizens as passive recipients of police services (rather than as coproducers of public safety). More of the same thing with greater efficiency does not translate into greater effectiveness.

Most research on policing not only suggests that improvements in traditional policing have had little, if any, effect on crime and public perceptions; it also points to the importance of the citizen’s role in solving crime. Information provided by ordinary citizens—not fancy detective work—is the basis for most criminal arrests. Also, nationally funded programs like the Weed and Seed initiative have taught police that local residents are the main source of information about the many neighborhood problems that concern the community. In sum, innovative police agencies began to see that a new approach to policing was needed—an approach to strengthen the cooperation between police and citizens in solving local problems, an approach that places the police officers where they started in 1829, back into the local neighborhoods.

Community-Oriented Policing

Although no single definition exists, the term community-oriented policing is generally considered to mean (in part) programs and policies based on a commitment to a partnership between the police and the community they serve. The emphasis is on working in collaboration with residents to determine community needs and how best to address them and to involve citizens as “co-producers of public safety” (Cordner & Trojanowicz, 1992).

Community policing attempts to help the members of a community feel safer by targeting both “hard” crime and nuisance offenses that breed disorder in a single area or throughout a jurisdiction. The idea is to involve the same police officer or officers, assigned to a given area, in identifying problems and mutually developing solutions in conjunction with the citizens who live and work in that community. This may require a single officer or a team of them to remain assigned to a specific geographic area and a specific problem long enough to develop personal ownership in the situation and good relations with the people affected by it. Community
policing does not result in an overnight “fix” but rather requires patient, long-term treatment and observation.

Problem Solving

Goldstein (1979, 1990, 1996) maintained that reacting to calls for service was only the first step. Police should go further by attempting to find a permanent solution to the problem that created the call. Goldstein called his alternative the “problem-oriented approach.” Problem solving policing is a direct extension of Goldstein’s approach. Indeed, the active solicitation of a community’s help in identifying and then solving the difficulty is, at least for many police officers and the agencies employing them, a new direction. Problem-solving policing in its true form only exists when the community or some element of it in addition to the police participates in the problem identification, analysis, and solution process.

The theory behind problem-solving policing is simple. Underlying conditions create problems. These conditions might include the characteristics of the people involved (e.g., offenders, potential victims, and others), the social setting in which these people interact, the physical environment, and the way the public deals with these conditions (Goldstein, 1979).

A problem created by these conditions may generate one or more incidents. These incidents, while stemming from a common source, may appear to be different. For example, social and physical conditions in a deteriorated apartment complex may generate burglaries, acts of vandalism, intimidation of pedestrians by rowdy teenagers, and other incidents. These incidents, some of which come to police attention, are symptoms of the problem. The incidents will continue so long as the problem that creates them persists.

The traditional police response would deal with each incident separately. Like aspirin, this symptomatic relief is valuable but limited. Because police typically leave the condition that created the incidents untouched, the incidents are very likely to recur.

In a problem-oriented response, police officers continue to handle to calls, but they do much more. They use the information gathered in their responses to incidents, together with information obtained from other sources, to get a clearer picture of the problem. They then address the underlying conditions. If they are successful in ameliorating these conditions, fewer incidents may occur, and those that do occur may be less serious. The incidents may cease altogether. At the very least, information about the problem can help police to design more effective ways of responding to each incident (Goldstein, 1979).

Even the most vocal advocates of problem-solving policing do not claim that the approach works every time and with every sort of problem. Many acknowledge the continuing need for officers who do traditional police tasks. Realistically, the problem-solving concept is but one additional piece of equipment in law enforcement’s effort to combat crime.
Research Objective

In November 1998, the Chatham County Police Department contracted with the Armstrong Atlantic State University Public Service Center to conduct an evaluation of the department’s program to assist businesses in the Gateway Savannah commercial district to reduce the incidence of motor vehicle theft and theft from motor vehicles. The program consisted of a number of strategic police activities that police believed would reduce these offenses. Program implementation began in January 1999 and continued throughout the remainder of the year.

The target area, Gateway Savannah, is located at the intersection of U.S. Interstate 95 and Georgia Highway 204. Over several years, a fairly large commercial district has developed at this location. Approximately five miles from the Savannah, Georgia, city limits, the first northbound interchange off Interstate 95 leads directly to the city. It is also a busy stopover for travelers, tourists, and county residents for fuel, food, lodging, and casual shopping. The business district consists of at least half a dozen restaurants, a dozen hotels, a golf course, and approximately four dozen stores. The location and type of commercial enterprises at Gateway Savannah make it an attractive target for, among other things, car theft and opportunistic theft from motor vehicles. Typically, the crime victims are travelers; the suspects, when identified—which is very rare—are locals. Quick access to the interstate (as well as GA 204, a four-lane, divided highway) make escape for perpetrators quick, easy, and less likely to be detected. Given these circumstances, the Chatham County Police Department recognized the challenge of providing effective and innovative, as well as traditional, efforts to reduce the attractiveness of this target area to opportunistic property criminals.

To gauge the effectiveness of its program, the police department was interested in two general measures: (1) actual reductions in the reported offenses of motor vehicle theft and theft from motor vehicles (including illegal entry) and (2) the perceptions of those working or owning businesses in the target area (commonly called stakeholders) about crime, personal safety, and the quality of police service. To that end, researchers developed a survey to collect data on stakeholder perceptions and opinions.

To establish baseline data for subsequent comparisons, the research staff collected and analyzed motor vehicle theft and theft from motor vehicle incident data from the Chatham County Police Department for the period of July through December 1998. In addition, the department administered a stakeholder survey to respondents in January 1999 to collect information on perceptions about crime and police service for the previous year (1998).

In January 2000, this process was repeated. Crime reports on motor vehicle theft and theft from motor vehicles for June through December 1999 were analyzed and compared with the results for 1998. Stakeholder surveys were again completed by businesses in the target area for 1999, and the findings were compared with survey results from 1998.
Methods

Research Setting
The target area, Gateway Savannah, is composed of a large cluster of gasoline stations, restaurants, hotels, motels, and clothing and tourist shops located at the juncture of U.S. Interstate 95 and Georgia Highway 204. For northbound interstate traffic, this juncture is the first exit into Savannah, Georgia. To assess the impact of police intervention in the target area, the research staff used stakeholder survey results and police agency archival data.

Data Collection
The survey included questions about the respondents’ . . .

- Perceptions of safety in the target area.
- Crime victimizations.
- Opinions about the quality of police service to the area.
- Security measures taken by the respondents.
- Views about relative changes in crime rates.

In late 1998, project evaluation staff, along with a police department representative, met with the business council for the target area to explain the role of evaluation to the project and to receive feedback on the previously circulated draft questionnaire. A few minor changes were suggested, and all were incorporated into the final draft.

Police personnel associated with the project disseminated the self-administered instrument to respondents in January 1999 and again in January 2000 to permit comparisons of responses for the year prior to police intervention (1998) with the year following (1999). The respondents to the survey for both years were business owners or managers of the commercial establishments in the target area.

The chief criminal complaint of businesses at Gateway Savannah was auto theft and theft from auto. Because of the target area’s close proximity to the interstate, many stakeholders believed that a criminal’s quick escape without detection made motor vehicles at the Gateway location more attractive targets. Archival data consisted of 1997 and 1998 police crime reports for the offenses of motor vehicle theft and theft from motor vehicle at Gateway Savannah. These were compared for any changes from 1998 through 1999.

Independent Variable
Police intervention strategies consisted of several activities typically viewed as part of the rubric of community policing. Chief among them were education programs aimed at stakeholders and their employees and increased police surveillance of areas where and when theft from auto, entering an auto, or motor vehicle theft were more likely. The department also conducted periodic demonstration projects to educate business owners, managers, and employees on the latest techniques used by criminals to gain access to vehicles and business property and to show effective strategies to thwart the perpetrators. In addition, police personnel met
every other week with stakeholders or their representatives to exchange information on developments of mutual interest.

Data Analysis
To compare any changes in the target area, data collected from the survey was cross-tabulated by year. Several, but not all, items or questions on the survey yielded useful information. For example, all businesses resorted to security and protection devices that did not change from one year to the next. The discussion contained in this article will address only those survey items that contained important information.

Given the measurement level of the data, a chi-square statistic ($X^2$) was used to determine whether changes in responses to the questions from 1998 to 1999 were due to chance or some real change in the target area. The conventional critical value of $p=.05$ was selected. That is, to reject the null hypothesis that there are no real differences between years 1998 and 1999, the $p$ value must be .05 or less to avoid the risk of assuming that a true null hypothesis (i.e., there are no differences between years 1998 and 1999) is false. In other words, it is conventional to accept no more than a 5% risk of claiming a difference or a change is real, when it is, in fact, due only to chance. A chi-square statistic ($X^2$) with nominal level data permits us to ascertain this.

The analysis of archival crime data (i.e., incidents of motor vehicle theft, theft from a motor vehicle, and illegal entry of a motor vehicle) consisted primarily of comparisons in offense rates and associated characteristics between 1998 (before organized and systematic police intervention efforts were undertaken) and 1999 (after these measures were implemented). The purpose of these analyses was to determine whether any statistically significant changes had occurred in the reported incidents of these offenses. Evaluation staff also examined the distribution of these crimes by day of week, hour of day, location within the target area, type of vehicle targeted, method of entry or theft, and the value of property loss.

Results
Analysis of Police Report Data
Table 1 depicts the results of our analysis of archival data. The frequency distributions of motor vehicle theft and theft from motor vehicles for the target area for years 1998 and 1999 indicate that there were two more such incidents in 1999 (29 versus 27) for a total of 56 offenses for the 2 years combined. Of these 56, only 7 (12.5%) were crimes of motor vehicle theft, 2 of which occurred in 1998. Furthermore, the incidence of theft from a motor vehicle was virtually identical for both years (25 in 1998 and 24 in 1999). What this data underscores is the stability of these offenses over the 2-year period of the project.

The third category, “type of vehicle,” displays the kinds of vehicles targeted by criminals for theft and illegal entry. General Motors, Ford/Lincoln/Mercury, and foreign makes (chiefly Japanese) show rough parity in terms of the likelihood of being preyed upon by criminals (29%, 34%, and 30%, respectively). Although there was a proportionate decrease in the number of GM cars broken into or stolen (from 37% in 1998 to 21% in 1999) and a proportionate increase by 14% in Chrysler cars targeted, neither of these shifts was statistically significant.
The fourth category shows the distribution of these offenses by day of week. Not surprisingly, Friday (at 16%), Saturday (at 21%), and Sunday (at 18%) accounted for the lion’s share (55%) of the incidents for the 2-year period. Interestingly, these 3 days account for only 44% in 1998 but almost two-thirds (66%) in 1999. This is due to a notable, but not statistically significant ($X^2 = 5.79, p > .44$), shift for Sundays and Mondays. From 1998 to 1999, auto theft and theft from auto on Sundays rose from 2 (7%) to 8 (28%); on Mondays, they fell from 6 (22%) to 2 (7%). However interesting this data may be, the lack of statistical significance suggests that these changes are due to chance. The frequencies of these offenses on any particular day are too low to be interpretable.

The distribution of motor vehicle crimes by location within the target area is presented in category five “commercial location.” For either year, the parking lot adjacent to the Cracker Barrel restaurant accounts for a disproportionate number of thefts from auto, entering an auto, or auto theft (7 or 26% in 1998; 16 or 55% in 1999; 41% or 2 of every 5, overall). During the same period, offenses at the Holiday Inn declined from 5 to 1. When the category is collapsed comparing the Cracker Barrel with all other locations combined, the increase from 7 to 16 incidents from 1998 to 1999 is statistically significant ($X^2 = 11.45, p < .001$). Put another way, the likelihood of this increase being due to chance is less than one in a thousand.

Category seven shows the distribution of offenses by method of entry for theft. Overall and by year, perpetrators preferred smashing, breaking, or forcing windows and window vents to gain entry to the automobile or truck (17 or 63% in 1998, 23 or 79% in 1999, 40 or 71% overall). For the 2 years of the project, more than 1 in 10 owners left their cars unsecured or locked their keys in the vehicle, either way facilitating illegal entry. This declined from 5 in 1998 to 2 in 1999, but given the small numbers to begin with, this is not a significant decline. The last category collapses the distribution to isolate the increase in window breakage as a means of entry from all other methods. As can be seen, this rise is just short of statistical significance ($X^2 = 3.44, p = .07$).
Table 1
1998/1999 Chatham County Police Report Data Distribution for Gateway Savannah

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Data</th>
<th>1998 n (%)</th>
<th>1999 n (%)</th>
<th>Totals n (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Thefts (MVT) and Thefts From Motor Vehicles (TFMV)</td>
<td>27 (48.2%)</td>
<td>29 (51.8%)</td>
<td>56 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Offense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>5 (17%)</td>
<td>7 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thefts From Motor Vehicles</td>
<td>25 (93%)</td>
<td>24 (83%)</td>
<td>49 (87%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Vehicle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Motors</td>
<td>10 (37%)</td>
<td>6 (21%)</td>
<td>16 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford/Lincoln/Mercury</td>
<td>9 (33%)</td>
<td>10 (35%)</td>
<td>19 (34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrysler/Plymouth</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
<td>4 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Make</td>
<td>8 (30%)</td>
<td>9 (31%)</td>
<td>17 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day of the Week</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td>6 (22%)</td>
<td>6 (21%)</td>
<td>12 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>8 (28%)</td>
<td>10 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>5 (15%)</td>
<td>5 (17%)</td>
<td>9 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday</td>
<td>4 (15%)</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
<td>8 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>6 (22%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>8 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td>4 (15%)</td>
<td>3 (10%)</td>
<td>7 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Location</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cracker Barrel</td>
<td>7 (26%)</td>
<td>16 (55%)</td>
<td>23 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holiday Inn</td>
<td>5 (19%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>6 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ride Share</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>3 (10%)</td>
<td>5 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoney's</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>3 (10%)</td>
<td>4 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleep Inn</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Western</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denney's</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-95/204 Underpass</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6 (22%)</td>
<td>3 (10%)</td>
<td>9 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cracker Barrel vs. All Others*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cracker Barrel</td>
<td>7 (26%)</td>
<td>16 (55%)</td>
<td>23 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Locations Combined</td>
<td>20 (74%)</td>
<td>13 (45%)</td>
<td>33 (59%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method of Entry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Window (forced/broken/smashed)</td>
<td>17 (63%)</td>
<td>23 (79%)</td>
<td>40 (71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlocked/Keys in Ignition</td>
<td>5 (19%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>7 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exterior Theft</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>4 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>5 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Window Entry vs. All Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smashing/Breaking Windows</td>
<td>17 (63%)</td>
<td>23 (79%)</td>
<td>40 (71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Methods of Entry</td>
<td>10 (37%)</td>
<td>6 (21%)</td>
<td>16 (29%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant at .001

Not unexpectedly, the bulk of motor vehicle thefts and thefts from motor vehicles occur undetected. In short, they are “discovery crimes,” not crimes that are typically reported while “in progress.” Consequently, it is rare that the victim can pin down the time of occurrence for the responding officer. For these kinds of offenses, two times are usually entered on the officer’s report. “Time 1” constitutes the last time the victim observed the vehicle undisturbed. “Time 2” represents the time in which the crime is reported to the police. In Table 2, data is aggregated in 4-hour blocks.
Table 2
Distribution of MVT and TFMV by Time of Day

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of Day (4-hour increments)</th>
<th>Time #1 n (%)</th>
<th>Time #2 n (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:00 AM - 2:00 PM</td>
<td>19 (35%)</td>
<td>16 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:01 PM - 6:00 PM</td>
<td>12 (22%)</td>
<td>10 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:01 PM - 10:00 PM</td>
<td>13 (24%)</td>
<td>12 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:01 PM - 2:00 AM</td>
<td>03 (6%)</td>
<td>01 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02:01 AM - 06:00 AM</td>
<td>01 (2%)</td>
<td>04 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06:01 AM - 10:00 AM</td>
<td>06 (11%)</td>
<td>11 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>54 (100%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>54 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Lag Time (from Time #1 to Time #2)</th>
<th>1998 hours (n)</th>
<th>1999 hours (n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Time in Hours</td>
<td>4.53 (25)</td>
<td>3.53 (29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As one can see, there are only small proportional variations between Time 1 and Time 2. For example, for the 54 incidents combined (for 2 incidents, no times were recorded on the police reports), 35% of the victims reported their vehicles undisturbed between the hours of 10:00 AM and 2:00 PM, 22% between 2:01 PM and 6:00 PM, and 24% between 6:01 PM and 10:00 PM. In other words, 10:00 AM to 10:00 PM accounts for 80% of all reports for Time 1. Time 1, of course, is probably a function of three behavioral patterns typical of Gateway clients and travelers checking into hotels or motels, travelers and residents stopping to dine at area restaurants, and residents leaving their automobiles at Ride Share. The percentages for these blocks of time for discovery and reporting (Time 2) were, respectively, 30%, 19%, and 22% or a combined total of 71%. The discrepancy of 9% between these tables is accounted for by the time slot of 6:01 AM to 10:00 AM. Only 11% are accounted for by this time period (Time 1); on the other hand, this time accounts for 20% in Time 2. We speculate that this too is a product of a typical practice exhibited by many Gateway customers—in this case, checking out of the hotel or motel only to discover that the car has been stolen or broken into.

Table 2 also depicts the average difference between Time 1 and Time 2 (i.e., the lag time between observing the vehicle undisturbed and the time of the discovery and reporting of the offense) for 1998 and 1999. The lag time averaged about 4 hours for the 2 years combined (4.5 hours for 1998 and 3.5 hours for 1999).

Table 3 describes the property loss due to motor vehicle theft and theft from auto for years 1998 and 1999. The unadjusted loss in dollars for the target area customers in 1998 totaled an estimated $165,261, with an average loss of $6,121 per victim. The figures for 1999 were $112,324 and $3,873, respectively; however, the research staff noticed three atypical incidents reported to the police (two in 1998 and one in 1999) that skewed these figures. Two involved costly thefts, one from a commercial tool truck (loss valued at $48,000), and the other, the victim’s life savings, jewelry, etc. ($84,275) from her motor home. The third involved the theft of a restored classic automobile ($60,000). Adjusting for these anomalies, the total loss of property due to motor vehicle theft and theft from a motor vehicle for 1998 was $32,986 or an average of $1,319 per victim. The corresponding adjusted figures for 1999 were $52,324 and $1,869, respectively.
### Table 3
1998/1999 MVT and TFMV Property Loss (Gateway Savannah)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1998 $ (n)</th>
<th>1999 $ (n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sum of Losses in Dollars (unadjusted)</td>
<td>$165,261 (27)</td>
<td>$112,324 (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Unadjusted Loss in Dollars/Theft</td>
<td>6,121</td>
<td>3,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum of Losses in Dollars (adjusted)</td>
<td>$32,986 (25)</td>
<td>$52,324 (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Adjusted Loss in Dollars/Theft</td>
<td>1,319</td>
<td>1,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range in Dollars</td>
<td>0 to 84,275</td>
<td>0 to 60,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Analysis of Stakeholder Survey Data

Table 4 details the results of the analysis of the stakeholder survey data. Survey questionnaires were administered to business owners, managers, or employees for many of the businesses located in the target area (Gateway Savannah commercial district) for calendar years 1998 and 1999. A total of 28 business representatives returned surveys for 1998; in 1999, 50 businesses participated in the survey. Because many surveys were returned anonymously, the reason for the discrepancy in these numbers cannot be confidently ascertained. We do know that in the first instance (1998), a representative from the target-area business council assumed responsibility for the distribution and retrieval of the surveys to all stakeholders. In the second administration (1999), the police department supervised the distribution and collection of survey instruments. In addition to this, there may have been more interest on the part of businesses to participate in the 1999 survey because of increased police activity, coupled with the growth of business in the target area during 1999. As explained in the previous section, the survey asked 38 questions of businesses. These questions asked respondents about their perceptions of safety, criminal victimizations, the quality of police service, current security measures, and crime trends relative to the target area. This survey was administered in January 1999 and again in January 2000.
Table 4
1998/1999 Gateway Savannah Stakeholder Survey Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Concern</th>
<th>Yes n (%)</th>
<th>No n (%)</th>
<th>Total n (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Crime in Gateway Area?</td>
<td>14 (52%)</td>
<td>13 (48%)</td>
<td>27 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>13 (48%)</td>
<td>27 (57%)</td>
<td>47 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(X²=.281, p&gt;.50)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerned for Personal Safety?</td>
<td>14 (50%)</td>
<td>14 (50%)</td>
<td>28 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>20 (42%)</td>
<td>28 (58%)</td>
<td>48 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(X²=.217, p&gt;.60)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerned for Safety of Property?</td>
<td>14 (50%)</td>
<td>14 (50%)</td>
<td>28 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>27 (57%)</td>
<td>20 (43%)</td>
<td>47 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(X²=.149, p&gt;.70)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary Likely?</td>
<td>9 (33%)</td>
<td>18 (67%)</td>
<td>27 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>25 (52%)</td>
<td>23 (48%)</td>
<td>48 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(X²=.168, p&gt;.20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft Likely?</td>
<td>13 (48%)</td>
<td>14 (52%)</td>
<td>27 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>18 (38%)</td>
<td>29 (62%)</td>
<td>47 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(X²=.680, p&gt;.70)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft from Motor Vehicle Likely?</td>
<td>17 (63%)</td>
<td>10 (37%)</td>
<td>27 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>27 (57%)</td>
<td>20 (43%)</td>
<td>47 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(X²=.220, p&gt;.60)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Damage to Property Likely?</td>
<td>8 (29%)</td>
<td>20 (71%)</td>
<td>28 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>24 (51%)</td>
<td>23 (49%)</td>
<td>47 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(X²=.364, p&gt;.055)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery Likely?</td>
<td>13 (46%)</td>
<td>15 (54%)</td>
<td>28 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>19 (40%)</td>
<td>28 (60%)</td>
<td>47 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(X²=.260, p&gt;.60)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated Assault Likely?</td>
<td>9 (32%)</td>
<td>19 (68%)</td>
<td>28 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>16 (34%)</td>
<td>31 (66%)</td>
<td>47 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(X²=.04, p&gt;.80)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported Crime to the Police?</td>
<td>9 (69%)</td>
<td>4 (31%)</td>
<td>13 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>18 (67%)</td>
<td>9 (33%)</td>
<td>27 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(X²=.0252, p&gt;.90)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 seems to indicate that respondents were more fearful of crime in the target area prior to police activity (1998) than the year following police intervention; however, this decrease in the fear of crime from the first to the second year (from 52% to 43%) is not statistically significant (X² = .281, p > .50).

The second category in Table 4 cross-tabulates concerns for personal safety by year. Respondents in the 1999 survey indicate a reduced concern, as compared with respondents the previous year (42% versus 50%), but again this decline is not statistically significant (X² = .217, p > .60). Interestingly, respondents evince a slight
increase in concerns for their property in the target area (from 50% in 1998 to 57% in 1999), but this finding too was not statistically significant ($X^2 = 149, p > .70$).

Categories 4 through 9 depict the results to questions of whether, in the upcoming year in the target area, respondents believed they would be the likely victims of burglary, motor vehicle theft, theft from their motor vehicle, vandalism or criminal damage to property, robbery, or aggravated assault. Response choices to each of these questions was limited to “very likely,” “somewhat likely,” “not very likely,” and “not at all likely.” To facilitate analysis and the presentation of results, these four categories were collapsed to read “yes” (as in very likely or somewhat likely) and “no” (as in not very likely or not at all likely). Stakeholders responding to the January 1999 survey showed a marked increase in the expectation of being the victim of a burglary at their business in the target area in 1999 than did those interviewed a year earlier for 1998 (52% to 33%). Although this rise was not statistically significant ($X^2 = 1.68, p > .20$), it is noteworthy that fully one-third to one-half of all respondents believed a burglary to a business likely. A similar proportionate rise is noted for criminal damage to property. This increase (from 29% in 1998 to 51% in 1999) approached, but failed to reach, statistical significance ($X^2 = 3.641, p > .055$). Again, half of the respondents expected to be victims of vandalism in the upcoming year.

The opposite trend, though also not statistically significant ($X^2 = .680, p > .70$) was evident for the crime of motor vehicle theft. Although 48% expected to be a victim in 1998, that proportion dropped to 38% in 1999. Likewise, a slightly smaller fraction of the sample for 1999 (57%) anticipated that someone would steal something from (or break into) vehicles parked on their premises than in 1998 (63%). This difference is not statistically significant ($X^2 = .220, p > .60$), but what is again striking is that in both years, an unmistakable majority of respondents believed that motor vehicles on their property would be likely targets of theft.

Categories eight and nine show only slight changes for robbery and aggravated assault, respectively, and neither was statistically significant. In 1998, 46% of respondents expected a robbery to take place on their premises; in 1999, the figure dropped to 40%. For aggravated assault, the figures were virtually identical (32% in 1998 and 34% in 1999). As with the other offenses, what is striking is the high proportion of respondents in both years that expected robbery and aggravated assault to occur or in their business premises (4 of 10 for robbery and 3 of 10 for assault).

The last category in Table 4 shows the proportion of businesses in the target area that said they reported crimes to the police for the 2 years of the study. As can be seen, they are nearly the same. Of the 13 who said they were victims of crime, 69% reported it to the police in 1998. Of the 27 crime victims in 1999, 67% called the police. In short, nearly 7 in 10 respondents affirmed that they had reported crime at Gateway Savannah to the Chatham Police during that 2-year period.

Table 5 indicates the proportion of businesses in each of the 2 years that said they were victims of at least one crime, by type of offense, regardless of whether they reported it to the police. Although the table shows some differences between 1998 and 1999 (e.g., up in burglary, theft from motor vehicles, vandalism, and “other” offenses; down in motor vehicle theft, robbery, and aggravated assault), none of these shifts is statistically significant.
Table 5
Percent of Businesses Reporting at Least One Crime by Type of Crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Crime</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>7.40%</td>
<td>10.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft (MVT)</td>
<td>3.80%</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft From a Motor Vehicle (TFMV)</td>
<td>9.20%</td>
<td>14.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td>12.20%</td>
<td>16.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>11.10%</td>
<td>6.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated Assault</td>
<td>7.40%</td>
<td>6.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Crimes</td>
<td>11.50%</td>
<td>16.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were also asked to rate police service as “excellent,” “good,” “fair,” or “poor.” While this question was intended only for those who actually reported crimes to the police, 24 of the 28 survey subjects in 1998 and 39 of the 50 in 1999 responded. Although not statistically significant, 25% of the 1998 sample rated police service as “excellent” and 75% as “good.” This improved to 36% “excellent” and 57% “good” in 1999. It’s important to also note that for all 63 respondents over the 2-year period, only three (5%) rated the police as “fair,” and none rated them as “poor.”

Conclusions

A comparison of results (in either crime rates or stakeholder views) before and after the implementation of community policing strategies showed, on the whole, little variation. For example, the incidence of target offenses, the types of vehicles targeted by thieves, the day of week and the time of day of occurrence, and the adjusted property loss to victims due to theft were relatively consistent for 1998 and 1999. On the other hand, the shift in the distribution of offenses by location within the target area was statistically significant. In 1999, over one-half (55%) of all vehicle theft and theft from vehicle crimes were reported in the vicinity of the Cracker Barrel—up from 26% the year before. In addition, all other locations combined showed a drop from 74% to 45%. Also of note, the distribution of offenses by method of entry approached statistical significance. Smashing or otherwise compromising windows to gain entry accounted for less than one-half of all incidents in 1998 but seven of ten the second year. All other methods of entry combined fell from over one-half to less than one-third during the same period.

Analyses of stakeholder responses also showed little difference from 1998 to 1999, and this is all the more remarkable given that there were almost twice as many surveys returned in 1999 (from 28 in 1998 to 50 in 1999 or a 79% increase). There were no statistically significant changes in fear of crime, concerns for person safety, security of property, the perception of the likelihood of serious crime, reporting crime to the police, witnessing serious crime, or quality of police services. For both 1998 and 1999, about one-half of the respondents said they feared crime in the target area and were concerned for their personal safety or the security of property at Gateway Savannah. From one-third to one-half of respondents for either year thought a burglary, motor vehicle theft, vandalism, robbery, or aggravated assault either somewhat or very likely. From one-half to two-thirds of respondents thought a theft from a motor vehicle likely. About one in ten reported knowledge of a burglary, theft from a motor vehicle, vandalism, robbery, aggravated assault, or other crime on
or near their business premises. Oddly enough, less than 4% in either year reported knowledge of a motor vehicle theft. Lastly, the stakeholders’ evaluation of the quality of police services was consistently high (good to excellent) for both years; no one in either year rated police service as less than “fair.”

In sum, there is little evidence of a particular impact of community policing efforts on crime or perceptions of safety at Gateway Savannah. The incidence of vehicle theft and of theft from vehicle is relatively stable, as are the perceptions of safety and the high regard stakeholders have for those officers responsible for policing the area. Much of the explanation for “little or no effect” can be found in both the relatively low crime figures (27 in 1998, 29 in 1999) and the comparatively small number of survey respondents (28 in 1998, 50 in 1999). Ultimately, while some patterns are suggested (e.g., lower fear of crime; less fear for personal safety; more concern for security of property; greater expectation of burglary and vandalism; lower expectations of motor vehicle theft, theft from auto, robbery, and aggravated assault), there can be little confidence in any assertion that these are real, much less substantial changes. The paucity of this data will not permit it.

Moreover, some of these shifts are counterintuitive. For example, while diminished fear of crime is insinuated, there is, at the same time, a greater expectation of burglary, and again, while there is less fear for personal safety, there is a heightened concern for the security of property. On the other hand, an extension of the project over a multi-year period would have allowed for more robust measures of change (e.g., time series analysis with monthly data increments).

The depth and breadth of this department’s commitment to community-involved policing is a larger issue that cannot be sufficiently addressed from the vantage point of this research, given its limited spatial and temporal scope. Nonetheless, it may be fruitful to speculate as academicians are inclined to do.

References


Michael E. Donahue is a professor of criminal justice and director of Regional Education Services for Armstrong Atlantic State University (AASU). As such, he coordinates all off-campus academic and online programming for the university. He also directs the consulting activities of the university’s Public Service Center, a collaboration of faculty and other experts providing training, research, and program evaluation services to private and public sector clients across the southeast United States. In addition, he oversees university programming in professional and continuing education and assists the vice president for external affairs in capital and other fundraising campaigns. He has over 25 years of social science research experience. His professional credentials include service as the head of the Department of Criminal Justice;
Social and Political Science at AASU; the director of research and planning for the Savannah, Georgia, Police Department; and several years as a police officer. He graduated with a PhD in social science from Michigan State University in 1983.

**Don A. Josi** is currently a professor of criminology/criminal justice at Armstrong Atlantic State University. He has over 30 years of experience in the field of criminal justice as a researcher, teacher, and practitioner including an extensive background in law enforcement and probation working with delinquent adolescents. He has collaborated with Dale Sechrest on a number of articles on juvenile adjudication and substance abuse treatment issues and with Michael Donahue on law enforcement issues. Additionally, Don has worked on numerous research projects dealing with the recruitment, selection, and training of correctional officers. He co-authored a book on the subject, *The Changing Career of the Correctional Officer: Policy Implications for the 21st Century*, published by Butterworth Heinemann in 1998. Don graduated with a PhD in criminology, law and society from University of California – Irvine.
Horror Stories: Dysfunctional Practices in Community Policing

DeVere D. Woods, Jr., PhD, Department of Criminology, Indiana State University
Marty Woods, Graduate Student, Department of Criminology, Indiana State University

Introduction

The future of community policing in the United States is far from clear. Though an important component of recent national criminal justice policy, its survival is not guaranteed. Several issues remain to be resolved. Do the programs being implemented reflect the philosophies from which community policing emanated? What will happen to community policing when federal funding expires? Is community policing sufficiently entrenched to sustain itself? Do current practices address public needs?

We examined officers’ behavior to better understand the movement called community policing. Many current efforts called community policing are limited programs and do not reflect the comprehensive philosophical approach envisioned by early scholars. They are limited initiatives with little impact. Some of these initiatives stray far from the principles and objectives of community policing. Unfortunately, many people form their impression of community policing from these misguided initiatives; if we are to accurately evaluate community policing, we must distinguish between the two.

Our purpose is to highlight activities mislabeled as community policing and learn from these mistakes. Regrettably, everyone makes mistakes no matter how good our intentions, and others judge us, in part, by our errors. The public scrutinizes bureaucrats, elected officials, and public policy by the mistakes that come to light. Whether errors result from careless disregard, over-enthusiasm, or mistake of fact, the results can be a public mistrust that undermines other efforts.

The cost of our mistakes is not easily determined. We rarely engage in extensive analysis of our mistakes; no one enjoys reliving errors. By revealing these inappropriate and dysfunctional practices, we hope to learn lessons that will improve future efforts.

Literature Review

Historical accounts of the development of community policing vary, but three scholarly works are commonly referenced: (1) Herman Goldstein’s concept of problem-solving policing helped to shift attention from the process that police use to the results they obtain (1979, 1990), (2) Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) observations linked disorder to serious crime, and (3) Robert Trojanowicz’s foot patrol experiment linked police-community involvement to crime control (see also Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990). These works spurred a deluge of other research on community policing.
These early writings present community policing as a broad-based initiative to incorporate citizens into crime control and make the police more responsive to public needs (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990). Lipsky (1980) asserts that there are insufficient resources for public bureaucracies to truly become more client-oriented. The manner in which resources (e.g., money, time, attention) are applied reveals actual, sometimes unspoken, policies of a public bureaucracy. Understanding discretion and the many ways it is used is fundamental to understanding police work (Brown, 1981; Rourke, 1984). How officers use their discretion is the true policy-making power in police organizations (Lipsky, 1980; O’Shea, 2000).

When discretion is possible, accountability is a concern. Lipsky (1980) argues that street-level bureaucrats, such as police officers, can easily tailor their behavior to avoid accountability, in part because of their managers’ reliance upon self-reporting. Philosophies such as community policing increase officers’ discretion, but do they ensure adequate accountability?

One of the principal incentives to implement community policing in the United States has been funding from the federal government. By the mid-1990s, federal funds began to shape the development of community policing through the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). The COPS program emanated from the Public Safety Partnership and Community Policing Act of 1994. Its four primary purposes were “(1) To increase the number of officers deployed in American Communities, (2) To foster problem solving and interaction with communities and police officers, (3) To encourage innovation in policing, and (4) To develop new technologies for assisting officers in reducing crime and its consequences” (Roth & Ryan, 2000, p. 1).

These goals sought to change the nature of American policing but were more modest than those proposed by earlier proponents of community policing.

Police agencies flocked to the program and the funds it provided. In fiscal year 2002 alone, the COPS office expended $656.9 million on community policing programs (COPS, 2003). The COPS program became an unprecedented federal intervention into local policing (Gaffigan, Roth, & Buerger, 2000).

**Methodology**

Scholarly research is all about asking the right questions. Researchers’ understanding of the subjects they study forms the nature of their inquiry. Policing journals are rife with evaluations of community policing. Much of this research consists of program evaluations and surveys. These methods have yielded a wealth of information, but there is still much we do not understand about community policing practices and their effectiveness. We may be able to enrich our knowledge by more extensive field observations of interactions and decisionmaking. While observational studies are plentiful, few have incorporated long-term field research into their methodology. Field research may reveal the more subtle and more guarded information that influences the actions of officers and shapes public perceptions.

Field research provides an understanding of context in which events unfold that cannot be revealed by other forms of research (Ferrell & Hamm, 1998). This method of collecting data provides greater insight into motivation as well as depth of understanding (Dean, Eichhorn, & Dean, 1967; Maxfield & Babbie, 2001). Even
when a subject’s reports are distorted, useful insight can be gained into how the individual views the situation (Dean et al., 1967).

Our observations were made from 1995 to 1999. The principal author worked as a police officer and had daily contact with officers from two of the police departments in this study. Working within the daily environment of the officers being studied resulted in access to information not easily obtained by other research methodologies. The subjects were not aware they were being studied. This approach reduces the likelihood that subjects would change their behavior or speech to appear more respectable (Maxfield & Babbie, 2001).

This approach offers many advantages. The researcher was a natural part of the environment, so the mode of entry into and exit from the research setting along with concerns about the researcher’s presence were not factors in this study. The subjects knew the researcher was a student or had been to graduate school but interacted with him as a police officer not as a researcher. Much as Van Maanen (1988) described, officers went about their business in their normal manner never considering that their daily activities merited any interest as research data. Our research design can best be described as observer-participant. The researcher was able to observe behaviors, listen to conversations, and hear stories in the vignettes described here.

Two midwestern police departments were observed. Both received federal COPS grants to supplement their workforce. The research has revealed several vignettes that illustrate our concern. Embarrassing the officers involved in these incidents is not our intent. We recognize that most officers are dedicated individuals laboring under difficult circumstances, and we accept Lipsky’s (1980) assertion that such people are doing the best they can. We focus on mistakes and questionable practices to demonstrate why some agencies are not achieving the results they expected from their community policing programs.

It is also not our intent to imply that nothing useful or positive could be found at the study sites. We feel that we can learn more by examining what went wrong. Examining the mistakes made by these practitioners will help us understand the difficulties encountered when implementing community policing. While the specifics of each incident are unique, the underpinnings of each failure are more common.

We do not contend that this is a balanced presentation of community policing in these departments. We are studying mistakes. We acknowledge the limitations of our approach. Culture and values determine mistakes. We accept that individuals laboring under difficult circumstances may not consider their actions inappropriate. Our purpose is to shed light on practices often hidden from public scrutiny to provide a more complete picture of how public policies are implemented. To avoid unproductive criticism and embarrassment of participants, pseudonyms are used to identify the study sites and individuals.

Site One

The officers at our first site, Rivertown, saw themselves as actively involved in community policing. The 81 sworn officers and nine civilian employees of the
Rivertown Police Department serve a predominantly Caucasian population (90% Caucasian, 2.9% African American) of nearly 39,000. The city’s economy consists primarily of light manufacturing and service industries. Rivertown has a moderate crime rate.

The Rivertown Police Department tried to incorporate community policing into the image it projected to the public. References to community policing were prominently found in statements to the media. In the early days of the community policing movement, Rivertown established a foot patrol and a community policing unit by obtaining a state grant to study the effect of community policing on crime and citizen satisfaction. Later, Rivertown transformed its foot patrol program to a bicycle patrol. Rivertown aggressively sought grants and external funding for projects they called community policing. Officers held positions on statewide advisory boards and training councils for community policing. This agency went through two orderly, if not routine, changes of leadership during the study period.

Site Two

The Lakeside Sheriff’s Office serves a population of nearly 58,000 people in a county of nearly 112,000 residents, predominately Caucasian. The jurisdiction ranges from suburban to rural. Its economy is based on manufacturing, service industry, retail, government enterprises, and farming. Lakeside is a small department consisting of 34 sworn officers and five civilian employees, and it has a low crime rate. The sworn officers focus on patrol and investigation while a larger division handles jail operations, court functions, and dispatching.

Lakeside was far less vocal about its community policing efforts than was Rivertown. Officials acknowledged community policing, but it was not promoted as the agency’s mission. Unless directly asked about community policing, the chief executive never spoke of it. He would acknowledge community policing as a model for service delivery, but he avoided specific details of how it shaped his department. The chief executive found foot patrol and bicycle patrol distasteful. They were very conservative in seeking or committing to external funding for community policing. Officers only appeared interested in community policing if they perceived it as a means to better working conditions or recognition. Otherwise, community policing was rarely discussed. This agency went through one fairly routine change of leadership during the study period.

Case Studies

Example One: Community Input – Lakeside

Pete was a young officer from a policing family. His father had worked as a local police officer for many years. Pete was confident; some would say cocky. He always had his eye on bigger things, yet he often remarked that he got his job because of his father’s influence. He did not plan to be a patrol officer all of his life and was always calculating means to advancement—however small.

Pete was what Downs (1967) called a climber. He wanted to get ahead and rise in the organization and was equally interested in accumulating power, income, and
prestige. (Near the end of the study, Pete left for a larger organization when he determined his options at Lakeside were limited.)

Lakeside officers could request equipment and uniforms at designated periods during each fiscal year. Pete always ensured he protected his interests: “I request new everything. I know they’re not going to give it to me, but if they get on my ass later about any of my equipment, I can say ‘I requested new equipment but you wouldn’t give it to me.’ I always keep a copy of my equipment requests.”

Pete constantly sought control. New community police officers (CPOs) are often a little anxious and intimidated before their first community meeting. Pete approached his first meeting with a full agenda and was eager to impress his superiors. His community policing training taught him the difficulty of developing useful workgroups from the community. Often, initial meetings are encumbered in miscellaneous complaints and bickering until individuals learn to function as a group. Pete hoped to avoid unnecessary complications by beginning his meeting with the admonishment, “I have a lot to cover so I won’t listen to any complaints. We are going to stick to the topic. If I hear any complaints, I’m leaving.” Later, when Pete recounted the event, he was pleased by how he took control of the meeting.

Understandably, those attending Pete’s meeting left with the feeling that the police were not interested in their opinions. It was not surprising that Pete’s project was unsuccessful. Community members did not become active participants. His words and demeanor made it clear to people attending the meeting that they were instruments, not partners. He failed to recognize or even look for the expertise or resources that community members might bring to a true collaboration (Gaffigan et al., 2000). Pete controlled the relationship and determined the agenda.

Police officers learn through training and socialization to stabilize and control situations. The community policing concept of empowering community members can be unsettling. In the early stages, the process can be rather chaotic as participants sort through complaints to find meaningful problems and as leadership roles develop. Though sometimes painful and threatening to officers, this initial lack of direction is a necessary step in the development of viable community workgroups. Pete began by telling the community members, whose support he was soliciting, that their views were not important.

Example Two: Who Is the Community? – Lakeside

COPS funds have brought police services to some small governmental units for the first time. In our next example, a township contracted community policing services from the Lakeside police. Such arrangements often benefit both parties. The party contracting for services may receive more cost-effective service than if they were to establish or expand a police department. The contractor often benefits by acquiring a new source of resources and may profit from economies of scale.

Jimmy had been a police officer for over 10 years. He was aggressive in his work and sometimes abrasive to his coworkers. His aggressiveness often got him involved in situations his peers found interesting, but his demeanor frequently caused friction between him and the officers around him. Others saw him as a constant complainer. When working with a partner, he complained about everything and everyone else.
His coworkers joked about Jimmy’s ego. They felt that Jimmy believed he knew everything, and the only other person capable of understanding important issues was whoever was assigned as his partner. Typically, Jimmy’s partners became less intelligent once they were reassigned to work with someone else.

Jimmy had the personality that Downs (1967) termed as a “zealot”: Someone “. . . loyal to relatively narrow policies or concepts” (p. 88). Jimmy focused on what he deemed as the right course and relentlessly pushed for his ideas. After years of failing to rise in the organization or implement his views, Jimmy was transforming into a conserver: someone focused on his own convenience and security (Downs, 1967). Jimmy’s poor performance on promotional exams ensured he could never be promoted. He began to withdraw psychologically, rejecting any responsibility for the organization’s performance (Lipsky, 1980). The conflict between his natural tendency to rock the boat and his concern to preserve what little he had made Jimmy’s actions erratic.

As a new community police officer (CPO), Jimmy was eager to impress his new boss, the township supervisor, and show the benefits he could provide. This assignment could mean a new start in a safe haven. He was aware of the importance of a good working relationship with political officials. Jimmy took the important first step of seeking input from the township supervisor. The township supervisor eagerly delegated a list of projects to Jimmy. Soon Jimmy was fully occupied with the supervisor’s assignments and sought input from no one else. To Jimmy, the township supervisor had become the community and held the keys to Jimmy’s new world.

Once again the public saw little community policing. Though the township supervisor was happy with this arrangement, Jimmy was not building support in the community or identifying their needs. He did not help the community use its resources for problem solving. Jimmy had become a personal operative for the township supervisor. Jimmy garnered his bosses’ favor by being loyal and unquestioning. To some extent, he is on the verge of returning to the politicized policing prevalent before the reforms of O. W. Wilson (Kelling & Moore, 1988).

**Example Three: Competing Purposes: Dispatch and Despots – Rivertown**

Stan was the director of the police dispatch center. He had been an administrator for several years and was generally well liked in his previous job as police chief of a small police department. A friend of the local police chiefs, particularly the Rivertown police chief, Stan could not refuse an offer to become the director of the regional police dispatch center. In his new position, he now controlled a larger budget and more personnel than at any other time in his career. His new job brought Stan a higher salary and more prestige. It also better positioned him to compete for political office. (Stan had previously campaigned unsuccessfully for the sheriff’s office.) His career was finally taking off.

Stan had the ambition of a climber (Downs, 1967) but began to transform into a conservator shortly after becoming director of the dispatch center. It was apparent that Stan’s new responsibilities were more than he could handle. His ambition overreached his abilities, however, and he could not walk away from the status of this new job.
Rich was an experienced officer, who was newly assigned to community policing. He went about the task of becoming known in his beat. Rich was very personable and easily engaged others in conversation. He was good at showing empathy for whatever problem you might be facing. To increase his contact with the public, Rich opened an office in his beat and frequented coffee shops and convenience stores.

Citizens began to anticipate Rich’s presence in their neighborhood. They were soon reporting nonemergency problems directly to Rich, rather than calling 911. Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux (1990) argued that such practices increase accountability. Trojanowicz claimed that when citizens know their CPO, they report their problems to a person, not a faceless agency. When citizens are unsatisfied with how a complaint is handled, they can go back to their CPO to express their concerns. Once a trusting relationship develops, citizens will report more sensitive matters. Trojanowicz felt that citizens prefer dealing with a person they know to dealing with a bureaucracy. If CPOs do not take problem solving seriously, citizens can make the CPO’s job more difficult in a number of ways. The CPO permanently assigned to the same area cannot avoid problems. He or she must address problems and be accountable.

Stan became quite concerned when he learned that citizens were bypassing the dispatch center and reporting their problems directly to Rich. Stan set out to curtail Rich’s style of policing and restore traditional reporting behaviors. His principal concern with Rich’s approach to community policing was the fear that the dispatch center’s computers would no longer accurately record calls for service and police activity. Stan wanted all citizen requests to initiate through the dispatch center so he could record them.

Part of Stan’s power was derived from his ability to generate information and demonstrate the productivity of the dispatch center. He feared that Rich’s activities made Rich less accountable and threatened Stan’s monopoly over this type of information. He viewed accountability only in terms of numbers because numbers were a source of power for him. Stan used these statistics to legitimize his dispatch center and to keep others dependent upon him for information on police activity. Through his personal relationship with the Rivertown police chief, Stan eventually forced Rich to instruct citizens to report everything through the dispatch center.

Stan’s approach to management led many to question his priorities. Upon taking office, he flooded his dispatchers with memos. Dispatchers soon found it difficult to keep up with the volume of Stan’s missives and their sometimes contradictory information. When one dispatcher gathered the courage to express her concern about all the memos, Stan responded, “That’s not my management style. It’ll stop soon and you’ll appreciate it.”

Rather than draw his subordinates into the decision-making process, Stan chose to break their will. He sought to grind them down, and then enjoy their gratitude when he became less oppressive. He had little compassion for his employees who were trying to adjust to a new boss and the changes associated with community policing.

On another occasion while reviewing dispatch tapes, Stan became confused when he could not identify who was talking. He realized that even when officers did not transmit their car numbers (or when numbers were cut off in the transmission),
dispatchers could identify officers and respond to them. Stan found this very troubling. He concluded that if his dispatchers could identify officers by their voices, then his dispatchers had become too close to the officers. He felt this indicated that his dispatchers needed to be more professional.

Stan set out to limit the contact between dispatchers and officers by imposing new restrictions that prohibited officers from entering the dispatch center. Mary, a long-time dispatcher, was troubled by this new policy. She said, “We see that [voice recognition] as a plus. It’s very useful when transmissions are cut off or when there is not time to give identifying information.” She feared the new policy could delay assisting officers needing help, and she also feared losing the social contact that Stan’s depersonalizing policy would bring.

Another incident demonstrated Stan’s inconsistency. During a period when dispatchers were frequently being forced to work overtime, Stan took action against Scott, a dispatcher who was chronically late for work. Stan disciplined Scott by giving him a day off with pay in conjunction with Scott’s scheduled days off. According to Stan, that gave Scott three days to think about coming to work on time.

When another dispatcher questioned the leniency of Scott’s punishment (many saw it not as punishment but a reward), Stan said, “I just attended a seminar that instructed us not to punish people because it makes them disgruntled.” His explanation seemed inconsistent. Previously, Stan had suspended a long-term dispatcher, Larry, without pay for 6 weeks and did not discuss the transgression with Larry until the day before a mediation hearing. According to Larry, until that time, he was unsure of the reason for which he was suspended.

Many of Stan’s actions appeared to be self-serving or stemming from an inadequate understanding of events. His need to be in control often drove him to react before thinking through his actions. Many saw Stan’s actions as vacillating between being clueless and conniving.

Example Four: To Serve and Protect – Rivertown

Stan’s management style was not the only problem dispatchers encountered in the move to community policing. When Rivertown implemented citywide community policing, they instituted a new numbering system for patrol officers. Each district was assigned a community police officer that was responsible for problem solving and coordinating activities within the community. Traditional patrol officers were assigned throughout the city to assist the CPO in handling calls for service and to fill in when CPOs were off-duty. The plan called for officers to use the district number as his or her radio designation. When additional officers were assigned to a district, they were to use the district number plus a letter designation, such as car 7A and car 7B.

Rivertown officers assigned to the night shift showed their disdain of the new numbering system by personalizing their call numbers and demanding that dispatcher use the designation that officers selected. Officers would not answer their radio unless dispatcher addressed them properly. One officer demanded to be called “7A” regardless of whether other officers were assigned to his district. He would not respond if the dispatcher called unit “seven” or “seven-alpha.” Other officers
preferred various unique mnemonic designations. Some officers responded only to “two-boy,” “two-baker,” “two-bravo,” or even “two-beagle.” Others responded to “two-adam” but not “two-alpha.” Still other officers required that the mnemonic designation precede the district number. They responded to “B2,” “boy-two,” or “bravo-two.”

Dispatchers quickly became frustrated by the idiosyncrasies of the Rivertown officers. Complaints to Ray, the patrol supervisor, were futile, in part because of the vast disparity between the status of dispatchers and patrol officers. When confronted with the issue, Ray shook his head and told the dispatchers, “Call them whatever they want. It’s no big deal.” One dispatcher became so confused by the eccentric numbering systems she declared, “It would be easier if we just call them by their first names.”

Regardless of how childish Ray thought his officers were behaving, there was little incentive to side with the dispatchers. Doing so might jeopardize morale. Ray was trying to maintain the support of his officers and would not risk alienating them by appearing to favor the dispatchers. Many officers were already wary of the changes brought by community policing. Ray knew he needed the support of his officers to manage the new policies. Officers need to be receptive to change, or they will not adopt new behaviors (Cochran, Bromley & Swando, 2002; Lurigio & Skogan, 1994). Ray felt that the minor crisis would pass once officers tired of playing their game. Besides, the officers were more capable than dispatchers of causing problems for Ray.

This bizarre numbering system was only one of the problems that Rivertown’s community policing activities created for dispatchers. Soon after implementing community policing, it was apparent that the deployment strategy was flawed. The plan was designed to keep community police officers in their districts by using regular patrol officers to supplement the CPOs. Regular patrol officers were to assist in districts with heavy call loads and to fill in when community police officers were not scheduled to work. Unfortunately, Rivertown did not commit sufficient resources to the plan.

Community police officers were assigned to districts without regard for their scheduled days off. One night, no one was assigned to work the west side of town (four districts), and dispatchers became annoyed when they had to constantly send cars from other parts of the city. The night supervisor would not supercede the community policing plan by reassigning anyone to the west side. Consequently, Bill, a young officer working the 10:00 PM shift and generally viewed as hardworking and energetic, spent the first part of his shift answering calls across town in the empty districts. As soon as he would finish one call, he was sent on another before he could return to his own district. He later complained, “Last night I didn’t get to my district until after 1:00 AM.” When asked about Rivertown’s community policing efforts, Jack, a long tenured officer said, “We’re just doing the same thing and calling it something different.” Frustrated officers found the department’s community policing efforts to be disorganized and doomed to fail.
Example Five: Whose Resources Are They Anyway? – Rivertown

Rivertown uses civilian crossing guards to assist school children traversing busy intersections. When a crossing guard does not come to work, a patrol officer must be assigned to help children cross the street. Occasionally, because of training, vacations, or sick leave, Jeff, the day shift lieutenant, has only a minimal number of patrol officers working. During periods of short staffing, Jeff would call the community policing unit to request that they send an officer to perform the crossing guard duty. According to Jeff, “The community policing unit could always find someone willing to take the assignment. They never complain about helping out.”

This practice seemed to be working to everyone’s satisfaction until the chief learned of it. He ordered it stopped immediately. The chief had learned at a seminar that community police officers should not be viewed as an auxiliary unit to supplement patrol or augment special functions. He was not going to hinder community policing efforts by assigning community police officers to other duties.

Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux (1990) described how the morale of community policing officers might suffer if they are frequently assigned to other duties. It sends the message that their work, community policing, is not really important; however, that did not seem to be a problem here. Crossing guard duty was infrequent. By helping as crossing guards, community police officers furthered good relations with patrol officers. Community police officers did not mind spending time with school children, and patrol officers appreciated not falling behind in their 911 calls while acting as crossing guards. The chief’s dogmatic adherence to the community policing unit remaining autonomous created friction among his officers. Patrol officers resented being assigned to “extra duty while community police officers sat in the office.” Community police officers were irritated by such comments and felt they were being unfairly blamed. They had not balked when asked to help, and they resented patrol officers characterizing their administrative duties as “goofing off or sitting in the office.” The chief’s hard line position hampered the acceptance of community policing.

Example Six: Pointless Surveys – Rivertown

The philosophy of community policing encourages police departments to enhance communication with the public. It recommends that police start by surveying public opinion. Rivertown, as part of a high-profile campaign, assigned officers to distribute and collect questionnaires. About 1,500 surveys (approximately 4% of the population) were completed and returned to the department, but no one examined them. They were simply put away in a file cabinet. CPO Rich grew concerned that the survey information was not being utilized. He became frustrated when his sergeant said, “just asking them [the public] made them happy. We don’t have to do anything with it [the survey].”

The sergeant viewed the survey as a public relations tool. Everyone wants to think that his or her opinion is important. The good will that the Rivertown Police Department derived by soliciting public opinion quickly dissipated when citizens realized their input did not matter. By failing to use the surveys, Rivertown missed
an opportunity and abused the public’s trust. The survey process wasted the time and effort of citizens and officers alike.

**Example Seven: Taking Advantage of Your Position – Lakeside**

A new grant for school liaison officers gave Pete an opportunity to work in a local high school. He normally worked the day shift, Monday through Friday. Regular patrol officers considered working days and having the weekends off as a nice perk, especially for an officer such as Pete who had little seniority.

An administrator at the high school asked Pete to work some night shifts to identify students who roamed the streets at night. The school administrator was concerned about a possible growing problem with gangs. Pete chose to work from 10:00 PM to 6:00 AM.

Though the afternoon shift was more likely to increase his contact with roaming youths, Pete found certain advantages to working the midnight shift. He selected nights when the midnight shift was at maximum staffing to limit the chances that he would be assigned radio calls. He also scheduled himself to work the Thursday night/Friday morning shift to maximize his time off. (After finishing his shift early Friday morning, he would have the remainder of that day and his regularly scheduled weekend off.) Pete was clearly manipulating his schedule for personal advantage. To make matters worse, Pete boasted of his scheme at a midnight shift roll call.

Pete was given flexibility in his schedule so he could respond to community needs. Instead, he used this flexibility for personal advantage. By empowering Pete to be creative in problem solving, Lakeside neglected to properly supervise him. Accountability was never clearly delineated; police department administrators relied on reports from school officials to judge Pete’s performance.

School officials were not equipped to evaluate a police officer’s performance and frequently allowed Pete to define what was appropriate work—a situation Pete exploited. Pete’s talents and personality allowed him to make it appear he was closely supervised while his actions were rarely monitored. School officials thought the police department was controlling Pete’s actions while police administrators believed that school officials were keeping track of Pete’s activities.

Pete may have been able to cloak his actions from police and school officials but not from his peers. Several officers grumbled that they had to “do all the work” while Pete manipulated the bosses and did little. Many of the regular patrol officers saw community policing as a soft assignment that accomplished nothing. They believed the department would be more effective if the community police officers returned to patrol duties and were made to do real police work.

**Example Eight: Take the Money and Run – Rivertown**

Rivertown police adopted a new community policing tactic by forming a Neighborhood Patrol Unit (NPU). This unit’s role principally consisted of serving arrest warrants. Jim, a gung-ho officer, was assigned to the new unit.
Jim was well known by his peers as someone always looking for action. When anything important or exciting occurred, you were likely to find Jim in the middle of it. Jim was also a member of the SWAT team, and his aggressive approach to policing was not slowed after being shot by a drug dealer. A couple of years earlier, he had positioned himself on the front porch of a drug dealer’s home as his team prepared to knock in the door. The suspect shot through the door wounding Jim. Though his injuries were not life-threatening, Jim spent several weeks recovering and was assigned to light duty. Once back to full duty, he resumed the aggressive style he practiced before.

The title of the new unit, Neighborhood Patrol Unit, belied its true mission. No one, including Jim, thought of him as a touchy-feely community police officer. He enjoyed his assignment to the NPU and its aggressive approach to policing. In a candid moment, Jim said, “We’re just called a neighborhood unit so we could get federal funding. We’re a kick-ass unit.”

Jim saw himself as a crime fighter whose role was to battle with criminals on the street. His assignment to NPU shifted the focus to arresting criminals and escaping the monotony of answering repetitious calls for service. Aggressively hunting criminals and getting them off the streets made sense to him. Like many of the officers, Jim’s perception of crime and its implications seduced him to use militaristic tactics (O’Shea, 2000). These coercive aspects of policing are expanding along with the community policing rhetoric (Kraska, 1996).

Rivertown’s concept of community policing was not very discriminating, which suited Jim’s needs. Since all policing involves the community, community policing was not perceived to include anything new. Unfortunately, the Rivertown police found that if the title sounded like community policing, it was often possible to find new money to support these activities.

Example Nine: The Teflon Chief – Lakeside

Kyle, the chief executive of Lakeside, built a reputation for public service and integrity. He belonged to community service organizations (e.g., Rotary, Lyons Club) and prided himself on being nonpolitical. He often spoke of building trust and serving community needs. He spoke of community policing but never really practiced it. During the observation period, other local officials publicly commented on his integrity and professionalism.

Kyle took control of an organization in turmoil. The previous executive had been mired in turf battles with other local officials; he left when he could no longer manage an organization whose effectiveness was being publicly questioned. Kyle was hailed as a reformer who would put the organization back on track. Even the supporters of the previous chief executive welcomed a new direction and an end to the controversy. Almost without exception, members of the organization expected their new leader to implement change and restore the agency’s reputation.

Kyle moved quickly to put an end to any apprehension that employees might feel in the transition to new leadership. He informed department personnel to “Do as you always have. I’ll tell you what I want changed.” Life began to return to normal in Lakeside as the change of leadership quieted public concerns. As time passed, those
seeking change in the department became discouraged when no significant reforms were implemented. It became apparent that Kyle was a caretaker, not a reformer. Several inside the department commented that a chance to bring meaningful reform was slipping away. Enthusiasm turned to resignation and then to resentment as officers got to know their new leader.

Morale sank to a new low. Kyle made progressive sounding public proclamations upon which he never acted. His statements to department personnel were often strong but clearly unenforceable. Because his threats were unreasonably harsh, everyone knew he could not carry them out. It was becoming clear that Kyle did not subscribe to the participative management practices that community policing advocates favored.

Kyle entered the department in the later stages of his career and assumed office as a conserver (Downs, 1967). Even as chief, he did not want to rock the boat or take chances. Kyle was interested in status but was averse to risk and sought the path of least resistance.

Kyle made it clear to his employees that he did not want to be proactive. Roger, a patrol supervisor, felt that staffing levels had fallen to a level insufficient for proper policing. When he brought the matter to Kyle’s attention, Kyle told him, “This is a reactive department. We just need enough people to react to things when they happen.”

Kyle’s actions and statements were interpreted by subordinates as evidence he did not respect or support them. Many within the department began to feel that Kyle was only interested in his own image and reputation. Soon rumors circulated from officers who had worked for Kyle at the last department he managed. Among his former officers, he was seen as quick to criticize and slow to praise. He passed out meaningless awards to impress the mayor. Stories were told of his uncanny ability to be out of town when a crisis arose. He never seemed to return until the crisis had passed. Then, he would accept the accolades or reverse unpopular decisions and blame subordinates for poor judgment.

Lakeside officers soon told many stories of their own. Kyle frequently stated that he demanded high standards from his officers, but he rarely acknowledged their efforts. Many were disgruntled when Kyle scrapped the process to recognize and present awards to officers. Kyle said, “I expect officers to do a good job. Their award is their paycheck. You shouldn’t get recognition for doing your job.” Such actions appeared to have the expected result. As Alchian and Demsetz (1972) predicted, when rewards and productivity are loosely correlated, productivity suffers. Some Lakeside officers appeared to withdraw and expressed less interest in their jobs.

Kyle assigned Tim, a supervisor, to revise the policy manual. Tim was perceived as one of the officers favored by Kyle. Tim’s first draft contained numerous grammatical errors. When a staff member mentioned the quality of the writing, Kyle’s demeanor became defensive.

George, another supervisor, offered to edit the document. Kyle angrily responded that this was the policy he wanted. When several grammatical errors were identified
on a randomly selected page, Kyle agreed to allow George to revise the manuscript as long as he did not change the intent of the policies.

A revised manuscript was prepared for the next staff meeting. Kyle opened the meeting by dramatically directing George to a passage in the 80-page draft and questioning a typographical error. He continued on with equal dramatic flare to identify two errors in the document where George had used the wrong tense of a verb. Each time, Kyle thoroughly questioned George’s meaning. When he concluded, Kyle commented, “The rest of it is alright.” Kyle’s message was clear. George’s offer to edit Tim’s manuscript was viewed as an attempt to undermine Kyle’s authority. Anyone engaging in such activity would be closely scrutinized and put in place.

In another incident, officers were sent to deal with a barricaded gunman who had fired several shots within his house. After several hours, the suspect surrendered. During the incident, he had fired several shots at officers and exposed himself to being shot, but officers held their fire. When questioned after the incident, the shooter stated he had wanted the police to kill him. On concluding the incident, officers took pride in resolving the situation without harm to anyone and without firing a shot.

Their feeling of accomplishment quickly dissipated when officers arrived for work the next day. They were told that Kyle was questioning their response time to the shooting incident. As is often the case, the people in this traumatic situation expected police to arrive immediately, and any wait seemed interminable. Kyle’s response to one such comment by a neighbor was to immediately commence an investigation and promise strong action against the officers. Two days later, without interviewing any of the officers at the shooting scene, a brief memo was posted that the investigation was finished and the officers’ conduct was acceptable. By then, the feeling of fulfillment and accomplishment enveloping the officers who had safely handled the incident had turned to bitter distrust.

Many felt there were two kinds of officers in the Lakeside Department: Kyle’s buddies who were above criticism and everyone else who was always criticized. Much as Brown (1981) observed in punitive organizational environments, officers were encouraged to “stay-low-protect-your-ass” and discouraged from working hard and taking risks.

Another incident is derived from comments made during a staff meeting when Kyle questioned the treatment of a bruised and bloodied prisoner. The previous night, a 20-year-old man robbed a convenience store. Officers chased the suspect’s car into a marshy area where the suspect fled on foot. They tracked the suspect for nearly an hour when suddenly they heard screams. Upon finding the source of the commotion, officers discovered the battered suspect being held down by a group of people.

The fleeing suspect had made it to his parents’ home, where he sought refuge. When his family learned of his crime, they demanded he surrender to the police. When he refused and tried to leave, his father and brother attempted to subdue him. A fight broke out that resulted in the suspect being beaten by family members. When the officers arrived, the suspect eagerly embraced the safety of being arrested.
Upon hearing supervisors’ recount the incident, Kyle smiled and said, “Tell your officers to stick to that story.” Supervisors Roger and George resented the implication that their account was a fabrication. Later they commented that “protecting the department’s image was more important than finding the truth. If officers had abused a prisoner, would a good story get them off the hook?” The chief’s attitude sets the tone for how police officers deal with the public (Brown, 1981). Roger and George feared that Kyle was leading in the wrong direction.

Kyle was very pragmatic about the law. One day while reminiscing about his previous job as a police chief, he said, “When I was chief I knew some of the city ordinances were unconstitutional, but I told the city attorney to keep them anyway. If someone wanted to fight it [a ticket or arrest], then we would dismiss the charges. But, I knew that 90% of the people wouldn’t fight it, and we’d continue to have the ordinance to work with.” Kyle’s statements and examples troubled Lakeside officers.

Many Lakeside officers felt they were getting little support from their chief or from the organization. These officers complained of a lack of training, unclear role definition, and absence of a reward system for doing a good job. The message they received was that success comes from doing nothing. They saw little legitimacy in community policing and were distrustful of their chief. They preferred to stay out of trouble by being unaccountable.

Example Ten: Register or Walk – Rivertown

Officers from Rivertown discovered a surplus of unregistered bicycles when they cleaned their property room. Even their auxiliary holding site was overflowing with bicycles. There never seemed to be enough space to store all the bicycles recovered by the police. Most of the bicycles could not be returned to their owners because they were not registered with the police department. These bicycles were stored for several months then sold at public auction.

Lieutenant Polly proclaimed to be an advocate of community policing. She often spoke of Rivertown’s commitment to community policing at schools and public meetings. Polly was a climber (Downs, 1967), actively seeking to advance her career. She often appeared to be a zealot because of her fanaticism, but her attention shifted from one cause to another in her quest for power.

In her new assignment as supervisor of the COPS Unit, Polly set out to solve the bicycle problem. It was obvious to her that the problem could easily be resolved if the public would comply with the ordinance to register their bicycles. So, she devised a plan to more strictly enforce the bicycle registration ordinance.

Polly set out to raise public awareness and “make an example” of those who did not comply. To aggressively enforce the ordinance, she assembled a team to go out and seize any unregistered bicycle they found. Once word got out that the police were seizing unregistered bicycles, people would surely start registering their bikes.

She chose a warm summer evening to implement her plan. The department did not have a vehicle large enough to hold all the bicycles she anticipated seizing, so Polly borrowed a large truck from a local business. It was likely that officers would get
dirt on their uniforms loading bicycles into the truck, so she told officers to wear
fatigue pants and tee shirts for the assignment. Prepared for a successful night, she
and her team headed out to confiscate all unregistered bicycles they could find.
As she anticipated, they found plenty of work. Some unregistered bicycles were
parked in public areas, and many others were being ridden on public streets. It
did not take long to fill the truck. It was soon clear to Polly that her efforts would
make an impression.

Unfortunately, it was not the impression Polly anticipated. Several children who
were unfortunate enough to encounter Polly’s team had their bicycles confiscated.
Left without their bikes, they were stranded and told to walk home. Some of these
children did not understand what was happening. Soon, the police department was
being flooded with complaints.

People began reporting their bicycles missing. Angry parents were complaining
that their children had to walk long distances to get home after officers seized their
bicycles. Some children stopped by Polly’s team did not recognize they were police
officers because of their casual attire, and soon people began calling the police
department to report a band of thugs that were roaming the streets and stealing
bicycles. Over her strenuous protests that she was succeeding in her mission, Polly
and her team were ordered to end their assignment and return to the station. The
next day, the chief characterized the incident as a miscommunication in which the
public overreacted. He found no blame in Polly’s actions.

Clearly, the police department would have benefited from community input before
carrying out this initiative. Aside from the obvious poor judgment used by officers,
this example points out the importance of community participation in problem
identification and problem solving. It is unlikely that the community shared the
police’s concern for bicycle registration. In this incident, the Rivertown police forgot
that their mission was to serve the public. They became their own client and defined
standards by their own values (Brown, 1981).

If Rivertown’s community policing efforts had truly sought community involvement,
it is unlikely that the department would have taken such an inappropriate course.
Community involvement may have refocused police concerns, identified the
shortcoming of this police strategy, or helped devise a more appropriate tactic to
address the problem. As Roth and Ryan (2000) found, problem-solving strategies
that are dominated by enforcement actions rarely solve the underlying problems or
generate public support. This unfortunate incident raised questions of the legitimacy
of community policing. The chief’s immediate and unquestioning support for Polly
reinforced the belief in the department that the public was to blame for the problems
police encounter.

Example Eleven: Don’t Bet on It – Rivertown

Rivertown was planning for an annual summer festival that boosted tourism in the
city. An influx of people would swell the local population and fill the coffers of local
businesses. Inspector Pam was assigned to manage and coordinate the city’s public
safety efforts for the event. The festival would dominate the police department’s
activities for 3 days. Many adjustments needed to be made. Some officers would
have their leave days cancelled, and many would be working additional hours.
Pam had risen through the ranks and was now second only to the chief of police. She was an aggressive self-promoter who prided herself on being action-oriented. Her close relationship with the chief gave her power beyond that of her peers. Some officers joked that Pam really ran the department and the chief merely rubber stamped Pam’s activities. She considered herself an expert on community policing and one of the principal architects of the department’s community policing efforts.

Pam thought she could improve the morale of officers and inject more interest into their assignments by creating some competition. She decided that some friendly wagering would stimulate officers to better attend to their duties. She created a betting board for officers to wager on the number of arrests that would be made during the festival.

A local reporter learned of the competition. His questions to the chief brought a promise of a full investigation and appropriate action to be taken. Several officers were interviewed as part of the chief’s investigation. From the beginning, some officers had predicted the investigation would collapse once Inspector Pam’s involvement became known. A few days into the investigation, the chief announced that appropriate measures had been taken and concluded that there was no indication that the wagering had any effect on officers’ actions during the festival. Pam’s involvement was never made public.

Officers who knew the whole story groused about a double standard. They cited examples of others who were disciplined for much less. Clearly Pam’s actions were inappropriate and violated statutes prohibiting gambling. She was seen as escaping punishment because of her close relationship to the chief. Her self-proclaimed expertise in community policing further brought the concept into question. Pam viewed arrests as the most appropriate measure of successful policing. The public was merely a commodity to be manipulated by the police. Such actions led to serious questions of Rivertown’s understanding and commitment to community policing.

**Conclusion**

We set out to study the implementation of community policing through the errors and missteps made by officers. We hoped to categorize common mistakes to better explain and understand the current state of community policing. The errors we observed centered on the use of discretion. As Goldstein (1977) observed, “the police exercise broad discretion in carrying out their multiple functions . . .” (p. 93). Our observations revealed problems of inadequate training, a lack of supervision, personal aggrandizement, dogmatic attitudes, wasted resources, and poor management practices.

While these missteps fell into six general categories, accountability is the principal problem. The requirements and oversight of COPS funding has done little to ameliorate this. We did not begin with the intent to study accountability, but it emerged from the conversations and events we observed. Repeatedly, we found inadequate or nonexistent accountability procedures.
Even when accountability measures are in place, often workers can make adjustments to avoid them (Lipsky, 1980). Though speaking principally of abuse of force, Walker’s (2001) observation is consistent with our findings: “The sad fact of American police history has been the failure, if not absence, of meaningful procedures for ensuring police accountability” (p. 7).

The traditional accountability mechanisms Walker (2001) identified, the political system, courts, and professional police administration, are no more likely to correct the practices we observed than they have been in curbing police abuse of force. Though true professional administration would have remedied many of the behaviors we encountered, the administrators in these agencies were publicly respected as competent office holders. Their shortcomings and abuses remained cloaked within their agencies. Identifying and implementing professional administration may not be as straightforward as we would hope.

Kelling (1999), while more optimistic about the potential effectiveness of accountability mechanisms, identifies two issues that hinder accountability: “First, police are almost uniformly unable to articulate what they do, why they do it, and how they do it . . . Second, virtually all of their order maintenance, peacekeeping, and conflict resolution activities are unofficial . . . [T]he only way that the activities can become official is if someone files a complaint against the officer” (p. 17). In other words, unless officers report their own misconduct, their supervisors are left with occasional citizens’ complaints to reveal officers’ behaviors. We cannot describe what police are supposed to do (also see Bittner, 1967); we are unable to monitor their actions (also see Goldstein, 1977; VanMaanen, 1978); and officers can easily manipulate the reporting process (Muir, 1977). There is little wonder then that Kelling concludes that traditional control mechanisms have had little influence on substantive police work.

Returning to our cautionary note, this was a study of dysfunctional practices. We did not study the successes of officers in these agencies. Our purpose was to identify some of the reasons that community policing may not be succeeding. The consequences of these errors are not easily determined. We do not know how they shape the public’s or officers’ attitudes toward community policing; however, our observations indicate that they play a role. In addition, the question of whether community policing was ever truly implemented in these agencies cannot be answered by this study; however, each agency qualified and received funds through the COPS Office to implement programs they call community policing. As such, their actions have an a priori claim in the evaluation of the success or failure of community policing.

References


**DeVere D. Woods, Jr.,** PhD, after a 26-year career as a police officer, is currently an assistant professor of criminology at Indiana State University. He received his PhD from Michigan State University where he collaborated with Robert Trojanowicz on research and consulting for the National Center for Community Policing. Along with his continual consultations on community policing, he was recently appointed as a special advisor for the National Police of El Salvador. His current research interests include community policing, police management, policy implementation, criminal investigation, and terrorism. His previous research has been published by *Police Studies, The Journal of Community Policing*, the Department of Justice, the Community Policing Consortium, and *Identification News*.

**Marty Woods** is completing her graduate studies at Indiana State University. Her research interests include a wide range of policing issues including community policing, criminal investigation, and police interaction with mentally ill individuals.
Overcoming Resistance to Community Policing: The Potential Role of Recruitment and Selection

Larry M. Coutts, PhD, Assistant Professor of Psychology, Department of Psychology, University of Windsor
Frank W. Schneider, PhD, Professor of Psychology, Coordinator of the Applied Social Psychology Program, University of Windsor

The Transition to Community Policing

Changing from a traditional law enforcement policing (LEP) model to a community policing (CP) model has been a major objective of North American police organizations since the 1980s (Chacko & Nancoo, 1993; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990). This change to CP requires adopting a new philosophy and strategy of policing. For example, the LEP model is based on a highly centralized organizational structure, is incident driven, and emphasizes reactive response in combating crime; whereas, the CP model is more organizationally decentralized, is more proactive, and entails close police-community partnerships in the identification, analysis, and solution of local crime and disorder problems (Leighton, 1994; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990).

As noted by Novak, Alarid, and Lucas (2003), many police administrators have espoused CP as the preferred strategy for the delivery of police services and have expressed little doubt that it represents the future of policing in America. The commitment to CP is impressive as evidenced by the enormous resources that have been expended. For example, in the United States, since 1994, more than $7.5 billion has been invested by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) to promote CP in law enforcement agencies (National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 2002). Moreover, it was recently estimated that as many as three-fourths of American police agencies employ some kind of CP strategy (Wrightsman, Greene, Nietzel, & Fortune, 2002). Similar progress has occurred in Canada where, by the early 1990s, most municipal and provincial police organizations had endorsed CP, and numerous CP programs had been implemented (Leighton, 1994). It is noteworthy that as early as 1994, Roberg declared that “community policing, in one form or another, appears to be a ‘done deal’” in the United States (p. 254). In Canada, while recognizing extant obstacles to CP, Leighton (1994) stated that CP was “firmly established as the dominant orientation or philosophy” (p. 209).

Resistance to Community Policing

It is our view, however, that now, 10 years after Roberg’s (1994) and Leighton’s (1994) pronouncements, the transition from LEP to CP in both countries is far from a “done deal.” The implementation of CP has encountered widespread resistance among significant numbers of police officers in significant numbers of police organizations. Schneider, Pilon, Horrobin, and Sideris (2000) note that there are very few examples of police organizations that have successfully completed the transition from traditional, response-centered policing, and Greene (1998) has observed that
a prevalent finding is the “intractability of police organizations in their adoption of community policing” (p. 145). A large part of this resistance is reflected in officers’ attitudes and beliefs about the value of CP. Recent studies of police officer attitudes document unacceptable levels of support for CP (e.g., Dicker, 1998; Novak et al., 2003; Roberg, 1994; Schneider et al., 2000; Scrivner, 1995; Vinzant & Crothers, 1994). As stated by Lurigio and Skogan (1994), “The success of community policing depends on the police officers who are responsible for implementing the programs. In essence, their attitudes, perceptions and behaviors must be substantially changed before community policing can be put into practice” (p. 315). Like other researchers (e.g., Novak et al., 2003), we believe that the transition to CP cannot succeed without effectively combating resistance and achieving widespread support among police personnel.

Why, despite the remarkably widespread police administrative and public support, has the movement to CP been met by such strong and persistent resistance? Notwithstanding the fact that employee resistance to organizational change is more the norm than the exception, what stands out with respect to the shift from LEP to CP is the magnitude of change that is mandated by the new model of policing (Leighton, 1991; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1994). Undoubtedly, there is overlap between the two approaches, such as in some goals (e.g., crime prevention and crime control) and the need to perform many traditional police activities (e.g., responding to emergencies, making arrests, and directing traffic). The CP model, however, with its proactive, citizen-police partnership emphasis, is philosophically quite different from LEP and calls for a substantially different type of police organization and way of policing society.

Fundamental to CP is the requirement of profound, broad-based changes in the role of the front-line officer. The changes consist of an increased variety of skills and responsibilities that derive from such key components of CP as proactive strategies, police-citizen partnerships, and extensive community involvement. For instance, in accordance with the proactive, crime-prevention emphasis, officers must look beyond specific incidents and be more innovative, analytical, and problem-focused in their work. As a result of the community-partnership emphasis, officers must, to a much greater extent, demonstrate abilities in such areas as communicating, planning, organizing, educating, and facilitating groups. Moreover, CP officers must be able to function with more autonomy and decision-making responsibility. As many proponents of CP have observed (Leighton, 1991; Meese, 1993; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1994), to accomplish greater officer autonomy and decision-making authority, police organizations have to move away from the traditional paramilitary, hierarchical, chain-of-command structure to a less centralized, less hierarchical (“layered”) structure. Furthermore, the skills, abilities, and activities required to properly carry out CP must be recognized by the organizational reward system (Leighton, 1991; Roberg, 1994; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1994). As the leading proponents of CP have affirmed, the successful incorporation of CP into a police organization necessarily affects and involves every managerial, human resource, and operational system. Such profound, organization-wide changes are a lot for the membership of police organizations to adapt to and accept in place of LEP, the policing model under which many, likely most, had been trained and worked and to which they had committed their vocational lives. Thus, given the enormous changes connected with the implementation of CP, it is not at all difficult...
to understand why many attempts at implementation have not gone smoothly and have met with resistance.

**Overcoming Resistance to Community Policing**

After 25 years of “transition,” it is quite clear that the change to CP is not simply going to happen as a matter of time. The desired transition will happen only when, as Lurigio and Skogan (1994) put it, the “hearts and minds” of police officers have been won over—that is, when their attitudes, values, and beliefs are congruent with the fundamental tenets of CP. CP mandates profound, organization-wide change. Accordingly, the transition to CP requires profound, organization-wide effort. What can police organizations do to facilitate the changeover to CP, in particular, to undermine the extant resistance and achieve its acceptance? The answer involves CP-tailored interventions in three major, related areas: (1) human resource management and reward systems, (2) education and training, and (3) recruitment and selection. We should note that these areas of intervention merely reflect what many leading proponents of CP have long proposed as necessary to the transition (e.g., Leighton, 1991; Meese, 1993; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1994).

The human resource systems of police organizations must be aligned with the basic philosophy, principles, and operational procedures of CP. This includes significantly increasing the autonomy, responsibility, and decision-making capacity of front-line officers by department-wide decentralization and delayering of authority. Whereas such structural change is fundamental to CP, Maguire (1997) found little evidence of its occurrence over a 6-year period in police departments that self-identified as practicing CP. Human resource system change also includes major alterations in the recognition and reward structure of police organizations, in particular, in their performance appraisal and promotion systems. Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux (1994) review many readily quantifiable, CP-related activities that can be included in police performance evaluations (e.g., the number of community meetings organized, projects developed to address social disorder problems, referrals to agencies, and crime-resolution communications received from citizens). Moreover, Coleman and Foley (2003) argue that the failure to connect compensation strategies to CP retards the acceptance and effectiveness of CP initiatives. They propose that the application of TQM procedures to police compensation systems will serve to support and advance CP.

Perhaps the most widely used means of advancing CP, including undermining resistance to it, is education and training. Citing the views of Gutierrez and Thurman (1997) and Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990), Breci (1997) affirms that, “the transition to community policing hinges on the development of skills and knowledge in line officers . . . . It is the agency’s responsibility to motivate and train officers into the ‘new’ [community policing] style” (p. 773). Traditional officer training has emphasized the technical aspects of the police role. Training in CP must include much of the traditional curriculum with CP principles “threaded” throughout it (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1994) but must go well beyond it (Breci, 1997; Meese, 1993; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1994). While virtually all police departments offer some form of initial training for officers engaging in CP initiatives, there is evidence that the quality and scope of the training falls far short of the comprehensive, multi-level, long-term training that is required for CP to take hold (e.g., Breci, 1997).
The goals of education and training include instilling favorable attitudes about CP, promoting understanding of CP principles and operational strategies, and developing officers' skills and abilities. Because CP represents an organization-wide philosophy and strategy, training and education have to be directed at all members—sworn and non-sworn—of a department. For instance, Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1994) describe the components of a training system that entails introducing all departmental members to the philosophy and merits of CP, new-hire training, training of officers in the field, in-service training, and training of supervisors and managers. Moreover, Breci (1997) has underscored the important role that college courses and continuing education can play.

The third area of intervention centers on the recruitment and selection of individuals who are most suited to the philosophy, objectives, and role requirements of CP. This is the area in which our own research program has focused. Some observers have noted that the expanded role and skills required of CP officers have significant implications for both police recruitment and selection (e.g., Hoath, Schneider, & Starr, 1998; Metchik & Winton, 1995; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1994). For example, Metchik and Winton (1995) reviewed the typical screening out practices of traditional police selection and argued that CP requires more positively oriented selection criteria and procedures.

Within the next few years, the recruitment of sufficient numbers of qualified police officers will become a significant challenge to police organizations as current members retire at an unprecedented rate (Cotton, 2003; Muldoon, 2001). For example, according to one large-scale study of Canadian policing (Strategic Human Resources Analysis, 2001), nearly one in four police officers will retire over the next few years. We agree with Cotton (2003) that this turnover presents a prime opportunity for change. What better way to promote the implementation of CP, she argues, than “to have the chance to select new members who represent the values and ideals inherent in the new culture” (p. 10).

Recruitment—Expanding the Applicant Pool

Whereas many proponents of CP have emphasized the necessity of aligning police recruitment and selection systems with CP, there has been very little, if any, published empirical work on this issue. Accordingly, during the past few years, we have directed our research efforts toward the implications of the transition to CP for police officer recruitment and selection. In the remainder of this article, we review some of our work that addresses recruitment and selection issues in CP.

In our first study (Coutts, Schneider, & Tenuta, in press), we argued that there is a need to increase the number of applicants to policing who possess the requisite competencies, values, and attitudes to become committed and successful CP officers. Our research drew upon the evidence that points to the suitability of college/university-educated individuals for CP. For example, Carter, Sapp, and Stephens (1989) report that college-educated officers are especially likely to demonstrate a variety of CP-relevant qualities, including communication skills; flexibility in dealing with persons of diverse cultures, lifestyles, and races; adaptability to organizational change and alternative approaches to policing; and the capacity to see the criminal justice system in a broader context. Also, Roberg (1994) has asserted that the skills associated with CP “are undoubtedly enhanced by, and may even require, a college
education” (p. 251). Thus, in our study, we considered how the police applicant pool might be broadened among university students—a population especially likely to include many individuals who represent a good fit with CP.

As a starting point, we reasoned that many people who possess the required competencies, values, and attitudes for CP may not be well-informed about the nature and emergence of CP and might be more interested in a policing career if they were better informed. Our reasoning led to three hypotheses. First, because the predominant image of policing portrayed in the popular media closely reflects LEP (Chermak & Weiss, 2002), we predicted that university students are more likely to associate policing with the LEP model. In addition, because of the job enrichment and job enlargement characteristics of the CP role (Greene, 1989; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990) and the job satisfaction experienced by many police officers as a result of their involvement in CP (Greene, 1989; Lurigio & Rosenbaum, 1994; Schneider et al., 2000), we predicted that students would prefer to work under the CP model versus the LEP model. Lastly, we predicted that increased knowledge and awareness of the CP model will lead to increased interest among students in a policing career. Our method consisted of first having participants indicate whether or not they were interested in a policing career after graduation. Then, they described in writing their perceptions of the functions and responsibilities of the police and their routine work activities and tasks. Content analysis of the descriptions allowed us to test the first hypothesis. Participants then read separate descriptions of the LEP and CP models and completed evaluative questions designed specifically to test the three hypotheses. All three hypotheses were supported.

In a second study (Coutts, Schneider, Johnson, & McLeod, 2003), we replicated portions of our initial study, which allowed us to test again the same three hypotheses. We also extended the investigation by examining the role of academic discipline (i.e., social science vs. non-social science students). The results of this study closely paralleled those of the first study. Again, students perceived the LEP model to be more consistent than the CP model with their initial views of policing and expressed a greater preference for working under the CP model.

Perhaps the most practically significant findings of these studies pertained to the third hypothesis. In both studies, we asked students the following question: “Policing is undergoing a transition from the Law Enforcement Policing Model to the Community Policing Model such that the Community Policing Model is being adopted by most police services. Given this change to community policing, are you more or are you less interested in a possible career in policing?” In both studies, approximately 45% of the students reported more interest in a policing career and only 10% indicated less interest. Even among those who had previously indicated no interest in a policing career, almost 25% now expressed greater interest. In the second study, we also asked “Given the transition to community policing, upon graduation from university, if you learned that a police organization in a community in which you would like to live had several job openings for police officer positions, what is the likelihood (i.e., probability) that you would apply for a job?” More than 65% of the students estimated the probability was 50% or greater. Even among those who had expressed no initial interest in policing, almost 25% estimated a 50% or more likelihood of applying.
These findings strongly support the assumptions underlying our studies. One assumption is that the general public is not well-informed about the ongoing transition to CP or about the nature of CP. Moreover, our data suggests that if informed about CP, an appreciable number of people will recognize the benefits of this model of policing and become more interested in a possible career in policing. The convergent findings of the two studies have direct implications for police recruitment. The police must counter the public’s view that equates policing with LEP. This can be done by the implementation of information-based communication strategies. Furthermore, police organizations should develop strategies to recruit university graduates much as they have in recent years with regard to recruiting visible minorities and women. The results of our second study also demonstrated that students in the social sciences reported higher probabilities of applying for a job in policing, a result that was not unexpected given the human service component of many social science disciplines. This suggests that social science students may represent an especially lucrative applicant pool for CP.

It is important to emphasize that the information-based intervention used in our two studies (Coutts et al., 2003; Coutts et al., in press) generated an expanded applicant pool; that is, many more students reported increased interest (45%) than decreased interest (10%) upon learning about CP. Thus, the pool was larger in size and included many of the individuals who would have been present without the intervention and also many who would not have been involved in the absence of the intervention. This latter group represents the population of university students who have been deemed as especially suitable for CP (Carter et al., 1989; Roberg, 1994). Thus, the number of university students who are likely to become more interested in a policing career after being informed about CP (or more completely informed) is potentially quite large. This is important because, compared with those students who initially expressed interest in a policing career, students who initially indicated no interest or uncertain interest were significantly less likely to prefer working under the LEP model. In other words, as future police officers, these students would probably be more committed to the values and practices of CP.

From Recruitment to Selection

As Hoath et al. (1998) have suggested, “extant problems with the implementation of community policing would be ameliorated if greater attention were given to individual officer characteristics . . . in the selection of personnel” (p. 344; see also Greene, 1989; Metchik & Winton, 1995; Scrivner, 1995). Thus, in the second part of our second study and subsequent research with our students (Nick Greer and Christopher Heikoop), we have begun to look beyond recruitment and turn our attention to the issue of selecting the most suitable applicants for CP. Specifically, we have focused directly on the general person-environment fit idea that individual difference variables may distinguish between persons who are well-suited for CP and those who are less well-suited.

In our second study (Coutts et al., 2003), we used the NEO Personality Inventory - Revised (NEO PI-R) (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and the Self-Directed Search (SDS) (Holland, Powell, & Fritzsche, 1997) to explore whether or not individual differences in personality and vocational interests predict students’ proclivity for CP versus LEP. The results were generally consistent with what one might expect given the variables involved. Within the CP work environment, officers must be able to
function autonomously; demonstrate greater decision-making ability; and display innovative, analytical, and problem-solving skills. Thus, it is not surprising that those students who were high on the Openness to Experience scale of the NEO PI-R (i.e., a greater preference for variety, novelty over familiarity, and independence of judgment) tended to prefer the CP model over the LEP model. Furthermore, participants who scored higher on Agreeableness were more likely to prefer working under the CP model and to become more interested in a policing career within a CP framework. This is also noteworthy because the qualities of Agreeableness (e.g., sympathetic to and eager to help others and cooperative rather than competitive) reflect some of the essential characteristics of the CP role, such as developing police-community partnerships and encouraging community input and involvement in establishing police programs and objectives.

Concerning vocational interest types, Holland (1997) describes the Social person as one who has acquired human relations competencies, perceives him- or herself as liking to help and understand others, views problems in human relations terms, and uses social competencies as his or her dominant problem-solving process. Consistent with this description, students who scored high on the Social dimension were more likely to want to work under the CP model and to express greater interest in a policing career within a CP context. Given the emphasis in CP on greater community involvement and proactive social problem-solving strategies, the personal characteristics embodied in Holland’s Social vocational interest type appear to be especially congruent with the philosophy and practices of CP.

More recently, we have attempted to explore the extent to which university students (as potential police applicants) are attracted to the day-to-day police officer activities associated with CP and LEP (unpublished research). Our approach involves presenting students with a list of 75 day-to-day police officer activities. Some activities are more closely associated with the CP model than the LEP model (e.g., “Training and coordinating citizen volunteers in crime prevention strategies”). Other activities are more closely associated with the LEP model (e.g., “Respond to each call for service as rapidly as possible”). Students are asked to indicate the extent to which they would like or dislike performing each activity. Each of the activities was selected based on the generally agreed upon tasks and responsibilities of police officers under each model of policing (e.g., Leighton, 1991; 1994; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990). We also ask students to indicate the extent to which they perceive themselves as possessing the abilities required to successfully perform these activities. For this purpose, they respond to a list of 44 abilities associated with one or both policing models (e.g., “Developing strategies for dealing with crime and disorder problems,” “Taking control of a problem situation and resolving it quickly”), indicating the extent to which they believe each ability would be one of their strengths or one of their weaknesses. The abilities were selected based on a review of the general personnel selection literature, the activities associated with each policing model, and the suggestions by various researchers (e.g., Metchik & Winton, 1995) concerning the skills and abilities likely to be required by CP officers.

Based on factor analyses of both the activities (four factors) and the abilities (four factors), we have related scores to students’ interest in working under the CP and LEP policing models and the probability that they would apply for a police officer job within the context of CP. Although preliminary, the results are extremely encouraging in their implications for future police officer selection. With regard to the four
activity factors, two are clearly CP related: (1) “interacting with the community” and (2) “analyzing crime and community problems.” Students’ preferences for these two sets of activities are positively correlated with their preference for working under the CP model. On the other hand, one factor is clearly LEP-related: “fighting crime.” This factor correlates positively with a preference for the LEP model.

The ability factors present a similar pattern of relationships. Two of the four factors are CP-related: (1) “working with community groups” and (2) “analyzing underlying causes of problems.” The first is positively correlated with wanting to work under the CP model and negatively correlated with wanting to work under the LEP model. The two remaining factors are LEP-related: (1) “enforce the law” and (2) “use physical force.” Both of these factors are negatively correlated with wanting to work under the CP model and positively correlated with wanting to work under the LEP model.

In combination, the results of our two published studies (Coutts et al., 2003; Coutts et al., in press) and our unpublished data suggest that there may be much to be gained in the pursuit of a more CP-focused recruitment and selection strategy in the hiring of CP officers. As noted by Furnham (2001), the closer the fit between an individual’s interests, values, traits, and skills and the demands and requirements of the job, the more satisfied and productive he or she will be and the more satisfied the organization will be with his or her performance. This, of course, is the basis of Holland’s (1997) theory of vocational personalities and work environments. Thus, maximizing the fit between employee and job should be at the core of police officer selection. In this regard, our research represents an initial effort to identify ways to encourage more college students (who are more likely to possess CP-related abilities) to apply for jobs in policing and to identify individuals whose personalities, interests, activity preferences, and self-rated abilities represent a good fit with CP. We hope that such work may eventually inform the development of CP-specific recruitment and selection methods, which ultimately will serve to accomplish greater officer acceptance of CP and, accordingly, a more successful transition to CP. We view our work on recruitment and selection in CP as being in its early stages, and more recently, we have expanded our research beyond the college population by examining similar relationships in populations of police personnel.

Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux (1994) suggest that basic recruit training will be more effective “if recruitment, screening, and testing are designed to select individuals with the desire and aptitude for community policing” (p. 59). This proposition (see also McGlaughlin & Donahue, 1995) affirms the inherent inter-connectedness of the systems of a police organization that we have considered (i.e., human resource, training, and recruitment and selection). Successful incorporation of the CP orientation into one area of the organization supports and advances the incorporation of CP into the other areas; conversely, inadequate incorporation in one area undermines and sets back incorporation in other areas. Interventions in one area (e.g., recruitment and selection) are no more or no less critical to ensuring the organizational transition to CP.

Lastly, it is clear that without total and sustained commitment on the part of the leadership of a police department, the steps required (many of which we have noted) for the organization to achieve a successful transition to CP will not be taken (Loree, 1988; McLaughlin & Donahue, 1995). All too many police executives
articulate support for the movement to CP but are insufficiently committed to fundamental organizational change (Seagrave, 1996).

References


Larry M. Coutts received his BA in psychology and political science from the University of Winnipeg and his PhD in social psychology from the University of Windsor. He is currently assistant professor of psychology at the University of Windsor where he specializes in research on policing and organizational psychology. Dr. Coutts has held positions with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police as senior executive (in charge), Organizational Design and Job Evaluation Branch, and as senior research principal with both the Personnel Research Branch and Canadian Police College. He has published policing-related articles on such topics as recruitment, selection, promotion, training, and executive development. Also, Dr. Coutts has consulted with several police organizations on organizational, management, and personnel issues and programs.
Frank W. Schneider received his MA in counseling psychology from Ohio University and his PhD in social psychology from the University of Florida. He is currently professor of psychology and coordinator of the Applied Social Psychology Program at the University of Windsor. He has published policing-related research on such topics as recruitment, organization effectiveness, program evaluation, job satisfaction, and community policing. His present program of research focuses on the recruitment and selection of community policing officers.
Policing the Suburbs

David B. Griswold, PhD, Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, Florida
Adam Dobrin, PhD, Assistant Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, Florida

The United States is characterized by small police agencies. There are more than 17,000 police departments in this country, the majority of which are in suburban area cities, with a median of 10 police officers per agency (Cordner, 1989). Yet, with few exceptions, there is a paucity of research on small police departments, especially those located in the suburbs. The present study represents an attempt to begin to remedy this situation by examining day-to-day policing in several suburbs in the greater Portland, Oregon, metropolitan area. Although the study is largely exploratory, descriptive, and based upon participant observation, it should provide some insight into the daily activities of police officers in suburban police departments.

A number of assertions have been made regarding small police departments, but the primary purpose of the present study is not to evaluate these claims. Instead, the focus will be on the daily round of activities of police officers in several suburban police departments; the qualitative nature of this study does not permit systematic testing of the various assertions that have been made about small police departments. Still, to the extent that the research can shed light on the operational activities of small police departments, it could further our knowledge of the police in general.

The Study

The study took place in September and October of 1989. Initially, 12 police departments in the Portland suburbs were identified and contacted; however, 2 of these departments only allowed local residents to ride with the police, and another did not allow any riders, leaving a total of 9 police departments. At first, consideration was given to focusing on a single police department, but, instead, the researcher decided to ride with each of the 9 police departments for a single shift. Not only would diversity be enhanced through such an approach, but hopefully commonalities as well as dissimilarities between the individual officers, departments, and communities could be observed.

Each department was informed that the researcher was a criminal justice professor and that he wished to observe the daily activities of the department through riding with an officer. To put the officers at ease and because it was often dark, no notes were taken until after the rides were completed. Swing shifts from Monday to Thursday were chosen as times to ride with members of individual police departments. It was hoped that this would eliminate the bias of greater activity on a Friday or Saturday night, for example, or the inactivity of graveyard shifts. The aim, then, was to select similar shifts on which there would be a moderate amount of police activity.
The following table indicates 1988 statistics for the population, number of sworn officers, and crime rate for the 9 suburbs as well as for Portland. With the exception of one community, all have a population of at least 10,000, and the largest suburb has a population slightly over 30,000. All of the suburbs are homogeneous; although, they range from working-class to middle-class communities. Also, only one department has fewer than 10 officers, and the largest has almost 40 officers. In terms of sworn officers/1000, however, all have fewer officers than the Portland Police Department.

### Populations, Sworn Officers, and Index Crime Rates for Portland and Its Suburbs in 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population</th>
<th># of Officers</th>
<th>Officers/1000*</th>
<th>Crimes/100,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gladstone</td>
<td>10,222</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>(1.2)</td>
<td>5,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillboro</td>
<td>32,193</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>(1.2)</td>
<td>5,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tigard</td>
<td>20,119</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>(1.8)</td>
<td>10,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Plains</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(.8)</td>
<td>3,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Grove</td>
<td>12,292</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>(1.5)</td>
<td>5,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon City</td>
<td>15,321</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
<td>8,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>18,581</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>(1.3)</td>
<td>5,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake Oswego</td>
<td>25,626</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>(1.5)</td>
<td>4,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>387,659</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>(2.0)</td>
<td>17,459</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The figures do not include reserve officers who sometimes performed the duties of regular sworn officers in the suburbs.

The differences in the UCR crime rate between the suburbs and Portland were even more marked. Except for one community (Tigard), Portland had a crime rate that was more than double that of the remaining communities. Overall, the average crime rate (x=5923/100,000) for the suburban communities was only about one-third for that of Portland (17,459/100,000). The suburbs surrounding Portland, then, tended to have crime rates which were dramatically lower than Portland’s.

Given the small size of many of the police departments, anonymity of the police departments will be maintained throughout the remainder of the discussion. This will ensure that anonymity of individual police officers will be preserved as well.

### Findings

In general, there was little activity in any of the police departments that were observed. As a consequence, many of the officers apologized or complained that it was “slow,” that there was “little action,” or that it was boring. In fact, in 4 of the 9 departments, there were no calls for service during the shift. In only one instance was there a call involving a serious criminal matter; in this case, the officer with whom the researcher was riding was the third officer dispatched to the scene, and he could have continued to patrol if he had so chosen.

Simply because there was a general lack of activity, however, did not necessarily mean that officers had a negative view toward policing their communities. Frequently, knowing and being known by a number of citizens was mentioned as
a positive aspect of policing the suburbs. Some characterized police work in their jurisdictions as “laid back,” “easy going,” or “like the old style of policing.” For example, one department periodically allowed wives to ride with their husbands. Another officer took the researcher home to dinner with his family, something he suggested would probably not be allowed in a large urban police department. So, in part, whether an officer was content with the inactivity in his community was a function of what he expected from police work. Was he satisfied with the “laid back” nature of police work in his community, or was he interested in the greater excitement that a larger police department might provide? One officer suggested that the younger officers tended to be least satisfied with the inactivity of their communities. In fact, younger officers most frequently complained about the boredom of policing the suburbs.

Calls for service involved a wide range of activities including the following: a woman running over her husband, an alleged employee theft, a minor hit-and-run involving slight damage to a car, a lost or stolen ATM card, two men and a woman in a fight, an abandoned car (unfounded), a suspicious person (unfounded) selling speakers from a van without a business license, three suspicious juveniles at a vacant house, a dog bite, and a residential false alarm. These represent the gamut of calls for service during the course of the study; arrests were made only in the first incident. In many of these situations, there was either no known suspect or no probable cause; in some cases, it was uncertain whether a crime had even been committed.

In spite of the infrequent calls for service, much to the chagrin of officers in three departments, they were required to answer all calls for service. This included removing wood from the street, dog nuisance calls, and a variety of calls that they felt were outside of the purview of the police. One officer noted that he had answered a residential alarm call involving a new system. When he arrived, the resident informed him that he had deliberately set off the alarm to see how long it would take for the police to respond.

Although not all officers indicated that they responded to all calls, it was evident that the suburban police were generally community-service-oriented. For example, two officers noted that they had had recent complaints concerning motorists illegally passing stopped school buses. In response to these complaints, both departments were assigning cars to follow the school buses. Another officer noted that the chief had instructed officers not to be too “nitpicky” because community relations was emphasized. Furthermore, an officer indicated that, unlike larger departments in which an officer can remain anonymous, it was not possible to ignore citizen complaints in smaller departments because often the citizen knew the officer. Still, this familiarity can have adverse consequences as well. One officer stated that he had arrested two of his neighbors, the most recent incident involving a domestic dispute. He suspected that vandalism to his car may have been a result of these arrests. Several officers also noted that they would not live in the communities they policed because of potential unfavorable actions directed towards them or their families from citizens with whom they had had previous contact.

Beyond the community service orientation of these suburban police departments, traffic was a leading priority in all of the departments. One department had a quota of at least one daily traffic citation per officer; two of the officers with whom the researcher rode set up radar on busy streets during rush hour. Contrary to the
assertion that small departments are not necessarily as enforcement-oriented as large ones, in only two cases were traffic violators not cited; in the first case, the officer stated that the violator had been friendly, precluding the issuing of a citation. In the other incident, the driver failed to yield the right of way and was given a warning. Perhaps it can be argued that the emphasis placed on traffic violations is a result of the general inactivity of suburban police, but it was also evident that traffic was a leading activity of the officers the researcher observed. In addition, the issuing of traffic citations can be viewed as a community activity because it is a method of keeping the streets safe for the residents.

In almost all cases, officers also indicated that drugs were a problem in their communities. Most frequently, crack was mentioned as being a problem, but methedrine, heroin, marijuana, and ice were also mentioned. Although it was difficult to precisely ascertain the extent of the drug problem in these communities, it was obvious that most officers viewed drugs as a significant problem; many perceived it as a problem that had emanated from Portland. One officer noted that he could not wait for his department to receive a narcotics grant so that his department could “crack down” on drugs.

Reflective of the perceived drug problem was the proactivity of most police officers who had identified “hot spots” or places where they believed that crimes were particularly likely to occur. (What could not be determined was whether a disproportionate number of crimes occurred in “hot spots,” but clearly, officers had this perception). The police observation that crimes occur disproportionately in certain places, or “hot spots,” has been empirically verified (see Sherman, Gartin, & Buerger, 1989). Reiss (1971) has also noted that the police identify places where they believe that crimes are particularly likely to occur; Rubinstein (1973) has suggested that territorial knowledge is important to police work. Drug “hot spots” in the current study included the following: convenience stores, a freeway rest stop, a low-income apartment house occupied principally by Chicanos, a major street intersection, a parking lot behind a small group of stores, a parking lot at a park, and a group of three or four houses. Generally, these “hot spots” were identified on the basis of past experience; there had either been complaints involving drugs, or officers reported that they had actually made previous arrests at the location. Drug “hot spots” had several other characteristics. First, they did not typically become “hot spots” until evening. Generally young people and sometimes Chicanos frequented these drug “hot spots.” In addition, “hot spots” usually involved relatively large concentrations of people rather than isolated individuals, which could increase the chances that an offense would take place in an officer’s presence.

In general, an officer would simply patrol a “hot spot” one or more times looking for signs of suspicious activity, but in several instances, the officer would park across from the “hot spot” and observe the activities of people there. One officer broke up a small group of juveniles milling about at a convenience store because of suspected drug activity. Less frequently, an officer would check the license plate of a “suspicious” car parked at a “hot spot”; one officer asked the driver of a parked car what he was doing at a particular parking lot.

Beyond the drug “hot spots,” several other “hot spots” were observed. During rush hour, certain busy streets were identified where radar would be appropriate; a government subsidized housing project was viewed as a place where domestic
disputes were particularly likely to occur; and a lower-class tavern was reported as having frequent fights. In the last case, the officer ended his shift when the tavern closed; he reported that a deputy sheriff had been badly beaten in the tavern a few months ago.

Invariably, few places on a particular beat were identified as “hot spots”; several factors may explain this observation. First, there were probably few places where the officers knew that crimes had occurred previously (either because of their own or other officers’ experiences). In addition, given the typically low crime rates in the suburbs, there may be few “hot spots”; instead, crime may be relatively randomly distributed. Finally, since most of the beats and jurisdictions were small, there were often few places that were potential “hot spots” such as convenience stores and parking lots. There are several factors that may restrict the identification of “hot spots” by officers in the suburbs.

Besides identifying “hot spots,” the officers tended to be suspicious. “Cars that did not look right,” “people out of place,” and “people frequenting ‘hot spots’” were all mentioned as reasons for special scrutiny. In some cases, the officer would know the car or it might have an out-of-state license plate, but in other cases, the officer could not explain why the car “didn’t look right.” About half of the officers followed “suspicious” cars looking for some traffic infraction; one officer chased several cars at high speeds to catch up with them, so that he could obtain their license plate numbers and have them checked. One officer stated, “I hope that this driver commits a traffic violation so that I can pull him over.” In this case, the driver was a known “troublemaker,” but he committed no infraction. Although several drivers were cited for traffic violations, none was arrested for a criminal offense. Still, one officer noted that he had recently made two “drug busts” in situations involving traffic violators.

The proactive nature of the police officers was evident from the disproportionate emphasis placed upon “hot spots,” as well as their scrutiny of “suspicious” cars and individuals. Perhaps the general lack of activity in policing the suburbs could explain their proactivity, but it was also apparent that most of the officers believed that their proactivity could net criminal arrests. Given the infrequent calls for service, and the fact that calls for service generally involved a noncriminal matter, many of the officers may have simply attempted to create their own business by carefully observing cars and individuals that they deemed “suspicious.”

The proactivity of many of the officers extended beyond focusing on “hot spots” and “suspicious” cars and individuals. Several juveniles were warned for riding without bicycle lights. In another case, a youth on an off-road motorcycle was ticketed. Also, three young males who had just purchased beer at a convenience store were pulled over, though it turned out that one of the young men was 23 years old. These kinds of activities indicate that many of the officers enforced relatively minor infractions, knowing that they were unlikely to lead to an arrest. Again, inactivity may lead some officers to enforce laws concerning petty offenses.

The general proactive orientation of the observed officers is consistent with strict law enforcement rather than leniency. This runs counter to the claim of some that officers in smaller departments tend to be more lenient than those in larger ones (Brown, 1988). This orientation, however, need not necessarily conflict with the
focus on community service. With regard to drugs, for example, it is likely that the residents of these communities generally wish to minimize drug activity. In other words, the people who the police perceive as most likely to be involved in drug activities are restricted. Chicanos, juveniles, and known “troublemakers” were all identified as potential drug offenders; only a limited number of places were identified as “hot spots.” These may be some of the same individuals and places that the local residents view as undesirable. The depiction of the upper and lower class taverns in one suburb illustrates this point. “Respectable” citizens frequented the upper class tavern; “troublemakers” and other less desirable people patronized the lower class tavern, explained an officer. As a consequence, he most carefully observed the lower class tavern.

Several priorities, then, emerged from these suburban police departments. A community service orientation or general responsiveness to the needs of the community was acknowledged by all of the officers in the study. Traffic was also viewed as a leading police priority. More surprisingly, the officer tended to be very proactive. This was reflected in identifying certain places as “hot spots” as well “suspicious” cars and individuals. Even though this proactivity only netted traffic violations, most of the officers believed that it could lead to an arrest for a criminal offense in many instances.

Beyond consideration of priorities, many of the officers indicated that a potential advantage of small police departments was the diversity of activities. Obviously, small organizations tend to have less specialization than larger ones, but an expressed advantage was that in some of the departments, officers were allowed to conduct follow-up investigations and engage in other activities (e.g., fingerprinting, undercover, etc.), which would be the responsibility of specialists in larger departments. Officers who mentioned the diversity of activities viewed it as being an advantage of small police departments, but it may also be the case that small departments have little choice but to use officers in functions they might not have to undertake in larger police departments.

**Conclusion**

Several general observations emerge from this study. Community service was a general orientation in all of the suburbs to the point that officers in three of the departments were required to answer all calls for service. In part, the community service focus may be explained by the lack of activity in these departments to be responsive to the need of the community.

Traffic was also a leading priority in all of the departments; with few exceptions, the officers enforced traffic violations stringently. In some cases, this was the wish of the chief, but in other instances, officers may have used their own initiative because there was little other activity. To the extent that traffic enforcement keeps the streets safe, it can also be viewed as consistent with the community service orientation.

Perhaps the most surprising finding, however, was the general proactivity of the officers. This proactivity usually consisted of patrolling “hot spots” or observing “suspicious” individuals or cars. Although none of the initiatives taken by the police netted a criminal arrest, they all believed that their proactivity could lead to an arrest; some mentioned instances in which they had netted criminal arrests previously. Like
the strict enforcement of traffic violations, this proactivity is inconsistent with the view that small town police tend to be lenient in their enforcement activities.

Beyond these observations, the departments tended to be “laid back”; depending on the officer, some viewed this as an advantage, while others saw it as a disadvantage of policing the suburbs. The former tended to be the older officers, but three of the officers were disgruntled at having to answer all calls for service in their departments.

The present study only represents a preliminary study of suburban departments. Nonetheless, perhaps it provides some insight into the daily activities of the police in these communities. Given the preponderance of small, suburban police departments in the United States, certainly the examination of these departments warrants systematic study in the future if we are to further our understanding of them.

Additional Resources

Several studies have examined various aspects of small town police (e.g., Cordner, 1989; Decker, 1979; Galliher, Donavan, & Adams, 1975; Handberg & Unkovic, 1978; Hudzik & Greene, 1977; Kowalewski, Hall, Dolan, & Anderson, 1984; Meagher, 1985; Ostrom, Parks, & Whitaker, 1978; Roberg & Kirchoff, 1981; Swanson, 1978; Swart, 1981; Walter, 1981). However, none of these studies deal specifically with suburban police.

References


**David B. Griswold**, PhD, is a professor of criminology and criminal justice at Florida Atlantic University. Most recently, he has conducted research on sentencing guidelines.

**Adam Dobrin**, PhD, is an assistant professor of criminology and criminal justice at Florida Atlantic University. His primary research interest has been in the area of criminal violence.
Civilian Review: Some Observations

Charles E. Reasons, PhD, Professor of Law and Justice, Department of Law and Justice, Central Washington University

“Review Panel Wants Changes”
“A Case for Civilian Review”
“Hearing Assesses Success of Civilian Review”
“Residents Should Have More Say on Policing”
“Civilian Oversight of Police: Would It Help Tacoma?”

The above newspaper headings attest to the fact that some form of civilian review of police has become a part of policing in some jurisdictions. This is a relatively new phenomenon in policing in the United States.

History of Civilian Review

External review can be traced as far back as London in 1828. The first modern police department in London provided mechanisms for both internal and external review of citizens’ complaints about police misconduct (Barton, 1970). The movement for external investigation of complaints alleged against the police gathered support in the United States in the 1960s (Barton, 1970). Two of the first civilian review procedures were created in Philadelphia and New York City (Goldsmith, 1988).

The Philadelphia Police Review Board was created on October 1, 1958, by the executive order of Mayor J. Richardson Dilworth. It was created in response to the demands of civilian rights groups. At first, the board was highly disorganized. It had no funding nor any clear mission statement of what it was supposed to do. In fact, during its first 8 months, the board received few complaints and disposed of none. Later in 1959, the board finally received some funding and was then renamed the Police Advisory Board (PAB). It wasn’t until 1963 that the board obtained a full time executive secretary, an office, and a secretary (Hudson, 1968).

The Philadelphia board operated from 1958 to 1967. During this period, it only recommended punitive sanctions against police officers in 6% of the cases it reviewed; however, for much of its shaky existence, the board was not able to hold any hearings because of pending court decisions. The Philadelphia lodge of the Fraternal Order of the Police had filed several lawsuits against the board. In 1966, they actually won a suit, and the board sat idle for over 2 years while the case was being appealed. The opposition that the board faced from police unions proved to be too much to overcome. Inadequate staffing, the lack of budgetary funding, and not being able to hold hearings for almost 3 years led to the board eventually disbanding (Hudson, 1968).

In New York City, the Civilian Complaint Review Board was established by Mayor Lindsay in July 1966. Its life span was even shorter than Philadelphia’s review board. It survived for only 4 months. It was abolished by public vote in November of 1966; however, it did receive 442 citizen complaints in that period, more than twice the number that had been reported annually to the internal review board. Just like the Philadelphia civilian review board, it was not able to surpass the opposition

The failure of civilian review in cities such as Philadelphia and New York discourage the adoption of civilian review agencies throughout the country for a period of time. Efforts were renewed in the early 1970s, but in the face of bitter opposition by police, their unions, and political pressure, most civilian review mechanisms created during this period lasted only a short time. During this time period, police unions were largely effective in preventing civilian review boards from being created.

**Resurgence of Civilian Review**

For over a decade, it appeared as if police opposition would be successful in preventing the expansion of external review beyond that provided through conventional means such as county, state, or federal courts. Since 1980, however, citizen participation in the review process has been established in many major American cities. Throughout the 1990s, citizen review has experienced its largest growth. Citizen review of the police has increased 74% since 1990. It is most prevalent in the 50 largest cities, existing in 36 of them; however, the largest increase in citizen review since 1990 has occurred among the second largest cities with a whopping 333% increase (Finn, 2001).

Two factors have contributed to this growth. First, there has been more public support behind the creation of the civilian review. The review boards in Philadelphia and New York City were created by executive order. They did not represent a decision by a majority of the elected representatives. This made them politically and administratively vulnerable. Incidents such as the Rodney King beating, among others, have drawn public attention to the police and have led them to demand civilian review. These types of incidents have helped organize the movement toward civilian review. As Walker and Bumphus (1995) state, “a well organized demand for civilian review is probably a necessary condition for its establishment.” More elected officials, mayors, and city council members have also began to support civilian review. Many have come to believe that civilian review is an appropriate method of handling citizen complaints about police misconduct.

Another major factor has been the apparent decline in the power of police unions. They were the principal force behind the defeat of many earlier forms of civilian review, but as the rapid growth of civilian review in many cities illustrates, police unions have been increasingly unsuccessful in most cities in defeating them. Unions, however, have had an influence through elections and collective bargaining, among other methods. Increasingly some police executives and police unions are faced with dealing with some form of civilian external review.

**Benefits of Civilian Review: According to Its Advocates**

One of the most important issues involved in civilian review is improving the relationship between the police and the public it serves. The attitude of the public toward the police is very important because police are primarily reactive or dependent upon citizens for their input. Cooperation between the police and the community is an important factor in all aspects of crime control; however, some people are skeptical about the police’s ability to police themselves. In other words,
they have lost faith in the internal methods. Civilian review is proposed to restore faith in the police. There are several ways that its advocates believe that it will do this (Human Rights Watch, 1998).

Many believe that citizen involvement in the investigations of police misconduct complaints will improve citizen evaluations of the police department. The involvement of citizens will provide a more independent and therefore more effective review of citizen complaints. Citizens bring a more objective view to the police misconduct problem, which means they will conduct more objective investigations. This prevents police from covering for their fellow officers. It is believed that the independence of civilian review will produce a greater level of satisfaction with both individual complaints and the general public. This will result in improved communication between the police and the public.

Advocates of civilian review also believe that it will improve police-community relations by providing more effective means for controlling police misconduct. The higher levels of objectivity and thoroughness, which civilian review is believed to provide, will result in more complaints being sustained and more disciplinary actions being taken against officers. This, in turn, will deter police misconduct more effectively than internal review. Fewer instances of police misconduct will invoke public confidence in the police, which will increase good police-community relations (Human Rights Watch, 1998).

Civilian review is also developed as a technique for enhancing the accountability of the police to the public. Those who demand civilian review do not think that police are adequately accountable to the public. Internal methods that exclude civilians limit police accountability to the public. They isolate the decision-making process from the public. Most civilians know very little about internal review mechanisms because of the secretive nature of police investigations. The secretive nature of police internal affairs is partially responsible for the public’s lack of support of internal methods. Because very few people outside of law enforcement know anything about the actual operation of internal review mechanisms, they are hesitant to accept them and believe they are inefficient. Police represent the public officials who interact the most with the public, yet they do not answer to the public when issues of misconduct arise. Civilian review is designed to fix this problem (Goldsmith, 1988).

Another argument used by civilian review advocates is that it will open up the complaint process. This is based on the ideal that citizens tend to be intimidated by police officers. In some departments, citizens feel as if their complaints will not be taken seriously. Advocates of civilian review believe that if complainants are interviewed by civilians, they will be more at ease and more open about their concerns. The assumption is that if citizens are more at ease with the complaint process, more will come forward with their complaints (Barton, 1970).

Why Civilian Review Will Not Work: According to Those Opposed to It

Local police officers and police unions are often the ones who lead the opposition against civilian review. They state numerous reasons for opposing it. One of the arguments they use is that it will prevent effective law enforcement. It will do this in two ways: (1) civilian review will provide means for criminals to harass the police
who have arrested them and (2) civilian review will inhibit police officers from doing their duty on the streets by being unjustifiably harsh on the police. Many police officials believe that the aggressiveness of civilians will make them function as kangaroo courts. They will not provide police officers with due process procedures and will be less willing to hear the police officer’s side of the story. Police officers will be too worried about civilian review boards disapproving of their actions to do their jobs effectively (Fyfe, 1985).

Police chiefs have resisted citizen review boards because they believe that it will undermine their authority. Some think that if they have to share one of the most important of their disciplinary powers, the rest of their authority will also erode. Some presume that officers will not respect their decisions in other police policies if their role in the disciplinary process is diminished (Fyfe, 1985).

Another argument is that police work is professional, and as in many professions, only those who actually practice it can effectively judge performance. Police officers view themselves as professionals with specialized and accurate knowledge about criminals and crime. Those who do not have this specialized knowledge should not be placed in the position to judge them. The police believe that civilian review bodies will be unduly harsh because they do not understand the nature of the job. They believe that internal methods are superior because of the knowledge of case law, statutes, and occupational standards that police bring to the table. In order to judge police officers’ conduct, you need to have experienced the problems and difficulties of being a police officer firsthand.

The police have also argued that citizen review will contribute to police-community hostility by emphasizing isolated, negative acts of the police. Because the boards’ focus is on misconduct, they will not recognize or publicize what the police are doing well. There is the belief that civilians will side more with the complainant than the police because they do not understand the nature of police work. If more complaints are sustained, it will bring negative publicity to the police. All of this will provide further distrust and dissatisfaction with the job that the police are doing, which will hamper their ability to fight crime.

Others state that there is no need for citizen review boards because they merely duplicate existing remedies. They remind people that external checks on police behavior already exist in the form of civil litigation, criminal litigation, and the press (Reasons, 2003).

**Impact of Civilian Review**

Civilian review does not maintain a higher rate of sustaining cases. On average, it has a much lower percentage of complaints sustained. The police internal affairs sustains complaints at more than twice the rate of civilian review. The fact that internal review receives complaints from the police does not appear to be a significant enough factor to explain this large difference. Civilian review does not appear to do a better job of deterring police misconduct than internal methods (Griswold, 1994). This is in part a function of lack of money, and legal power, among other factors (Human Rights Watch, 1998).
The argument that involving citizens would open up the complaint process because citizens will be less intimidated also proves not to be true in most cases. In most forms of civilian review, citizens are still interviewed by police officers before they can file a complaint. Civilians may still be intimidated by the complaint process and hesitant to file their complaints at the station to an officer.

Many arguments police have used in opposing citizen review also tend to be unfounded. The argument that civilian review will be unduly harsh on the police is unproven, and citizen review appears to have a positive effect on the public’s attitude toward the police. Even though the belief that civilian review would improve police and community relations and deter misconduct has been shown not to be accurate, the community apparently still thinks that civilian review is more thorough and objective than internal methods (Finn, 2001). Although there are a variety of organizational structures and legal powers (Walker & Write, 1995; Finn, 2001), citizens as well as some police and sheriff department administrators see important benefits in citizen oversight. These benefits include improving their image and relationships with the community, strengthened internal investigations, and making valuable policy and procedural recommendations (Finn, 2001). Furthermore, local and elected officials view it as demonstrating their concern with stopping police misconduct and, in some cases, reducing the number of civil suits or successful suits brought against their county or city (Finn, 2001).

The Future of Citizen Review

Community policing was heralded as a new methodology to better serve the public and make a difference (Zhao, Scheider, & Thurman, 2002). It would seem logical that if there is to be participation by the community in addressing problem solving with the police, that the issue of complaints against the police by citizens also needs community involvement. In fact, it may be that civilian review and community policing are a natural together (Reasons, Reid, & Kerlikowski, 1999).

In the areas of threat of terrorism and increased legal powers of intrusion by all levels of government, civilian participation in addressing complaints becomes even more crucial. While the form and nature of external review may vary from ombudsman to citizen review boards to office of professional accountability to civilian advisory councils, among others, the fact is that some type of civilian extent review is here to stay (Human Rights Watch, 1998; Kim, 2001; Walker & Write, 1995). Foreword looking administrators will support civilian review as a valuable aspect of a democratic society run by the rule of law (Bayley, 2002).

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Shirrell Veitenheimer for aid in the preparation of this article.

References


Zhao, J., Scheider, M. C., & Thurman, Q., (2002). Funding community policing to reduce crime: Have cop grants made a difference? *Criminology and Public Policy, 2*(1), 7-32.

**Charles E. Reasons** received his PhD from Washington State University in 1972 and his LLB from the University of British Colombia Law School in 1992. Currently, he is a professor of law and justice at Central Washington University. He has conducted research on policing issues in both the United States and Canada.
Community Policing Clearly Defined: The Seven Core Elements

Bruce L. Benson, PhD, Associate Professor, School of Criminal Justice, Police Chief Emeritus, Michigan State University

From its inception, real community policing has been hampered by a lack of clear and conclusive definition. Swanson, Territo, and Taylor (2001) explain, “Despite its popularity (or perhaps because of it), the concept of community policing remains only loosely defined . . . At best, community policing is a muddled term without exact meaning and precise definition” (p. 52).

This writer, in conducting community policing training and consulting at numerous police agencies, has often been presented with the question, “What’s the minimum change we need to make in our police department to qualify for COPS (Community Oriented Policing Services) federal grant money?” For this and other reasons, many police agencies have continued to function in a primarily traditional policing mode, relying on the basics of response to calls for service, patrol, and investigation, while adding some type of community element to the fringes of the organization. Police departments, in the name of community policing, have placed one or a few officers on walking beats; assigned one community policing/crime prevention officer to work more closely with community groups; obtained a McGruff dog suit or other visible teaching tool for community presentations; changed some officers’ transportation to bicycles or motorized scooters; or added programs for the community, such as a citizens’ police academy or child identification program. Such actions may have some positive benefits in various ways. They do not, however, constitute actual community policing, either in philosophy or in operations. This is especially the case if the primary orientation of the majority of the police agency continues in the traditional policing mode.

Dr. Robert Trojanowicz, in his landmark book, Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective (1990) with Bonnie Bucqueroux, lists “Ten Principles of Community Policing” (pp. xiii-xv). He devotes a full chapter to the issue of “What Community Policing Means” (pp. 1-39). He discusses “what it is,” including a detailed description of community policing as a new philosophy and new organizational strategy. He also discusses “what it is not,” including the points that it is not public relations, soft on crime, a technique, or cosmetic.

In a later publication, Trojanowicz acknowledges “the challenge of defining community policing.” He states, “… confusion persists concerning precisely what community policing is. What definition are departments using when they claim to be doing community policing?” (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1994, p. 1). He then elaborates with a further definition of The Nine P’s of Community Policing, summarized as: “Community policing is a philosophy of full service personalized policing, where the same officer patrols and works in the same area on a permanent basis, from a decentralized place, working in a proactive partnership with citizens to identify and solve problems” (p. 3).
I am privileged to have worked as a police practitioner in two community policing environments, one in a municipality and one on a university campus. The first instance involved serving as a supervising police lieutenant, and later as a commanding deputy police chief, directing the experimental “Foot Patrol” Community Policing operations in Flint, Michigan. This developing experiment, in 1982, became the nation’s first full city-wide community policing operation. The second instance involved serving as police chief at Michigan State University, a major residential university campus, and implementing pragmatic community policing there. At Michigan State University, community policing was credited with achieving a 65% reduction in serious crime over a 10-year period. In both of these community policing environments, the following definition, consistent with the Trojanowicz outlook, was used:

**Community Policing is the philosophy of involving a police officer in a specific section of the community, with ownership, on a long-range basis. The key element is geographic ownership. The officer works to organize the resources of the community, the police department and other agencies to reduce crime and meet the appropriate needs of the community. Community Policing is a department-wide philosophy of caring, working with people and helping people. This often means helping people informally when the formal systems don’t seem to work. Community Policing is the dominant department-wide philosophy of this organization.**

Over the last two decades, a number of very knowledgeable scholars have described, examined, and further defined aspects of community policing from various viewpoints. These scholars include Goldstein (1990), Kelling (1981), Wilson and Kelling (1982), Carter (1994), Mastrofski and Greene (1988), Braiden (1986), and Manning (1984). Still, in both academic and pragmatic environments, there exists a great deal of confusion over just what community policing really is. Police chiefs still describe their traditional policing agencies as “doing community policing” because some officers ride bikes or present some programs to community groups. Academics continue to discuss and debate what community policing means from different viewpoints and interests. Collectively, those with interests in this subject have not identified and adopted a clear, conclusive definition of community policing that is universally accepted.

In 1994, law enforcement leaders in the state of Ohio decided to promote a strong state-wide emphasis on community policing, beginning with a clear definition for state-wide implementation. Lead agencies included the Ohio Association of Chiefs of Police (OACP) and its related organization, the Law Enforcement Foundation (LEF). Dr. Todd Wurschmidt, Executive Director of OACP, appointed Mr. Clair Young (Professor Emeritus, The Ohio State University) as Community Oriented Policing (COP) Project Director. I was selected as primary COP consultant. In May 1995, OACP sent a mailing to all its members asking the Ohio police chiefs what they felt the basic, core elements of community-oriented policing are or should be. Input was received from 140 responding police chiefs. These recommendations were then consolidated with primary factors of community policing definitions or descriptors in the literature of major relevant scholars, including those mentioned previously in this article. It should be noted that this process included and combined several foundations of community policing knowledge and expertise. Scholarly community policing publications were utilized, particularly the works of Trojanowicz. The
practitioner expertise of the 140 responding Ohio police chiefs was included. The collective information was reviewed and sifted through by this author, who had not only a thorough academic background in the field, including personal study with Robert Trojanowicz, but also possessed intuitive and experiential community policing expertise through leading and revising two major community policing departmental operations over a period of about 15 years.

The result of this unique community policing definitional effort is a clear listing of the Seven Core Elements of Community Oriented Policing, in summary form as follows:

1. Police Philosophy of True Police-Community Partnership
2. Open COP Police Management Style
3. Problem-Solving Orientation
4. Active COP Citizen Involvement
5. Permanent Ownership of Beat Areas, in Some Way
6. Local Police Officer (Community Police Officer, or CPO) Serves as Neighborhood Leader and Resource Organizer
7. Personal Relationship Between Police Officer (CPO) and Community

A more thorough description of this seven-part definition, with descriptive phrases, is given below:

**Seven Core Elements of Community-Oriented Policing**

1. **Police Philosophy of True Police-Community Partnership**
   The philosophy is not just a program. It is department-wide, involving all members; has strong support from the top; integrates community policing in all aspects of the department; and emphasizes mutual trust and respect.

2. **Open COP Police Management Style**
   Related strong points are a vision and mission. This style involves real empowerment of members (giving the “freedom to fail” with honest mistakes); employing leadership, not just traditional police management; being a coach, facilitator, and resource to frontline officers; having management balance of being tough on values, while giving officers the “freedom to fail” with new ideas; celebrating innovation, creativity, and community policing champions; fostering genuine advising and access to the police department by citizens; emphasizing quality and customer service; re-evaluating the deployment of resources; and employing a management sense of humor.

3. **Problem-Solving Orientation**
   This element consists of utilizing a proactive, positive approach; using problem-oriented policing (POP) as a strong part of community-oriented policing; using the SARA problem-solving method (scanning, analysis, response, and assessment); using both informal and formal methods; stressing innovation and experimentation; using department values as an anchor; and seeking permanent solutions.

4. **Active COP/Citizen Involvement**
   This core element emphasizes developing solid citizen support of the community policing philosophy and the local community police officer; real information
sharing; mutual identification of appropriate problems and concerns; prioritizing crime prevention and reduction; citizen input into police policies, operations, and priorities; giving a challenge to citizens for volunteering, participation, and active involvement in community service; involving the “Big Six” – police, community, government, business, social services, and the media; and employing regular feedback and evaluation.

5. Permanent Ownership of Beat Areas
This is the single most important element of community-oriented policing; it involves a stable, consistent officer(s) presence in the neighborhood; the same officer for 1½ to 3 years or longer; two-way ownership (“my beat” – “my officer”); the police officer is the “mini chief of police” in the neighborhood; and the officer has a “turf, not time” outlook.

6. Local Community Police Officer (CPO) Serves as Neighborhood Leader and Resource Organizer
The local CPO is a full-service police officer (an organizer, facilitator, and catalyst as well as a “doer”). The CPO organizes the resources of the community, police department, and other agencies to reduce crime and meet other community needs; identifies and leads neighborhood leaders; delegates; utilizes innovation and experimentation; is responsive and respectful to citizens; is a mentor and friend to youth; builds neighborhood pride, improving the quality of life; and “owns” and leads his or her beat.

7. Personal Relationship Between the Community Police Officer (CPO) and the Community
Involved in this element are a first-name basis relationship; mutual trust and respect; friendly, caring, courteous, and genuine demeanor; developing a relationship beyond mere business matters, and beyond race, color, religion, or nationality; and creating and using positive “moments of truth.”

To practice true community policing, then, are all seven core elements necessary? Of course they are, at least to some appreciable degree. If a police agency only implements Core Element #3, a Problem-Solving Orientation, there may be resulting benefits, but the agency is not practicing community policing. Similarly, if a police department implements six of the seven Core Elements, but disregards Core Element #5, Permanent Ownership of Beat Areas, there may be some good things taking place between police and community, but it is not true community policing. This standardized definition of community policing allows for true definition in terms of police philosophy and operations and promotes foundational discussion as to the actual type of policing and police department functioning within a community. It gives police agencies a clear road-map of direction for transitioning to a community policing philosophy.

The Seven Core Elements of community-oriented policing have been used extensively throughout Ohio law enforcement and will continue as the basis for further community policing efforts. This standardized definition was promoted in state-wide OACP law enforcement conferences, beginning in 1995. It was used as the basis for community policing workshops presented throughout the state in either 3-day or 4-day formats in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998. Hundreds of police officers, including police chiefs, from a total of 86 Ohio police departments attended these
workshops and were trained in the philosophy and pragmatic implementation of true community policing. Further support to this change effort was provided by on-site assistance visits to police departments changing to the community policing mode. Specialized workshops were also presented to meet particular community policing needs and implementation problems. Feedback and evaluation took place throughout the state, and results were overwhelmingly positive.

Dr. Todd Wurschmidt, Executive Director, and the officers of the Ohio Association of Chiefs of Police (OACP) are now putting The Seven Core Elements of Community Oriented Policing into use on an international policing basis. OACP has already established an international exchange relationship with the Brazilian police, with visits having taken place by Brazilian police officials to Ohio and by Ohio police officials to Brazil. OACP has now also established an international exchange effort with the Turkish National Police, with a visit to Turkey planned for the near future. Specifically for the police chief visit to Turkey, and with other exchange possibilities in mind, OACP has now had The Seven Core Elements of Community Oriented Policing translated into four additional languages. These Seven Core Elements have been printed on one page, with corresponding national flags, as follows: in English translation, for the United States of America and also for Uganda; in Turkish translation, for the Republic of Turkey; in Portuguese translation, for the country of Brazil; in Swahili translation, for the country of Kenya; and in Italian translation, for the country of Italy. These translations are also a special tribute to Professor Clair Young, who has visited all of these countries and has evidenced a personal passion for the promotion of community policing. The Turkish police have especially indicated an interest in studying democratic methods of policing, and community policing specifically, and copies of the translations will be disbursed to Turkish police officials during the upcoming international visit to aid in community policing discussions.

The Seven Core Elements of Community Oriented Policing have provided a solid foundation and focus for state-wide Community Policing efforts in Ohio. These efforts have been sustained over a period of several years by the Ohio Association of Chiefs of Police and the Law Enforcement Foundation and will serve as a model for continued community policing progress and success, both domestically and internationally, in the future.

References


Bruce L. Benson is associate professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University. His specialties include police leadership and management, community policing, police ethics, and police stress. He retired in August 2002 as MSU police chief and director of public safety, a position he held for over 15 years.

As police chief at Michigan State University, Dr. Benson implemented community policing campus-wide, with a resulting reduction of serious crimes by over 60%. Targeted crimes, with police and community collaboration, were reduced even further. Bruce is the individual recipient of the MSU Excellence in Diversity Award, the Greater Lansing Urban League Visionary Award, and the Community News 2002 Outstanding Police Officer Award. Bruce has been interviewed on ABC’s *Good Morning America* regarding the successes of community policing at Michigan State University.

Dr. Benson’s education is in the areas of administration and criminal justice. He received his BS degree in police administration from Michigan State University, his MS in criminal justice from Michigan State University, and his PhD in administration and supervision from the University of Michigan. He has instructed criminal justice classes at various colleges and universities over the last 20 years.

Bruce is the author of a number of police journal articles and has performed consulting, training, and management reviews at police agencies throughout the United States and Canada. He is a graduate of the FBI National Academy and of the FBI Law Enforcement Executive Development Seminar (LEEDS).
Russian-American Law Enforcement Exchanges: What One Program Has Accomplished

Ronald R. Pope, PhD, President, Serendipity-Russia, Associate Professor of Russian Politics, Illinois State University

Background

I began my formal study of the Soviet Union in 1962. One of the first things I learned was the extent to which the Communist Party tried to control every aspect of Soviet society, especially contacts with the outside world, but by end of the 1980s, it was clear that the Soviet Union was in the midst of radical changes. These included new opportunities for relationships in “politically sensitive” areas.

One particularly promising approach involved establishing Sister City ties. Thanks to a dedicated group in the twin cities of Bloomington and Normal, Illinois, a Sister City agreement was signed with the ancient Russian town of Vladimir in April of 1989. As one of the few people in the community at that time who spoke Russian, I was asked to help interpret for the three-person Russian delegation, none of whom spoke English. One of the members of the delegation was the Secretary of the Communist Party organization for Vladimir. At the time, this was the most important political position in the city.

Through this contact, I managed to obtain an invitation to observe the first ever competitive local elections under the Communists in March 1990. As I prepared for the trip, I started giving thought to what might be accomplished beyond my learning firsthand about changes in the Russian political system. One possibility involved establishing contacts between Russian law enforcement professionals and their American counterparts. I approached Dr. Frank Morn from Illinois State University’s Criminal Justice Sciences Department about this possibility. One of his areas of interest is comparative law enforcement systems, and he was immediately intrigued by the idea.

While I was in Vladimir, I met Major (later Colonel) Vladimir Sergevnin who happened to be the head of the “social studies” program at what was then the Vladimir Special Militia School. At the time, the school provided a 2-year program that trained primarily young men who had completed their military service to be “investigators” in the Russian militia. (The School’s program was later expanded to 4 years and the name changed to the Vladimir Juridical Institute. It is now a 5-year program, and the name will soon be changed to the Vladimir Juridical Academy. More information about this is available in the Notes section at the end of this article.)

Major Sergevnin was also very interested in the possibility of arranging exchanges. Ultimately, it was decided to invite Major Sergevnin, in part because he spoke English and was a representative from the Vladimir militia, and Colonel Ivan Golubev, to visit Illinois. (Colonel Golubev was ultimately promoted to Colonel General
and was appointed a Deputy Minister in the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Unfortunately, he passed away in December 2003.

The two Russian officers spent two weeks in Illinois in March-April 1991 visiting various law enforcement organizations and training programs. This was followed by a visit of a delegation to Vladimir in August 1991. The group consisted of Dr. Morn; Dr. Michael Charles, then Chair of the ISU Criminal Justice Department and later Director of the University of Illinois Police Training Institute; and Ronald Swan, Chief of the ISU Police Department. Dr. Charles and Chief Swan played a major role in the subsequent exchange program.

Friendly relations were established—and the search was on for specific projects that could provide concrete results for both sides. Short get-acquainted visits are necessary, but unless they are carefully planned and focus on limited specific achievable goals, they don’t generally result in substantive outcomes.

The first “extended” project was the team teaching of a special course at Illinois State University on Russian law enforcement by Dr. Morn and Vladimir Sergevnin, who by that time had been promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. This went well. It was followed by the first ISU academic credit trip to Russia led by Dr. Morn. (The fifth of these highly successful trips took place this past May.)

The first major training program for Russian officers was put together for spring 1994. Two staff members at the Vladimir Special Militia School were selected to attend the Police Training Institute (PTI) at the University of Illinois—which by then was headed by Dr. Charles. This is one of the best programs in Illinois for the training of police officers and other state law enforcement personnel.

I personally screened the potential participants and recommended the two officers who I thought had an adequate command of English, were in a position to make good use of what they would be learning, and who had the kind of personality that would enable them to get along well with their American hosts. (All subsequent candidates for this program have also been interviewed. The consensus on this side is that one of the keys to the success of the program has been the screening process.)

The officers selected were Major, now Colonel, Alexei Grigoriev and Lieutenant, now Lieutenant Colonel, Anna (Korovina) Kulakova. As with all subsequent participants in this exchange program, after their selection, both officers attended English classes at the American Home in Vladimir. (For more on the American Home, which is operated by Serendipity-Russia, see www.serendipity-russia.com.)

PTI provided the training and room and board for the two Russian officers while they were in Champaign, and Stanard and Associates, a Chicago-based consulting firm, covered their airfare and other expenses and hosted them when they visited Chicago. Without the support of the firm’s founder and President, Dr. Steven Stanard, the first exchange would not have been possible.

Major Grigoriev and Lieutenant Kulakova went through the complete PTI program, which was 10 weeks long at that time. Before returning to Vladimir, they spent one week each with four different Illinois law enforcement organizations observing in the “real world” what they had studied at PTI.
As with all the other participants in the exchange program, in each city they visited they stayed with families. This provided them with a much more “personal” perspective on American law enforcement than they could have gotten through classes and official visits alone. The host officers and their families deserve very special thanks for their contribution to this program.

As an interesting side note, while with the police department in Rockford, Illinois, Lieutenant Kulakova was accompanying an officer on patrol when they spotted a driver who seemed to be lost. It turned out that, by chance, the driver was a recent Russian émigré. When she saw Lieutenant Kulakova, who was wearing her Russian militia uniform, she was, to say the least, greatly surprised. Because the driver’s English was very limited, the Lieutenant was able to be of significant assistance in providing her with directions to her destination.

All the Russian officers participated in various social, cultural, and professional activities in each community they visited. On the professional side, for example, while in Chicago, Major Grigoriev and Lieutenant Kulakova were able to spend some time with the marine unit on lake front patrol, and they spent a day with an undercover team observing drug transactions on the streets.

Since the first exchange, to date, three more pairs of officers have participated in this program. The rest of this article will focus on some of the information and ideas they were able to bring back to Russia—and put to productive use.

Contributions

One of the first significant outcomes of the exchanges was the creation by Vladimir Sergevnin at the Vladimir Special Militia School of a course on “International Law Enforcement Experience” and the publication of a textbook with the same title. All of the officers from the school who have taken part in the exchange program have participated in teaching this class. (Prior to this, the official position was, in general, that “Communism” was so far superior to “Capitalism” that there was little to be learned from the West.)

Among many other topics, the class includes information on “patrol work” in America, including, for example, how to identify and handle drunk drivers. Here, it is important to mention that the Russian police system is structured like a military organization with “enlisted” patrol officers who actually patrol the streets and “officers” who are trained in separate programs, such as the Vladimir Juridical Institute (formerly the Special Militia School). As a result, the officers generally do not have extensive “street experience.” Several of the Russian participants in the PTI program have commented on the obvious value of having police officers work their way up through the ranks beginning with street patrol duty.

It’s, of course, unlikely that all Russian militia officers will be required to start with a minimum of several years of patrol duty, but, clearly, the best patrol officers can be encouraged to eventually attend an “officer training” program. More “street experience” in the officer ranks will undoubtedly be of benefit. In addition, including more information on policing work at the street patrol level in the curriculum of the officer training programs is undoubtedly beneficial.
In addition to adding the new course on foreign policing experience to the curriculum, the officers who have participated in the exchange have helped bring about a change in the way some classes are taught. For example, additional exercises have been developed using mock crime scenes. They have also introduced more team teaching, and some limited video has been used to help critique student performance. More video critiquing will be used as resources allow.

Of special value has been the enhancement of psychological screening of prospective students—and faculty. Stanard and Associates made a special contribution in this area. One of their areas of expertise is the development of screening exams for public safety positions. In this connection, more emphasis has been put on the role of psychology in police work, including techniques for dealing with witnesses and suspects under interrogation.

In another area, one of the participants in the exchange, Captain Anya (Gavrilova) Petrunina, was able to contribute to the revision of the Russian Penal Code thanks to her U.S. experience—and the fact that her father, Major General Boris Gavrilov, was one of the participants in the writing of the new code. For example, under the old Russian criminal code, burglary cases involving the theft of less than the official minimum wage were recorded only if the authorities were able to identify the guilty party. Now, as in the United States, all burglaries are supposed to be treated as criminal cases. The U.S. policy of not allowing criminal cases to be “drug out” by the government influenced the decision to, at least in principle, largely abolish the Russian practice of referring cases for “further investigation” if there appeared to be insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction at trial. The prosecution now is supposed to present its best case up front. The Russians are also in the process of adopting the American practice of “plea bargaining,” in part as a way to unclog their court system and save resources.

A number of publications have been influenced by what the Russian officers learned while they were here. This has included a series of books and articles on the prevention of drug abuse, including a book that was nominated for a national award.

After a hiatus of several years, the new Director of the University of Illinois Police Training Institute, Tom Dempsey, is working with his counterpart at the Juridical Institute, Major General Valeri Morozov, to restart the exchange program. They were able to discuss the program when Mr. Dempsey led a small delegation to Vladimir that participated in the Juridical Institute’s 60th anniversary celebration this past November.

Related to this, we have arranged for a June 2003 Juridical Institute honors graduate, Lieutenant Maria Yumatova, to enroll in Illinois State University’s master’s program in Criminal Justice Sciences—and then attend PTI. She has been awarded a full tuition waiver and a graduate assistantship. Lieutenant Yumatova is currently gaining practical experience as an investigator in the district (or “county”) of Bogolubovo, which includes the town of Bogolubovo and several villages.

This exchange program has not been a one-way street; it has also been a very rewarding experience for the American participants—who, unfortunately, are too
numerous to name. I will leave it to those directly involved in the program on this side of the ocean to comment on what they have gained from the exchanges.

**Notes:** The author would like to especially thank Lieutenant Colonel Anna Kulakova and Captain Anya Petrunina for the information they contributed for this article—and for their ongoing efforts to make maximum possible use of what they learned through the exchange program. Lieutenant Colonel Kulakova made two subsequent trips to the United States after her pioneering stint at PTI. This included team teaching the course on Russian law enforcement in spring 1997 with Dr. Frank Morn. In 1999, she returned to work for several months at PTI. Captain Petrunina participated in the PTI program in 1999. She is currently on maternity leave but will soon be returning to the Moscow Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs where she is studying and teaching—and where she is making active use of what she learned from her interaction with her American colleagues. Colonel Vladimir Sergevnin played an important role in getting the exchanges started and contributed to the “lessons learned” through lectures and publications in Russia before moving to the States where he is now interim director of the Illinois Police Corps Academy and editor of the journal, *Law Enforcement Executive Forum*. Most important, General Golubev and, especially, General Morozov played a crucial role in supporting and facilitating the exchanges, especially in the beginning when developing contacts with the United States required entering uncharted territory.

Helpful comments on this article were provided by Dr. Steven Stanard and Dr. Donna Vandiver. (Dr. Vandiver led the most recent ISU Criminal Justice study trip to Russia.)

Finally, thanks in part to the experience it gained—and the positive attention it attracted—through its participation in this and related foreign exchange programs, the Vladimir Special Militia School was able to persuade the authorities in Moscow to allow it to expand from a 2-year to a 4-year program and, most recently, to a 5-year program. As noted above, the addition of the fifth year will result in the Juridical Institute becoming a “Juridical Academy.” It will also allow them to add extra courses and, as a result, to turn out even better prepared law enforcement and correctional officers.

**Ronald Pope,** PhD, has been teaching Russian politics at Illinois State University since 1976. He has an MA in Russian area studies from UCLA and a PhD in international relations from the University of Pennsylvania.

In 1989, he helped interpret for a visiting delegation from Bloomington-Normal Illinois’ new Russian Sister City, Vladimir. Out of this, he received an invitation to observe the first truly competitive local elections that next March.

In response to the wide-ranging changes that were taking place, Dr. Pope decided that he didn’t want to remain on the sidelines, observing, lecturing, and writing. Instead, with a great deal of help from others, he organized the construction of a model American Home in Vladimir where, among other things, English is now being taught by nine Americans to more than 350 Russians each term. This includes local militia officers, some of whom have participated in the law enforcement exchange program discussed in this article.
Stress has always been present to some degree in law enforcement. Police officers often face stressful situations while performing their duties, which causes them to suffer symptoms of stress. Pranzo and Pranzo (1999) believe stress and trauma are more prevalent in law enforcement today than ever before. They believe police officers are stressed by not only events in which they are involved, such as critical incidents but also from the rules and regulations of the departments in which they work. Police officers face challenges that the average citizen cannot even begin to fathom.

The effects of police stress can also extend to police spouses and families who are often ill-prepared for the changes an officer’s job will cause in their lives. According to Pranzo and Pranzo (1999), shift work, working on holidays, rotating days off, having a firearm in the house, and the inherent dangers of police work can be very stressful to the officer’s family. In fact Bennett and Hess (2003) noted that the aftermath of a stressful incident can greatly affect a police officer’s family and leave damaging emotional scars, a phenomenon identified as “afterburn.” Risk factors that make a police family vulnerable to stress include limited knowledge of police work among family members, a conflict between the job and family priorities, and isolation felt by the officer and spouse. According to Means (1986), the police family is not different than any other civilian family in terms of being exposed to outside stress factors except dealing with the highly structured atmosphere of the department.

In a study of spouses of police officers, 77% reported experiencing unusually high levels of stress from the officers’ job (Finn & Tomz, 1997). Specifically, in this study, the stressors experienced by spouses included concerns about the officer being hurt or killed, friends’ discomfort with the spouse being a police officer, teasing and harassment of children because of parents’ job, and concerns related to firearms in the family residence. Similarly, Maynard and Maynard (1982) found that police spouses viewed inherent job demands, shift rotation, changing schedules, and promotional practices as sources of stress on police families. According to Rafky (1984), studies of stress in the immediate families of police officers revealed that 10 to 20% of all police wives are dissatisfied with their husband’s job and would like their husband to leave the police department. Interestingly, Southworth (1990) outlined that not only the negative aspect of police work but also the positive aspects, when taken home, can be destructive.

Hageman (1989) observed that while the family is often viewed as a stress reducer in other occupations, in policing, the spouse often becomes identified as one of the
stressors. Furthermore, he points out that while police divorce rates appear to be no higher than those in the general population, officers’ perceptions of the impact of the job on their marriages often differ significantly from those of their spouses, indicating a potential for misunderstanding and distrust.

Family-related stress has the potential to adversely affect the job performance of employees (McCamey, Scaramella, & Cox, 2003). Police officers not experiencing job stress can be adversely affected by problems in the home environment. For example, spouses often perceive that the officer prefers to spend time with coworkers rather than the family, that there is too much or too little discussion of policing, and that the officer is overprotective (Borum & Philpot, 1993; National Institute of Justice, 2000). In addition, Territo and Vetter (1981) noted that the following stressors appear to further contribute to marital discord for police families: children encounter rejections from peers; officers find it necessary to suppress their feelings to function on the job; and the pressures and working hours of police work lead to intimacy problems. In 1985, Blumberg and Niederhoffer, in discussing the police family concluded,

The police profession is a jealous mistress, intruding in intimate family relationships and disrupting the rhythms of married life. The danger of police work arouses fears for the safety of loved ones. The revolving schedule of a patrol officer’s “around-the-clock” tours of duty complicates family logistics . . . Although wives adapt to the pressures of the occupation on family life, they, nevertheless, gripe about the injustices and inconsistencies. They resent the “secret society” nature of police work that obstructs free-flowing communication between spouses. Paradoxically, although they are treated as aliens in the police world, their family lifestyle is scrutinized by a curious public. (p. 371)

According to McCamey et al. (2003), this may also be true of husbands of female officers.

Recognition that policing can exact a toll in personal costs has led to numerous attempts to identify and reduce the stress experienced by the officer and the family. According to Lott (1995), law enforcement officers are not receiving enough help and counseling from their agencies. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) suggested that law enforcement agencies offer several services for family members, including individual and family counseling, post-shooting incident support and debriefing, group discussions among officers and their spouses, orientation programs, and frequent family events (IACP, 1991). In addition, the Collier County, Florida, Sheriff’s Office provides training to spouses and other domestic partners of deputies and recruits who are enrolled in the regular training academy (National Institute of Justice, 2000). The program includes an introduction to law enforcement work and discussions concerning the effect policing will have on family lives. Spouses enrolled in this program discuss the structure of the department, stress management, and conflict resolution techniques. Training at the academy offers perhaps the best opportunity to introduce family members to the program and other available resources and to begin to inoculate them against—or at least prepare them for—stress-related difficulties during the officer’s law enforcement career (CTI, 2003).
Methodology

The exploratory study was a one-time cross sectional investigation of perceived stress of spouses of police officers from a large Midwest municipal police department. At the time of the study, 179 of the department’s officers were married. Due to the potential transitory nature of relationships other than marriage, only married spouses were included in the study.

The questionnaire was a self-administered, anonymous survey that was mailed to all married spouses at their residence. Completion of the survey was voluntary, and respondents were guaranteed confidentiality. The sample was a purposive/convenience sample and cannot be generalized to other police spouses. The questionnaire was composed of closed-ended questions, and most contained a 5-point Likert scale.

A total of 179 questionnaires were mailed to spouses of married police officers. One hundred and one surveys were returned for a response rate of 56%.

Data Analysis

The majority of the spouses in this study were employed and between 23 and 42 years of age. All of the respondents (100%) were Caucasian, and a majority had been married between 1-16 years. Thirty five percent had two children, and 32% had a spouse that had been a police officer for over 16 years. Eighty-three percent of the respondents had attended college to some degree. The characteristics of the sample are included in Table 1.
**Table 1**
Characteristics of Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N*</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32-36</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37-42</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43-52</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years Married</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17+</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Children</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years Spouse Employed as a Police Officer</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17+</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employed</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College Work</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Graduate</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Graduate Work</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Degree</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Differences in N by category due to missing data.

**Perceptions of Stress Data**

Respondents were asked whether they worry about their spouse’s safety while they are at work. Approximately 74% of the respondents reported some degree of worry about the safety of their spouse while he or she is at work (see Table 2).
Table 2
When my spouse is at work, I worry about his or her safety.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes Agree</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Next, respondents were asked whether their spouse regularly talks to them about their job as a police officer. Approximately 85% of the respondents indicated some degree of communication with the spouse about their job as a police officer (see Table 3).

Table 3
My spouse regularly talks to me about his or her job.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes Agree</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Data</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were asked whether they perceived an attitude change by their spouse toward other people since the spouse became a police officer. A majority (58%) indicated that they have noticed a change in their spouse’s attitude toward other people since the spouse became a police officer. Next, if respondents perceived a change in the spouse’s attitude, they were asked how it changed. A majority (87%) reported their spouse’s attitude toward other people was a negative change (see Tables 4 and 5).

Table 4
My spouse’s attitude has changed towards other people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Data</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If the spouse’s attitude has changed, how has it changed?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were asked what their response would be if their spouse were assigned an officer of the other gender as a regular partner. A majority (64%) perceived this type of assignment as neutral, and only 26% of the respondents were opposed or strongly opposed to their spouse being assigned a partner of the other gender (see Table 6).

What would your response be if your spouse were assigned an officer of the other gender as a steady partner?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly in Favor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Favor</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposed</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Opposed</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Data</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Next, respondents were asked how people in the community reacted when they became aware that their spouse was a police officer. Thirty-five percent perceived that the community reacted very friendly and normal; only 2% perceived a somewhat hostile response from the community (see Table 7).

How do members of the community react when they become aware that your spouse is a police officer?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Friendly</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Friendly</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Hostile</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Data</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were asked how their spouse’s work schedule affected the family’s life. A majority (57%) perceived that their spouse’s work schedule did not affect the family’s life; only 28% believed the work schedule weakened it (see Table 8).
Table 8
How does your spouse’s work schedule affect your family life?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthens It</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does Not Affect It</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weakens It</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Data</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next question on the survey asked the respondents how serious a problem is the necessity of safeguarding the police service weapon at home. A majority (82%) felt that the necessity to safeguard the police service weapon was not a problem (see Table 9).

Table 9
How serious a problem is the necessity of safeguarding the police service weapon at home?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Problem</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Problem</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious Problem</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Data</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final question asked whether an education/orientation program provided to spouses/families of newly hired police officers would be beneficial. A majority (81%) of spouses indicated that an education/orientation program would be a benefit (see Table 10).

Table 10
Do you feel an education/orientation program provided to spouses/families of newly hired officers would be beneficial?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings and Implications
The majority of police spouses in this study were Caucasian, currently employed, between the ages of 23-42 years, and had completed some college. Several of the findings in this study were consistent with earlier studies. For example, this research confirmed that a majority (74%) of police spouses worry to some degree about the safety of their spouse while he or she is on duty. This is consistent with the findings of Finn and Tomz (1997) in which a majority of spouses were concerned
about the officer being hurt or killed. Related to this, however, is the finding that a majority (85%) of spouses indicated some degree of regular communication with the police spouse about their job as a police officer. This is an important finding since regular communication between spouses has the potential to positively influence the perceptions of the impact of the police job on the marriage and reduce the possibility for misunderstanding and distrust.

A majority (58%) of spouses in this study reported that they noticed a change in the spouse’s attitude toward other people since the spouse became a police officer. In addition, of those who noticed a change, a majority (85%) noted that this was a negative attitude change toward other people. This finding is consistent with research completed over 20 years ago by Territo and Vetter (1981). In their study of stressors that contribute to marital discord in police families, they concluded that police officers find it necessary to suppress their feelings to function on the job. For example, many of the duties performed by police required that they adopt a “courtroom face,” which requires the officer to not show any emotion. Adlam (1982) concluded that police officers develop an “emotional hardening” or protective shell that insulates them from emotional upheavals.

There is little doubt that police-community relations are the cornerstone of good policing (Cox, 1996). Regular training in human and public relations skills and social communication skills is an important requirement for all police officers. The movement toward community policing may be important in the reduction of stress among police officers. The increased contact with law-abiding citizens under positive circumstances should help alleviate stress; however, to some extent, this gain may be offset by the additional problem-solving responsibilities placed on the community policing officers. If administrators accept risks and occasional failures as part of the growing process in community policing, however, this stress, too, can be reduced (Cox, 1996). Furthermore, the philosophical and operational changes associated with community policing, which in essence turn traditional police practices upside down, should improve the human and public relations skills and social communications skills of police officers.

Contrary to earlier research, this study found that police spouses did not perceive that shift work affected family life and that the need to safeguard the police service weapon at home was a problem. Previous studies concluded that shift work, working on holidays, rotating days off, and having a firearm in the house were very stressful to the officer’s family (Pranzo & Pranzo, 1999; Maynard & Maynard, 1982). In this study, a majority (87%) of the spouses were employed and had attended some college. As an employed person, the respondents have experienced shift work, holiday assignments, and other work-related frustrations that may have contributed to their understanding of job requirements. In addition, a copy of Kirschman’s (1997) I Love a Cop, which discusses the challenges a police officer’s family will experience during various stages of a police officer’s career, was provided to a majority of spouses by the Spouses Association. Finally, guest speakers at association meetings have discussed stress-related difficulties spouses might encounter in relation to the organizational aspects of the officer’s job.

With respect to the safeguarding of weapons, a majority (82%) of spouses in this study indicated the weapon was not a problem. This perception by respondents may have been influenced by the department’s purchase of a gun safe for all police
officers. When officers are not physically carrying the duty weapon, it is locked in a gun safe that can be secured in the residence or the trunk area of a vehicle.

Finally, a majority (81%) of spouses indicated an education/orientation program provided to spouses and families of newly hired police officers would be beneficial. There is general agreement among most law enforcement stress researchers that stress training can assist police officers and their families in the reduction of stress-related problems. An education/orientation program can increase family members’ awareness and understanding of the job the recruit is about to undertake (CTI, 2003). It is also important that education/orientation programs not neglect new spouses of veteran officers. Counseling for them can break a “rocket ball” pattern in which officers being stressed by work elevates the stress level of the family and consequently, brings more stress back to the department. In addition, stress training should not be limited to the academy or orientation at the time of employment. Many police departments are now providing ongoing stress-related training for officers and families, which discusses issues related to high-risk relationships and personality changes of police officers at various stages of their careers.

Conclusion

The results of this exploratory study may assist police officers, police managers, police trainers, and police families in developing strategies to prevent and reduce stress in their occupational, social, and family lives. This study was completed in a suburban Midwest municipal police department where stress levels may not be as high. Much of the previous research in this area has been conducted in large metropolitan police organizations. Further research is needed to confirm and expand on the findings of this study.

References


John W. Bolinger received his bachelor of science in organizational leadership from Greenville College and his master of arts in law enforcement and justice administration from Western Illinois University. He is currently a detective assigned to Fire/Arson/Bombing Investigations with the Springfield, Illinois Police Department. He serves as an adjunct faculty member for Lincoln Land Community College, Springfield College at Benedictine University. John Bolinger is a member of SPD’s Hostage Negotiations Team and a member of the Central Illinois Critical Incident Stress Management Team.

William P. McCamey received his PhD from The University of Iowa. He has been a faculty member with the Department of Law Enforcement and Justice
Administration at Western Illinois University since 1982. He is the production editor of the *Journal of Security Administration* and is co-author of *Contemporary Municipal Policing* (Allyn and Bacon, 2003). In addition, Dr. McCamey has published articles in a number of professional journals.

**Vladimir A. Sergevnin**, PhD, Illinois Police Corps Academy Director, is a research manager at the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board Executive Institute. He earned his PhD at the Moscow Institute of National Economy in 1986. He has 25 years of teaching experience at Illinois State University, Western Illinois University, Saint Petersburg University, and Vladimir Juridical Institute (Russia). He has published 60 articles and written seven books.
Risk Management Issues

Andrew Tolle, MS, Captain, Galesburg Police Department

Introduction

Law enforcement is perhaps one of the most complex professions in society today. As the criticalness of an incident increases, so does the potential for something to go wrong. With this in mind, it is very important that police officers have the tools to handle the barrage of discord they face every day.

Research will be focused on the examination of risk and how managing risk can minimize factors that lead to harm and the resulting personal injury lawsuits. A comparison will be made between post-incident correction and pre-incident prevention. An initial inquiry will be made into the definition of risk and how humankind has managed risk through the ages. Our survival is evidence of successful risk management by our ancestors.

Private sector organizations and other public sector organizations, namely fire services, have had measurable successes in dealing with risk. Risk management in these sectors has been studied over the years. Research techniques in this field of study will be examined and applied to the law enforcement setting.

Risk management should be a major concern for all law enforcement agencies. There is perhaps no other profession besides law enforcement faced with so many unknowns on a daily basis. For example, a police officer may receive a domestic disturbance call. Having handled these calls a hundred times before, the officer has established a certain method in dealing with the incident. After all, domestic disturbance calls are all the same. On this occasion, the officer is faced with a hostage situation. What does the officer do? The lives of everyone involved hinges on the critical decision the police officer makes.

In the above example, the police officer will make a decision based on two points of reference: his experience and his training. Unfortunately, having never been faced with this situation, the officer cannot rely on his experience; therefore, he must rely on his training. If the proper training has not been identified, the decision process will suffer. Training is one important component of risk management and will be discussed in greater detail.

Safety a major concern in law enforcement and so are lawsuits, embarrassment to the department, internal issues, and possible criminal charges against individual police officers. All of these issues hinge on the conduct of individual officers regardless of rank or duties performed.

Gordon Graham, a law enforcement lecturer on risk management, has identified three areas of concern for law enforcement officers; he calls them “Threshold Incidents.” They are as follows:

1. Any injuries to person, deprivation of liberty, damage to property, or damage to interest in property caused by police officers

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2004 • 4(4)
2. Any death or major injury requiring hospitalization
3. Any time someone tells you “I'll sue!” or any deprivation thereof, or if he or she informs you of an injury sustained

Experience tells us that certain incidents, if not handled properly, will certainly cause agencies and individual officer’s problems. They include, but are not limited to, use of force, forced entry, vehicle operations, racial profiling, off-duty activities, ethical considerations, and sexual harassment. Many lessons can be learned from mistakes of the past.

When things go wrong in law enforcement operations, you can look at pre-incident preparation by the agency and employee. Graham has identified five pillars of success: (1) people, (2) policy, (3) training, (4) supervision, and (5) discipline. Applying these five pillars in risk management will minimize many problems for law enforcement agencies. Pre-incident planning is certainly a desired approach when compared to post-incident correction. Focusing on these five pillars is a necessity for a successful risk management program. The five pillars of success will be discussed in greater detail.

**History of Risk**

Managing risk is not a new concept. Human beings have been dealing with risk for centuries. In *Risk Management*, Vaughn (1997) offers an explanation on the history of risk and humankind’s ability to survive.

The entire history of the human species is a chronology of exposure to misfortune and adversity and of efforts to deal with these risks. From the dawn of their existence, humans have faced the problem of survival, not only as individuals but as a species. The initial human concern was a quest for security and avoidance of the risks that threatened extinction. Our continued existence is testimony to the success of our ancestors in managing risk.

Other humanlike creatures, such as Homo Erectus or Homo Sapiens Neanderthalis reacted to threats but failed in their efforts toward survival. In contrast, anatomically modern humans (Homo Sapiens Sapiens) not only survived but flourished. The difference was the unique human gift of reason. (p. 2)

**Definitions**


The word “risk” derives from the early Italian *riscore*, which means to dare. In this sense, risk is a choice rather than a fate. The actions we dare to take, which depends on how free we are to make choices, are what the story of risk is all about. And that story helps define what it means to be a human being.

Choice is a constructive and contingent process when faced with a complex problem, people use computational shortcuts, and editing operations. Evidence summarizes only a tiny sample of a huge body of literature that recalls reported
patterns of irrationality, inconsistency and incompetence in the ways human beings arrive at decisions and choices when faced with uncertainty. (p. 8)


As a condition of the real world in which there is an exposure to adversity. More specifically, risk is a condition in which there is a possibility of an adverse deviation from a desired outcome that is expected or hoped for. (p. 8)

Vaughan defines uncertainty . . .

A state of mind characterized by doubt based on a lack of knowledge about what will or will not happen in the future. Uncertainty, then, is simply a psychological reaction to the absence of knowledge about the future. The existence of risk, a condition or combination of circumstances in which there is a possibility of loss creates uncertainty on the part of the individuals when the risk is recognized. (p. 9)

Police officers face uncertainty every day; the choices they make range from critical life-and-death decisions to simple decisions, such as when to eat dinner. Police officers have vested authority to make choices far beyond choices made by those in any other profession in our society. No other profession in our society has the authority to strip a person of their liberty. Does it not make sense then, that police officers have all the tools possible to make those choices? Even with the proper tools, the human element cannot be removed from the equation.

Vaughn describes different ways of handling risk. One way is through risk avoidance. Risk is avoided when the organization refuses to accept it even for an instant. The exposure is not permitted to come into existence. He says this is accomplished by merely not engaging in the action that gives rise to risk. This is sometimes considered a negative rather than a positive technique. This technique is used in the private sector but may not always apply in the public sector in emergency situations (p. 18).

In law enforcement, many risks cannot be avoided. The profession represents society’s “thin blue line” that separates control from chaos. For example, a police officer is confronted with an armed subject in a situation in which he has no other choice but to use deadly force. To avoid this situation, the officer must risk his own life.

Occasionally, people in law enforcement can avoid risk in certain situations in which they have control. An example would be a vehicle pursuit. Equipped with the proper tools, an officer can choose not to pursue, thus avoiding the inevitable risk of injury to him- or herself, the offender, or the innocent pedestrian. Yet on the other hand, if an officer does not pursue, the same outcome may result. Having the proper training, supervision, and policies in place will not eliminate risks associated with vehicle pursuits, but they will certainly aid in the decision-making process.

Risk retention is another concept used by the private industry. Risk retention is perhaps the most common method of dealing with risk. Organizations, like individuals face an almost unlimited number of risks. In most cases, nothing is done
about them. When some positive action is taken to avoid, reduce, or transfer the risk, the possibility of loss involved in that risk is retained (Vaughan, 1997, p. 19).

Risk retention may be conscious, unconscious, voluntary, or involuntary. Conscious risk retention takes place when the risk is perceived and not transferred or reduced. When the risk is not recognized, it is unconsciously retained. Voluntary risk retention is characterized by the recognition that risks exist and a tacit agreement to assume the losses involved. The decision to retain a risk voluntarily is made because there are no alternatives available. Involuntary risk retention takes place when risks are unconsciously retained and when the risk cannot be avoided, transferred, or reduced (Vaughan, 1997, p. 19).

Vaughan discusses two other types of risks: (1) risk transfer and (2) risk sharing. Risk transfer takes place when risk may be transferred from one individual to another individual who is more willing to bear the risk. Risk sharing is a special case of risk transfer; it is also a form of retention. When risks are shared, the possibility of loss is transferred from the individual to the group (pp. 19-20).

In law enforcement, many risks are retained, transferred, and shared. As mentioned earlier, law enforcement agencies have no choice but to retain risk. The public calls on law enforcement agencies as a last resort. The duty to respond to a complaint and subsequent acceptance of risk is an expected practice. It would be safe to say that risk in law enforcement is unavoidable in many cases. Although, that does not mean it cannot be minimized to manageable portions.

Vaughan defines risk management as follows:

Risk management is a scientific approach to dealing with pure risks by anticipating possible accidental losses and designing and implementing procedures that minimize the occurrence of loss or the financial impact of the losses that do occur. (p. 3C)

This definition is designed for private industry but can also be applied to law enforcement agencies. Knowing that vehicle pursuits will result in property damage or loss of life, agencies can incorporate guidelines to minimize the associated risks involved.

Henri Fayol, the famous French management authority, divided all industrial activities into six broad functions:

1. Determining the objectives – Deciding precisely what the organization would like its risk management program to do. A plan is needed to provide guidelines.
2. Identifying risks – Generalizations about risks cannot be determined because of organizational differences.
3. Evaluating the risks – This involves measuring the potential size of the loss and the probability that the loss is likely to occur and then providing some ranking in order of priorities.
4. Considering alternatives and selecting the risk treatment device – In this phase the organization determines which technique should be used in dealing with the risk.
5. Implementing the decision – This step is determined by the particular risk involved.
6. Evaluating and reviewing – Evaluation and review must be included in the program for two reasons. First, risk management does not take place in a vacuum. Second, things change, new risks arise, and old risks disappear. (Vaughan, pp. 35-36)

These functions can be applied to law enforcement. First, law enforcement agencies must determine the objectives of their risk management program. Typically, this is determined by analyzing methods in which the work is performed. Not all agencies function in the same environment, so the objectives must be tailored for the individual agency setting. Although, standards can be applied and then customized to meet individual agency needs.

Secondly, law enforcement agencies must be able and willing to identify risk. This can be accomplished through an extensive review of police reports, arrest data, conviction data, personal injury reports, citizen complaints, and interviewing police officers. Upon completion of this time-consuming process, the agency can move forward to the third step.

In the third step, the data can be measured to determine the potential size of loss. Finally, risk treatment devices could be implemented. This includes, but is not limited to, training programs, policy changes, and proper supervision. All employees must then accept implementation of the program. In order for the program to survive, there must be evaluation and review. As Fayol pointed out, the environment of risk is constantly changing.

**Risk Management in Fire Service**

Law enforcement agencies can learn risk management techniques from fire service agencies. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has developed a standard for fire service agencies. The standard is known as NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupation Safety and Health Program. Section 2-2, calls for the establishment of a risk management program and reads as follows:

2-2 Risk Management Plan
2-2.1 The fire department shall adopt an official written risk management plan that addresses all fire department policies and procedures.
2-2.2 The risk management plan shall cover administration, facilities, training, vehicle operations, protective clothing and equipment, operations at emergency incidents, operations at non-emergency incidents, and other related activities.
2-2.3 The risk management plan shall include at least the following components:
   (a) Risk Identification: Potential problems
   (b) Risk evaluation: Likelihood of occurrence of a given problem and severity of its consequences
   (c) Risk control techniques: Solutions for elimination or mitigation of potential problems; implementation of best solution
   (d) Risk Management Monitoring: Evaluation of effectiveness of the risk control techniques (Kipp, 1996, p. 8)
Effective risk management can yield many benefits. For example, making money or, not losing money, is an accepted goal of organizations, and effective risk management will help ensure this. Effective risk management can also help to ensure the continued health, safety, and well-being of the organization’s personnel (Kipp, 1996, p. 16).

According to Kipp, benefits of risk management are as follows:

1. Financial Benefits
   (a) Fewer accidents
   (b) The ones that do occur will be less serious
   (c) Quicker recovery
2. Improved Efficiency – Translated into an improved decision-making environment, which allows the organization to function as effectively and therefore as safely, as possible.
3. Safety and Health – An effective risk management plan has a positive impact on safety.
4. Compliance – A successful risk management plan will allow a more orderly, comprehensive review and understanding of applicable laws, codes, regulations, and standards.

According to Kipp, the roles of responsibilities of personnel are as follows:

1. First-line supervisors are the link between management and workers. They understand the workflow and can balance the needs of all parties while still getting the job done.
2. Top management is made up of the decision-makers. They are the policy setters.
3. The employees are the backbone of the organization. Without their acceptance and understanding, the risk management program will not work. (pp. 17-19)

Training is a very important component in fire service risk management. According to Kipp, the goal of any training program is to provide the necessary instruction and education to properly identified personnel to perform at a particular level of competency and in a safe and efficient manner. Training is an essential and fundamental control measure (Kipp, p. 137).

Simply stated, effective training for personnel is a form of risk control. There are three types of training used in fire service (Kipp, pp. 141-143):

1. Accident prevention and training programs should be included as part of the recruit training program. Personnel are instructed on the proper methods of completing tasks in a safe effective manner.
2. Live training evaluations are excellent tools to use in risk management programs. Simulating fire rescues would be an example.
3. Mandated training includes the kind of training required by state and federal law.

Incident Command Systems have been utilized by fire service agencies for years. In the early 1970s, a series of major wild land fires in southern California prompted fire authorities to form an organization known as Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies. The organization identified organizational
difficulties in multi-agency incidents. In 1987, the Incident Command System (ICS) was adopted by the National Fire Academy and endorsed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (FEMA, 1999).

Based on the FIRESCOPE study, an ICS should include the following:

1. Common terminology
2. Modular organization
3. Unified command structure
4. Integrated communications
5. Consolidated action plans
6. Manageable span of control
7. Designated incident facilities
8. Comprehensive resource management

Law enforcement agencies could benefit from this type of command system for major incidents and for everyday occurrences. For example, in hostage and barricade situations, the Incident Command System (ICS) can be implemented to provide a systematic approach to the incident. When all responders arrive, predetermined assignments have already been made, and everyone is working together. ICS can also be used at a traffic accident. The first responding officer would assume the position of incident commander, and assisting officers would be under his or her direction. ICS would certainly enhance the efficiency, safety, and effectiveness of an agency’s risk management program.

The Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board has teamed up with the Illinois State Police and BowMac Educational Services, Inc. with the goal of training all Illinois law enforcement agencies in critical incident management. The primary goal of the program is to provide law enforcement agencies with a game plan. This is done through the “Model City” simulator, which provides hands-on training for police officers. The ICS is just one part of the Critical Incident Management System (Gillespie, 2000).

**Risk Management and Civil Liability**

These are very trying times for law enforcement. Police officers are being scrutinized every day by the public, the media, and special interest groups. In addition, police work has become more complex. Because of this complexity, the chances of something going wrong have increased. Law enforcement agencies need to look at ways to minimize risks encountered during these turbulent times.

Graham (2000) has identified three phases to any incident encountered by police officers:

1. The pre-incident phase takes place beforehand and is when police agencies have the most control.
2. The incident phase is the actual occurrence in which police officers can get themselves in trouble.
3. The post-incident phase is when most law enforcement agencies determine why things went wrong.
The goal of each incident encountered by police officers should be proper conduct. In order to obtain the goal of proper conduct, the experience risk manager will take action during the pre-incident phase. This can be accomplished through what Graham calls the five pillars of success: (1) people, (2) policy, (3) training, (4) supervision, and (5) discipline. The alternative is waiting to make the correction during the post-incident phase. Unfortunately, few benefits occur at this phase as the table below illustrates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Incident</th>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Post-Incident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Lawsuits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Injuries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td></td>
<td>Embarrassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervision</td>
<td></td>
<td>Internal Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline</td>
<td></td>
<td>Criminal Charges</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proper Conduct

Graham describes “threshold” incidents as those types of incidents that make their way across an attorney’s doorway. There are three:

1. Any injury to person, deprivation of liberty, damages to property, or damage to interest in property caused by police officers
2. Any death or major injury, requiring hospitalization occurs
3. Any time someone tells you of “I’ll sue!” or any deviation thereof

The Rodney King incident is illustrated as a “threshold” incident that will leave a dark blemish on law enforcement for many years to come. Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) describe the incident as follows:

The videotape Holliday shot showed a large black man down on hand and knees, struggling on the ground, twice impaled with wires from an electronic TASER gun, rising and falling while being repeatedly beaten blow after blow—dozens of blows, fifty six in all about the head, neck, back, kidneys, ankles, legs, feet—by two police officers wielding their two foot black metal truncheons like baseball bats. Also visible was a third officer, who was stomping King, and about ten police officers watching the beating along with Holliday’s neighbors. (p. 2)

After the incident took place, both Holliday and Paul King, Rodney’s brother, tried to report the abuse to the police; neither succeeded.

Paul King went to the Foothill Station to report that his brother had been beaten; the officer at the desk told him to wait. After waiting and growing impatient, Paul King returned to the desk. Finally, a sergeant came out of the back of the station and proceeded to give Paul King a bureaucratic hard time. The sergeant then left the room for about thirty minutes while Paul King, who had asked about procedures for making a complaint had told the sergeant about the possibility of a videotape. When the sergeant returned, instead of addressing Paul’s complaint, he asked whether Paul had ever been in trouble. He told Paul that an investigation was ongoing, and that Rodney was in big trouble, since he had been caught in a high speed chase and had put someone’s life in
danger, possibly a police officer’s. The sergeant told Paul King to try to find the video, but at no time did the sergeant fill out a personnel complaint form. (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993, p. 2)

The Rodney King incident is an example that contains all of the elements of a post-incident quagmire. It was followed by lawsuits, injuries, embarrassment, internal issues, and criminal charges. Of course, attempts were made to make corrections but not at a small price.

In 1989, Los Angeles paid out $9.1 million to settle law suits alleging police misconduct. In 1990, that figure had risen to $11.3 million for suits alleging excessive force, wrongful deaths, false arrests, negligence, misconduct, and civil rights violations. The Christopher Commission found that a significant number of LAPD officers repetitively use excessive force against the public and persistently ignore the written guidelines of the Department regarding force and that the failure to control these officers is a management issue that is at the heart of the problem. What made the King beating different from those earlier events was not the conduct of the police, but the presence of George Holliday’s video camera. (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993, p. 3)

Law enforcement agencies repeatedly use post-incident techniques to resolve problems. In an effort to correct problems in the Los Angeles Police Department after the riots, an extensive recruitment campaign was implemented. This resulted in hiring too many people in one campaign. In the push to hire more police officers, managers overlooked some important factors, the most important of which, is recruiting the right people.

Even today, LAPD is experiencing more problems. Police officers are being arrested for stealing drugs from the evidence room, planting evidence, and shooting innocent people. Most of those officers involved have 6 to 8 years of experience. Is it just a coincidence that they were hired soon after the riots? I do not think so.

On Thursday Mayor Richard Riordan recommended spending roughly $100 million in tobacco-settlement money to cover anticipated lawsuits from victims of the police misconduct. “The Rampart scandal may well be the worst manmade disaster this city has faced,” City Councilman Joel Wachs said. At least 11 officers and perhaps as many as 20 have been relieved of duty, and 40 convictions have been overturned since the scandal broke last fall. Dozens of other criminal cases are under investigation (Los Angeles AP, 2000, p. A3)

The same thing happened to the Miami Police Department in the early 1980s. The riots that took place in that city resulted in a massive hiring campaign. As a result, some less qualified individuals were hired and subsequently fired and arrested for an assortment of offenses.

Some credit must be given to the Miami Police Department following the riots they encountered. The Miami Police Department developed the Mobile Field Force concept. The Mobile Field Force System is designed to provide rapid, organized, and disciplined response to civil disorder, crowd control, or other tactical situations. It generally consists of six to eight squads and may be supplemented by specialized units (MFF, 1999).
The Los Angeles Police Department implemented the Mobile Field Force Concept after the riots in the early 1990s. This is another example of post-incident correction. The riots in Los Angeles may not have been prevented; however, had the Mobile Field Force Concept been adopted, the outcome may have been different.

Where are the lessons learned? They are available but were somehow overlooked. The post-incident (correction) method of problem solving continues, and municipalities are paying for them. It makes more sense to prevent the incident from happening.

Graham (2000) indicates that this can be accomplished through applying the five pillars of success. Having good people is important, but good people without direction (policy) are not enough. Without training, supervision, and discipline, agencies will experience failure.

Obtaining good people is accomplished through recruitment efforts. Recruitment involves obtaining the best-qualified people. This can be accomplished by following standards for law enforcement agencies developed by The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA). Recruiters must be qualified and familiar with the agency’s needs. Recruiters must be familiar with EEO guidelines (CALEA, 1999). Requiring sworn personnel to recruit one person per year would be an excellent means of obtaining qualified people.

Validated testing and thorough comprehensive background investigations must be completed on recruits. Home visits are recommended to be a part of the background investigation. Speaking with neighbors, friends, and other references can be done in person and not on the telephone. Many of these techniques are time-consuming and costly, but the benefits certainly outweigh the potential cost.

Well-defined policies are also vital to a successful risk management program. Graham (2000) recommends that police agencies color code their policies based on criticalness of tasks. The policies are divided into three categories. The most critical policies should be color coded red. Policies covering deadly force, pursuit driving, domestic battery, strip searches, and sexual harassment would fit into this category. Policies that are important but not necessarily as critical should be color coded yellow. Policies of lesser importance should be color coded white. When training is conducted, supervisors must review all policies frequently and routinely.

Training is a very important component for a successful risk management program. It must be done initially and continue through the course of an officer’s career. Graham says that emphasis must be focused on solid, realistic, ongoing, verified training (SROVT).

Graham suggests that shift supervisors provide 6 minutes of training at the beginning of each shift. Each day a different topic is discussed, and officers are then asked questions about the material. A very important factor of training is ensuring learning through testing. This is especially true for tasks that are high-risk and not performed very often. When exposed to a situation that does not happen very often, yet is quite hazardous, police officers cannot rely on their experience. They must rely on their training.
Supervision is another important component in a risk management program. Supervisors must enforce organizational policy all of the time. This includes all of the policies regardless of the color code. The policies have to apply to everyone in the organization and be enforced by all supervisors (Graham, 2000).

There is a relatively new concept called the Early Warning System. This is a non-disciplinary management system for identifying potential problem officers. The Early Warning System is a computer database, which tracks individual officers based on reportable elements of behavior. Each element in and of itself may not demonstrate any deficiency on the part of an individual officer, but numerous elements over short periods of time may indicate a behavioral problem. If this is the case, then the officer is red flagged (Oliver, 1994).

According to Oliver, reportable elements include the following factors:

- Discharge of a firearm
- Excessive use of force
- Any motor vehicle damage
- Any loss of equipment
- Injury on duty reports
- Sick leave in excess of five days or regular patterns of using one or two sick days over long periods
- All complaints, including supervisory reprimands and disciplinary action (pp. 182-183)

In the past, most of the focus was on whether the officer was right or wrong. The Early Warning System attempts to remove this sole analysis and look at the totality of the circumstances. It is a proactive, nondisciplinary system and is not designed for the purpose of punishment. The system is designed to intervene on an officer’s career to prevent him or her from becoming a disciplinary problem or being terminated (Oliver).

The final component that Graham discusses is discipline. Discipline is derived from the word *disciple*, meaning *to train*. The elements of discipline should include training, rewarding, counseling, and punitive actions when necessary (CALEA). When discipline is administered, it must be prompt, fair, and impartial (Graham). In order for the risk management program to be successful, all five pillars must be applied.

Another important factor in minimizing risk involves damage control. This is completed after a critical incident has occurred. An important component in a post-incident occurrence is the officer’s police report. A poorly prepared report may result in criminal charges against a police officer, so every effort must be taken to assure the facts are reported accurately.

It is well known that an officer’s perceptions during a high-stress incident may not be totally accurate, particularly regarding real-time chronology events and distances. During a high-stress incident, the officer may suffer from diminished cognitive processing skills, hypervigilance, irrational behavior, and perceptual narrowing. These are perfectly normal responses to potentially lethal threat and every police
officer will experience most of these symptoms to one degree or another (Brave & Farnham, 1999).

Knowing the officer will experience these symptoms, it is very important that supervisors do not require the officer to provide an immediate statement. At this point, it is not necessary for the supervisor to know everything. All he or she really needs to know is . . .

1. Are there any other casualties, other than what are apparent?
2. Are there any other suspects in need of apprehension?
3. Is there any evidence that is likely to be lost or compromised by delay?
4. Are there any witnesses that need to be interviewed right away? (Brave & Farnham, 1999, p. 31)

The supervisor must be cognizant of what is going through the officer’s mind. The officer may be thinking about his or her own future or whether he is going to be charged with a criminal offense. He or she may be thinking about being sued and losing his or her house. It is of great importance that supervisors are aware of these issues (Brave & Farnham).

The officer must be removed from the scene as soon as possible. This is done for several reasons. If the incident involves a shooting, the suspect’s family may be in the area. The media may also be present, and the officer should be protected from their questioning and video cameras.

At no time should the officer be left alone. He or she should be with someone who knows what he or she is going through. Counseling should be made available for the officer. A policy requiring mandatory counseling can be considered in cases involving deadly force cases. Emphasis should be placed on the officer’s well-being.

When the officer is ready, he or she should return to the scene with a supervisor and the State’s Attorney. The purpose is for the officer to explain in detail what happened. The State’s Attorney should ask questions to . . .

• draw out as many details from the officer as possible.
• draw out all of the details of the suspect’s behavior.
• solidify the legal basis for the officer’s actions.
• solidify the chronological sequences of the events.
• remove the potential inaccurate responses caused by stress-induced misperceptions (Brave & Farnham, p. 33).

In the event of possible criminal charges against the officer, the above recommendations should be conducted with a private attorney under the attorney/client privilege (Brave & Farnham).

After the details have been drawn out, the State’s Attorney should assist the officer in preparing his or her report. The purpose is not to fabricate a story but to solidify the events that took place. If other officers were at the scene, it is very important that the State’s Attorney sits down with everyone to make sure events are accurate. Again, the purpose is not to fabricate stories but to make sure the reports are accurate, complete, and unambiguous (Brave & Farnham).
**Conclusion**

As discussed earlier, risk management is a means to deal with anticipated outcomes through planning and implementing procedures that will minimize the occurrence of loss. Plans are necessary if risk is to be addressed at the pre-incident stage. Everyone must recognize adopted procedures if the risk management program is to succeed.

There is no one best way to manage risk. What works for one agency does not necessarily work for another. Every organization is unique and different approaches may be used for minimizing risk. The question the research was intended to answer is what works best, post-incident correction or pre-incident prevention? Most agencies unknowingly choose post-incident correction. The relentless behaviors revealed in Miami during the early 1980s and the Rodney King incident brings this to light. There is nothing gained by treating the gaping wounds of misconduct with a band-aid. This is exactly what happens when incidents gone wrong are not addressed until afterward.

By far, the best method to manage risk is pre-incident prevention. Gordon Graham has identified critical tasks as being the starting point in determining what course of action to take. Once the critical tasks are identified, they must be analyzed. This can be accomplished by comparing the criticality of the task with how frequent the task is performed. If the criticality of the task is high and the frequency of performance is low, police officers must rely on training.

As Graham suggests, getting the right people, and establishing well-rounded policies is crucial. Solid, realistic, ongoing, and verified training coupled with good supervision and consistent discipline will also enhance a risk management program. The process is continuous and dynamic, and agencies must adapt accordingly.

Well-planned damage control is effective in those instances when things do go wrong. Police officers need to be guided during the report writing process. Brave and Farnham point out that words have power, and this power can be destructive. Proactive damage controls occur when a police department realizes what they must do to fairly and justly protect their interests.

Lessons can be learned from the fire service when responding to critical incidents. Police officers learn early on in their careers that they respond to a call and then resolve a problem. This is accomplished independently and with limited supervision. In contrast, men and women in fire service respond to a call as a team. They work as a team and are dependent on one another. The essence of critical incident management is teamwork. This is a very difficult concept for police officers to get used to because they are trained to work independently and make sound decisions on their own. Police managers must realize this and train accordingly.

The best gauge for the future is looking at the past. Police agencies must learn from past mistakes in order to address present behavior. This can be accomplished through education, training, and applying the lessons learned to the working environment.
Recommendations

**Recruitment**

- Continue proactive recruitment efforts, which includes college campus visits and minority recruitment within and outside the community.
- Encourage all employees to recruit one person per year.
- Continue Police Explorers/Cadet Program.
- Continue internship program.
- Incorporate home visits of recruits during the background phase of the hiring process.
- Speak with neighbors, friends, and other references in person not on the telephone.

**Policy**

- Color code general orders.
- Require officers to carry their general orders with them.
- Spot test officers on critical policies.
- Review and evaluate policies annually.

**Training**

- Continue mandated training (e.g., firearms qualification, haz-mat, blood borne pathogen, CPR, OC-10, Mobile Field Force).
- Require all shift supervisors to provide 6 minutes of training every day during the shift meeting.
- Test and document all training.
- Conduct monthly firearms training (e.g., presentation drills, manipulation drills, and dry fire drills in addition to periodic live fire).
- Require an annual drivers’ safety course.
- Implement mandatory monthly training in 2-hour blocks.
- Train all officers in the Incident Command System.

**Supervision**

- Provide consistent training and discipline for all employees.
- Reduce personnel appraisal forms from 20 categories to 10 categories.
- Supervisors should ride with each officer on the shift for at least 2 hours per month.

**Discipline**

- Implement the Early Warning System.
- Implement the Incident Command System

**References**


Andrew Tolle has 21 years of police experience with the Galesburg Police Department. He currently holds the rank of captain. Captain Tolle has held various positions within the Galesburg Police Department including patrol officer, patrol supervisor, evidence custodian, training supervisor, and records and communications manager.

Captain Tolle holds a master’s degree in Law Enforcement and Justice Administration from Western Illinois University. He is a graduate of Northwestern University Center for Public Safety School of Police Staff and Command. He is also a graduate of the Illinois Law Enforcement Executive Institute’s Executive Management Program.
Andragogy: What Police Trainers’ Should Know About Adult Learners

Michael L. Birzer, EdD, Assistant Professor, School of Community Affairs, Wichita State University, Wichita, Kansas

Introduction

The central question of what makes the best teaching/learning transaction in police training has occupied the attention of both police scholars and practitioners for some time. Police trainers must be properly trained in order to deliver quality and cost-effective training programs to both veteran and neophyte police.* Quality police training is also important due to the legal environment in which police operate (Callahan, 1989; Fyfe, 1998; Thurm, 1993). Police agencies face a tremendous liability when they fail to train properly (Blackwell & Vaughn, 2003; O’Linn, 1992; Risher, 2001; Ross, 2000).

In an effort to try to meet what seems like never-ending training demands, police from all levels within the organization may find themselves teaching in the police academy or in an in-service training session. This is especially true of smaller agencies that do not have an actual training department with adequately staffed trainers. Authorities responsible for training police may possess the expertise but do not necessarily have any knowledge of instructional design, training techniques, or principles of adult learning (Birzer, 2003a). In many cases, on-the-job training traditionally represents the only training that trainers receive themselves.

The scholarship that centers on police training is framed primarily on three foundations:

1. There is an abundance of literature that has discussed police training curricula or what should be taught in the academy (Brand & Peak, 1995; Meadows, 1987; Ness, 1991; Palmiotto, Birzer, & Unnithan, 2000; Tally, 1986).

2. There has been some scholarship advanced that centers on specific police training approaches in the classroom (Birzer, 2003b; Charles, 2000; Geller, 1991; Ramirez, 1996).

3. There has been a fair amount of scholarship that has addressed teaching methods when teaching specific subjects such as firearms training (Couture, Singh, & Lee, 1999; Morrison & Vila, 1998), culture diversity training (Barlow, Barlow-Hickman, 1993), defense tactics (Kaminski & Martin, 2000), sexual assault response training (Lonsway, Welch, & Fitzgerald, 2001), and ethics training (Birzer, 2002; Morgan, Morgan, & Foster, 2000).

There is a dearth of literature that offers guidance on training-the-police trainer. Given this limitation, the purpose of this article is four-fold: (1) I briefly review the traditional method of delivering training to neophyte and veteran police, (2) I discuss

---

*I use police training here as generic to all local, county, and state law enforcement agencies. This includes police departments, county sheriff’s departments, state highway patrols, and state police agencies.
what trainers should know about the principles of adult learning, (3) I introduce the adult learning theory of andragogy as a viable teaching technique that police trainers can utilize to make training more exciting and real, and (4) I offer specific examples of how trainers can utilize andragogy in the police training classroom.

**Traditional Police Pedagogy**

The methods of teaching both neophyte and veteran police are fairly uniform in American police organizations. The predominant model of law enforcement training is one that emphasizes teacher-directed activities and usually consists of a curriculum based upon the transmittal of content from teacher-to-learner, or is teacher-centered as it is also called (Amaral, 1989; Birzer & Tannehill, 2001; Ortmeier, 1997). Likewise, the philosophy of most police training programs is based on three precepts: “it should closely follow the military training model; it should be a punishment-centered experience in which trainees must prove themselves; and it should help screen out those who aren’t up to par” (McCreedy, 1983, p. 32). The teacher-centered approach holds that the instructor is the center of the classroom environment and the dispenser and guardian of knowledge. In this approach, the trainee is assumed to be a passive learner, and learning is in large part dependent on the instructor’s actions in the classroom. The instructor is the manager of the learning environment and determines learning objectives, develops activities to meet these objectives, and decides on appropriate evaluative criteria (Conti, 1985).

Police trainers have relied heavily on teacher-centered methods, which are a natural complement to the military model. Teacher-centered approaches fall within the realm of behaviorism. Under the realm of behaviorism, the intellect, feelings, and emotions of a person’s inner life are not observable or measurable and therefore not investigated (Elias & Merriam, 1995). A behavioral trainer would advocate that learning is a change of behavior. These same trainers would rely heavily upon behavioral objectives, norm-referenced testing, and evaluative techniques. Advocates of behavioral objectives assert that learning outcomes can be measured objectively and precisely, which will subsequently reveal how much progress has been made by the learner. Elias and Merriam (1995) point to three components that can readily be found in behaviorism:

1. The relevant conditions or stimuli under which a student is expected to perform;
2. The behavior a student is to perform including a general reference to the product of the student’s behavior;
3. A description of the criteria by which the behavior will be judged acceptable or unacceptable, successful or unsuccessful. (p. 89)

Many behavioral instructional methods are readily identifiable in the police training environment. For example, when the police receive firearms training, there are a number of behavioral objectives set by the trainers (e.g., shoot at a 70% proficiency level, shoot under conditions of darkness, shoot 12 rounds from a barricaded position in 25 seconds, etc. Other examples include defense tactics training, emergency vehicle operation training, felony car stops training, and building searches. One of the objectives when law enforcement officers attend training sessions is to learn a new skill or simply to improve performance of an existing skill, with performance usually being objectively and quantitatively measured. It is undeniable that many of the skills taught in law enforcement training academies will have to continue to
be taught in a behavioral format. The behavioral format, however, may not always be the best approach when many other subjects are taught in law enforcement training; this approach may actually perpetuate a few problems. For example, the behavioral environment of police training may create an unnecessary amount of stress on the learner, which in some cases may minimize the learning experience. Police training environments must be free of fear, and a stressful environment fraught with threats is not likely to elicit trainees’ openness, participation, and positive feelings (Torrence, 1993).

The paradox to police training advocated under the militaristic behavioral model is that this model is in direct conflict with what many scholars call the paradigm shift in policing from the military model to the community-oriented policing model (Breci & Erickson, 1998; Rosenbaum & Yeh, 1994). Community policing differs from traditional law enforcement because it allows officers the freedom to expand the scope of their jobs. Community policing requires police officers to learn a whole host of new skills. Officers in this sense are challenged to become community problem solvers and encouraged to use their time creatively. Furthermore, officers will be required to discern vast amounts of information and recognize resources to solve a problem. Community policing officers are frequently expected to not only respond to the full range of problems that the public expects the police to handle, including peace keeping, but also to take the initiative to identify community problems beyond those within the widest definition of police functioning that may affect the public’s sense of well-being (Goldstein, 1987).

Considerable theoretical scholarship on community policing has speculated about the importance of police working in partnership with citizens in order to solve problems and improve the quality of life in neighborhoods. For example, Trojanowicz (1990) observed that “community policing requires a department-wide philosophical commitment to involve average citizens as partners in the process of reducing and controlling the contemporary problems of crime, drugs, fear of crime, and neighborhood decay; and in efforts to improve overall quality of life in the community” (p. 125).

If the policing profession is to effectively evolve into community-oriented policing strategies, then it becomes paramount to identify the most effective methods to accommodate the changes required. To change an organization or a profession requires training and education. Police trainers will face the encumbering task in carrying out this new orthodoxy. They will have to make a critical examination of the past methods of doing business and adopt improved techniques to teach the new skills that accompany community-oriented policing. It will also be important for police executives and trainers to have specific knowledge on the most effective means to teach police so that they may learn and conceptualize new information and tasks.

**Adult Learning**

Unfortunately, police trainers may lack knowledge of adult learning methods. Many police trainers teach the way they have been taught primarily by use of the teacher-centered lecture with minimal input on the part of the trainee. Traditional pedagogical approaches have assumed, perhaps falsely, that the learning process is uniform for most human beings, both children and adults. However, the literature
clearly shows that adults and children do differ in a number of significant ways (Kerka, 2002; Knowles, 1984). For example, adults approach learning with prior knowledge and a greater amount of life experiences when compared with children, and adult trait characteristics are not as plastic as in children. Factors such as these have prompted a fair amount of scholarship, which has increasingly called for different approaches in the education of adults.

Until relatively recently, there has been very little thinking, investigating, and writing about adult learning, and most of the investigations into learning have been with children or animals. Thus, it is by no coincidence that Malcolm Knowles (1984) so eloquently asserted that the adult learner is a neglected species. Adult education scholars have long recognized that behavioral approaches such as those discussed above may result in a spurious notion of learning and that the teaching/learning transaction in police training environments should increasingly move from teacher-centered pedagogy to adult student-centered strategies (Brookfield, 1986; Hiemstra & Sisco, 1990).

Andragogy

In what follows, I present the notion that police trainers should become familiar with adult learning methods, specifically the theory of andragogy. The training conducted in the police academies should highlight self-directed learning on the trainee’s part. This can go hand-in-hand with community policing. For community policing to be successful, police officers will have to be self starters. When they discover a problem, they will be expected to solve it working with members of the community. Thus, this self-directed culture should be initiated within the context of training. The theory of andragogy may in part be one mechanism to assist police trainers in accomplishing this perplexing task.

Knowles (1980) argued that adults must be taught differently than children and that the learning process of adults is drastically distinct when compared to children or the traditional pedagogical approach. Knowles, a strong proponent of self-directed learning and the teacher’s role as a facilitator in the process of adult education, is well known for his theory of andragogy. “Andragogy is a theory which is vastly in contrast to the traditional pedagogical model and it advocates both the self-directed learning concept and the teacher as the facilitator of learning” (Knowles, 1984, p. 57).

The writings of Knowles are fraught with the message of self-directed learning and learning based upon the experience of the student. Knowles (1984) argued . . .

Adults are motivated to devote energy to learn something to the extent that they perceive that it will help them perform tasks or deal with problems they confront in their life situations. Furthermore, they learn new knowledge, understandings, skills, values, and attitudes most effectively when they are presented in the context of application to real life situations. (p. 61)

Many other scholars have also found self-directed learning and andragogy to be the principal guiding force in the practice of educating and training adults (e.g., Brookfield, 1996; Cafferella, 1993; Cotton, 1995; Merriam & Cafferella, 1999).

Knowles (1970) defined andragogy as the “art and science of helping adults learn and contrasted andragogy with pedagogy, which is concerned with helping children
learn” (p. 38). Knowles argued that adults must be taught differently than children and that the learning process of adults is drastically distinct when compared to children or the traditional pedagogical approach. Knowles (1970, pp. 83-84) offered several distinctions in the manner that adults and children learn:

- Adults need to know why they need to learn something before undertaking to learn it.
- Adults have a self-concept of being responsible for their own lives.
- Adults come into an educational activity with both a greater volume and a different quality of experience from youths.
- Adults become ready to learn those things they need to know or to cope effectively with their real-life situations.
- In contrast to children’s and youths’ subject-centered orientation to learning (at least in school), adults are life-centered (or task-centered or problem-centered) in their orientation to learning.
- While adults are responsive to some extrinsic motivators (better jobs, promotions, salary increases, and the like), the more potent motivators are intrinsic motivators (the desire for increased self-esteem, quality of life, responsibility, job satisfaction, and the like).

The most critical skill for the police trainer who uses andragogy is to be able to conceptualize learning and what it means to be a facilitator of learning instead of solely a transmitter and evaluator. The police trainer must realize, for example, that veteran police officers have moved from being subject-centered to problem-centered. This means that the trainer not only facilitates new knowledge but also helps the trainee learn, for example, how to identify contemporary police problems, and then facilitates the development of solutions by allowing the student to use his or her own creative abilities within certain parameters.

There are several advantages of the andragogical approach: it draws on the trainees’ past experiences; it treats trainees’ as adults; it adapts to the diverse needs and expectations of trainees; and it develops critical thinking, judgment, and creativity in the learner. For the purposes of acquiring knowledge in police training, the fourth advantage is extremely important.

When using andragogy, knowledge is transmitted by inductive discussion, inductive games, debriefing experiences, relevant discussion, and active collaboration. In essence, the trainer of police should make training as experimental, interactive, and participatory as possible. For example, trainers can make every aspect of law enforcement training inclusive of simulation exercises and problem-solving activities that help to develop communication and language skills (Codish, 1996). Learners are then required to bring their experience, powers of observation, and communication to solve the problem. This reinforces the andragogical assumption that adults bring a vast amount of experience to the learning process, and they are rich resources for learning. Knowles (1990) makes this point well:

Hence, the greater emphasis in adult education on experimental techniques, techniques that tap into the experience of the learners, such as group discussion, simulation exercises, problem-solving activities, case method, and laboratory methods, over transmittal techniques. Hence, also, the greater emphasis on peer-helping activities. (p. 59)
Andragogical Approaches for the Trainer

The instructional process itself should be flexible and provide the learner with options. Offering the learners options allows them to take responsibility for the learning process and guide their own learning (Birzer, 2003a). This may be difficult to accomplish in a law enforcement context since state and federal law mandates much of what the curriculum contains; however, as Codish (1996) pointed out, choices can be offered in a law enforcement curriculum that emphasizes original research, critical thinking, and community involvement. Furthermore, police trainers should strive for active participation. According to Brookfield (1986), educators or trainers who ignore the use of participatory techniques will find (unless they are stunningly charismatic performers) that their learners are physically absent in the sense of not being actively engaged with the ideas, skills, and knowledge being presented.

According to Birzer and Tannehill (2001), it has become common in many police training curriculums to provide instruction on topics that were once absent in training curricula. A few subjects that are increasingly being taught in the police academy are problem solving, cultural diversity, sexual harassment, conflict resolution, interpersonal communication skills, and community organization skills. These subjects will require police trainers to increasingly teach and facilitate using andragogical approaches. In other words, the lecture (teacher-centered) approach will probably be deficient in teaching these skills.

The remainder of this article will be devoted to illustrating how a simple andragogical approach can foster the learning of several skills in one academy activity. Ideally, this activity can be conducted towards the end of the academy training. For this activity, police trainees would be required to conduct a neighborhood survey in a minority neighborhood. The trainees should work in teams when conducting this survey. The purpose of the survey is to discover citizen satisfaction with police services, citizen satisfaction with the police, neighborhood problems, and other concerns. The trainees should be required within their teams to plan and design a questionnaire/survey as well as conduct and carry out the survey including analyzing and reporting the data.

There are several purposes of the training exercise. It will allow trainees an opportunity to practice the skills that they have learned in the academic academy environment. For example, the trainees would have to do research on the most appropriate questionnaire design. By conducting the survey in minority neighborhoods, trainees will be exposed to diverse populations of citizens. This may require the recruit to learn something about the particular minority group predominant in the neighborhood prior to conducting the survey. In a case in which the neighborhood is predominately Hispanic, the trainee should study information or brush up on this culture. This may require the trainee to identify resources in the Hispanic community to assist with the questionnaire, perhaps writing the questionnaire in Spanish. The very nature of this activity not only requires trainees to learn about a culture, but it requires them to practice skills such as communication, problem solving, resource identification, research, data analysis, teamwork, and possibly community organization skills. Trainees can then be required to hold a neighborhood meeting with the purpose of revealing the survey results and brainstorming with citizens on appropriate solutions to problems identified in the survey. Recruits should then be required to have debriefing sessions after the neighborhood
meeting where they can share their experiences with other recruits who may have been assigned to other neighborhoods.

Within the context of the exercise described above, the instructor plays an important role in the training. The instructor acts as a facilitator or guide in the learning process. The instructor is also a learner in the sense that he or she may actually learn from the trainees’ experience. Furthermore, the instructor provides an environment and setting that is conducive to learning. This gives new meaning to the andragogical theme that there must be a reciprocal relationship between trainee and instructor.

By embracing the humanistic [andragogy] paradigm, which presents the instructor as a collaborative facilitator who works with the learners in creating objectives, methods and evaluative criteria, law enforcement training can begin to give more validity to the experience and perspective that the students bring with them. Facilitators need to encourage students to question and challenge the subject matter being presented. (Ramirez, 1996, p. 24)

Recall that there are some subjects in the police training curriculum for which the trainer will be limited in adapting andragogical techniques. Police firearms training is one such technique; however, trainees may benefit from active dialogue in the classroom about real-life case critiques of officer-involved shootings or other relevant events pertaining to police shootings. For example, trainers could include discussions on controversial police shootings around the United States. The well-publicized shooting that occurred in New York City would be an excellent case for trainers to discuss in the academy with trainees. This is the case where Amadou Diallo was shot at 41 times by New York City police officers, and of those 41 shots, 19 hit and subsequently killed Diallo. Cases such as this are the realities of the job, and trainers should use the classroom as an ideal vehicle to discuss controversial shootings such as the one noted here. Critical discussions regarding controversial police shootings are currently not done that often in police academy training; however, there is a growing body of literature that suggests that critical discussions should be made part of the academy training experience, even imperfections of police actions or the criminal justice system.

Trainers should allow recruits to discuss, for example, the Diallo shooting in the classroom and solicit what trainees think the officers did right or wrong and how well the situation was handled, what the officers should have done differently, and how this situation could have been avoided in the first place. These varieties of questions lay at the heart of a critical discussion. Discussions such as this will allow the trainer to glean important information about trainees. Furthermore, trainers will be in a position to see how effectively trainees are bringing his or her specific training into the shooting discussion.

One of the major aims in allowing for these case critiques and critical discussions in firearms training is that they are thought-provoking in nature. The aim of opening the mind of the trainee to major problems that may occur in the police occupation is an important goal of case critiques of police-involved shootings. There is no expectation that the student will acquire a new skill from a case exercise. Rather, students discover they may have to learn a new skill or to look at a situation in a new light.
Conclusion

Police trainers are highly skilled and competent in their content area; however, content expertise and skill does not necessarily prepare them for content delivery or effective teaching. Many police trainers have completed instructor development courses, and these provide a good starting point for content experts to learn about teaching. I have many anecdotal accounts as well as field observations of instructor development courses that usually lack substantial coverage of adult learning theory. Thus, police trainers should increasingly be given instruction on adult learning theory and more importantly how to use this theory in the police training classroom. Appreciation of alternative methods of teaching may improve future instructional activities and develop an appreciation for facilitating learning.

The adult learning theory andragogy provides for principles of training practice that are very compatible with evolving police philosophy, such as community-oriented policing. Likewise, a learner-centered teaching style provides both neophyte and veteran police trainees opportunities to learn at higher cognitive levels while at the same time providing for personal growth. Police trainers that incorporate the learners’ experiences, which can be immediately applied to real-life situations, can be beneficial to the trainee. Police trainers that have been trained in the use of andragogy can develop police officers that are problem solvers, self-directed, and life-long learners.

Police trainers do not often think about the needs, desires, and goals of learners, or for that matter changing their method of content delivery to meet the demands of an ever-changing police landscape with varying perspectives, viewpoints, experiences, and motives for entering police work. Nor do police trainer development courses adequately prepare trainers with the tools of adult facilitation. Likewise, police trainees themselves have traditionally played, and continue to have, a submissive role in the training dynamics. Andragogy offers much promise for those authorities responsible for training the police. Trainers that use andragogy have the ability to meet the many needs of learners and move police training to increasingly student-centered environments while at the same time shaping and honing the traits that are desired in today’s police force.

Bibliography


---

**Michael L. Birzer** is an assistant professor in the School of Community Affairs at Wichita State University. He received his doctorate from Oklahoma State University. His research interests center on police education and training, police minority relations, and a variety of social justice issues. He enjoys using both quantitative and qualitative methods in the study of the police and other criminal justice phenomenon. Prior to his entry into academia in 1999, he spent 18 years with the Sedgwick County Sheriff’s Department in Wichita Kansas.
Local Law Enforcement and Transnational Crime Preparedness

Gene L. Scaramella, EdD, Interim Chairperson, School of Criminal Justice, Kaplan College
Raymond Rodriguez, MA, SCSA, Assistant Chairperson, School of Criminal Justice, Kaplan College

Introduction

At a time in our history when the complexities of transnational crime pose more of a threat to our nation than ever before, one of the many questions that beg an answer is whether or not members of our local law enforcement community feel adequately prepared to respond to these challenges, particularly in the areas of terrorism and organized crime.

While the official response to these global issues seems to be associated primarily with the federal law enforcement community, it is hoped that the events of 9/11 have made it clear that if we, as a nation, are to responsibly address these forms of crime, law enforcement personnel from all levels of government must work together and contribute to this global policing effort. As McCamey, Scaramella, and Cox (2003) point out, “... we must be sure not to make the same mistake as before—placing all of the responsibility for [this] on the shoulders of the federal government. For obvious reasons, the federal government must assume the lead role, but our nation’s response . . . must be a concerted effort on behalf of the police at all levels” (p. 329). Moreover, we must keep in mind that it is our local police that serve as our first line of defense or as the first responders to the myriad of problems posed by transnational crime.

Thus, the focus of our research was to elicit and examine the attitudes and beliefs of police officers from the Chicago metropolitan area (the region in which the research was conducted) regarding various issues of first responder preparedness to an assortment of transnational crimes.

Transnational Crime

In its most basic sense, transnational crime may be defined as “... criminal activities extending into and violating the law of several countries ... and local crimes whose commission and prevalence are influenced by factors beyond the boundaries of the affected jurisdiction” (Mueller, 1999, pp. 3-4).

The list of crimes that fit the criteria of this definition are numerous and diverse. For purposes of this research, we identified categories of crime thought to be transnational in nature as those previously identified as such by the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division via their Fourth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (United Nations, 1995). The United Nations survey identified the following categories of transnational crime as being the most serious by the countries responding to the survey:
• Money laundering
• Terrorist activities
• Theft of art and cultural objects
• Theft of intellectual property
• Illicit traffic in arms
• Aircraft hijacking
• Sea piracy
• Land hijacking
• Insurance fraud
• Computer crime
• Environmental crime
• Trafficking in persons
• Trade in human body parts
• Illicit drug trafficking
• Bankruptcy fraud
• Infiltration of legitimate business
• Bribery of public officials
• Other organized crime offenses

It must be noted at this point that while a few of those crimes are discrete or mutually exclusive, most are not. In fact, many of these crimes overlap and can fit easily into the broader categories of organized and white collar crime; therefore, during a portion of our data analysis, these 18 crime categories were collapsed into four broader categories of transnational crime for coding purposes. They include organized crime; white collar crime; terrorism; and transportation security-related crimes (see Appendix A for a specific breakdown).

Regarding the negative effects and consequences of these crimes, they are numerous and hold the potential for global, catastrophic events. Shelley (2001), in her overview of transnational crime victimization, points to several factors at work. First, she identifies the illegal trade in nuclear materials, large scale arms smuggling, international narcotics trafficking, and illegal alien smuggling as “. . . exacting an even higher human cost in large numbers of source and destination countries.” She then examines the fact that the massive profits generated by transnational crime groups, estimated at “. . . thousands of millions of dollars,” much of which is laundered through the world economic markets, place the security of these marketplaces at serious risk. Due to the huge profits generated by these crimes, the resultant public corruption places all governments and legal systems at great risk as well (Shelley, 2001).

Related to Shelley’s work is what Williams (1999) identified earlier as the major factors responsible for the proliferation of transnational crime in general and terrorism specifically. According to Williams (1999), first is the current unprecedented mobility of people, as he estimated there to be approximately 100 million migrants worldwide. Second is increased trade flows spurred by the lowering of tariffs, the creation of free trade agreements, and the relatively recent democratization of Eastern Europe. Remaining factors identified include the establishment of a global financial system, the rise of mega cities, and the growth of global communication systems (pp. 24-41). When these factors combine, as they have, the potential for disastrous consequences is imminent.
Given knowledge of the current state of transnational crime, it seems logical that local law enforcement agencies would begin training their personnel, at least fundamentally, to respond to these threats in an effective manner. Herein lies the core of our research. Based on experience derived from our former careers in law enforcement, the current state of training, at least in the state of Illinois, paints a dismal picture. For example, the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board (ILETSB), the regulatory body that oversees the training and certification of all local and state police officers in the state, currently mandates little or no basic training or continuing professional education in any of the crimes that have been identified as transnational in nature. The only exception is the limited amount of training directed at environmental crime and narcotics trafficking (ILETSB, 2003). This is a sad state of affairs indeed given the serious nature of transnational crime.

Methodology

A written survey was developed to elicit the beliefs and attitudes of local police officers or first responders from the Chicago metropolitan area regarding first responder preparedness to transnational crime. The survey contained 16 variables, 5 of which were demographic in nature: (1) age, (2) gender, (3) level of education, (4) organizational rank, and (5) agency longevity. The remaining 11 variables were statements designed to elicit respondents’ opinions regarding perceived preparedness to transnational crime. Specifically, these statements were directed at the following (see Appendix B):

- An assessment of respondents’ knowledge concerning the definition of transnational crime
- Whether or not respondents had received prior formal education (college or graduate school classes) in our collapsed categories of transnational crime
- Whether or not the respondents had received or sought training in any of these areas and whether the training was delivered in-house or from an outside vendor
- Whether or not respondents’ respective agencies had a formal plan designed to address these transnational issues
- Whether or not respondents were familiar with the plan and whether they had practiced the plan in the past 12 months
- Respondents’ perception regarding the degree of effectiveness of preparedness training they may have received
- Respondents’ perception as to whether or not the plan(s) provide adequate protection for their respective communities
- Respondents’ perception regarding the necessary equipment for confronting various acts of terrorism and environmental crime
- Respondents’ perception regarding overall preparedness to confront these issues

A nonprobability, purposive sampling technique was utilized to survey the respondents. This form of sampling was used for purposes of economy, convenience, and availability of subjects. The sample was further refined by selecting local police officers/first responders from four large, local law enforcement agencies in the Chicago metropolitan area, totaling 260 responses. This judgmental sample was also based on the practical and academic experience of the researchers who believe this sample to have a high probability of being representative of the research population; however, the researchers do acknowledge the limitations of nonprobability sampling techniques.
Furthermore, because no previously existing instrument with a proven track record of validity and reliability could be located, the reader is cautioned in this regard as well.

The data was measured at the nominal and ordinal levels and analyzed using frequency and percentage distributions, the Chi-Square test of statistical significance, and related measures of association (i.e., Phi and Cramer’s V). Finally, regarding presentation of data, only cross-tabulations that proved significant were reported.

Due to the large number of tables generated by the data, what follows are summary tables of both the frequency distributions and statistically significant cross tabulations.

Data Analysis

Table 1
Summary of Demographic Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>61+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level*</td>
<td>HS/GED</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SG</td>
<td>GP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level*</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>PO/Det.</td>
<td>Sgt.</td>
<td>Lt.</td>
<td>Exempt</td>
<td>Other**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Service</td>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>16-20</td>
<td>21+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Service</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Education – HS/GED=High school or GED, SC=Some college, B=Baccalaureate degree, SG=Some graduate work, GP=Graduate or professional degree

**Includes Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs

Table 2
Summary of Education/Training Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Yes%</th>
<th>No%</th>
<th>DNA%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal Education in Organized Crime</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Education in White Collar Crime</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Education in Terrorism</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Education in Transportation Safety</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training in Organized Crime</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training in White Collar Crime</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training in Terrorism</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training in Transportation Safety</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Type</th>
<th>In-House</th>
<th>Outside</th>
<th>Other*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes a combination of in-house and outside source training
Table 3
Summary of Plan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Yes%</th>
<th>No%</th>
<th>DNA%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plan Availability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Plan for Organized Crime</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Plan for White Collar Crime</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Plan for Terrorism</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of Transportation Safety Plans</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan Details</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read or Is Familiar with Formal Plan</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practiced or Implemented Plan in Last 12 Months</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4
Summary of Respondent Perceptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>SA%</th>
<th>A%</th>
<th>N%</th>
<th>D%</th>
<th>SD%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training was adequate for first responder readiness.</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans are adequate to protect the public.</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment is available for terrorism and environmental crime.</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of personal preparedness to respond to transnational crime.</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree, N=Undecided, D=Disagree, SD=Strongly Disagree

Table 5
Summary of Cross Tabs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cross Tabs</th>
<th>ChiSq/DF</th>
<th>Phi</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plan is Adequate/Education Level</td>
<td>39.991/20</td>
<td>.392</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition/I Feel Prepared</td>
<td>41.026/25</td>
<td>.397</td>
<td>.178</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar Crime Ed./I Feel Prepared</td>
<td>12.552/5</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar Crime Ed./Equipment Available</td>
<td>20.642/5</td>
<td>.282</td>
<td>.282</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Crime Tng./Plan Is Adequate</td>
<td>20.129/5</td>
<td>.278</td>
<td>.278</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar Crime Tng./I feel Prepared</td>
<td>24.359/5</td>
<td>.306</td>
<td>.306</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar Crime Tng./Equipment Available</td>
<td>16.204/5</td>
<td>.250</td>
<td>.250</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar Crime Tng./Plan Is Adequate</td>
<td>31.703/5</td>
<td>.349</td>
<td>.349</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism Tng./I Feel Prepared</td>
<td>22.338/5</td>
<td>.293</td>
<td>.293</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism Tng./Plan Is Adequate</td>
<td>15.877/5</td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Type/Equipment Available</td>
<td>27.862/15</td>
<td>.327</td>
<td>.189</td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Type/Training Adequate</td>
<td>26.353/15</td>
<td>.318</td>
<td>.184</td>
<td>.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal OC Plan/I Feel Prepared</td>
<td>21.462/5</td>
<td>.287</td>
<td>.287</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal OC Plan/Training Adequate</td>
<td>41.337/5</td>
<td>.399</td>
<td>.399</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal WCC Plan/I Feel Prepared</td>
<td>18.286/5</td>
<td>.265</td>
<td>.265</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal WCC Plan/Equipment Available</td>
<td>17.036/5</td>
<td>.256</td>
<td>.256</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal WCC Plan/Training Adequate</td>
<td>31.775/5</td>
<td>.350</td>
<td>.350</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Terrorism Plan/I Feel Prepared</td>
<td>26.969/5</td>
<td>.322</td>
<td>.322</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Terrorism Plan/Equipment Available</td>
<td>21.811/5</td>
<td>.290</td>
<td>.290</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Terrorism Plan/Training Adequate</td>
<td>37.344/5</td>
<td>.379</td>
<td>.379</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read/Familiar with Plan/I Feel Prepared</td>
<td>54.973/15</td>
<td>.460</td>
<td>.265</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read/Familiar with Plan/Equipment Available</td>
<td>47.287/15</td>
<td>.426</td>
<td>.246</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read/Familiar with Plan/Plan Is Adequate</td>
<td>135.127/15</td>
<td>.721</td>
<td>.416</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read/Familiar with Plan/Training Adequate</td>
<td>144.022/15</td>
<td>.744</td>
<td>.430</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practiced Plan/I Feel Prepared</td>
<td>71.591/15</td>
<td>.525</td>
<td>.303</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practiced Plan/Equipment Available</td>
<td>65.538/15</td>
<td>.502</td>
<td>.290</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practiced Plan/Plan Is Adequate</td>
<td>136.544/15</td>
<td>.725</td>
<td>.418</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practiced Plan/Training Adequate</td>
<td>148.834/15</td>
<td>.757</td>
<td>.437</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

The main finding of this study is that police officers’ confidence in their own ability to effectively respond to incidents involving transnational crime lies at the intersection of three factors: (1) in-service training in transnational crime activities, (2) officer familiarity with formal transnational crime response plans, and (3) practicing or periodically implementing the formal plans. The main value of these findings lies in the realization that training dollars are well spent, table top and physical implementation exercises inspire more than the command staff of law enforcement agencies, and formal response plans have utility beyond occupying a space on a shelf for accreditation purposes.

It is significant to note that the five demographic variables—age, gender, level of education, organizational rank, and agency longevity—were not significant factors in perceptions of equipment adequacy, training sufficiency, plan efficacy, or overall preparedness.

An interesting dichotomy was found in officer perceptions between those receiving in-service training in the various areas of transnational crime and those having had formal academic coursework in one or more areas related to transnational crime. In-service transnational crime training fostered significantly positive perceptions of agency plans, available equipment, and overall preparedness, while formal academic coursework led to significantly negative perceptions of these variables. The cause remains unclear from the results of this study, but this paradox is ripe for further research. In addition, overall perception of preparedness was dependent on the respondent’s definition of transnational crime with those adopting a more global definition less likely to have a positive perception of preparedness. Those with higher levels of formal education were more likely to adopt the global definition.

Figure: Transnational Crime Response Confidence Model
Positive perceptions of general preparedness in responding to incidents of transnational crime were related to relevant in-service training, the existence of formal plans related to transnational crime, having read or otherwise being familiar with existing plans, plan adequacy, having practiced or implemented the plan, and being properly equipped.

Statistically significant relationships were found between positive perceptions of plan adequacy and the variables of transnational, crime-related, in-service training; having a formal plan for transnational crime response; being familiar with the plan; equipment sufficiency; and having practiced or implemented the existing plan within the last 12 months.

A positive perception of equipment adequacy was dependent on the existence of formal plans, plan adequacy, familiarity with agency response plans, in-service training, and having practiced or implemented the existing plan.

The existence of formal plans, plan adequacy, plan familiarity, and having practiced or implemented the agency plan within the last 12 months, and being properly equipped led to statistically significant positive perceptions of training adequacy.

Positive perceptions of the adequacy of transnational crime plans in protecting the public were related to having read or being otherwise familiar with the plan, having practiced the plan, in-service transnational crime training, and having adequate equipment available.

It should be noted that positive perceptions of in-service training were related to the source of the training. Those officers receiving a combination of in-house agency training and training from outside sources were more likely to have positive perceptions of their training, which is influential among the various confidence variables.

For police administrators, the implication is clear. Merely having a plan to respond to transnational crime activities is not sufficient to protect the public from the devastating effects of transnational crime in all its forms. If officer perceptions can be associated with the true nature of things, then a comprehensive approach is necessary to adequately protect the public. Enhanced and comprehensive training from a variety of sources; dissemination of plan details to the troops beyond the perfunctory requirements found in departmental general orders; familiarizing officers with the available plans; sufficient equipment; and comprehensive practicing of existing plans are all necessary to maintain the level of readiness officers believe is required to protect the public.

References


Gene L. Scaramella, PhD, currently serves as the interim chairperson of the School of Criminal Justice at Kaplan College and is a former member of both the Chicago Police Department and the Cook County Sheriff’s Office.

Raymond Rodriguez, MA, SCSA, currently serves as the assistant chairperson of the School of Criminal Justice at Kaplan College and is a retired commander of police from the DuPage County Sheriff’s Office.
Appendix A: Transnational Crime Categories

As stated in the “Transnational Crime” section of the report, for analysis/coding purposes the multitude of crime categories identified as transnational crime by the United Nations were broken down or collapsed into four broader categories. What follows is a specific breakdown of those collapsed categories.

1. Organized Crime
   - Money laundering
   - Theft of art and cultural objects
   - Trafficking in persons
   - Trade in human body parts
   - Narcotics trafficking
   - Bankruptcy fraud
   - Infiltration of legitimate business
   - Bribery of public officials
   - Other organized crime activities

2. White Collar Crime
   - Theft of intellectual property
   - Insurance fraud
   - Environmental crime
   - Computer fraud
   - Financial crime

3. Terrorism
   - Terrorism
   - Illicit trafficking in arms

4. Transportation Security-Related Crime
   - Air hijacking
   - Land hijacking
Appendix B

Please complete the following questionnaire on First Responder Preparedness to Transnational Crime. Your responses will be completely anonymous and neither your name nor your agency affiliation will be included in the data analysis.

Background Information
Please check the appropriate blank for each question.

**Age**
(1) ___ 21-30  (4) ___ 51-60
(2) ___ 31-40  (5) ___ 61-over
(3) ___ 41-50

**Gender**
(1) ___ Male
(2) ___ Female

**Education**
(1) ___ High school graduate/GED
(2) ___ Some college
(3) ___ College graduate
(4) ___ Some graduate work
(5) ___ Graduate or professional degree

**Current Rank**
(1) ___ Police Officer/Detective
(2) ___ Sergeant
(3) ___ Lieutenant
(4) ___ Exempt Rank (e.g., Commander, Deputy Chief, etc.)
(5) ___ Other (please specify _____________________)

**Years of Service**
(1) __ 0-5
(2) __ 6-10
(3) __ 11-15
(4) __ 16-20
(5) __ 21-over

**Police Training and Educational Preparedness**
1. Which of the following would you select as the best definition of transnational crime?
   (1) ___ Criminal activities extending into and violating the law of several countries and local crimes whose commission and prevalence are influenced by factors beyond the boundaries of the affected jurisdiction.
   (2) ___ Criminal activities which violate international laws.
(3) ___ Criminal activities which are the product of the relatively recent globalization of the economy, of communications, and of transportation.
(4) ___ All of the above
(5) ___ None of the above

2. You have had formal education (college or graduate school) in which of the following areas? (Check all that apply.)

(1) ___ Organized Crime
(2) ___ White Collar Crime
(3) ___ Terrorism
(4) ___ Transportation Security
(5) ___ None of the Above

3. Your agency has provided training or you have sought and completed training on your own in which of the following areas? (Check all that apply.)

___ Money laundering ___ Environmental crime
___ Terrorism ___ Trafficking in persons
___ Theft of art and cultural objects ___ Trade in human body parts
___ Theft of intellectual property ___ Narcotics trafficking
___ Illicit trafficking in arms ___ Bankruptcy fraud
___ Air hijacking ___ Infiltration of legitimate business
___ Land hijacking ___ Bribery of public officials
___ Insurance fraud ___ Computer fraud
___ Other organized crime activities ___ Financial crime

4. If your agency provided training in any of the above areas, it was: (Check all that apply.)

___ in-house ___ from an outside source ___ other

5. Your agency has a formalized plan to respond to which of the following criminal activities? (Check all that apply.)

___ Money laundering ___ Environmental crime
___ Terrorism ___ Trafficking in persons
___ Theft of art and cultural objects ___ Trade in human body parts
___ Theft of intellectual property ___ Narcotics trafficking
___ Illicit trafficking in arms ___ Bankruptcy fraud
___ Air hijacking ___ Infiltration of legitimate business
___ Land hijacking ___ Bribery of public officials
___ Insurance fraud ___ Computer fraud
___ Other organized crime activities ___ Financial crime

6. If your agency has a formal plan for responding to any of the criminal activities cited above, have you read it and/or are you familiar with it?

___ Yes ___ No ___ Does not apply (no such plan)
7. If your agency has a formal plan for responding to any of the criminal activities cited above, have you practiced or implemented it in the last 12 months?
   ___ Yes
   ___ No
   ___ Does not apply (no such plan)

8. If your agency has a formal plan for responding to any of the criminal activities cited above, it is your perception that it includes comprehensive training for first responder readiness to deal with these crimes.
   ___ Strongly agree
   ___ Agree
   ___ Undecided
   ___ Disagree
   ___ Strongly disagree

9. If your agency has an emergency responder plan, or a formal plan for responding to any of the criminal activities cited above, it provides adequate protection for the residents and visitors of your jurisdiction.
   ___ Strongly agree
   ___ Agree
   ___ Undecided
   ___ Disagree
   ___ Strongly disagree

10. It is your belief that you and the other members of your agency have the equipment necessary for responding to crimes such as terrorism and various environmental crimes.
    ___ Strongly agree
    ___ Agree
    ___ Undecided
    ___ Disagree
    ___ Strongly disagree

11. Overall, I feel adequately prepared to respond to any of the crimes cited above.
    ___ Strongly agree
    ___ Agree
    ___ Undecided
    ___ Disagree
    ___ Strongly disagree
## Appendix C: Operational Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Responder</td>
<td>Any state-certified police officer currently performing their official duties in the Chicago, Illinois, metropolitan area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Crime</td>
<td>Group activities of three or more persons, with hierarchal links or personal relationships, which permit their leaders to earn profits or control territories or markets, internal or foreign, by means of violence, intimidation, or corruption, both in furtherance of criminal activity and to infiltrate the legitimate economy (Abadinsky, 2000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>The unlawful use of force or threat of violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (Simonsen et al., 2000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational Crime</td>
<td>Criminal activities extending into and violating the law of several countries and local crimes whose commission and prevalence are influenced by factors beyond the boundaries of the affected jurisdiction (Mueller, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Security</td>
<td>The hijacking or other related crimes of air craft, railways, or ground transportation vehicles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar Crime</td>
<td>The whole range of illegal, prohibited, and demonstrably harmful activities involving a violation of private or public trust, committed by institutions and individuals occupying a legitimate respectable status, and directed toward financial advantage or the maintenance and extension of power and privilege (Friedrich, 1995).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Triad of Collaboration: Internet-Related Investigative Considerations Prior to the Computer Forensic Application

Robert DeYoung, PhD; Coordinator, Master’s in Management Program; Assistant Professor, Department of Management, St. Thomas University

Historically reactive in nature, law enforcement once again finds itself ill-prepared to effectively confront the criminal element operating in our technologically advancing society. The very technology, which has made life easier for each of us, has opened the door for offenders of crimes against persons and property to proliferate at an unprecedented rate. Federal agencies dealing with tremendous caseloads are in a position to offer local law enforcement only limited support. Local law enforcement response is often sporadic and outdated.

Today’s society has become increasingly dependent upon computers for both personal and business use. “Computers have revolutionized the way we store information and communicate. The Internet has revolutionized the way we obtain information” (Read, 2001). It is not surprising to note that in 2000, there were a reported 153.2 million computers in use and 135.7 million Internet users in the United States (Hendrick, 2000) (see Figure 1). The global figures only add to the potential for criminal activity. Technology itself creates an environment through which exploitation is facilitated, allowing the victimization of individuals, organizations, and entire societies.

The list of crimes occurring on the Internet is extensive and growing. The familiar offenses include the sexual exploitation of children, identity theft, stalking, fraud, malicious destruction of data, and the proliferation of virus attacks.

Figure 1
Results from Research Reports by eTForecast

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>USA (millions)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web/Internet Appliances in Use</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>115.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web Share of Internet Users</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>55.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCs in Use</td>
<td>153.2</td>
<td>178.9</td>
<td>221.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet Users</td>
<td>135.7</td>
<td>165.7</td>
<td>208.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Worldwide (millions)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web/Internet Appliances in Use</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>139.8</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web Share of Internet Users</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>71.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCs in Use</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>1008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet Users</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hendrick, 2000
We, in our own arrogance in believing our society somehow possesses exclusive rights to Internet rules of use, were dumbfounded to discover the extent to which terrorists utilized electronic mail messaging to fulfill the tragic outcome of September 11, 2001.

As profound an event as September 11, 2001, was, individuals are still more likely today than ever to become a direct victim of technology. A clear example of this is noted in newspapers across the country every week. My initial Internet crimes against children investigation occurred in 1994 when I posed as a child victim in an online chat room. It seemed at the time that so many potential offenders approached me for illicit purposes that it was sometimes difficult to keep track of who was who. It was imperative to investigate a few and let the rest go, fully realizing the possibility that those individuals let go might ultimately contact and victimize a real child. The numbers of offenders have not diminished but have, in fact, continued to increase as the criminal element educates itself with technology. Further adding to the problem is the realization that offenders often possess a better understanding of the technology’s capabilities and limitations while typically being better equipped than law enforcement.

In 1994, legislation lagged behind the proliferation of technology, posing serious problems for both the investigator and the prosecution. Fortunately, many laws have been enacted that address the cyber-environment directly, assisting the prosecutorial efforts.

Electronic evidence is one of the fastest developing legal frontiers. The Federal Rule of Evidence provides enough latitude to allow admissibility of electronic evidence in nearly every form for every possible document. A sound document retention policy, consistently applied, can be a party’s best defense to an assertion of spoliation. Given the immense number of examples of what electronic evidence could constitute, it more often falls within several general categories: data, electronic mail, offline storage, voice mail, applications, hardware, networks, and peripherals. (Kridel, 2001)

Additionally, significant advances have been made in forensic recovery software and the training demanded of computer forensic examiners. “Law enforcement agencies are scrambling to hire and train officers skilled in computer forensics, the discipline of collecting electronic evidence” (Tobias, 2001).

What has not changed dramatically is the need for standardization in the investigative stages of Internet-related crimes, and this remains a weak link in the effort to prosecute offenders. An important investigative element is the topic of this article: A Triad of Collaboration.

A Triad of Collaboration

Most criminal and civil cases involving electronic data are won or lost in the initial investigative stages. An absence of attention to detail during the actual investigation significantly diminishes the prosecutorial effort. As a certified computer forensic examiner, I dreaded most the frustrating explanations as the investigator looked to forensics to somehow materialize evidence that was not present. I cannot count the times an investigator looked to the forensic examiner to collaborate
expectant testimony in the absence of electronic data. The forensic process can be the investigator’s best friend or worst enemy in that the computer forensic report identifies both the strengths and weaknesses of the investigation. The strengths are obviously highlights for the prosecution, but the weaknesses become the soapbox for the defense.

Law enforcement investigators must come to terms with a reality that is unique to Internet-related crimes. “In the digital world, all information entered by any individual or organization leaves a digital data trail that records all communications and actions” (Yam, 2001). The receipt, transmission, and exchange of electronic data, be it in the form of e-mails, attachments, or text messaging is critical to the prosecution’s effort to successfully act against criminal activity.

Traditional law enforcement techniques—in which evidence is a process of gathering with specific attention to ensuring that nothing is added, deleted, or altered from the evidence in its original format—are inappropriate in the cyber environment. Unquestionably, it is incumbent upon the investigator to generate sufficient evidence to facilitate this endeavor. The dilemma arises when one directs law enforcement to generate evidence. But is that not exactly what is done through the exchange of electronic data?

Let me be more specific in my definition of “generate evidence.” The generation of evidence compels the officer to conduct a thorough investigation, one that is compelling to a jury. A single online conversation or e-mail message is, by definition, probably sufficient to develop probable cause. Consider the implications of several, or many, or a multitude of conversations or e-mails that portray a predisposition or portray an unquestionable intent. I am not suggesting that investigations must be never-ending, but too many potentially strong investigations are cut short before sufficient evidence to prosecute is gathered. The generation of evidence includes any and all electronic exchanges that occur between the law enforcement officer and the offender(s). This generation of evidence is the substance of the Triad of Collaboration.

In an investigation in which there is a receipt, transmission, or exchange of electronic data, it is imperative to the prosecutorial effort that three aspects of each and every electronic contact be completed. The Triad of Collaboration, used consistently, provides a cross-reference of documentation that details explicitly each electronic exchange between the investigator and the offender (see Figure 2).

The first element in the triad requires that the investigator electronically save “any and all” electronic transmissions that transpire in the course of the investigation. The term any and all refers to just that—any and all electronic transmissions, including extraneous information that the investigator may deem unimportant at the time. This information may become the focus of the defense to question lapses in dates, times, or what appears to be unexplainable lapses in otherwise understandable conversations. Once the investigator is on the stand, it is too late to recall minor details, and juries are often unsympathetic to careless investigative practices, perceived or actual.
Use consistency in deciding on a file naming convention that will be clear to you, the prosecution, the defense, and a jury.

This is important if the investigation consists of many transmissions that occur over days, weeks, or even months. It is highly recommended that all saved data be stored to a separate media (e.g., 3.5” diskette or CD-ROM). Saving the evidence to a law enforcement hard drive might open the content of that hard drive to discovery, potentially creating problems with other active investigations.

The second element in the triad is to print a copy of all data stored as a result of the ongoing investigation. This hard copy should be printed immediately after saving the data to the selected media. The file name and date/time should be included in the printout (the importance of this element will become apparent later).

The final element of the triad is simply a register. This register will identify criteria specific to the type of investigation being conducted. The register will include for each exchange the date and time, all references to saved evidence files (specifically noting the name of the file that was saved), and the investigator involved. Other important criteria should be added as deemed appropriate (e.g., one might include the criteria for file attachments or telephone contacts). It is important that the register be sufficiently detailed so as to provide a collaborative cross-reference between each of the elements.

The Triad of Collaboration provides a comprehensive, cross-referenced record of each and every electronic receipt, transmission, or exchange relevant to the investigation. The electronically stored evidence file bears a file name and date and time stamp. This same information appears in the hardcopy printout and is further collaborated by the register maintained by the investigator. All three elements of the triad are now complete. A single piece of evidence is important; a second associative reference is significant; and a third occurrence is compelling.

Conclusion

The use of the Triad of Collaboration in all Internet-related criminal investigations provides a cross-referenced, detailed record of any and all activity for which there
is a receipt, transmission, or exchange of electronic data between law enforcement and a potential offender(s). In that the federal agencies can only provide limited support, local law enforcement response must ensure thoroughness and consistency in the implementation of the investigative process.

Accepting the realization that the computer forensic process will distinguish undeniable strengths and weaknesses in the investigation, the Triad of Collaboration is one tested means to facilitate the prosecutorial effort to bring to justice those individuals predisposed to commit crimes through the use of technology.

References


Robert DeYoung, PhD, is the Master’s in Management Program coordinator and an assistant professor in the Department of Management at St. Thomas University, teaching across a spectrum of graduate-level managerial and research curriculum. He completed his master’s degree (MSM) at St. Thomas University, with a specialization in human resource management and continued his studies, receiving a PhD in educational leadership from Lynn University in Boca Raton, Florida. Dr. DeYoung completed his doctoral dissertation, a naturalistic inquiry into the differences in coping strategies among parents of murdered, abducted, or long-term missing children.

Dr. DeYoung is retired from the Broward County Sheriff’s Office in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. He was responsible for originating the Law Enforcement Against Child Harm (LEACH) Task Force, a federally funded, nationally recognized task force that combats Internet crimes against children. Recognized as an expert in the field of Internet crimes against children, Dr. DeYoung holds Advanced Computer Forensic Examination certifications and Advanced Computer Crimes Investigator’s certification. He has instructed nationally on numerous topics related to law enforcement and management.

Dr. DeYoung is a member of the Decision Science Institute, the Southern Management Association, and the Southern Criminal Justice Association. Dr. DeYoung owns Forensic Recovery, a South Florida-based corporation providing expert computer forensic processes to the legal and corporate communities.
Dr. DeYoung owns Forensic Recovery, LLC, a corporation offering the legal and corporate communities computer forensic processes, including the collection, preservation, analysis, and presentation of electronic evidence in criminal investigations and civil litigations. The courts recognize Dr. DeYoung as an expert in the field of computer forensic processes.
Guidelines for Preparing Manuscripts

There are virtually no restrictions on subject matter as long as the material pertains, in the opinion of the editor, to law-enforcement-related areas. Manuscripts should be typed and double-spaced. A résumé or vitae from the author(s) must accompany submissions. Book reviews and research notes will be considered for publication. No submission will be published until recommended by referees, who will review blind copies.

Final manuscripts must be submitted on 3.5” microcomputer diskettes readable on Macintosh or IBM (and true compatible) computers. Please specify word processing program used when submitting diskettes (e.g., MacWrite 5.0, WordPerfect 5.1, and so on). Also, an ASCII version would be most helpful. Disks will not be returned. Figures and line drawings must be submitted in camera-ready form.

Send three hard-copy manuscripts, vitae(s), and a diskette to . . .

Vladimir A. Sergevnin, PhD, Editor
ILETSBEI Law Enforcement Executive Forum Editorial Office
1 University Circle
Macomb, IL 61455
(309) 298-1939; fax (309) 298-2646

Manuscripts should be prepared according to the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (5th ed.) (2001). Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (3rd ed.) (1983) is the standard reference for spelling. Contributors are responsible for obtaining permission from copyright owners if they use an illustration, table, or lengthy quote that has been published elsewhere. Contributors should write to both the publisher and author of such material, requesting nonexclusive world rights in all languages for use in the article and in all future editions of it.
Works Published/Produced Through the Illinois Law Enforcement Executive Institute


Methamphetamine Labs: A New Danger for Illinois, 30-minute videotape, produced in cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Illinois State Police, through funds from the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board.

Small Town Policing in the New Millennium: Strategies, Options, and Alternate Methods, Robin Johnson, author and researcher; published in cooperation with the Illinois Institute for Rural Affairs, March 2000.

Managing a Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement Program, Inspector Thomas McNamara, through a grant from the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board, March 1999.

Model Domestic Violence Protocol for Law Enforcement, 1999, through a grant from the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority.

Making Empathy Statements to Defuse Conflict and Generate Rapport, Joseph Kulis et al., 1998.


Sex Crimes Investigation Course: Train-the-Trainer, Scott Keenan, Susan Welch, Polly Poskin, authors, Illinois Law Enforcement Executive Institute, 1997.

Police Executive’s Perspectives of the Pre-Service Model, Kent Harrington, primary researcher and author, Illinois Law Enforcement Executive Institute, 1997.


Zero Tolerance, 1994 Illinois Secretary of State Police. (Videotape produced as well as a satellite interactive television program through Educational Broadcasting at Western Illinois University.)

Sexual Assault Investigation Series (three tapes) in cooperation with the Illinois Coalition Against Domestic Violence through a grant from the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, 1996.

1. Preliminary and In-Depth Interview of the Victim of Adult Sexual Assault

2. Evidence Collection

3. Suspect Interview


1. Obvious Scenario

2. Subtle Scenario

3. Rural Scenario (Orders of Protection)
# Topics for Next Year’s Subscribers

- **Patrol Resource Allocation** ................................................................. September 2004
- **Special Edition** ........................................................................... October 2004
- **Internal Affairs Investigations** ..................................................... November 2004
- **Law Enforcement Agency Accreditation** ..................................... January 2005
- **Law Enforcement Unions** .............................................................. March 2005
- **Generational Conflict: Police Loyalty and Brotherhood** .............. May 2005

## Back Issues Available ($10.00 each includes shipping)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>No. Ordered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment – August 2001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retention – December 2001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism – March 2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Ethics – July 2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Impact of Emerging Science and Technology on Law Enforcement Agencies – August 2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Training – November 2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Management and Leadership – February 2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Force – May 2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police-Medical Collaborations: Dealing with Mental Health – July 2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Enforcement Response to Methamphetamine – September 2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Self-Defense for Law Enforcement Administrators – November 2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Pursuits – January 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Administration: Psychological Landmines – March 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training the Police Trainer – May 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Policing – July 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Ordered</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Payment can be made by check, money order, or credit card (MasterCard, Visa, or Discover). No CODs are accepted. Orders may be faxed to (309) 298-2642 or mailed to . . .

ILETSBEI • 1 University Circle • Macomb, IL 61455

For further information, contact the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board Executive Institute at (309) 298-2646.

## Shipping Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First</th>
<th>Middle Initial</th>
<th>Last</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Zip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Telephone</th>
<th>Fax</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E-Mail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>☐</th>
<th>$40.00 Subscription price July 2004-June 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

## Credit Card Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name on Credit Card</th>
<th>☐ MC</th>
<th>☐ Visa</th>
<th>☐ Discover</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Card Number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expiration Date</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>