



Law Enforcement Executive
FORUM

**Police Management
and Leadership**

February 2003

Law Enforcement Executive Forum
Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board
in cooperation with Western Illinois University
Macomb, IL 61455

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The *Law Enforcement Executive Forum* is published semiannually by the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board's Executive Institute. The journal is sponsored by Western Illinois University in Macomb, Illinois.

Institutional Subscription: \$40

Personal Subscription: \$25

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Editorial

The famed basketball coach, John Wooden, was a leader, teacher, and motivator, who gained success. Coach Wooden led his UCLA basketball teams to ten national championships in twelve years. In reflecting upon his success, the Hall of Fame coach stated . . .

Knowledge alone is not enough to get required results. You must have the more elusive ability to teach and to motivate. This defines a leader; if you can't teach and you can't motivate, you can't lead.

Law enforcement administrators must be leaders, teachers, and motivators—they indeed must be coaches. While winning or losing a sporting contest may be emotional, the consequences of winning or losing pale in comparison to contests faced in the public safety arena. Nevertheless, the analogy is instructive.

The collection of articles that follow focus on law enforcement leadership and management. It is my belief that it is the leadership of law enforcement agencies that has the most significant and immediate effect upon the delivery of constitutional, civil, enlightened, and effective service delivery. Law enforcement leaders of today must not only be visionaries, but they must also be aware of their roles as teachers, motivators, and coaches. What life goal could be more important than leading a team of dedicated well-trained law enforcement officers in their quest to ensure citizen safety?

Thomas J. Jurkanin, PhD
Executive Director
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Ethical Leadership: Every Officer's Responsibility

P. J. Ortmeier, PhD, Grossmont College, El Cajon, California

Introduction

To meet and resolve the conflicts, issues, and challenges that confront the police in the 21st century, major rethinking of the police service will be necessary (Goldstein, 1993). The traditional model of policing must be modified by a redefinition of the ways in which police officers provide services to the public (Goldstein, 2001). Traditional incident-driven policing must be supplemented, and in some cases replaced, with proactive, problem-oriented, community policing. The basic police mission—to protect and serve—will not change; however, the culture and methodology in and through which police services are provided must change radically. New policing strategies will demand unprecedented police officer skills and require a re-examination of police selection criteria as well as education and training requirements. Accordingly, police agencies must strive to select individuals who possess or can develop ethical standards and leadership ability. Furthermore, in addition to knowledge acquisition and technical skill development, police education and training protocols must emphasize affective competencies such as those skills associated with ethics and leadership.

To secure and maintain public support, which is an essential ingredient for police success, police agencies must strive to deploy high-quality personnel who possess integrity and leadership skills. The police themselves may actually be in the best position to orchestrate new policing philosophies and strategies to meet 21st century challenges and requirements. To accomplish this, however, police officers of all ranks must possess ethical leadership skills as well as technical competence (Meese & Ortmeier, *In press*).

Competence as ethical leaders equips police officers with the tools necessary to face issues and challenges (Anderson, 2000; Ford, Boles, Plamondon, & White, 2000; Meese, 1993; Meese & Kurz, 1993; Meese & Ortmeier, 2004; Ortmeier, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2002; Whisenand & Ferguson, 2002). Actually, leadership skills and ethical behavior are essential to policing in a democratic society. The police have a duty to serve the law as well as the public, and since the police possess tremendous authority over an individual, officers have a responsibility to perform their duties in an ethical manner. Coupled with effective leadership ability, high moral and ethical behavior places the police in the position of a powerful force to secure and maintain public safety and order.

Ethical leadership is not restricted to a few with rank and privilege (Johnson, 2001). On the contrary, sharing command is inevitable in a democracy, and it is necessary to accommodate the ever-changing demographics and expectations of society. Ethical leadership skills are especially critical for the frontline officer, the person responsible for implementing police strategies consistent with social order expectations.

Line officers are forced to assume leadership roles whether they want to or not. The police officer on the street necessarily exercises broad discretion and is the public official with whom most citizens have direct contact (Cohen, 1996; Crank & Caldero, 2000; Fyfe, 1996; Goldstein, 1990, 2001; Kleinig, 1996a, 1996b). Appropriately empowering all police officers with ethical leadership skills also enhances the public's perception of the police and enables street-level officers to assist with the creation of solutions to community problems (Stevens, 2002). Through appropriate education, training, and experience in leadership, ethics, and policing, the ethical police officer can lead others to set high standards and improve the quality of life for the police practitioner, the citizen-consumer, and the community (Meese & Ortmeier, 2004).

Leadership Is Not Management

Leadership should neither be confused with position or rank, nor management, although leaders often occupy positions of authority (Johnson, 2001). Leadership and management are interrelated yet different (Anderson, 2000; Baker, 2000). Both represent distinct concepts even though management and leadership may be exercised or exhibited by the same individual.

In spite of the considerable amount of overlap between leadership and management, the two concepts should not be confused with each other (Northouse, 2001). Leadership, which is broader than management, occurs anytime one attempts to motivate, influence, or mobilize an individual or group. Management, on the other hand, involves directing people toward organizational goals (Hersey & Blanchard, 1982). Leadership produces change by establishing direction and aligning, motivating, and inspiring people. Management brings a measure of order and consistency to organizations through planning and budgeting, organizing and staffing, and controlling (Kotter, 1990). Leaders do not operate in a vacuum. They are accountable to others within the context of values, norms, and expectations (Vinzant & Crothers, 1998). Leadership is an art based on a philosophy. Management involves analysis, sequencing, and application. In other words, management follows leadership (Covey, 1998).

Ethical Leadership Is Every Officer's Responsibility

The chief executive officer (CEO) of a police agency is probably the most important strategic initiator. Whether a sheriff, chief, superintendent, director, or commissioner, the CEO plays a significant role in defining the organization's philosophy, values, mission, and priorities. The CEO is instrumental in creating the climate conducive to successful change and positive outcomes. The CEO is in the best position to view the relationship between the police agency and the community as a whole and to assist with the creation of a vision for the future.

Upper and middle managers (e.g., deputy chiefs, captains, and lieutenants) should lead as well as manage. Rather than insulate themselves from line supervisors and officers, upper and middle managers should interact with subordinates, assisting them through the processes of mentoring, coaching, and team building. Upper and middle managers are in an excellent position to act as conduits, monitoring for and adjusting the pace of change. True leadership is not so much the exercise of power as it is the empowerment of others. Leadership is service to others that

requires tremendous commitment, energy, patience, humility, and selflessness (Meese & Ortmeier, 2004).

Line supervisors (primarily sergeants) are in a pivotal leadership position to facilitate the achievement of goals. These supervisors help line personnel achieve accountability and performance objectives. Line supervisors are in the best position to assume a leadership role in reviewing officer productivity and citizen contact, making recommendations for improvement, and taking corrective action when appropriate (Baker, 2000).

However, regardless of the size of a police agency, the territory it covers, or the number of levels of authority or supervision, it is the line officer who has the most direct role in serving the mission of the agency. The line officer has the greatest contact with the citizenry and is in the best position to directly impact the lives of the people who are served. Thus, considerable training and education resources should be expended to develop ethical leadership competencies in police recruits as well as senior officers (Anderson, 2000; Johnson, 2001; Kokkelenberg, 2001; Meese, 1993; Meese & Ortmeier, 2004; Ortmeier, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2002; Stevens, 2002; Vinzant & Crothers, 1998).

Research on Police Leadership Competencies

During the 1990s, several studies were conducted to identify police leadership competencies. Most of the studies focused on supervisory-level leadership while a few addressed leadership skills required of line-level officers. In 1995, Ortmeier conducted a study to identify essential line officer leadership competencies. The study focused on the leadership competencies perceived as essential for operations-level (frontline) practitioners in an environment that emphasizes community participation, engagement, and problem-solving—all of which are essential ingredients to effective policing. The Ortmeier study is believed to be the first study to address leadership skills at the street officer level (Ortmeier, 1996).

In 1996, Anderson and King conducted two studies through the Justice Institute of British Columbia. The purpose of the Anderson and King studies was to identify necessary leadership skills for supervisors and managers in the police community and public safety sectors in British Columbia (Anderson & King, 1996a, b). Similar studies were subsequently conducted with the Vancouver, British Columbia police and the San Diego, California Police Department.

In 1997, through a project sponsored by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), in conjunction with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), developed a list of leadership competencies for all police officers. The FLETC/RCMP list contains core leadership values that were identified as the foundation for the core leadership competencies, including integrity, honesty, professionalism, compassion, respect, accountability, fairness, and courage. The FLETC/RCMP core leadership competencies are categorized in eight major groups: (1) change management, (2) communication, (3) relationship building, (4) service orientation, (5) sharing power, (6) creating opportunity, (7) inspiration, and (8) motivation (Anderson, 2000).

Essential Police Leadership Competencies

Police officer leadership competencies relate to the knowledge and skills necessary to function effectively and appropriately in a policing environment. Officers must think creatively and independently. They must communicate well in their interactions with others (Harr & Hess, 2003). They must be able to create a vision and develop appropriate steps for solving problems. Instead of reacting primarily to incidents, the officer is often forced to analyze, plan, and take initiative (Meese, 1993). One must remember that it is the individual patrol officer who has the greatest freedom, discretionary authority, and ability to work directly with the public. The patrol officer is the one who is perceived as the primary representative of the police agency (Goldstein, 1990; 2001). It is this officer who has the most direct contact with the public and its problems.

In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice observed that physical strength and aggressiveness reflected the popular image of what the police do. The commission also observed that this image was inconsistent with a careful analysis of the job requirements. It further noted that one incompetent officer could trigger a riot, permanently damage the reputation of a citizen, or alienate a community against a police department. In a contemporary policing environment, brute strength and aggressiveness give way to a new breed of officers who are better educated, self-managed, creative, guided by values and purposes, and who are not constrained by rules and excessive supervision (Meese, 1993; President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967). This does not suggest that brute strength and aggressiveness are not appropriate when circumstances warrant, but most police work does not involve physical confrontation. Most police activity requires situation management and ethical leadership. Thus, police agencies must deploy the most innovative, self-disciplined, and self-motivated officers directly into the community as outreach specialists and community problem solvers, not soldiers (Peak & Glensor, 2002; Trojanowicz & Carter, 1990).

The leadership competencies identified as essential for line police officers can be grouped into five major competency categories:

1. The communications and related interpersonal competencies category addresses one's ability to communicate with diverse populations.
2. Through motivational competencies, a person demonstrates the ability to encourage others and build proactive relationships.
3. Problem-solving competencies focus on problem identification, critical and analytical thinking, and situation analysis.
4. Planning and organizing competencies are used to create a vision, prioritize, delegate, and define goals and objectives.
5. Actuation-implementation competencies address the ability to implement a vision and evaluate results.

Overall, skills in effective verbal communication, listening, and demonstration of empathy or understanding in a multicultural society are essential. Other essential competencies include the ability to identify problems, make commitments, understand the reality of police impact on crime, analyze situations, demonstrate persistence, employ situational strategies, and recognize solutions to problems. Summarily, the ability to think critically and engage in team building and group problem solving are highly rated leadership competencies necessary for the police officer (Meese & Ortmeier, 2004; Ortmeier, 1996).

The Ethical Leadership Challenge

Although experts in a study conducted in 1995 determined that many police training and education programs do an excellent job of assisting police officers in the development of cognitive, procedural, and technical skills, these programs often do little to promote the development of essential nontechnical competencies and qualities, such as effective judgment, leadership, and integrity, all of which improve police performance and help generate community support for the police (Ortmeier, 1996).

Ethical leadership skills are among the most important competencies required of a line police officer, yet leadership skill development is often reserved for the higher-level ranks in the police service. Many reasons for this phenomenon exist. One is the false assumption that the line officers simply follow the lead presented by their superiors, but experience demonstrates that this is not necessarily true. Police officers, particularly in a 21st century policing environment, must develop leadership competencies to grasp a vision, transmit it, and help translate it into constructive action (Meese & Ortmeier, 2004; Ortmeier, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2002). Utilizing a sense of purpose, citizens should be viewed as customers, and the police should be viewed as leaders providing a community service (Meese & Kurz, 1993).

In essence, the underlying concepts for leadership in policing generally support front-line officer competencies that assist a community in the creation of a vision for its future. They support the creation of a process through which the community can assist itself in the identification and development of solutions to problems. In addition, the community is encouraged to take action to solve those problems. Effective leadership also increases the public's confidence in the integrity and judgment of the police as well as improves the process and outcomes of human interaction between the individual police officer and the citizens.

Leadership is viewed as a management function by some authorities; however, leadership skills are also required of the line police officer to improve public confidence and lead communities to identify and solve problems. Officers must be able to create and sustain community interest and activity in the law enforcement effort by fostering an environment that reinforces positive behavior and results. In essence, management follows leadership but does not supersede it.

Contemporary policing requires competencies beyond those traditionally taught in police academies and college classrooms. Efforts should and are being made to incorporate affective competencies, such as those associated with leadership and ethics, into basic police academies, in-service training, and college curricula

(Brown, 2001; California Association of Administration of Justice Educators, 2002; California State Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, 2002; Meese & Ortmeier, 2004; Ortmeier, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2002).

Additionally, police recruitment efforts must focus on individuals who possess the psychological profile as well as the background, educationally and experientially, to develop leadership skills appropriate to policing. The potential for ethical leadership and the ability to develop leadership competence are essential components in the police officer candidate screening process.

Police officer ethical leadership competency development can no longer be ignored. A review of the literature, expert opinions, and study results support the premise that ethical leadership competencies are essential for contemporary police officers. Additionally, some experts argue that the traditional paramilitary structure and attitudes of the police service are inconsistent with contemporary community needs (Champion & Rush, 1997; Lyman, 2002; Peak & Glesnor, 2002). It is suggested that the paramilitary automatons of the present must be transformed or replaced with self-contained human leadership agents who can guide communities safely through the 21st century (Brown, 2001; Meese & Ortmeier, 2004; Ortmeier, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2002).

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Leading from the Middle: The Challenge of the Leader-Follower

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Introduction

As law enforcement agencies work to “empower” officers and move decisions closer to the front lines, the middle manager is under increasing pressure to perform. What qualities, strategies, and behaviors may contribute to success for middle managers seeking to lead others in a law enforcement organization?

Effective middle managers need good leadership skills. Popular and scholarly books, college classes, and training sessions offering advice for effective leadership skills and influence techniques are abundant. It seems that much of this advice is given from the perspective of the executive. Leading from the middle, however, is different from leading from the top of an organization. Leading from the middle more explicitly involves a multi-directional relationship with power.

Leaders in the middle are servant and master, follower and leader. They are leader-followers. Some writers suggest that effective middle managers lead, in part, by teaching good followership skills to their employees (Fairholm, 2001). To be effective, it appears that leader-followers in the middle need to model and practice good followership and leadership behaviors.

The Context of Middle Management

In this article, the term *middle manager* will be used broadly to mean managers in the middle of formal law enforcement organizations. Middle managers are assigned to positions, in formal organizational structures, that are vertically situated between two other positions, one higher, the other lower (Frohman & Johnson, 1993). Some definitions of middle management exclude first-line supervisors (Dopson, Risk, & Stewart, 1992). For the purposes of this article, however, the term *middle managers* will include first-line supervisors. Middle managers may be given the rank of corporal, sergeant, lieutenant, or captain.

The position of middle manager is of strategic importance to the organization because it serves as a linking pin between levels in an organization (Likert, 1961) and because its occupants are able to draw from their expertise in specified areas (Schilit, 1987). Middle-level managers are concerned with interpreting and executing policies (Yukl, 2002). The middle manager translates guidance from above (in varying degrees of abstraction) into operational plans, goals, and objectives. “Leadership and coordination, therefore, take place on the battlefield rather than from distant headquarters” (Uyterhoeven, 1991).

Frohman and Johnson describe the difficult organizational circumstances common in middle management:

We believe that people in the middle levels of most organizations have very difficult jobs. What makes their positions almost impossible is that the real nature of their jobs is unrecognized—that they must deal with inconsistent signals and changing messages. Coupled with a feeling of powerlessness, these elements make the jobs of middle managers full of frustration, disappointment, and anger that ultimately result in a death of spirit. . . . [yet] we are continually amazed at the strength, courage, and initiative taken by middle managers once they perceive an opportunity. (1993, p. xi)

The Middle Manager as Leader

Leadership at Different Organizational Levels

Tillery (2001) cautions against falling into the trap of considering and teaching leadership as if everyone is, or will be, executive-level leaders. The law enforcement executive can leverage the resources and legitimized authority mechanisms of the formal organization to shape the mission, vision, policies, and goals. For middle managers, however, the mission, vision, policies, and goals have been established higher up in the organization. It is important to think about how people adapt the organization's vision to fit in-the-middle circumstances. Furthermore, modeling desired leadership practices needs to begin at the top because there is a cascading effect into lower levels (Bass, Waldman, Avolio, & Bebb, 1987).

The formal chain of command is intended to provide control downward over behavior and performance. This control orientation ensures conformity, predictability, accountability, and no surprises for higher-level managers and executives. This means that decisions often must receive multiple levels of approval from above. In situations in which there is a limited number of choices to be made, there may be a proportionately limited opportunity for leadership. In this context, leaders in the middle may perceive less opportunity to be visionary and creative. Middle managers, however, must inspire and lead their followers—the people on the front lines—to strive willingly and enthusiastically to achieve the organization's core mission. This context provides a challenge for law enforcement executives and middle managers.

The Middle Manager as Follower

Ineffective Followership Fuels Ineffective Leadership

Middle managers are change masters, and they are the recipients of intended change. Middle managers are masters and servants of power, who need to be effective as leaders and as followers (Bartolomé & Laurent, 1991). Middle managers are performing in their follower roles as often, if not more often, than in their leadership roles. Being an effective follower, influencing upward, is a functional part of leadership and may be as important professionally as being an effective leader (Fairholm, 2001).

Middle managers, acting in their supervisory role, know how much they depend upon their subordinates' performance and, therefore, how much real power, as opposed to formal power, their subordinates have upward over them. When middle managers are operating in their follower role, however, they lose sight of this relative power aspect of organizational life (Bartolomé & Laurent, 1991). Indeed, some managers may be convinced that they have little, if any, ability to influence upward and often can become preoccupied or obsessed with continually winning the favor of their boss.

Middle managers, who are ineffective followers, may see themselves as subservient, buy into hierarchy, and despair over powerlessness (Kelley, 1991). Managers, who are possessed of a self-perception of organizational impotence and who find their constituents resisting, are likely to respond with punishing forms of influence. This self-perception of powerlessness may lead to bossiness (Kanter, 1991). This can harm morale and weaken motivation of subordinates.

Managers who are ineffective followers also may be hesitant to defend constituents from unfair criticism or mistreatment by higher managers. Not defending one's constituents will diminish trust, respect, and the manager's ability to inspire those constituents (Bartolomé & Laurent, 1991). In sum, a sense of powerlessness, resulting from ineffective upward influence by the middle manager, may fuel ineffective leadership. In contrast, being effective in influencing upward in the organization may increase the opportunity for successful downward influence.

Effective Followership Fuels Effective Leadership

People prefer to have bosses with clout. Even "association or affiliation with other people that their followers perceive as important can augment the power" of the middle manager (Fairholm, 2001, p. 147). People are less critical and are less resistant to middle managers who are perceived as influential upward in the organization and with external stakeholders.

"We have faith in leaders because of their ability to make things happen in the larger world, to create possibilities for everyone else, and to attract resources" (Kanter, 1991, p. 95). The power to influence others flows to persons who can provide the desired rewards and opportunities (Fairholm, 2001). Middle managers gain power when they control resources that are desired by the group. One way to increase control over resources and opportunities is by managing one's boss, which Gabarro and Kotter (1980) conceptualize as, "the process of consciously working with your superior to obtain the best possible results for you, your boss, and the company (p. 45).

Effective following and leading takes courage not to succumb to "assumed" boundaries. Parker Follett (1949) thought it essential that leaders take risks but not be gamblers. Kouzes and Posner (1995) see challenging the process and searching for opportunities as essential ingredients of leadership.

Effective middle managers "must often go beyond the formal limits of power and authority set forth in their job description" (Frohman & Johnson, 1993, p. 148). They must deal with the full scope of responsibilities (Uyterhoeven, 1991). The full scope will include areas where authority and responsibility are not explicitly

given, but neither are they explicitly prohibited. It is in this area of flexibility that the wiggle room may be found for creative and imaginative leadership. Overcoming boundaries and potential constraints is important to demonstrate good followership and good leadership, yet challenging the process may have its costs, which is explored below.

Differing Expectations: Caught in the Middle

Taking the conventional view of leadership and placing it at the middle manager level “is heresy according to all the principles, values, and beliefs of the traditional pyramidal structure” (Frohman & Johnson, 1993). While one might stereotypically expect more adherence to the pyramidal structure in government agencies, it is found in businesses also. For example, Bass (2000) notes that General Motors in the 1980s refused to promote middle managers evidencing too much leadership. This strategy did not have positive results for GM.

The middle manager engages in relationships: up, down, lateral. The three roles may require different or nonconsistent behavior patterns (Uyterhoeven, 1991). For example, different types of influence techniques may be required depending upon whether the direction of intended influence is upward and downward in the organization. A study by Floyd and Wooldridge (1997) found that higher productivity was associated with upward influence based on knowledge and expertise and centrality of the manager’s network to the pressing issues. Higher productivity was also associated with uniformity in downward influence toward efficient execution of intended strategy; however, the needs and perceptions of followers may differ from those of bosses. Followers may want more opportunity for autonomy, responsibility, and personal development, and be less concerned with ensuring “no surprises” (p. 472).

Indeed, one study documented that executives and subordinates hold differing expectations for middle managers. Salam, Cox, and Sims (1997) conducted a longitudinal field study involving a defense contractor in the U.S. that included 526 subordinates, 73 middle managers, and 37 top managers. Middle managers seen as *challenging the status quo* were rated lower by their bosses but rated higher by their subordinates. The top managers associated *challenging the status quo* negatively with the perceived performance of the middle manager.

The study also evaluated the leader behavior of *encouraging independent action*. This was defined as encouraging employees to solve their own problems without supervisory input, approval or assistance. The top managers rated this behavior as negatively related to middle managers’ performance; the subordinates rated it as positively related to performance of the middle manager.

Top-level managers and subordinates are likely have different expectations and different values for leader behaviors. It is important that middle managers be perceived by one’s boss *and* subordinates as an effective follower and leader. Clarifying expectations is essential to avoid being caught in the middle. The following section considers other strategies and behaviors potentially important to being an effective leader-follower.

Effective Leader-Follower Behavior

Good followers are energized, self-motivated, and courageous. They are able to work well with others and grasp the big picture yet support their boss without star-billing (Fairholm, 2001). While respecting the position their boss holds in the formal organization, they see themselves as equals on a personal level. They recognize the relationship with their boss as one of mutual dependence (Gabarro & Kotter, 1980). Good followers tend not to be intimidated by status. They are comfortable in agreeably disagreeing with organizational superiors, while understanding that support from the top of the organization is important for acquisition of necessary resources.

Kelley (1991) offers strategies for middle managers to be effective as followers and as leaders:

- Think independently and critically.
- Disagree agreeably.
- Align personal and organization goals.
- Move between leader and follower roles with ease.

Being a good follower is not being blindly obedient, and loyalty does not require unbending conformity (Fairholm, 2001). Effective followers are credible, honest, insightful, and candid (Kelley, 1991). Good followers are loyal and competent, but they speak truth to power (Fairholm, 2001). Effective followership is not a passive activity; it requires active engagement to make the organization's vision happen. "Boundaries do not go away, but our ideas about the nature of boundaries can change" (Drath, 1998, p. 411).

Katzenbach et al. (1996) lists common characteristics of real change leaders in the middle of organization, who are also effective as followers:

- Are committed to a better way
- Challenge existing power bases and norms
- Take the initiative to go beyond defined boundaries
- Motivate themselves and inspire others
- Care about how people are treated and enabled to perform
- Stay undercover (low profile)
- Have a sense of humor about themselves and situations

Leaders at the mid-managerial level seek to draw followers into a quest for improvement and achievement. These leaders align individual, group, and organizational goals as they lead with personal initiative to achieve beyond and above expectations. Effective leaders in the middle may need to rely upon influence processes that are not constricted by hierarchical, legitimate authority. These influence processes, for example, are energized by followers' needs for self-esteem and self-actualization.

"Middle managers may be correct when they blame senior managers for not creating the right conditions for leadership from the middle. . . . However, only if middle managers are willing to accept the responsibility, to risk failure, and to display courage will their [organization's performance] improve in the long run"

(Frohman & Johnson, 1993, p. 152). Fairholm (2001) suggests that effective power tactics used to influence bosses include proactivity (ask for forgiveness rather than permission), rational persuasion using outside experts, displaying charisma, exercising leadership in ambiguous situations, and building a favorable image. At the same time, the executive level can help shape organizations that create environments more supportive of effective leader-followers.

How Can Law Enforcement Executives Help?

Law enforcement executives need to accept that true loyalty from middle managers does not involve unbending conformity. It involves followership that is credible, honest, insightful, forward-thinking, competent, energized, and candid. Effective followers speak truth to power and are not uncritically obedient (except in emergency and tactical situations, of course). Research has shown that followers are more willing to follow middle managers perceived to have influence upward in the organization. Accordingly, executives need to create such an environment.

Executives should seek candid, evaluative upward communication from middle managers and encourage leadership-style critical, creative thinking. Ensuring that middle managers can be effective as leaders requires executives to value the type of followership that is conducive to effective leadership. Also, as noted earlier, leadership style tends to cascade downward in organizations (Bass et al., 1987). Leaders go first and show the way.

Summary and Conclusion

Much leadership literature provides advice, or describes leadership, in the context of top-level executives. Middle managers, however, face organization constraints and realities that may serve to inhibit or mitigate the effectiveness of some leadership practices.

Leadership is an influence process. To be effective as leaders, middle managers need to be perceived by their followers as having influence upward and laterally in the organization to obtain resources and cooperation from key stakeholders. Research suggests that effective leader-followers at the middle level are respectful of hierarchical responsibilities but do not succumb to assumed boundaries, are not intimidated by formal trappings of power, and do not see themselves as somehow inferior to their hierarchical superiors. In leading, they convey self-confidence, show imagination, and embolden their followers. They are considered competent and trustworthy.

Middle managers must remember to take the initiative to lead, not just manage. Effective middle managers recognize and fulfill the need to be effective as followers themselves. They lead, in part, by teaching good followership skills to their employees. Every organization needs more good followers than leaders, and professional followers reduce the need for leaders (Fairholm, 2001). Executives are in a strong position to ensure that the right culture is present for developing capable followers and leaders. Middle managers must push for that culture through positive performance and communication.

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Leadership: Task-Oriented vs. Employee-Oriented

Dan Terry, Detective, Elmhurst Police Department

Good supervision is one of the cornerstones upon which successful police operations rest. There is no police agency, regardless of its size or scope of operations, that can function at maximum efficiency unless it maintains high quality supervisory control over all its personnel. . . . Both good police service and misconduct by police officers are noted by the public and reflect favorably or unfavorably on the entire force. Good supervision, then, is essential in all agencies concerned with the administration of justice and is, in fact, their obligation to the public. (Melnicoe & Mennig, 1978, pp. 1-2)

A police supervisor, manager, and/or leader must have knowledge about, and control over, subordinates and line members of the organization, specifically the patrol officers in the police setting. This must be maintained so that leaders can demonstrate to the community and their superiors how well the department is functioning and make adjustments and changes in areas that need improvement. The line members, or patrol officers, are those most visible to the community. The public's impression of the police department will rely primarily on its observations and attitudes of these patrol officers. If they are not perceived as functioning properly, the organization or department will not be successful. It will not have the support of the community. This will inhibit the potential growth of the department, and its obligation to the public will not be met. Thus, it is of the utmost importance that the leaders of the department be qualified personnel who are able to perceive the needs of the community and department and ensure that their people or subordinates meet those needs on a consistent basis. This article focuses on styles of supervision or leadership. What are some of the different styles? Is one style any better than another? Though the following information can be applied consistently to all levels of leadership or management within the hierarchy of the police department, this article focuses primarily on line-level supervisors—those in charge of the patrol officers and those performing similar functions.

At this point, it may be beneficial to take a brief look at the history of the police so we can see how police service has evolved, how it has come to be as it is, and where it is going. Are the styles of supervision or leadership of the past appropriate for the tasks and police functions of today?

There has always been law enforcement in one form or another. Law enforcement is as old as human society itself. In the early years of human societies, there was an "eye for an eye" theory by which people were protected by group norms. If an offender wronged somebody, the individual, family, or group would retaliate, seeking vengeance for the wrongdoing. As time progressed, individuals were given the responsibility of enforcing laws. Sometimes, this responsibility was given formally as in written laws, and other times it was informal, given by word of mouth or passed through generations (Kirkham & Wollan Jr., 1980, p. 39). Eventually, American law was introduced when the colonists arrived. American law originated from England's law, which the colonists brought with them. Early

in American policing, individuals were charged as watchmen. Their duty was to stand watch at night. They would patrol at night for the purpose of protecting citizens from law violators. In the early 1800s, modern policing began to evolve. Britain's Home Secretary, Sir Robert Peel, known as "the father of modern policing," introduced the first organized police force (Kirkham & Wollan Jr., 1980, p. 28). Peel developed twelve principles of modern policing, which according to Kirkham & Wollan Jr. (1980), are still present in the basic structures and operations of today's police departments. These twelve principles became known as the "Peelian Reform":

1. The police must be stable, efficient, and organized along military lines.
2. The police must be under governmental control.
3. The absence of crime will best prove the efficiency of the police.
4. The distribution of crime news is essential.
5. The deployment of police strength by time and area is essential.
6. No quality is more indispensable to a policeman than a perfect command of temper; a quiet, determined manner has more effect than violent action.
7. Good appearance commands respect.
8. The securing and training of proper persons is at the root of efficiency.
9. Public security demands that every police officer be given a number.
10. Police headquarters should be centrally located and easily accessible to the people.
11. Policemen should be hired on a probationary basis.
12. Police records are necessary to the correct distribution of police strength (p. 29).

It is also evident that Peel's principles were structured along military lines—something else that is still present. A lot of what Peel believed is still accurate today; however, many would argue and recent research would suggest that some of these principles would not apply appropriately in today's policing. As American law was influenced by England's society, this too was adapted by the United States in the 19th century, and these principles were used in the organization of America's police departments.

Throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s, the role of the police was to maintain social order. The police were not seen by the public as being crime fighters. They were simply there to assure that disorder did not occur, and they often wouldn't step in until disorder had, in fact, occurred. When violence and disruption were present, they would often resolve the situation with violence of their own. Police corruption was a common problem, and politics also played a major role in policing. It wasn't necessarily the laws that shaped enforcement efforts by the police but rather, public opinions and beliefs of the present politicians who maintained control of the police. The administration and leadership of the police during these times were of the autocratic nature. Those in positions of rank gave the orders, which were strictly obeyed without questioning.

In the 1920s, August Vollmer, the police chief in Berkeley, California, made great strides in professionalizing the police. He placed emphasis on education and training, brought technology to law enforcement, and made efforts to separate politics from the administration of police services (Swanson, Territo, & Taylor, 2001, pp. 4-5). Since the Peelian Reform, departments were organized along militaristic

lines. This military model was adopted as a dominant force and somewhat remains that way today. It was common to see military officers recruited as high-ranking police officials (Swanson et al., 2001, p. 6).

In the 1960s and early 1970s, while the country was going through unrest, police were being criticized about how they handled their jobs and the citizens. They began to lose popularity among the public. Major changes were needed. New developments began to occur within the police profession. Questions regarding college training for officers, increasing minorities in departments, reducing police brutality, recognizing police stress, and having a better understanding between the police and the community became issues. "Since the mid-1970s, the relationship between police and the public has changed. Police departments have become more sensitive to their public image" (Siegel, 2000, p. 499). In a 1982 article titled "Broken Windows," James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling recommend a new way of policing. Their theory is that police should reduce the amount of effort spent on crime fighting and focus more on maintaining order. If the police focus on and find solutions to the more minute problems in the community, they will prevent larger criminal problems. The example given by the authors is that "If the first broken window in a building is not repaired, then people who like breaking windows will assume that no one cares about the building and more windows will be broken" (p. 37). They go on to say that just as a doctor must be concerned about maintaining health as well as treating illness, so too should the police be interested in maintaining order and addressing small community problems as well as fighting crime. In order to effectively solve these problems before they grow into larger ones, the police must have better communication and a more intimate relationship with the community. From this time on, policing has moved into a direction focusing less on crime fighting as the main function and more on service to the public.

Today, the new philosophy is community-oriented policing. This philosophy is continuing to grow and become more popular; however, enough time has not passed to determine the successfulness of the program. Here, the focus is on crime prevention (a proactive attempt to prevent crime before it occurs) rather than on crime fighting (responding or reacting after a crime is committed), on customizing police service to meet each community member's specific needs, and on involving the community with the problem-solving process. Police officers are to widen their functions, becoming coordinators between the community and other agencies that may assist in the resolutions of problems as they arise. The focus is on the quality of service rendered and not the quantity, which has been used in the past to rate police performance. In order for community-oriented policing to be successful, the officers must be given more responsibility and authority to make discretionary decisions as individual social concerns and neighborhood problems arise. A total adaption to this philosophy may prove difficult as the management of the traditional police organizations have always been structured along military lines. Discretion and decisionmaking is something that supervisors and managers haven't always allowed their subordinates to do freely. There are still many today who do not agree with the community-oriented philosophy. These people hold the belief that the primary police function is that of crime fighting. Whether community-oriented policing is to be successful is yet to be seen; however, it is becoming increasingly more popular in organizations everywhere, and it is

something, at least for now, that we must get used to. Whether we agree with it or not, it is likely to be around for awhile, and we must be prepared to accept it.

Within a community-oriented policing model, the tasks and functions of the police organization are different than those of the traditional model. We can see by examining the history of policing that drastic changes have taken place and will continue to do so. These continuing changes are part of the everyday problems and challenges that any organization faces. Supervisors or leaders must identify and adjust to these changes to assure their organizations' survival and growth. Leaders are needed to accept this change and bring it into the next era of policing. "Progressive police leadership is essential both in terms of sensing the need for change and in managing the process of change" (Sheehan & Cordner, 1999, p. 293). If the police chief or others in charge of an organization really want the new philosophy to work, they may need to examine their department's leaders to see if the present styles of leading are compatible with this new model of policing.

Hilgert and Leonard (2001) define leadership as "the ability to guide and influence the opinions, attitudes, and behavior of others. This means that anyone who is able to direct or influence others towards objectives can function as a leader" (p. 468). Iannone and Iannone (2001) identifies three different types of leaders or leadership styles: (1) the autocrat, (2) the democratic, and (3) the free-reign leader (pp. 33-35). The autocrat or authoritarian is authoritative. He or she makes decisions based on personal beliefs without regard for the opinions of subordinates. He or she doesn't allow any subordinates to participate in the decision-making process and will not accept any questioning of his or her decisionmaking. The autocrat is a "by the book" type of a leader who often controls people through fear and/or intimidation. The democratic leader is group-oriented and encourages active participation by subordinates in planning and carrying out tasks. He or she seeks ideas from others and sees him- or herself more as an associate of subordinates rather than a person of authority. The free-reign leader (also known as the laissez-faire leader) displays a low amount of control over subordinates. He or she allows them to make their own decisions with very little input. The free-reign leader is passive, mostly out of the picture, spending minimal time with the group. These three leadership styles appear to be the most common; however, some additional styles exist. These additional styles vary slightly from those already mentioned in regards to the amount of authority shown towards the subordinates and the amount of participation allowed of the subordinates. They generally fall somewhere between the autocratic and democratic leader.

What kind of style should be used? Is one style any more productive than another? These are questions that still go somewhat unresolved. "This often becomes an issue of the degree to which supervisors should rely on their authority and position as compared with trying to utilize positive human relations strategies, which may provide greater opportunities for employee self-motivation" (Hilgert & Leonard, 2001, p. 108). In 1960, in his study on supervisory approaches, Professor Douglas McGregor developed two theories which became known as Theory X and Theory Y (Champoux, 2003, pp. 18-19). It was his belief that supervisors would manage their employees based upon their own attitude toward individuals' motivation to work.

Theory X supervisors have negative views towards people and believe that people must be motivated by close supervision, authority, and discipline. They tend to make all the decisions and punish bad behavior but seldom reward good behavior. They believe that the average person dislikes work and will try to avoid it unless he or she is controlled and directed.

Theory Y supervisors, on the other hand, have a positive view towards people. They believe people are self-motivators and will accept responsibility and accomplish their tasks with little direction and supervision if the proper working conditions are met.

The beliefs and behaviors of the Theory X supervisors and Theory Y supervisors are similar if not synonymous with the autocratic leader and the democratic leader. Autocratic leaders supervise very closely, make all the decisions, and don't trust subordinates to make any of the decisions. Furthermore, they have no concern for the opinions or beliefs of subordinates. Autocratic leaders are solely responsible for the motivation of their people. On the other hand, democratic leaders encourage participation from subordinates, practice less control, and seek self-motivation from their people.

According to Stoner and Freeman (1992), two major functions of leadership are needed to operate effectively. Both functions must be performed. These functions are task-related; problem-solving; and group maintenance, or social, functions (p. 475). These two leadership functions can be seen in two different kinds of leadership styles: (1) task-oriented and (2) relationship- or employee-oriented. Though a balanced combination of both styles would probably produce a more well-rounded, qualified leader or supervisor, individuals tend to lean more towards one or the other. They, thereby, choose or identify with their specific supervisory style. Task-oriented supervisors put more emphasis on getting the job done by closer supervision and not on employee growth or satisfaction. Employee-oriented supervisors try to motivate their employees rather than control them. Having a friendly, trusting rapport with their employees is of more importance. All of the aforementioned leadership styles, other than possibly the free-reign leader, could be classified into one of these two styles. The autocratic and Theory X supervisor would obviously fall into the task-oriented category and the democratic and Theory Y supervisor into the employee-oriented category. The free-reign or laissez-faire leader would probably not fall into either, as there is really not much relationship between the supervisor and subordinates in this style of leadership. All of the sources examined for this article clearly concluded that the free-reign style is a poor leadership style that is much less productive than either of the others (autocratic and democratic). "Under the laissez-faire leader, less work was produced, the work quality was poorer, and the work was less organized and less satisfying to members of the group" (Swanson et al., 2001, p. 219).

For the remainder of this article, the focus will be on task-oriented versus employee-oriented supervisors. Nearly all of the present leadership styles can be placed into one of these two categories based on the primary emphasis of that particular style. The perspective of supervisors—how they see themselves, how they see their jobs, and how they see others—will determine what leadership style they use. What style they use may or may not determine their successfulness as supervisors and leaders.

“American police departments have historically been dominated by Theory X assumptions” (Swanson et al., 2001, p. 149). This may, in part, be due to the fact that police departments have traditionally been considered a paramilitary organization that practices close control of its members from the bottom line to the top. “Most municipal departments are organized in a military way, often using military terms to designate seniority (sergeant, lieutenant, captain)” (Seigel, 2000, p. 507). People see the military as a symbol of strength, stability, and public morality, something which police departments attempt to mirror. As previously noted, American law was adapted from English law, as was, the philosophy of modern policing. The Peelian Reform became a part of American policing and for the most part is still present today. The first principle of Peelian Reform says that “the police should be stable, efficient, and organized along military lines.” The next principle says “the police must be under governmental control” (Kirkham & Wollan Jr., 1980, p. 29). Other principles address the issues of having a disciplined temper, a respectful appearance, and proper training. In looking at these principles introduced by Sir Robert Peel, was there any organization, other than the military, that could have served as an appropriate model for the police departments to emulate? Still today, the structure of most police departments remains similar to that of the military. Even the training emulates that of the military. Many police departments utilize training academies for new recruits that are similar in nature to the boot camps of the military. The primary function of the military is the protection of the country and its interests; therefore, the people of the military must be trained and prepared for combat, as they may be called on for such. It is no wonder then that the military is a very authoritative, autocratic, task-oriented organization that demands intense discipline and control of its members.

The police too, from time to time, are also called on for combat—not to protect the country and not in some foreign land but on the streets of their cities and municipalities. They must face emergency situations in which their lives and the lives of others are at stake. At these times, the priority must be the task at hand. A supervisor or leader must be task-oriented to ensure that the task is completed. There is no time to consider the feelings and opinions of each individual member. Whisenand and Ferguson (1978) refer to the autocrat as someone who tells (commands) subordinates what to do. They emphasize that “telling [an employee what to do] is most appropriate in those situations requiring immediate action, when any delay is likely to result in negative consequences for the organization and where the leader doing the telling is in the best position and has the best information to do so” (p. 100). When someone has been caught or interrupted in a commission of a crime and now has barricaded him- or herself inside a building with hostages; when a man is standing in the middle of a crowded public street holding a gun to his head; or when an apartment building is on fire, and there may be several people still inside, the task-oriented supervisor with confidence in his or her decision-making ability possesses a greater chance of obtaining a successful outcome than that of the employee-oriented supervisor. “When conditions are unstable during periods of stress or emergency; when initiative and decisiveness are needed; when there is usually no time for permissive leadership and no time for discussion with subordinates before each decision is made; and when bold, rapid action is indicated, the autocratic leader is most likely to succeed” (Iannone & Iannone, 2001, p. 34).

Task-oriented organizations tend to focus on quantity. The success of police departments is also usually measured by quantitative means—how many arrests are made, how many tickets are written, how many street contacts are generated, etc. These methods have traditionally been used to determine how productive a department is as well as how productive individual officers are. Many departments maintain quotas that must be met. An officer may be held responsible to generate a specific amount of arrests or write a specific number of tickets. If success is determined by quantitative means—and in past history, it has been—then the task-oriented leader is the preferred leader. The autocrat can obtain a greater amount of work. In the business world, task-oriented supervision is commonly used. The employees are watched over, controlled, and pushed to generate more. In this case, specifically in the manufacturing of products, success is determined by the amount of money made. The higher the quantity of product made, the more of the product there is to sell, which means a greater profit for the company. In policing, the task-oriented supervisor closely directs and controls the subordinates to ensure that they perform the task at hand in the most appropriate way. The supervisor believes that his or her way is the best way. The downfall to this is that subordinates are not viewed as people with emotions that have something to contribute to the group but as machines that must be programmed by the supervisor if any beneficial work is to be obtained. This can lead to hostility and frustration among the employees.

A group led by a task-oriented leader tends to be well-organized and disciplined. The subordinates know where they stand and what is expected of them. The supervisor is consistent in what he or she expects of each member and goes “by the book.” If discipline is required of one of the members, the task-oriented leader tends to exercise that discipline more easily than an employee-oriented leader, as there is no emotional attachment. The task-oriented leader is the decisionmaker; therefore, in times of uncertainty, the subordinates can turn to him or her for answers and not depend on themselves to determine the correct action to be taken to complete a task. “Autocratic leadership has the advantage of speedy decisionmaking and works well if most group members are seeking to avoid responsibility” (Sheehan & Cordner, 1999, p. 301).

Obviously, there are advantages to task-oriented supervision; however, most current sources depict the employee-oriented supervisor as the most productive, or at least the most popular. “The supervisor who leads democratically, seeking ideas and suggestions from . . . subordinates and allowing them to participate in decisionmaking that affects them, by and large secures the best results as a leader” (Iannone & Iannone, 2001, p. 34). Being allowed to participate in the activities and decision-making efforts of the group promotes a feeling of self worth. More responsibility is given to the employee, which allows for personal growth and achievement on the part of the individual employee. The employee-oriented supervisor is more popular than the task-oriented because of the emotional ties, rapport, and relationship between employee and supervisor. This supervisor will be more respected, and employees will be more likely to be self-motivated than those that work out of fear and intimidation for the authoritative task-oriented supervisor. “Studies indicate that leaders who are perceived by subordinates to be supportive are likely to have high-producing units. . . . Supervisors with the best records of performance focus their primary attention on the human aspects of their subordinates’ problems and on endeavoring to build effective work groups with

high-performance goals" (Whisenand & Ferguson, 1978, p. 104). The production levels of members of an employee-oriented group are more consistent than that of the task-oriented. They are entrusted with more responsibility, made to feel like an important part of the group, and have some dedication to the leader or organization; therefore, they have a personal interest in their performance and the outcome of the task at hand. The production level of the task-oriented members is based primarily on the presence of the leader. In his or her absence, with no control over the members, production levels may decrease.

One of the downfalls of the employee-oriented leadership style is that it's time consuming. There is a significant difference between the amount of time it takes to consider the opinions and feelings of the members and how something may affect them, and the time it takes to make a decision based solely on the leader's own belief and interests. The personal relationship between supervisors and employees can create another downfall to this leadership style. This style is based upon a concern for the well-being and gratification of employees by the supervisors. In most instances, employees answer back with respect toward the supervisors. A positive relationship is therefore built upon rapport and respect. The supervisors, aware of the positive effects caused by this relationship, want to maintain it. They want to be respected and liked by the employees. These supervisors may find it difficult to discipline or correct subordinates when it's needed because they fear losing the relationship that has been built. Iannone and Iannone (2001) explains that many supervisors do not face up to their responsibilities of giving criticism when it is needed. They fear the repercussions of the group and are afraid to tell employees what to do. This may just be part of human nature, as it is often difficult to hurt those with whom you have a close relationship. A good example of this would be a parent who needs to discipline his or her child. At times, this can be a painful and difficult task. The employee-oriented supervisor may overlook minor infractions that should be addressed because of this personal relationship. Task-oriented supervisors do not maintain such close relationships with subordinates. They are unattached to them and may find it much easier to discipline.

Today, supervisors with vision are needed—not just people who can keep order or control the organization as it is. Supervisors are needed who can change, adapt, and reach new goals, as the citizens' or public's needs arise. They must be able to see and change the future. Probably the most successful supervisor would be the one that could adapt to each and every situation as needed. The contingency theory or situational theory addresses this idea. If a situation requires a task-oriented response, the supervisor acts accordingly. If the circumstances warrant an employee-oriented response, the supervisor acts accordingly. The supervisor, in these theories, adapts and changes leadership style to fit the circumstances of the present task. At one moment, he or she may be using a task-oriented style and the next an employee-oriented style. A supervisor who can accomplish this would be ideal and probably prove to be the most effective and productive type of supervisor; however, many supervisors may not be able to change their style with such ease. In absence of this ability, the supervisors who practice the employee-oriented leadership style have a definite advantage over task-oriented supervisors. Their groups will be more productive, motivated, and dedicated to the organization. Furthermore, the group members of an employee-oriented group will be a greater asset to the organization. They will be more likely to share

the goals of the organization, will be more knowledgeable in regards to their job functions, and take more pride in the work they do.

“The principal task of management in a Theory X police department is control, whereas in a Theory Y department, it is supporting subordinates by giving them the resources to do their jobs and creating an environment where they can be self-controlling, mature, contributing, and self actualizing” (Swanson et al., 2001, p. 149). “It is the human factor which binds a group together and motivates it toward goals. . . . It involves more than just a grant of authority” (Iannone & Iannone, 2001, p. 31). Parker and Kleemeier (1951) state . . .

When men obey another because of fear, they are yielding. Their obedience is given grudgingly. There is little loyalty or teamwork, and no desire to give their all for a common cause. But when men follow, they do so willingly—because they want to do what a leader wishes. Herein lies the distinction between being an authority and being a leader. The leader stimulates, motivates, and inspires the group to follow willingly, even eagerly. The authority pushes and drives his men, who yield and obey because they fear the consequences of disobedience. (pp. 411-412)

Swanson et al. (2001) define leadership within the police context as “the process of influencing organizational members to use their energies willingly and appropriately to facilitate the achievement of the police department’s goals” (p. 212). This definition goes one step further than the previous definition given by Hilgert and Leonard (2001), in that being a leader involves more than just influencing others; it also involves influencing others to modify their behaviors or beliefs willingly. Individuals may be granted the formal authority and given a supervisory positions; however, that doesn’t mean they will be able to successfully lead and influence people. They may be able to temporarily influence people by fear, intimidation, or coercion, but the subjects will not be performing willfully. A member whose production is based upon fear, will eventually become a hostile, frustrated member with low morale. To the authoritative and intimidating supervisor, it may be perceived that the employee lacks any motivation without being closely supervised or micromanaged. In reality, the lack of motivation may be caused by low morale and feelings of low self-worth. In the presence of the supervisor, the employee produces out of fear. When the supervisor isn’t present and this fear is gone, the employee’s motivation slacks off because there is no bond between him or her and the supervisor or organization. He or she isn’t treated as an important asset of the organization and doesn’t see him- or herself as one.

Dobbs and Field (1993), in their article on leaders and managers, say that there are three things police leaders must know to effectively accomplish their goals. They must know their business, know themselves, and know their subordinates. Leaders must maintain a relationship of trust in order to keep people motivated. They need to work at understanding all of their people, showing interest in their lives, and being sensitive to their jobs. They need to find out what satisfies them and what motivates them. Dobbs and Field (1993) further state that “stimulated employees increase morale in the organization” (p. 22).

Dinse and Sheehan (1998) state that “to maximize employees’ performance, leaders must understand their people and themselves first as individuals.” They go on to

refer to a speech given by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, after he returned from the Gulf War. General Schwarzkopf described this leadership characteristic when he said “. . . I have seen competent leaders who stood in front of a platoon and all they saw was a platoon. But great leaders stand in front of a platoon and see 44 individuals, each of whom has aspirations, each of whom wants to live, each of whom wants to do good” (p. 18).

All too often with the overly controlling task-oriented supervisor who doesn't take the time to know employees, a poor cycle or snowball effect is created. Employees are supervised directly or micromanaged. They are instructed as what to do and exactly how to do it. They are given no opportunity for self-initiated thinking or decisionmaking. This is done because the supervisor has a Theory X belief. The employee, out of frustration and low morale, isn't motivated to achieve. To the supervisor, this gives the appearance of laziness and an unwillingness to work; therefore, the supervisor reinforces this behavior with more direct supervision, further frustrating the employee and continuing the problem.

Task-oriented supervisors focus on the present task and the appropriate way of handling the task. They rely on themselves to make the decision of what is and what isn't appropriate. They don't trust their subordinates with this responsibility. As previously mentioned, this can cause the loss of motivation and self worth on behalf of the subordinate, but it also stifles growth. There is very little learning opportunity for the employee when all decisions are made by the supervisor. The employee may or may not even know why a decision was made or why he or she must complete a task in a specific way. Employees carry out the orders of the supervisor, but do they completely understand the intricate details of their jobs? Can the subordinates question the supervisor? Will the supervisor allow subordinates to inquire as to why decisions are made and what effects they have on the outcome? Many autocrats will not tolerate employees questioning their decisions as they may interpret this as a challenge of their competence. In the future, many employees who are officers today will be promoted to supervisory positions. Where are these individuals going to gain their experience and knowledge to lead others if they are not allowed to make decisions, give input, or inquire about why decisions are made today?

A police officer is often called on to respond to emergencies. At times, these emergencies involve life and death situations in which the officer's life or the lives of others are in jeopardy. Situations sometimes arise when an officer must decide whether he or she will take the life of another. As mentioned earlier in this article, in these types of stressful emergency situations, a task-oriented leadership style is believed to be the preferred style. The issue here is that officers will not always have the luxury of having the supervisor present to make all of the decisions. Police officers must be able to make split-second decisions. There will be times when they are faced with these decisions and no supervisor is available, or at least no time is available, to consult with one. If officers see a serious crime occur, they must be prepared to act. They must be confident in their ability to make decisions. Indecisiveness will be looked on as weakness by the public. If officers are unable to maintain control over themselves, as well as any situation that arises, then they will be viewed poorly in the eyes of the community. If the officers are seen as incompetent and the public has no confidence in them, then the organization will not succeed to its full potential.

Giving employees responsibility and allowing them to make decisions that affect them and their performance will benefit them in many ways. It allows for self-initiated activity and motivation. It allows for an increase in their feeling of self-worth, and it encourages growth in knowledge. People learn by doing. The opportunity to make decisions will build confidence in their decision-making abilities. Mistakes are an opportunity to learn. Employees should be held responsible for their mistakes, but given the chance to grow from them.

Understandably, employees will make judgement errors from time to time when carrying out their responsibilities. In fact, employees who never make mistakes may be doing very little to try to improve the performance of the department. Each error in judgement, however, offers a learning opportunity for the employee and the department, although some errors will come with greater consequences than others for the public, the department, and the employee. (Stephens, 1994, p. 20)

It is better to allow employees to learn and increase their knowledge through their own experiences in making decisions and mistakes than to dictate orders that employees will follow without understanding why those orders were given.

The majority of a police officer's daily duties does not involve the arresting of criminals. The percentage of actual crime fighting is low, whereas keeping the peace and performing service-oriented functions are much higher. "Recognized police authorities have indicated that approximately 98% of current police activity involves social service assistance dedicated to the prevention of crime and to the development of an environment of stability and security" (Melnicoe & Mennig, 1978, p. 9). Those unstable, stressful times of emergency when a task-oriented leader has a better chance of succeeding are very few compared to the many functions officers perform on a daily basis. It is these routine day-to-day tasks that give officers opportunities to learn, grow, and build confidence in themselves, so when those occasions of emergency arise, they are prepared to respond appropriately. "People who learn to make appropriate decisions under nonstress situations are more likely to be effective when emergencies do occur" (Whisenand & Ferguson, 1978, p. 101). The key here is that they must be given the opportunity, during these routine tasks, to be creative and make the appropriate decisions.

The last point and maybe the strongest is that community policing contrasts the paramilitary structure of the past. The authoritarian leadership of the military may have been a good style of leadership for policing in the days of Sir Robert Peel, but today, they contradict the philosophy of community-oriented policing. "Traditional structures of police organizations have historically followed the principles of hierarchy that aim to control subordinates. These principles tend to stifle innovation and creativity, promote alienation and loss of individual self-worth, emphasize mediocrity, and diminish the ability of managers to lead" (Swanson et al., 2001, p. 201). "Community policing advocates empowering the individual officers with more discretion and more responsibility than traditional policing; hence direction from the organization must emphasize shared values, participatory decisionmaking, and a collegial atmosphere" (Swanson et al., 2001, p. 202). The community-oriented philosophy is characterized by promoting a greater amount of involvement between the community and the police, customizing police services to meet the needs of the community, helping make

decisions and solve problems for and with the community, and not having set standards or operating procedures describing how the problems will be handled but making discretionary decisions with the community as different issues arise. If the police are required to be sensitive to the feelings and needs of the community and its individual members, then so too, should the police administration be towards its members. If the officers don't feel that their opinions are considered valuable by their supervisors, how can they be expected to consider the opinions of others? If they are ruled by an authoritarian with heavy discipline, then they too will rule the same way, as they perceive this to be appropriate. Traditionally, the police have been called on to intervene in situations and take charge. Once they step in, it is their job to handle the situation, whatever it may be. "Unfortunately, police have a tendency to dominate actions and sometimes disregard the feelings of those who need their aid" (Siegel, 1986, p. 486). This is an example of a task-oriented officer. The officer is granted formal authority in the form of his or her position. He or she exercises this authority, and the concern is maintaining order and completing the task; however, no time is spent on the one who is in need of assistance or support. This is a traditional way of thinking from a traditional way of policing.

The community-oriented model focuses on working with community members, to empower them to improve the quality of life in their neighborhoods. If the police can be concerned with individuals and their problems, then maybe problems can be addressed and prevented in the future. If the concern is only in responding and handling a call in the traditional manner without any concern for the root of the problem, then it will surely continue to be a problem.

This is not to say that there is no room for the military anywhere within the police structure. The military has a lot to offer policing. They teach things such as responsibility, self-discipline, command presence, and much more, and because the police must be concerned with some aspects of firearms, combat, and self-defense, the military can be a tremendous resource for this type of training. Many police organizations, especially the larger ones, maintain specialized units such as SWAT teams or tactical teams. These teams acquire most of their tactics from military procedures and should continue to do so. Furthermore, it may be more justifiable to have a task-oriented leadership style within these specialized units as their protocol is more consistent with that of the military. We must realize, however, that the day-to-day procedures of a police organization are different than that of the military. The police department performs many functions of service to the community it serves whereas the primary mission of the military is combat. A community-oriented police department needs a shorter and flatter organizational design with members confident enough to make their own discretionary decisions, interact with the community, and represent their organization well.

The famous experiments known as the Hawthorne Studies were conducted in the late 1920s and early 1930s. These experiments initiated the human relations movement. During these experiments, different variables were introduced to employees at the Western Electric Hawthorne plant near Chicago. Regardless of the variables introduced, productivity tended to increase. These studies have been the focus of controversy over the years, and no positive conclusions have been drawn; however, it is believed that the increase in productivity was due to the attention and special treatment given to the employees (there previously had been

none). A subsequent study conducted by Harvard University at the Hawthorne Plant concluded that a employee-oriented form of management would be more productive than an authoritative type (Champoux, 2003, pp. 17-18).

Two other studies, the University of Michigan study and the Ohio State University study, lend support to the theory that employee-oriented supervision or management leads to better employee performance. The University of Michigan study focused on “production-centered” (task-oriented) leaders and “employee-centered” leaders. They concluded that the employee-centered leadership style led to higher production than the task-oriented. The Ohio State University study focused on “initiating structure,” which is a task-oriented characteristic of leadership, and “consideration,” a people-oriented characteristic of leadership. A conclusion drawn was that employees working for an employee-oriented leader who was high in consideration, had a higher level of job satisfaction. This job satisfaction in turn is associated with the level of performance. In contrast, the supervisor rated high in initiating structure was associated with low job satisfaction by the employees (Champoux, 2003, pp. 256-257).

During the research conducted for this article, nearly all of the sources examined pointed towards the employee-oriented style as a better or more productive style. Except for a few circumstances, such as the immediate emergency type situation, the employee-oriented style is the preferred. Furthermore, I’m confident that this style is promoted more in supervisor training than the authoritative type. Then, why is the task-oriented autocrat still so prominent in policing today? It could be that we’re so used to the traditional way of policing that change is difficult. It may be the nature of police work and the unique type of individual prone to such a profession. It takes a certain type of person to do this work. Often, large egos are involved and relinquishing control to others may not be easy. It may also have to do with the stressful, sometimes dangerous nature of the job, often involving a high amount of liability. These supervisors may feel responsible for the outcome and automatically assume control without realizing they’re micro-managing their employees. In a study of 64 police departments in Illinois, 81% of the officers believed their department used an autocratic style of management, while the administrators thought an employee-oriented style was mostly used (Sheehan & Cordner, 1999, p. 303).

Douglas McGregor believed that the majority of workers behave as the Theory X assumptions indicated; however, he believed it was due to the atmosphere created by the managers—that is, the managers saw the workers as lazy and irresponsible, so they treated them that way, which made it difficult for workers to display interest or motivation (Sheehan & Cordner, 1999, pp. 423-424). If supervisors could adopt a Theory Y attitude, they may be more in a position to influence their subordinates. This would give them an opportunity to nurture their people and their attitudes and to teach them, train them, and influence them into sharing the supervisor’s and/or the organization’s goals. Supervisors may then find it easier to relinquish responsibility making their job easier, while boosting up the employees and increasing job satisfaction.

The irony of police administration is that, in spite of Theory X management, the street level performance of police work is left largely to the discretion of those police officers who are assumed to be lazy, irresponsible, and in need

of direct supervision. Police administration is characterized by Theory X assumptions and the appearance of strict, tightly controlled management; actually worker behavior is loosely controlled. Police administration would benefit greatly from the adoption of Theory Y assumptions and a management system more honestly adapted to the realities of police work. (Sheehan & Cordner, 1999)

In the ever-changing field of policing, specifically within the era of community-oriented policing, supervisors need to examine their leadership styles to ensure that they are consistent with the nature of police work and the direction it is headed. Leaders are needed to bring the organizations forward and not hold them back.

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Tangible Leadership: The Blending of Concept and Action

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While attending a leadership conference at a Southern California college, I had high expectations with hopes of being impressed and enlightened by those who develop and teach the foundational aspects of leadership. What I found was groups of highly educated academics who could define, classify, and theorize what leadership is with focus and depth; however, as I studied their lectures and listened to their out-of-classroom conversations, it struck me that these teachers of leadership understood only the conceptual elements of leadership—the *what*, but not the *how*. They knew *what* leadership was by definition but not *how* to do it through action, demonstration, or lucid personal examples. Their comprehension of leadership was illustrated in the pages of a thesis, from formulas, through aesthetic flow charts; demonstrated in models or paradigms; and described in manuscripts and in their theories. They had their hearts in the right place, but their ideas about leadership were only that—ideas without a tangible plan of action. Certainly, the conceptual aspects of leadership are valuable, but they are only partial—showing that conceptual *only* leaders can *talk the talk* but could they *walk the walk*?

In the best seller, *Leaders: Strategies for Taking Charge*,¹ authors Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus write that there are over 850 definitions for *leadership*. Law enforcement personnel of every rank who have sought to capture a workable definition of *leadership* and furthermore, to practice or teach this vast concept in the exemplification of their professional roles, have found these explanations to range from simplistic, even silly, to complex, involving comprehensive models with hundreds of pages of text to illustrate their function. Having a solid definition of *leadership* is beneficial; however, the concept alone has a sum value of zero if the concept cannot be blended with action and put into real-world practice. While leadership is powerful and highly valued, it remains somewhat elusive in terms of finding the definitive “how to” of its concept and more importantly, its practice. Certainly, the definition of leadership is of less importance than the undefined but essential practice of it. While leadership may be difficult to express in absolute terms, those who serve under effective leaders clearly recognize it when it’s present and even more so when it’s absent.

What Is Tangible Leadership?

Police supervisory and management training and the books and articles we read are often flooded with example after example of what leadership qualities are—a motivator, charismatic, ethical, influential, a good communicator. This common laundry list is usually infused with famous quotations and exemplified through illustrating great leaders in history like Patton, Lincoln, and Churchill or big business leadership evangelists like Covey, Peters, and Blanchard. This type of training and study has value, but it is cognitive-based—untouchable—offering law enforcement personnel a conceptual plan (the what to), but lacking in real-life application (the how to).

For example, if a watch commander strives to become a better leader through becoming a more effective communicator—a must for police supervision and management and an integral skill of effective leaders—he or she may learn about how ineffective words alone can be, accounting for only 7% of our communication effectiveness. He or she would discover that the tone of one's voice—the message behind the words—accounts for about 38% of our communication effectiveness and that our nonverbal communication (body language) accounts for an extraordinary 55%.² Further study would show the watch commander that a critical and foundational element of communication that must be practiced for communication success is active listening.

Armed with this knowledge (concept), the watch commander has an opportunity to put this knowledge to work. The result of this application—turning concept into action—has the potential to dynamically change the watch commander's effectiveness and the success of a team. Such successes include new connections and better relationships being made with officers who were once commanded through management and are now led through influence. Existing relationships can be strengthened; messages are not only delivered better, but are also received better; speaking in meetings or in front of groups can become easier and more effective. This improved communication begets motivation, and individuals begin to flourish when their opinions, ideas, and feedback are finally outwardly acknowledged and accepted as valid. Through all this, the watch commander seems to walk a little different and talk a little different, and this new physical demeanor denotes a command officer who is more sociable and approachable.

If the communication skills that were learned by the watch commander were kept conceptual and never acted upon, the concept would have little benefit, and as a result, you might find the watch commander staring at his or her computer screen while one of his or her officers is trying to carry on a conversation. Officers' ideas—good or bad—will be met with rebuttals that illustrate tonal disassociation instead of interest, disapproval instead of support, or boredom instead of advocacy. Professional relationships would not improve, and the watch commander's posture and physicality might deliver messages that are unintended, even adverse. Even these subtle forms of poor communication carry heavy consequences in that they can decrease motivation, destroy an officer's incentive to share information or ideas, and damage any healthy supervisor/subordinate relationship that may have been established or developing.

This example, using communication, is only one of many. The consequences of conceptual-only leadership can apply to delegation, risk management, discipline, decisionmaking, ethics, coaching or mentoring, performance evaluation, training, and officer development to name a few.

Getting *There* from *Here*

A good start would be to follow Nike Company's famous advertising slogan, "Just Do It." Police supervisors and managers understand what delegation is and what to delegate, but many of them are still overburdened with work because their understanding of delegation is never put into practice or is, at least, grossly underapplied.

Start Empowering Others; You Cannot Deliver Public Service by Yourself

We know, in theory that leadership relies on influence, so why do we rely on the old management hammer of telling rather than selling?

Start Explaining Why Things Are Done Instead of Merely What Needs to Be Done

Talented leaders have great energy, yet many supervisors lead from behind their desks.

Leaders Show up a Lot and Lead Not Only from the Front, but Also from Behind

Leaders are self-confident, yet some of us fail to act when we should because we fear making mistakes, being criticized, creating liability, or . . . you fill in the blank.

Leaders Allow Themselves to Take Risks

Leaders are life-long learners and developers of people, but many managers miss or fail to recognize all those teachable moments when they or the officers they lead are most receptive to growth through learning.

A Professional Officer Who Can No Longer Learn Is an Officer Who Has Suffered a Professional Death

Leaders are ethical and understand the importance of integrity, yet how many of us can effectively provide a lucid verbal example—more than a mere dictionary definition—of what *integrity* means? If you filled a balloon with honesty, honor, morals, values, courage, standards, and principles and left that balloon in a room for one year and upon returning to the balloon, if it was smaller than it was when you left it, that balloon has lost its integrity. Some of the ethical standards have slipped away or lessened slowly, even unnoticeably, over time. Some officers, like the balloon, when left alone over a period of time, lower their standards for the ease of taking shortcuts. Their honesty is compromised when rationalizing why it's okay to call in sick when they are healthy. Principles tend to change or flex to meet the circumstances when principles should be unyielding and used by officers to stand on when practicing their values.

This example of using a word picture to illustrate integrity shows a certain depth of appreciation and a unique understanding of ethics. This comprehension, however, is only half the battle. An effective leader would utilize this understanding as a springboard to action. What good is the understanding or espousing of ethics if your actions model anything but integrity or ethical behavior? It takes self-discipline for leaders to apply their concepts, especially under adverse conditions or when the application of a concept is not the popular or personally rewarding thing to do. Tangible leadership is investment leadership. The more you put into it through application, the better return on your investment. Law enforcement leaders from patrol officers through chiefs of police must consider taking idealized

law enforcement practices and doing everything possible to transform their ideas, beliefs, and core values into tangible, do-able, everyday actions.

The Value and Power of Action

Ralph Waldo Emerson said, “What you do speaks so loud that I can’t hear what you say.” The contemporary phrase is “Actions speak louder than words.” The management term for this is called *modeling*. Officers will view what a leader does with much more credibility than what a leader says. Leaders, who understand this and can apply their actions with deliberate intent, have a unique appreciation for the value and power of action. All of us have moments in our lives when we wish we had done this instead of that or said one thing instead of another. Such common wishes or regrets are always based on the actions we took or didn’t take—when we should have spoken up but kept silent or when we said the wrong thing and regretted it. Few of us ever reflect back on our lives and think: “Boy, when I was twenty, I sure wish I had thought differently.” It’s our actions or lack thereof that stand out in our memory as well as in the memories of followers who are influenced by leaders. Those whose conceptual thoughts and ideas are cast upon others but directly conflict with their actions are known as hypocrites.

I often conduct an exercise in the seminars I teach. I direct the class to make a circle with their hands by touching their index finger to their thumb (the hand symbol for *A-okay*). I physically do the same thing and then tell the class to hold the circle high up in the air over their heads as I model exactly how to do it. I then tell the class to bring the circle down and place it on their chins. As I tell them this (verbally), I bring the circle down (physically) and place it on my upper cheek next to my eye. On average, about 90% of the class places the circle next to their eye as they model my physical movement. What I did spoke much louder than what I said. The class followed what I did and ignored my words, and through this simple exercise, the value and power of action is revealed.

Back to the Basics

Police personnel attempting to best define and understand their own personal styles of supervision, management, command, or leadership in order to better practice such traits, may find themselves lost in an ocean of commercial and academic theories. While many of these theories are effective and time tested, how can a leader adopt the concepts of so many styles or methods and, even more difficult, put them into practice?

Principle-centered leadership, ethical management, total quality management, management by walking around, autocratic leaders, democratic leaders, participative leaders, free-reign leaders, situational leaders, transactional leaders, transformational leaders, charismatic leaders, management by objective, vision-based leadership, goal-oriented leadership, transcendental leadership, success-based leadership, courageous leadership, performance leadership, management by consensus, servant leadership, management by exception, one-minute management, the seven habits, leading by example, path-goal leadership . . . and the list goes on and on. There are so many paradigms, continuums, models, theories, processes, and methods designed to enhance leadership that the study

of leadership and often the attempted applications of it has become needlessly convoluted, even counterproductive.

To be a good leader, police professionals must practice the basics. Excellence in leadership occurs when the basics are perfected. While an all-encompassing list describing all the leadership traits available does not exist, officers should make their own personal and professional lists and strive for mastery through action of each chosen quality. Officers, whose list illustrated leaders as learners, would seek out specialized training, involve themselves with self-directed learning, and attend college to achieve higher levels of education. If the list included being influential, officers would learn about rapport and practice their skills at establishing commonality, mutuality, and shared core values. Were the list to include leaders as having high energy, officers might quit smoking, exercise, maintain a better diet, and skillfully manage their time to allow full focus and effort to the task at hand or group to be led. If the list described leaders as emotionally stable, officers would work to maintain an effective balance between family, friends, and work; giving enough time and attention to each to maintain emotional health.

This list might include confidence and a sense of humor. Strong leaders see the lighter side of adverse situations. They see opportunity where others see failure, and they make others feel at ease because they have the confidence in themselves to do so. They do this through humor, and their confidence manifests itself in the form of composure and poise. For example, minutes before Louis J. Freeh, was nominated to Director of the FBI in the Rose Garden, he was in the Oval Office with the President and was pointing out his family outside. To his horror, what he saw outside the Oval Office, right next to the Rose Garden was his then four-year-old pushing his seven-year-old into a White House pond just minutes before the ceremony. Director Freeh then assured the President that he could do a better job of controlling 10,000 armed agents than two small boys. This type of confidence, poise, and composure blended with humor in response to an adverse or embarrassing situation exemplifies tangible leadership. His response, rather than reaction, was controlled, balanced, and smooth. These are the qualities and benefits of applied leadership.

The basics of leadership don't exist only in the highest levels of government, the military, big business, or religion. They can be found in the humble efforts of a little league baseball coach giving meaningful advice to his young players. Most, if not all of our nation's most treasured heroes were heroes, not because they were rich or achieved fame, but because they were leaders of people. It was the basics of their dynamic leadership—concept and action—that inspired others to follow. Fame, social status, and wealth are not factors of leadership; they are byproducts of leadership that already existed. Leaders are honest mothers and fathers (ethical), the school teacher who stays after school to help her students (committed), an anonymous businessman who gives his money to charity (generous), and the police officer who risks his or her own life to help others (courageous). In the end, it's their actions that best define their leadership.

Conclusion

Leaders have a bias for action, and they live their vision through the practice of it and not the thought of it. Leadership is a magnificent concept, but the act of leadership does not have to be a magnificent act; it can be small (e.g., volunteering to be a big brother or sister to an underprivileged child) or it can be significant, even historic (e.g., facilitating a team of medical researchers to cure all forms of cancer). Conceptual-only leadership is equivalent to a master surgeon who has never operated. Leadership also offers a choice. Police professionals can choose to lead or they can choose not to, but the consequences of inaction may be substantial and lifelong. The blending of concept with action provides potential and possibility, and this formula, in the hands of a leader, can accomplish limitless success for individuals, teams, or organizations.

Endnotes

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Calculating the Cost of Police Officer Turnover

Dwayne Orrick, Chief of Police, Cordele, Georgia

In recent years, police agencies nationwide have experienced increasing levels of staff turnover and difficulty recruiting new officers. Several factors have contributed to this situation. For more than ten years, we have enjoyed a good economy. As established businesses grew and new companies emerged, employers had to compete more aggressively for employees. This demand for good employees has reduced the size of the labor pool.

A second factor contributing to higher turnover has been the introduction of a new generation of employees, dubbed Generations X and Y, who appear to have a different view of work than the generation preceding them. These employees, while highly motivated and often well-educated, are prone to change jobs more frequently than previous recruits due to a desire to build job skills for career advancement. This was illustrated by a recent survey of police academy recruits that revealed 40% planned to leave their current agency within three years of graduation.¹ It is important for law enforcement personnel to recognize the positive qualities of this generation and to implement effective ways to recruit and retain them.

Labor market competition for police officers comes not only from other law enforcement agencies, but also from the private sector. The skills and abilities required of police officers including good judgement, oral and written communication skills, and problem-solving abilities make them attractive candidates for many private businesses.

In an effort to address this turnover, much of the literature has focused on teaching techniques for recruiting new staff. This information has helped many departments speed up the process of finding new candidates and reduce the time required to fill vacancies. Others have proposed that it is better to avoid having to recruit “new” employees by focusing efforts on retaining incumbent staff. Some of the retention techniques used by police agencies have included increased salaries and benefits, mentoring programs, and job enhancement.²

What are the best or most cost-effective ways to retain or recruit employees? How can a chief convince elected officials and the community leaders of the severity of the problem and the department’s needs? To effectively address these issues, four variables should be identified:

1. Cost of employee turnover
2. Why employees are leaving
3. Proposed recruitment/retention techniques
4. Cost of implementing proposed techniques

Cost of Turnover

In the past, turnover expenditures have been considered a cost of doing business and were absorbed into the operating budget. Since these costs don't appear as a line item, little attention has been given to the cost of losing employees; however, it is important to first have a full understanding of the organizational and financial investment an agency has in its staff.

Often, there is a tendency to focus on the short-term costs of replacing an officer and ignore the investment that has compounded over the years. Much of the knowledge and experience an officer possesses can only be obtained by doing the job. A great portion of this knowledge is gained in the first five years of employment. When an officer is recruited away or "poached," the knowledge and experience the department paid for him or her to obtain is lost forever. This investment serves as a substantial grant to the new employer. Basically, the agency paid to train the officer for his or her new employer. Compounding the problem, the strength and cohesion gained from having experienced staff within the department is diminished and cannot be replaced. Over time, agencies with higher turnover and less experienced officers often suffer a reduction in productivity, lower quality of service delivery, and more frequent complaints and liability issues. While these costs are difficult to quantify, they are just as real to the organization.³

To project a conservative estimate of an agency's financial investment in an employee, it is recommended, at a minimum, to consider the cost of selecting and training a new officer. To complete a thorough analysis, however, administrators should consider the costs of the incumbent officer leaving, as well as expenditures for new employee recruitment, selection, hiring, and training.

The following list provides criteria for consideration when calculating personnel turnover costs:⁴

A. Separation Costs

1. Cost of supervisor's salary and benefits to conduct all of the exit interviews
2. Cost of the salary and benefits of the person who is leaving to participate in exit interview
3. Administrative costs for processing the resignation of the employee including payroll, benefits deductions, COBRA notifications, etc.
4. Administrative costs for changing computer security codes
5. Salary of staff and officer to return and inspect equipment
6. Selection costs invested in the departing officer (Use Section D as a guide.)
7. Training costs invested in the departing officer (Use Section E as a guide.)

B. Recruitment Costs

1. Annual advertising/recruitment costs divided by the number of new hires (Include cost of newspaper advertisements, commercials, brochures, giveaway, etc.)
2. Salary/benefits of recruiters divided by the number of new hires
3. Expenses of recruiters divided by the number of new hires
4. Hiring bonuses paid by the department

C. Selection Costs

1. Total cost of selection tests divided by the number of new officers hired
2. Cost of the review board members' salaries/benefits divided by the number of officers hired
3. Cost of investigator's salary and expenses for background investigations divided by the number of new officers hired
4. Cost of the officer's salary/benefits administering the physical agility exam
5. Cost of executive interview panel's salary divided by the number of officers hired
6. Cost of the applicant's medical and drug screening
7. Cost of the psychological screening exams

D. New Employee Costs

1. Salary/benefits and expenditures to complete employment paperwork
2. Salary/benefits for payroll personnel to set up the new employee
3. Department's expenditures for setting up computer security codes
4. Cost of new uniforms and equipment
5. Travel costs associated with obtaining new uniforms and equipment (if applicable)
6. Salary/benefits for staff to issue equipment

E. Training Costs

1. Cost of orientation/field training material
2. Supervisory salary/benefits making and reviewing assignments during field training
3. Recruit's salary/benefits during academy training
4. One-half of the field training officer's salary/benefits during recruit's field training
5. Recruit's salary/benefits during field training
6. Supervisor's cost to set up attendance in training
7. Recruit's travel expenses and equipment costs during training
8. Salary/benefits of recruit for all inservice training beyond field/basic training
9. Salary/benefits of recruit for advanced training classes
10. Expenditures for travel and meals for advanced training classes
11. Salary of new officer to attend inservice training

F. Other "Soft" Costs (Optional)

1. Overtime to cover vacancies
2. Loss of productivity prior to employee leaving
3. Loss of knowledge and experience
4. Supervisor disruption (time spent correcting increased mistakes, lower quality of work by new officers)
5. Peer disruption (lower productivity from increased workload, lower morale)

It is critical to include both the cost of training the officer who left and the cost to train the new recruit in this formula. The reasoning for this is based upon the assumption that the department has a specific fund dedicated for training. Had the officer not left, these same funds would have been used to provide the incumbent or

others within the department advanced, specialized, or inservice training. With the departure of officers, this “depth” cannot be developed because efforts are being focused on the basics for the new officer. Essentially, the department invested this money once and lost it, now the investment has to be made again.

As illustrated in the table below, replacing an officer with three year’s experience who earns \$24,000 plus benefits with a new recruit may cost the agency \$58,900. These separation costs can substantially differ, depending upon the advanced training attended by the individual officer, the salary and benefits paid, and the selection procedures utilized by the agency.

Costs for Replacing an Officer

I. Separation Costs.....	\$28,647
II. Recruitment.....	1,250
III. Selection	4,246
IV. New Employee	1,592
V. Training.....	23,165
Total	\$58,900

Since turnover tends to occur in cycles, it is best to obtain the average over several years. This will compensate for any peaks and valleys occurring in one year. By multiplying the average number of officers leaving the department by the cost to replace an officer (see table above), the average total cost of turnover for a year can be determined. For example, assume a department of 20 officers has an average turnover rate of 10% or two officers per year. If the cost to replace these officers were \$59,000 each, the average total cost to the department is \$118,000 per year.

Determining Reasons for Departures

Once the cost of losing employees is identified as an issue that needs to be addressed, administrators can focus their efforts on learning why officers are leaving. What can the department do to retain employees? What are potential recruits seeking from the department?

In order to have successful hiring outcomes, employees must be provided an opportunity to be involved in this process. One of the most important things to do in this phase is to ask employees what is important to them. Not all employees desire pay increases or changes in benefits. Pay does not motivate employees; however, the absence of adequate pay is a demotivator. Repeatedly, studies have found that employees are more concerned with opportunities for advanced training and career development programs than salary alone.

Several techniques can be used to capture this information including confidential surveys,⁵ personal interviews, exit interviews, focus groups, and surveys of academy recruits.

Cost of Actions to Improve Retention

Using the information gathered in the surveys or interviews, retention/recruitment techniques or actions can be rank-ordered from most to least desirable. The costs of implementation should be assigned to each proposal.

When making these calculations, it is important to provide accurate and objective estimates. There may be a tendency to inflate the costs of turnover and underestimate the costs of the proposed retention efforts. Failure to provide accurate, justifiable, and objective projections can sabotage the department's credibility and efforts to effectively address the turnover problem.

Once this calculation process is complete, the retention/recruitment efforts needed may be obvious. If they aren't, a comparison should be made of the average cost of turnover to the cost of implementing the new retention effort along with the projected reductions in turnover and cost savings.

Despite the best efforts of any department, some turnover is inevitable and cannot be entirely eliminated; however, it is critical to know why officers are leaving your organization and what the costs of these losses are to your community and to make a conscientious effort to reduce "avoidable" losses.

These processes will assist leaders in identifying the most effective recruitment and retention techniques for their communities.

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Ethical Police Management

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In his 1996 book, *Character and Cops*, Edwin J. Delattre references a passage from the Police Foundation, which states, "Police services must strike a balance between effective crime fighting and humane efforts to keep the peace" (p. 24). How is this accomplished? What is the make-up of a police department? Does a department enforce the law, keep the peace, or do both?

On average, the police officer spends more time performing jobs such as directing traffic, escorting vehicles, dealing with mentally disabled citizens and intervening in domestic disputes than he or she does enforcing the law.

This variety of functions or jobs can cause a great deal of tension in the officers' routine. There will be times when they must take a coercive role to settle a dispute. Other times will require that they act in the role of a public servant. This is recognized as a difficult task that requires a strong person. "To serve and protect" is a task that is not as easy as it has been made out to be. Officers are bound by strict legal guidelines in most instances and are required to weave those guidelines into and out of each situation that they are presented with during the workday.

As managers, we are bound by our obligations to our superiors and the community we serve to make sure that the officer we allow to come into contact with the public is a person of good character and has the tools to do the job at hand. We must constantly reinforce the rightful use of authority in the officer. An officer, for example, cannot break the law to enforce the law. We maintain individual character and ethics in the officer through the use of department policy and the conduct of our command. We must ensure that the expectations of the department are clear. If the command of a department fails to ensure that policies and rules are followed, they should expect failure. Their officers will treat their words and rules as worthless.

We must speak to the character of a department before we can go much further. It would make sense that a department's command and employees make up the character and shape of the department. I know of departments that lack leadership of good character and, as a result, have hired officers whose character is questionable. These departments lack the confidence of the community and other law enforcement agencies in the area. How will agencies like this ever be able to change? Successful police departments recruit and hire candidates who, they believe, have achieved some moral and intellectual strength. They teach these candidates the values that make them successful. They maintain those values through reinforcement and training. Good communication between the community and the police helps all parties in times of controversy.

There are many challenges that a department faces when it hires a candidate. Departments must find candidates who possess a background that shows strong fortitude. They must recruit and hire in a way that prevents false expectations

and fosters the ideals of the department. The candidate must have as complete an understanding of the job as is possible. Police work is more peace officer than law enforcement officer, and many candidates fail to realize this, which creates disappointment after only a short period of time. Part of our job, as police managers, is to relate these facts to those who are charged with recruitment and hiring.

We have often, as the old salts of our job, said something like, “Where did we get this guy or girl?” as we refer to the new person just hired. This comment often comes from our lack of understanding of the environment from which the new person comes—the educational environment. Delattre (1996) cites a comment by Lawrence W. Sherman of the Crime Control Institute, who contends that the lack of constitutional training in schools, colleges, and universities is so commonplace that police departments should expect a lack of knowledge on the part of their applicants (p. 150). He goes on to say that a candidate should be asked his or her opinion about constitutional guarantees. What does the candidate think about the Fourteenth Amendment, which denies the government the power to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law? Does the candidate understand that “any person” means that they can afford no prejudice? This seems to be a simple question. Are we asking that question as we hire a candidate? Can we afford to take this issue for granted?

A second question that must be asked of the candidate pertains to his or her understanding of the rights of a person. We must ensure that each candidate understands that we enforce the law in a unilateral way. We operate on the premise that all people have the same rights and that we do not deprive someone of those rights because of the real or perceived imperfections of that person. At times, we have all been in a position in which we wished we could take a different course of action. We need to know how the candidate feels about such an issue. We need to know if he or she can get beyond their feelings and take the correct action. It seems an old statement when we say a person’s rights are not given; they are guaranteed. Therefore, candidates, who sometimes lack constitutional training, must be asked if they understand this. What does this mean to them?

Police departments cannot afford to be less than clear and direct about these and other issues. We cannot begin to instill an understanding of the rightful use of authority unless we start with a candidate who is at least on the same level of understanding. A police manager must not allow police law breaking in the name of conscience. A police manager may find it more difficult to be responsive to one view than to another, but his or her position calls for an evenhanded approach.

Police managers can struggle when they are faced with these questions. Some choose to avoid the issues and allow the law breaking. Those that choose to make the hard decisions must be consistent with their approach. One possible approach comes from a passage written by Kenneth Blanchard and Norman Vincent Peale in their book *The Power of Ethical Management*. They suggest the use of an ethics check for decisions that are difficult (p. 20). First, is the decision legal in the eyes of the law and in the eyes of the department’s policy? Is the decision balanced? Will the decision be fair, or will it favor one party over another? How will the decisionmaker feel about his or her position?

The lack of a decision or a decision that lacks balance and legality erodes self-esteem. This erosion can cause bitterness and lead to something less than the full faith that the officer needs to do his or her job.

Who, then, do we hire? What are modern-day police departments looking for in a candidate? How do we select candidates that we can develop into leaders? Discussion of these issues points out that there are several types of candidates that apply for the police job. The *bad character* will seek opportunities to victimize others. People are there for him or her to use as he or she wishes. The *uncontrolled person* is one who may behave like a person of bad character at times. The passion for gain can override regard for the law. The *self-controlled* person has better self-discipline but resents the higher standard of conduct that we want to hold him or her to. The *excellent candidate* is the one that we try to recruit. The *excellent candidate* actually loves honesty, which is second nature to him or her. The *excellent candidate* has integrity and a balanced perception of the issues. He or she will try to make the best of every situation.

How do we stay in touch with our employees on these issues? What should a department do to reinforce the ethics issue? Many people who write in this field say that character can be reformed in later life. Adults do change habits such as the food they eat or the amount of alcohol that they consume, but there needs to be a measure of self-control for this to take place. The assumption here is that the employee or officer has some measure of this left. With these factors at work, the department needs to train on subjects of ethics and ethical behavior. Tolerance, sexual harassment, and cultural diversity training must become part of the regular curriculum for a department. The management of any department must be taught to reinforce these and other issues during conversation with members. A continuous dialogue on these and other issues only helps to foster understanding and reduces the opportunity for abuse.

The old saying, "It's lonely at the top," is finally realized when issues such as these are presented. How does a police manager deal with all of this? What tools does he or she need to prepare for these problems? For the police chief, communication with the city manager and other department heads is important. When difficult issues in the community arise or when problems with police employees develop, close ties to these people will help. This is also true with the recruitment of the candidate. While I do not suggest that the other department heads of a city become involved in the hiring practices of the police candidate, it is important that the chief have the confidence and agreement of the city manager to hire the proper candidate.

It is very important that as the chief of a department, you develop and use a management staff. The staff and the chief need to have a feeling of mutual trust. They must work together on the issues. They must be of one mind on operations, training, and discipline. Management must impart its philosophy to the first-line supervisor. A successfully managed police department appears to depend on whether the sergeant or first-line supervisor has a management orientation. Sergeants are entry-level supervisors. We must bring them into the management circle and treat them as a higher-level employee. They should attend staff meetings and be involved in decisions. If we neglect to do this, the sergeant will remain closer to the patrolmen than to the chief. With these programs in place, the chief

and the department have a greater chance of success during the recruitment of a candidate as well as the continued development of the employee.

Much of the discussion thus far has been about the way in which we can deal with the problems that face policing today. As managers, I believe we need to start with the recruitment phase. I suppose that, in a perfect world, we would hire only those people who we believe are morally strong enough to resist temptations and remain true to their oath. This does not happen in our world today. The science, if there is one, of hiring people for our line of work is not as exact as we would like. We do hire those who are prone to temptations and corruptibility. What do we do to prevent as much of this as we can? How do we prepare our department to defend itself when problems arise? These are difficult questions, but I do think that there are directions that we can take to help us to solve some of these problems.

We deal with corruption almost every day in our society. Unfortunately, we sometimes have to deal with it in our own departments. We have to ask the questions, "How, as a police manager, do we deal with these problems? What are the ethical questions that are presented? What should we do, or what could we have done?" There are many types of corruption. We focus now on corrupt police officers. Although corruption takes on many forms, it is by no means uniform in degree. Delattre (1996) makes reference to the Knapp Commission, a New York City Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption. This commission cites two types of corrupt officers: (1) meat-eaters and (2) grass-eaters. The meat-eater is the guy who uses his position purely for personal gain and is not very concerned, if at all, for the welfare of the public. The grass-eater is the type who will just take what is given. This is the guy who takes the Christmas turkey from the storeowner or the extra couple of bucks from the speeder. Whatever comes his way is fine. He usually won't go looking for it.

Do police departments, through the lack of proper management, create the environment that allows for these types to survive? A theme that seems to be pervasive is that if we as managers fail to take an action on an issue of wrongdoing, we have, in an informal way, condoned that issue and set a policy. Are there examples in many departments where this occurs? I would say that there most certainly are. What systems can be put in place to prevent or correct this?

Personnel matters, internal disciplinary procedures, and sound two-way communication systems between management and the line officers should be in place or created to deal with these issues. The reasoning behind this is simple. All levels of the department must view management as being supportive, just, and nonthreatening. This enhances communications and helps to establish the internal social control and support needed by all members of the organization. The overwhelming majority of corrupt police officers are grass-eaters that take the pay-off from the tow truck driver or a couple of dollars from the speeder. There are usually very few meat-eaters in a department—those who use the office for their own corrupted agenda. An open communication structure that offers strong support to its officers makes it difficult for these types to flourish.

There are additional ways that a department can defend itself from the corruption issue. The establishment of an internal affairs function is one way. Another way

is the establishment of a definition of what constitutes corruption. What do community leaders consider a corrupt act? The community must be involved in this definition. Then, determining whether or not corruption exists in your department is a good start. A strong commitment from the chief, village manager, or city council to fight the corruption issue must also exist. Finally, an anticorruption policy that includes statements that define the issue and a command structure that enforces it should be implemented.

This policy should be set forth in writing and reviewed by the entire department. This review should probably take place on an annual basis and include all levels of supervision and line personnel in the department. Because the community is involved, the policy should speak to the public by notifying them of what the department considers a violation. This should provide for less abuse. This is a difficult task, but managers must make a strong effort in this area.

Managing a police department effectively requires a considerable amount of organization. This is true regardless of the size of the department. Orders are written and carried out through the use of effective supervision. A police manager will often meet with his or her staff to discuss problems or make plans for upcoming events in the community. This is so that the department can amass the resources needed to deal with problems that may occur. This planning is a natural process that occurs often. If this is the case, what prevents those same managers from meeting and taking an aggressive approach to the issues discussed in this article? I think that successful departments do that very thing.

Organizations need perspective on all of these issues to be able to deal with them effectively. When key members of the organization (e.g., police managers) take time to assess and reflect on the direction of their agencies, they often find a direction to take. No matter what the issue, managers need to take time to strategically plan for the future. This includes building an organization that operates in an ethical manner, one that is flexible and in touch with both the members of the department and the community. Continued dialogue on these issues ensures that police managers will stay abreast of the topic and in tune with what is happening in their agencies. Ethical management thrives on communication and understanding!

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The Search for Truth

Nathan J. Gordon, Director and Founder of the Academy for Scientific Investigative Training

There have always been those in society who have elected to enter into deviant behavior. The earliest writings of the bible tell us about the wrongdoings of humankind; therefore, it appears that from the beginning of time and still today, man has been on a constant search for truth. This article will attempt to follow this search from the early attempts to the current methods utilized in determining truth. These methods include forensic interviews, statement analysis, and use of instrumentation.

Our search begins with what we now identify as “trial by combat.”¹ We can imagine two primitive men throwing a rock or spear at animal in an attempt to gain food for survival. The animal falls dead, and both men approach with the belief that they killed it, and it is theirs. Obviously, they find themselves in a dispute to determine which of them will eat that night. How do they resolve it? They engage in combat, and the victor is declared the rightful owner.

By no means does this method of determining truth stop there. By medieval times, disputes between two landlords were often resolved by combat between their followers; the victory concluded which landlord was correct. Obviously, society had realized by now that the primitive method of “Trial by Combat” was unfair and demonstrated fighting ability and brute strength more than truth. So, they added to the concept and now believed that the combatant on the side of truth would be guaranteed victory by “Divine Intervention.” Even today, at any given time, police officers are called to intercede in altercations in which the combatants are trying to establish truth through physical means.

As civilization progressed, so did our attempts at determining truth. Cultures began to establish physiological and psychological methods of determining truth. We refer to these methods as “Trial by Ordeal.”²

Many cultures recognized that one of the ways deception revealed itself resulted in a dry mouth. In China, suspects told their story and were told to fill their mouth with crushed rice and then spit it out. If the mouth was moist with salivation, the rice clung together, and the task was easy. If the mouth was dry, the task was difficult at best. In Africa, hot materials were placed on a suspect’s tongue.³ Again, salivation theoretically protected the truthful suspect’s tongue from being burned, and the lack of it caused the deceptive suspects to be identified. Recently, in a major Arabic newspaper, there was an article on the current method of burning a suspect’s tongue and determining truth or deception by analyzing the blistering that occurred.

In India, the search for truth was psychological, rather than physiological. Priests would tell their suspects that they had a “Sacred Ass”⁴—a donkey, that had the ability to determine truth from deception when someone pulled its tail. The suspects were told that if a truthful person pulled its tail, the donkey remained silent. If a liar pulled it, the donkey would bray. One by one, the suspects were sent alone into a dwelling to pull the tail of the “Sacred Ass.” Unbeknownst to the suspects, the tail was covered with lamp black (soot). Truthful suspects would

enter and pull the tail. The “Sacred Ass” may or may not have brayed; however, they came out with the lamp black on their hands and were readily identified as truthful. The liar would enter the dwelling, thinking he could fool the priests by waiting with the “Sacred Ass” but never touching the tail. Since he did not pull the tail, the donkey would not bray, but when he exited without lamp black on his hands, he would be immediately determined as deceptive.

As with “Trial by Combat,” “Trial by Ordeal” lives on. In the 1950s, there are stories of Philadelphia detectives using psychological attempts to search for truth. A seated suspect had a detective stand behind him with a heavy phone book, as a detective in front of him explained that he was going to ask some questions, “If you tell the truth to me nothing will happen. If you lie, my partner standing behind you is going to hit you in the head with that telephone book! I can tell you now it won’t leave any marks on you, but, it will hurt like hell!” The detective would then ask some irrelevant questions, knowing the suspect had no reason to lie to them. Then, the suspect was asked if he committed the crime, and the test for truth was determined by whether or not the suspect “ducked” in anticipation of being struck by the phone book.

The search for truth then led us to “Trial by Instrumentation.” The first known use of an instrument to determine truth was written about by the daughter of Caesarea Lombroso.⁵ In 1895, Lombroso had a suspect place his hand into a tank of water (a *hydroshygmomanometer*) and analyzed a suspect’s veracity by rises and falls in the water level caused by changes in blood volume in the hand.

In 1909, Hugo Mustenberg, a professor at Harvard, wrote the book, *On the Witness Stand*.⁶ He devoted an entire chapter in the book to his fear that the greatest threat to our judicial system was perjury. He suggested witnesses be attached to instrumentation to monitor various aspects of their physiology in an attempt to ensure the veracity of their testimony.

In 1914, Vittorio Benussi, an Italian scientist, published a paper on his findings concerning breathing and deception.⁷ Benussi examined the difference in time of a suspect’s breathing between inhalation and exhalation. He reported that when a person lied, the time period of inhalation shortened and exhalation increased. Benussi reported over 90% accuracy in detecting deception via breathing.

William Marston, a student of Mustenberg, wrote a dissertation in 1917 on the “Discontinuous Blood Pressure Method for Detecting Deception.”⁸ Marston took periodic blood pressure readings from subjects during an interview. By plotting out changes that he observed in systolic blood pressure, he reported over 90% accuracy in detecting deception.

August Vollmer, Chief of Police, Berkeley, California, was one of the leading figures in the American law enforcement community. In 1921, he instructed one of his officers, John Larson, to look into the feasibility of instrumental detection of deception. Larson combined the works of Marston and Benussi, along with a device called a polygraph (meaning “many writings”), and the Berkeley Police Department became the first law enforcement agency to use instrumental truth verification as an aid to their investigative inquiries.⁹ Mounted on a breadboard, Larson’s device was nicknamed the “Breadboard Polygraph,” and it monitored simultaneous changes in a suspect’s breathing and cardiovascular phenomena.

Today, the search for truth continues. There are many methods, including forensic interviewing (assessment of nonverbal and verbal behavior), statement analysis, and instrumental detection of deception (polygraph, voice stress, brain waves, etc.).

First, let us explore forensic assessment interview techniques that rely on nonverbal behavior and projective analysis of unwitting verbal cues. There are many interviewing techniques currently available, all originating and developing from the work of John Reid. All of these techniques rely on the basic fundamental difference between an innocent and guilty suspect being interviewed under investigation: Innocent suspects want the interviewer to be successful, thereby identifying the actual “doer” and eliminating them from suspicion, whereas the guilty suspect wants the interviewer to fail.

Due to this fundamental difference, the following patterns emerge:¹⁰

Innocent	Guilty
Talkative since there is nothing to hide	Not talkative fearing he or she may say something contradictory or revealing
Tries to narrow or assist the investigation (i.e., may name or eliminate a suspect)	Has no information to offer or makes statements that broaden the investigation (i.e., increase suspect pool)
Uses appropriate/strong terms in describing the crime (“ <i>stolen</i> ”)	Uses mild/evasive terms when describing the crime (“ <i>missing</i> ”)
Expresses real feelings	Appears detached and/or distant in affect
Argues actual innocence (“I didn’t do it!”) often before ever being asked	Argues legal innocence (“What proof is there that I did it?”)
Admits having the opportunity to have committed the crime	Denies having the opportunity or makes sweeping declarations to exclude him- or herself from being able to have committed the crime
Becomes more relaxed and confident as the interview goes on	Tense and defensive; increasing anxiety as the interview goes on
Maintains face-to-face body alignment with the interviewer	Demonstrates evasive body alignment
Uses illustrative nonverbal gesticulations (Nonverbal behavior assists the interviewer in understanding the verbal response.)	Uses adaptive nonverbal gesticulations (Nonverbal behavior does not assist and may interfere with the interviewer understanding the verbal response.)
Has natural and settled foot and leg positioning	Has tense, repetitive, restless foot and leg movements

In addition, the forensic interviewer utilizes “projective” questions to evaluate the suspect’s complicity. An example of a projective question that may be asked is, “What do you think should happen to the person who did this when they are caught?” An innocent suspect will often choose a harsh punishment. The guilty suspect is being asked what should happen to him or her, and therefore, tends to refuse to answer the question or offers a mild punishment.

You may wonder how accurate forensic assessment interviewing is. Based on a current research project the author is involved in, accuracy appears to be approximately 80%. The process is not perfect but far greater than chance.

Statement analysis is an attempt to detect deception by assessing how innocent and guilty suspects differ in how and what they write. There are several versions currently being taught; however, the most useful in the author’s opinion is Scientific Content Analysis (SCAN). SCAN was originated by Avinoam Sapir and introduced in this country in the 1980s.¹¹

It begins with obtaining a “pure” written statement by the suspect concerning what happened and how the suspect would explain it. Sapir, a psychologist who specialized in breaking codes in the military observed that guilty suspects differ from innocent suspects in their “pure” statement. Among his observations were signs that indicated a lack of commitment to what was being written, generally associated with deception.

People who do not put themselves in the statement by avoiding pronouns, such as *I*, are not committing to what they are saying. The same holds true for people who suddenly phrase things in present tense, such as, “I am not cheating on my wife.” *Not cheating* is present tense. This person may be giving a speech or at a business meeting. He “is not” cheating on his wife. This does not mean he *never* cheated on her in the past, only that at this very moment he is not!

To better understand SCAN, let’s examine the statement of a store manager whose store was burnt down:

Please write what you did from the time you woke up until you went to sleep, on Friday, January 7, 2000:

1. I took a shower. I got dressed. I went downstairs to the
2. kitchen. I ate a bowl of cereal and left for our store. It
3. was about 6:30 a.m. I got into my car and drove to our store
4. at 5200 Bridge Road. I opened and began setting up our
5. registers for business. Nothing unusual occurred during the
6. day. I did get a phone call from Joe, but we didn’t really
7. talk about anything of importance. At 4:30 p.m. closed the
8. store. Cleaned up. Left with seven other employees. As the
9. door was locked I heard the phone ring. Went in the store to
10. answer the phone. When I went in the store the phone stopped
11. ringing. After a couple of minutes went back out, locked the
12. door and everyone went home. I went home to make
13. dinner, but around 6 p.m. got a call that there was a problem at
14. the store so I went back. When I got home I ate, watched TV
15. and went to bed. I think it was about 10 p.m. That’s about it.

Sam Shady I

You should immediately realize that by reading the statement you would have had no idea what problem took place. Deceptive suspects often try to avoid the issue or matters they will have to lie about.

The statement begins with a lot of unimportant information (lines 1-3), often a way deceptive suspects try to avoid getting to the part of the statement where the incident takes place.

Notice in lines 3 and 4, he uses the possessive pronoun *our* when talking about "*our store*" and "*our registers*"; however, after the telephone conversation with Joe, the owner, on line 7, it becomes "*the store*." Just prior to this change, the suspect tells us "nothing unusual occurred" (line 5) and "we didn't really talk about anything of importance" (lines 6-7). We do not ask the suspect to tell us about what didn't happen; therefore, these remarks that seem unimportant are very important.

Also notice in line 7, he also suddenly begins leaving out pronouns, which continues through to line 12. We must question why the suspect fails to commit to this part of his statement.

This statement would be classified problematic. The reason why "*our store*" became "*the store*" was that a decision was made in the conversation with the owner, Joe, when they "didn't really [not really = really] talk about anything of importance [to burn the store]." Our suspect actually commits the act when he goes back inside to answer the phone, which none of the other employees heard. This is where he suddenly begins leaving out pronouns.

How accurate is SCAN? Sapir states it is just as accurate as polygraph; however, there are no scientific studies the author knows of that demonstrate its validity. The author has had great success utilizing this technique. It has been, and continues to be, used by all levels of law enforcement in this country and many other countries around the world.

Forensic psychophysiology or use of the polygraph measures psychophysiological changes in a suspect as he or she is asked questions. The physiological parameters monitored are cardiovascular changes, breathing changes, and changes in electrodermal activity.

In our country, police use the polygraph to assist them in the selection process of police applicants and as a tool in criminal investigations. The polygraph is extremely useful in the applicant process. The greatest predictor of future behavior is past behavior. The most accurate record of people's past behavior lies within themselves. Police applicants should not be tested on issues that can be verified in other ways. For example, finding out an applicant's driving or criminal record can easily be accomplished through other means. What cannot be accomplished in other ways is whether applicants have ever committed serious *undetected* crimes, their involvement with illegal substances, and their honesty.

In the investigative process, the polygraph can play an important role in focusing an investigation and often results in confessions, which may be the only available evidence to ensure a perpetrator's conviction.

The polygraph examination itself can be divided into three segments: (1) the pre-test interview, (2) the collection and analyzing of physiological data, and (3) the post-test interview.

During the pre-test interview, the following occurs:

1. The examiner explains to the suspect his or her legal rights concerning the examination.
2. The examiner will ask background questions to establish rapport and also to ensure that the suspect is physically and mentally capable of taking the examination.
3. The examiner will conduct an interview of the suspect. Some examiners will inquire only about the actual reason for the test, while others will utilize a forensic assessment interview technique, which may include statement analysis.
4. The examiner will perform some type of initial test, often referred to as an Acquaintance or Demonstration Test to ensure that when the suspect lies, there is a noticeable psychophysiological change and to demonstrate to the suspect that his or her lies can be detected.
5. The examiner will review all of the questions to be asked on the test with the suspect, and the suspect will give the examiner subjective truthful answers to these questions.
6. The examiner will explain to the suspect how the polygraph works.

During the collection and analyzing of psychophysiological data, the examiner must utilize an accepted test format. As a general rule, the profession today favors what is known as a "Comparative/Control Question" technique. These techniques vary in whether they attempt to resolve a "single issue" or multiple issues in an examination.

Let's assume we have a "gang style" homicide for which the cause of death was by shooting. A "single issue" examination would consist of approximately ten to thirteen questions. Only two or three would deal with the actual crime; these are called relevant questions. All of these relevant questions would have the same emotional weight and deal with the same issue: "Did you shoot John?" "Regarding John, did you shoot him?" "Did you lie about whether you shot John?"

In a multi-issue examination for the same case, there may be up to four relevant questions asked in the format. These questions would differ in emotional weight and focus: "Were you present when John was shot?" "Did you shoot John?" "Do you know for sure who shot John?"

The author believes that while both formats have been researched and found to be above 90% accurate, the "single issue" examination is superior and should be utilized whenever possible. All data should be analyzed using an approved numerical evaluation system. The author recommends the Horizontal Scoring System he co-innovated or the Backster Seven Point Scale.

During the post-test interview, the examiner informs the suspect of his or her results, and when the conclusion is that deception was indicated, the examiner must give the suspect the opportunity to explain the negative findings. This phase of the procedure is commonly referred to as an interrogation or focused interview.

When administered by a *competent examiner*, the polygraph procedure used today reaches the criteria for scientific acceptability of over 95% accuracy.¹² There are two major organizations in this country that accredit polygraph training: (1) the American Polygraph Association and (2) the American Association of Police Polygraphists. The most important thing to consider concerning examiner competency is whether he or she graduated from an accredited polygraph school. Obviously, experience and continuing education are other considerations, but be cautioned, quantity in itself does not necessarily equal quality.

Three retired military officers, who formed a company called Dektor Counterintelligence, introduced the Psychological Stress Evaluator (PSE) in the 1960s. This instrument was developed to detect changes, known as micro tremors, in suspects' voices when they answered questions. Over the years, there have been many instruments designed to accomplish this task; however, none have shown any degree of scientific validity.

Unfortunately, many agencies confuse the Computer Voice Stress Analyzer's (CVSA) ability to produce confessions with its validity in determining truth and deception. In 2001, the U.S. research division of DoDPI did a study on the validity of the CVSA, which is currently being marketed to law enforcement agencies throughout the country and abroad.¹³ The researchers found no changes in stress scores utilizing the CVSA that would accurately indicate truth or deception. In studies of the CVSA by Cestaro and Dollins, they reported 37% accuracy (1994), 38.7% accuracy (1995), 52.2% accuracy (1996), and 49.8% accuracy (1996).

With the threat of terrorism today, the search for truth continues. There are numerous researchers striving to find new ways to detect deception. Studies are underway examining brain waves, brain activity, thermology, and other physiological parameters that will hopefully work with current methods to increase validity, or improve validity in and of, themselves.

For now, the research indicates that investigators trained in statement analysis and forensic interviewing techniques, combined with the polygraph offer the greatest accuracy in the search for truth. As our knowledge and society continues to advance, we can only wait, and continue to search.

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Employee Discipline: Managing the Problem Employee with a Union Contract in Effect

Thomas Q. Weitzel, Sergeant, Riverside, Illinois Police Department

Executive Summary

It is crucial to discipline police employees within the criteria established by the department's union contract as well as state and federal laws. This framework defines what the organization legally can and cannot do in dealing with a problem employee. Those in supervisory positions must clearly understand the union contract and laws to be able to effectively deal with problem employee situations. The use of progressive discipline is critical in establishing a foundation from which the employee has an opportunity to improve his or her job performance before further action is required by the department.

Purpose

The purpose of this article is to address the following issues:

- Dealing with a problem employee effectively
- Management's rights to discipline versus union considerations and state and federal laws
- Importance of progressive discipline and not allowing unions to "run the department"

Often, management has the monumental task of managing problem employees who enter the workplace with varying degrees of competence in relating to the work environment. Management faces the challenge of how to effectively deal with these employees to the satisfaction of the employee as well as the employer. Management should have a clear understanding of departmental regulations and the union contract if the disciplinary process is to have any chance of success.

Reasons

Once a problem employee has been identified, there are some steps that can be taken to prevent future problems. It is vital to keep the officer's career path free of dead ends by making the job interesting, challenging, and rewarding. It is through these measures that some problem employees can be "nipped in the bud." Challenging the officer with additional responsibilities can help satisfy the officer's sense of self-esteem. Many jobs, projects, and special assignments present themselves in law enforcement agencies. Assigning duties to patrol officers who may be at or near the "burn-out" stage can imbue them with a sense of belonging (Bruchman, 1992). These assignments will also keep the patrol officer's job varied and interesting. Crime prevention, school liaison, evidence processing, and drug interdiction are some of the tasks that the chief of police can assign to nonsupervisory personnel. It is also crucial to recognize an officer for a job

well-done; knowing that he or she is, indeed, a consequential part of the department inevitably will increase the officer's motivation and self-actualization.

First and foremost, the department's goals and objectives are important to employees regardless of their rank or grade. A mission statement plays a critical role in establishing the goals of the department, thereby giving its officers a sense of direction. The role of the individual officer in attaining these goals needs to be clearly defined and annually updated (CALEA, 1992). The chief of police should solicit the input of all his or her employees to establish and redefine the department's goals and in so doing, give the officers the feeling that they are a part of the "big picture." This statement will also have the added benefit of establishing what the department expects of its officers in terms of conduct and performance. Evaluation of this performance will have a major impact on dealing with the employee should a problem develop.

Some of the ways my department effectively deals with a problem employee include the following:

- Performance evaluation
- Counseling
- Internal investigation
- Suspension
- Termination

It is through a performance evaluation that issues deemed as problems by the officer's supervisor can be addressed and an action plan discussed. Before a performance evaluation can be validated, certain needs must be dealt with. A performance evaluation, by its nature, is dependent upon standards of performance and clearly defined job descriptions. These must be in place before an evaluation can be utilized. Establishing minimum acceptable levels of performance provides the officer with goals to attain or surpass. The performance must be within the officer's scope of employment (Newstrom, 1993). These expectations need to be communicated to all officers upon the onset of their employment and continually re-emphasized throughout their career.

Our union contract states that the village has the right to evaluate employees as well as to establish performance standards. The areas that an officer is rated on include the following: job knowledge, quantity of work, quality of work, care of tools and equipment, compliance with rules and regulations, safety habits, personal appearance, physical condition, attendance and punctuality, public relations, oral communication, responsibility, initiative, working with associates, written communication, stability and temperament, technical knowledge, general patrol duties, preliminary investigation, traffic enforcement, quality of arrests, and case preparation and presentation.

The union contract specifically states that the village can establish these work and productivity standards and from time to time change these standards. The meeting between the supervisor and officer allows for the opportunity to document any areas in which the officer needs improvement. The supervisor can specifically list those areas in which improvement is necessary and where notation is made of what is expected to be accomplished before the next review period—typically

three to six months. By opening up the floor for discussion, it is hoped that officers will acknowledge those areas in which they are deficient and take specific steps to improve their work habits before further action is required by the department.

The supervisor plays a crucial role, perhaps the most important one, in the problem employee equation. The shift sergeant is the link between the patrol officer and management. The way a sergeant deals with a problem officer during the rehabilitation phase will frequently determine the need for more severe sanctions. Immediate supervisors must know what is expected of them and employ the tools and techniques that are at their disposal. They must provide goals for their subordinates as well as the necessary stimulus to achieve these goals. If the supervisor is to be a successful supervisor, it is imperative that he or she has the skills necessary to provide an open line of two-way communication (Nowicki, 1993).

An officer may be provided with counseling when a need for it is observed by a supervisor through work productivity or through complaints received from others about an officer's conduct that do not require the initiation of an internal affairs investigation. Counseling is designed to improve employee performance and is not considered a disciplinary measure. It provides the opportunity to correct, coach, and consult the officer. It is hoped that counseling will foster an atmosphere that will encourage free exchanges when an officer is troubled so that future problems can be diverted. A form is used to identify the reason for counseling and states the supervisor's comments and the counseled employee's comments. It is kept for one year, at which time the chief of police evaluates whether there has been improvement; if improvement has been shown, the counseling form will be destroyed.

My department, as well as other police departments, must adhere to bylaws established by Uniform Peace Officers' Disciplinary Act. This act is basically a police officer's "Bill of Rights." It clearly states the rights of the police officer during an investigation except when an officer has violated any provisions of the Criminal Code of 1961 or when a collective bargaining agreement is in effect that deals with the subject matter of the Act (50 ILCS 725/5 & 725/6).

If improper conduct has occurred—either witnessed by a citizen or by another officer—an internal investigation is begun thereby opening a "CR number." A supervisor notifies the officer of the charge/allegation and gives the officer his or her administrative proceedings rights, waiver of counsel/request to secure counsel, and criminal rights, which he or she is asked to sign. At this point, a thorough investigation is conducted, and a meeting is scheduled to inform the officer of the findings. This investigation includes obtaining copies of all pertinent reports, contacting witnesses and complainants, and preparing the necessary reports.

Our department follows the steps outlined by the Uniform Peace Officers' Disciplinary Act wherein an informal inquiry is initiated to determine if the misconduct necessitates a formal investigation (50 ILCS 725/2 b, c). Additionally, our union contract states that officers must be told the purpose of the inquiry whether written or oral, as defined in 50 ILCS 725/1, prior to any questioning. Any

officer, summoned to an investigatory interview called by supervisory personnel, has the right to request that a representative of his or her choosing be present if he or she reasonably believes that discipline will result from the meeting (Riverside FOP Lodge #39, Article VI, Section 6:4).

Management reserves the right to discipline per our contract provisions. The contract clearly states that the village retains the right to discipline or discharge any employee in accordance with the Board of Police and Fire Commission. The contract asserts, however, that if an officer reasonably believes that discipline will result from the meeting, the officer may request that a representative of his or her choosing be present, provided that such a representative is reasonably available. If the officer would like to file a grievance, which is defined per our contract as a "dispute or difference of opinion raised by an employee or the Council against the village involving meaning, interpretation, or application of the provisions of the contract" (FOP Lodge, #39 Article XII, Section 12:1 Definition), he or she may do so per our contract grievance procedures. The grievance procedure statement in the contract is mandated by the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, which states, . . .

The collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the employer and the exclusive representative shall contain a grievance resolution procedure, which shall apply to all employees in the bargaining unit and shall provide for final and binding arbitration of disputes concerning the administration or interpretation of the agreement unless mutually agreed otherwise. (5 ILCS 315/8)

Suspension or termination may result from any of the previously mentioned procedures. The union contract states that the village reserves the right to discipline, suspend, and discharge employees for just cause. The contract states that no officer may "authorize, institute, aid, condone, or engage in a slowdown, work stoppage, refusal to cross picket line, strike, or other interference with the village work" (Riverside FOP Lodge #39, Article VIII, Section 8.1: No Strike). If an officer violates any of these provisions, the contract states that the village has the right to discipline accordingly. Illinois Municipal Code mandates that the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners conducts a fair and impartial hearing of the charges within 30 days of the filing. If an officer is found guilty, the board has the right to discharge the officer or suspend him or her for 30 days without pay. If the officer is suspended, the suspension period must not last more than 30 days (65 ILCS 5/10-2. 1-17).

The chief of police, without first going to the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners, may suspend an officer for not more than five calendar days without pay; however, he or she must notify the board in writing of such suspension. If an officer has been suspended, he or she has the right to appeal that decision within five calendar days. The board may then sustain the chief's action or reverse it with instructions that the officer receive pay for the period involved, or it may suspend the officer for an additional period of time, not more than 30 days, or discharge him or her depending on the facts in the case (65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-17).

Progressive discipline is still used today; however, there have been many changes in law enforcement that have compromised the professionalism of police departments. This includes the unionization of police departments and collective bargaining by officers with the municipalities. Unionizing members has become the current trend. Some officers may think that this unionization offers them some protection against the state, county, city, or village when it comes to enforcing the rules and regulations of the police department. This can possibly become a barrier to establishing a good disciplinary system. It is essential for the municipal government to negotiate properly with the union so that it does not gain more power to the detriment of the management within the agency.

Progressive discipline plays an essential role in law enforcement today. It assures that the police department has a firm set of policies in place. Characteristically, a disciplined police department represents a well-trained police department. This, in turn, will result in a professional police department. Having a good discipline program to which personnel closely adhere will provide the department with good policies that are established to train rather than punish.

The term *progressive discipline* can be defined as an approach to modifying undesirable employee behavior by using a range of disciplinary consequences that are applied based on the nature and history of the particular employee's conduct. Our department, as described previously, relies on several union/Illinois code laws in the event that such discipline is needed.

Not having a strict disciplinary system in existence in a police department is likely to breed indecision, doubt, unprofessionalism, and low self-esteem among the officers. Often, these are the departments that have an absence of self-policing in them. By establishing a step-by-step discipline system, the officers are aware of what to expect ahead of time in the event that discipline becomes necessary. Progressive discipline provides an opportunity for the department to make a clear record of the reasons for disciplinary action. Such a record could be crucial in the event that a lawsuit is filed if the progressive discipline path ultimately results in termination of the employee.

The union and management must work together to clearly institute the guidelines necessary to protect the rights of both officers and management to effectively deal with any problems fairly and authoritatively.

Conclusion

Managing problem employees while taking into consideration union regulations and state and federal laws requires the use of all sound management practices and skills. The organization sets the tone for problem employee avoidance by the use of the mission statement, goals, and objectives to clearly establish what is expected of its employees in the way of performance and conduct. A performance evaluation based on realistic and job-related appraisal criteria is an essential tool for the supervisor to monitor an officer's performance. Our union contract includes the right of the village to determine the tools used in such criteria.

Progressive discipline can be used as a tool to motivate a marginal performer by providing him or her with an opportunity to improve performance through

training and other step-by-step disciplinary measures. If rehabilitation of the problem employee is unsuccessful, then a thorough documented foundation has been established to discharge the officer from service. By following union, state, and federal guidelines, it is more likely that dismissal will be validated by the scrutiny of administrative appeals and courts if management can show that it made a "good faith" effort to bring the marginal performer back to productive status.

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The Extent and Impact of Prejudicial Attitudes of Police Officers

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Introduction

Racism and discrimination by the police directed at citizens in the United States has been one of the most controversial and talked about subjects of recent history. Often, the police have been accused of abusing their power and failing to provide adequate service to blacks, Hispanics, and other minority groups due to discrimination and prejudice toward minorities. Prejudice for the purpose of this article shall be defined using Morrison's (1992) definition:

Prejudice can be defined as the tendency to have prior negative judgment toward . . . people who are different from some reference group in terms of sex, ethnic background, or racial characteristics such as skin color. (pp. 34-35)

The police are the most visible representatives in our justice system and have the ability to act on their prejudices in the form of exercising power unfairly against minority groups. This visibility makes the police one of the most outward indicators of prejudice in the justice system.

When one reviews the literature, there is an abundance of documentation that prejudice does exist in the police profession and is a prevalent and driving force in decisionmaking at all levels of the bureaucracy (Muwakkil, 2001; Reinhold, 1991; Wise, 2001). Prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory practices of the police damage the fiber of our society, and much has been written about the extent of the problem; however, the reasons why these attitudes exist are less clear and much less frequently addressed. The question of whether a prejudice mindset came with the officer to the job or if the officer formed such opinions while on the job seems to be an area for which little research has been conducted. The great reduction/elimination of institutional racism within police departments may lie in the prevention of such attitudes forming. In order to develop a preventive strategy, we must understand the causes and not just the outcome of prejudice and discrimination by police departments.

Police discrimination is a sensitive and emotionally charged topic. It is a subject, which has many complex facets and an enormous effect on law enforcement (Tizon & Forgrave, 2001). In order to be seen as sensitive to the issue of police discrimination and prejudice, police administrators take great pains to create policy and procedures to announce that they do not approve of prejudice and discrimination (Schott, 2001). Is the problem of prejudice by the police one which exists in isolation, created by high profile cases in the media, or are there legitimate grounds to assume the problem does exist? In order to address the issues of police prejudice, one must first look at the extent of the issue and the impact it has on our society as a whole.

This article will examine how and the extent to which prejudice is displayed by the police and what is known about the formation of prejudicial attitudes in the police.

The Extent of the Problem Related to Prejudicial Attitudes

The images of the police beating black demonstrators in the 1950s and 1960s during the civil rights movement were responsible for untold damage to the reputation of the police. The nation watched as black demonstrators were beaten, sprayed with fire hoses, and attacked by police dogs. The news footage of the civil rights demonstrations has been played and replayed until it has become a part of our nation's collective memory. The law enforcers who were entrusted to protect the rights of all citizens were portrayed by their own actions to have racist mindsets. This film footage has increased ten fold in the years following the demonstrations. The Internet, popular journalism, television, and the radio are saturated with stories of racist police officers and institutional racism. On almost any given day somewhere in the United States, a story about the police abusing their powers for reasons of racism can be heard via the popular media. The most infamous in recent history was the beating of Rodney King, a black motorist who was arrested and beaten following a vehicle chase by Los Angeles Police in March 1991 and the subsequent riots in Los Angeles. This incident, which was widely viewed to be the result of racist police officers acting on their attitudes, had national impact causing a string of rioting and violence across the country. The Rodney King incident also caused an outpouring of emotion and contempt to be directed toward the police, in the form of public attacks on the very validity of our national system of policing. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) came under intense public scrutiny following the March 3, 1991, beating of Rodney King and subsequent trial of the officers charged in the attack. Following the acquittal of the officers, riots broke out lasting five days and resulting in 40 deaths (Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998).

As a response to the trial and riots in the Rodney King case, the LAPD was studied extensively in an attempt to uncover the causes and develop solutions to the underlying cause of the racial unrest. The Christopher Commission, set up in 1991 as a response to the Rodney King incident, studied the LAPD's response to officer brutality. According to Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert (1998), the LAPD has a subculture of racism and violence; however, this department is not alone. As reprinted in Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert (1998), the Christopher Commission went on to state, "This is a national problem," said the commission chairman, Warren M. Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State in the Carter Administration. "We have conducted our study with awareness that it might have considerable relevance for other cities, other police departments around the country" (pp. 4-8).

The Christopher Commission equated the LAPD's excessive use of force directly with the racist attitudes of its officers and stated that the problem was a national problem rather than just an LAPD problem.

Christopher (1991) suggested that the LAPD suffers from institutional racism. The term *institutional racism* has been increasingly associated with law enforcement agencies. *Institutional racism* means "racism, which, covertly or overtly, resides in the policies, procedures, operations, and culture of public or private

institutions—reinforcing individual prejudices and being reinforced by them in turn” (Institute of Race Relations, 2002, p. 1).

Institutional racism tends to exist in a much more subtle and indirect way. It is often more recognizable in the form of racial jokes, prejudices, conservatism, and exaggerated stories about minorities (Understanding, 1999). Institutional racism can also be more outright as in the example of the LAPD. The term institutional racism appears to be a term more and more associated with the police. Institutional racism also implies that the condition permeates throughout the entire organization. The popular media seems to portray the law enforcement community as a whole as suffering from institutional racism (Understanding, 1999). What happens in the larger cities such as Los Angeles and Chicago has an effect on the smaller communities in the form of policy setting and trends. Los Angeles has had an effect on the rest of the country (Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998). The literature suggests that the extent of the problem is far reaching perhaps even to the extent of saturation (Muwakkil, 2001).

In the arena of law enforcement prejudice and discrimination, the most devastating scenario is the unjustified killing of a minority suspect. This type of incident often leads to further violence in the form of rioting and at the least racial unrest within the community. Muwakkil (2001) describes several incidents in which white officers killed minority suspects allegedly without provocation. The incidents occurred throughout the United States, and all sparked some form of racial tension in the community. Muwakkil goes on to state that the police are using deadly force more and more frequently without justification against minorities and are getting away with murder. Muwakkil states . . .

Escalating police violence reflects a growing fear of black criminality among the broader population. The skyrocketing rate of black imprisonment and the profits to be made from the prison industry suggest that the criminal justice system and young African-Americans are increasingly becoming each other’s sworn enemies. (p. 60)

Muwakkil appears to be suggesting a conspiracy between the police and the prison system to incarcerate young African Americans for the profit of the prison system. While this suggestion may be far-fetched, he does point out incident after incident in which the police seem to be in an adversarial position against minority populations. The fact that rioting and racial unrest have erupted from the killing of minority suspects by white police officers suggests that much of the minority population feels the police are racist and take the lives of minority individuals because they have racist attitudes (New York Urban League, 2002). The violence clearly suggests that the public perception is that had the suspects been white, they would not have been killed. This lack of trust from the public that the police are sworn to protect hinders the police in their duties and forms a vicious circle of animosity between the police and the public (Reinhold, 1991).

The misuse of the Bill of Rights takes many forms from improperly arresting an individual on a felony to using police powers to inconvenience an individual by temporally restricting his or her movements. To stop and detain an individual for a short period of time could seem to be trivial in comparison to arresting an individual for a felony charge; however, stopping individuals solely because of

their race is certainly harassment by the police and is an improper use of police power. Racial profiling has been extensively discussed in recent years. It is a subject that evokes emotion from both the police and minority groups. The frequency with which racial profiling is discussed in the media is an indicator that the subject is of widespread concern to the population. The controversy surrounding racial profiling is yet another demonstration of the extent of the problem of prejudice by the police.

Racial Profiling

One of the most recently controversial topics relating to racism and discrimination within police departments is the subject of racial profiling. Racial profiling has been a repeated topic in the media gaining national attention in recent years. The very term *racial profiling* seems to anger anti-racist groups and the public in general, as it implies profiling people as criminals on the basis of their race. Citizens have filed lawsuits in reference to racial profiling, and police departments across the nation have implemented policies to avoid lawsuits on the basis of racial profiling (City of Peoria Police Department, 2000). The practice of officers using race as a criminal profiling factor has caused immense controversy and reflects yet another aspect of the complex issue of racism and discrimination by the police.

The term *racial profiling* is defined as the police targeting someone for investigation on the basis of that person's race, national origin, or ethnicity (ACLU, 2002). As racial profiling is defined, it appears to be a blatant misuse of authority by the police. Recently, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has taken a strong stand against what they believe to be blatant racism on the part of the police against minority citizens: "Today skin color makes you suspect in America. It makes you more likely to be stopped, more likely to be searched, and more likely to be arrested and imprisoned. One of the highest priority issues is the fight against the outrageous practice of racial profiling" (ACLU, 2002, p. 1).

The fact that the ACLU feels this strongly about the subject of racial profiling is telling on the effect it has on society. The police and the minority population are heavily divided on the subject. Minorities say the practice is widespread and rampant, while the police argue that the emotions associated with the issue are not backed by facts. The foundation of the racial profiling issue is the idea that racist police are using their police power to violate the 14th Amendment rights of minority citizens.

According to Garrett (2001), more than half of all Americans believe that law enforcement officers actively engage in the practice of profiling. The statistics were taken from a 1999 Gallup Poll that also noted that approximately 81% of all Americans do not approve of the practice. As stated by Garrett, "The belief that police profile, whether real or perceived, creates fear and distrust of law enforcement, particularly among minority groups. Major incidents that receive a lot of exposure serve to foster this fear, making it seem as if the practice of profiling is widespread" (p. 101).

The practice of officers detaining or arresting individuals on the sole basis of race is a violation of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Police

officers are allowed to profile individuals using a number of indicators for stop and questioning; however, they may not detain on the basis of race alone. Officers argue that they conduct criminal profiles rather than racial profiling. Officers are often accused of racial profiling despite the fact that they claim to have established probable cause before the stop. The courts often rule favorably on the police in cases of racial profiling because the cases are so difficult to prove on the part of the plaintiff. According to Schott (2001), plaintiffs who filed complaints against the police were often speaking to the police on a voluntary basis and were being questioned based on a legitimate description of a suspect in a crime. Plaintiffs also have the burden of proving that individuals of other races are not being subjected to police action, while they themselves and their race are subjected to unfair police action.

In order to avoid costly lawsuits, cities such as Peoria, Illinois, have created general orders prohibiting racial profiling. Administrators feel that by creating orders that denounce racial profiling, they can insulate their departments from civil liability. It is also advocated in top police publications such as *Law Enforcement Technology* written by Garrett (2001), "Management needs to send the message that this behavior whether widespread or incidental, will not be tolerated" (p. 108). The City of Peoria's 2000 General Order number 400.81 demonstrates this ideal by being explicit in its direction to officers, requiring that all complaints of racial profiling be immediately investigated by a supervisor. The order also defines racial profiling and orders officers not to detain individuals solely on the basis of race. The very existence of such orders acknowledges that police departments are responding to the public outcry against racial profiling by denouncing the practice even if they may not actually be supportive of the idea.

Many police departments are now using the technology of video and audio recordings once used against them in the famous Rodney King case to prove they are not practicing racial profiling. On June 23, 2001, Peoria officers were accused publicly of making an unjustified traffic stop implying racial profiling. The officers were making a felony car stop of a female driver mistakenly believed to be driving a stolen vehicle. The officers were alleged to have pointed their guns at the woman and her children and to have acted in a hostile manner during the traffic stop (Okeson, 2001). A newspaper article printed on June 26, 2001, by the *Peoria Journal Star* was written from the standpoint of the citizen and was quite unfavorable to the officers. The police squad car video told a much different story. The video taken by the in-car video system cleared the officers of any wrongdoing by demonstrating probable cause for the stop and by showing the officers had performed in a professional manner. Officer C. Warner of the Seattle Police Department stated that racial profiling accusations are now being filed when there is no evidence to back up the accusation: "It's [racial profiling] the catch phrase now," Warner said. "If I were an African American drug dealer here, that's the way I'd play the game. It intimidates officers" (Tizon & Forgrave, 2002).

Many officers are feeling that drug dealers are now using the media attention as insulation to carry out their drug trade. This has further alienated the police from the society they are bound to protect. The Peoria incident, which was widely publicized in the local area, showed the value of the videotape as a means for the police to protect themselves against false accusations.

The public nature of accusations of racism, prejudice, and racial profiling leads one to believe that the police should have some reaction, beyond the policymaking and collecting statistics, to the controversy directed at them as individuals and as a profession. The police conduct their business in the public eye and are therefore subject to the attitudes and trends practiced by the public. The police cannot ignore the demands of the public for long periods of time and still expect to conduct business as usual. The police must react in some way either internally or publicly to the politics of prejudice. The way the police respond to this controversy—by choosing either to resolve or not to resolve the conflict—could have a tremendous impact on the direction that police work will take in the future and how the police are perceived as a whole.

The Reactions by the Police to Accusations of Racism and Prejudice

The police are human and were reared in the same society in which they serve; therefore, they do have opinions on the accusations filed against them. Often, police feel these accusations are unjustified. The police respond to the criticism and social unrest of police shooting minority suspects in a number of ways. Levin (2001) writes that following a police shooting of a minority suspect, a pattern emerges:

Within hours, community leaders—translation: no visible means of support—organize demonstrations against “police brutality,” complete with a telegenic chorus of black women wailing “they’ve got to stop killing our babies” even though the suspect was 6’2” and weighed 250 pounds. These small protests acquire a life of their own under media magnification. Well-known blacks suddenly remember how often they have been hassled by the police for no reason, allegedly, other than their color. Politicians, to show “racial sensitivity,” declare that a grave wrong was done. (p. 65)

Levin suggests that leaders in the black community begin to start more upheaval by suggesting civil rights violations leading the involved police to face a federal lawsuit. Levin states that this is done by individuals who have no information of the facts of the case and view the killing as totally racially motivated rather than action motivated. When an individual pulls a gun on a police officer and is subsequently shot and killed, the officer is acting with legal authority to protect his or her life and the lives of innocent civilians. Levin states that any and all killings of minority suspects by the police are viewed as racially motivated despite the facts of the case. The media, as suggested by Levin, is responsible for acting in an irresponsible manner fueling the incidents of racial unrest. Delattre (1996) who supports Levin’s viewpoint writes that many of the reporters in the popular media are poorly educated and have no command of logic. The reporters gather quotations from people rather than try to determine the truth. The media reports of conflict between individuals makes the story rather than the truth of the situation. Delattre feels that the reporters fuel the racial unrest by way of poor reporting and cannot be trusted as guardians of public interest (Delattre, 1996).

Whether one agrees or disagrees with the roll of the media in race-related riots, it appears that the public is not the only party listening to what the media is saying about the police. The police are beginning to react to the chronic charges of police

racism in black neighborhoods by looking the other way at crime. According to the *Seattle Times*, “De-policing is passive law enforcement: Officers consciously stop trying to prevent low-level crime and simply react to 911 calls. Many officers, wary of being labeled racists or racial profilers, say they hold back or bypass opportunities to make traffic stops or arrests of black suspects” (Tizon & Forgrave, 2001).

The Seattle Police Chief, Gil Kerlikowske, agreed that officers were being particularly cautious in black neighborhoods but denied the problem had become a crisis. The officers are beginning to refer to themselves as “tourists in blue.” Officers report that they would rather park under a tree and do nothing than be labeled as a racist and subjected to an investigation and lawsuit. Officers also report holding back on acting on experience when they feel a minority individual may be up to illegal activity. In essence, the police are afraid to do their job because they do not want to suffer the consequences of being called a racist (Tizon & Forgrave, 2001). Tizon and Forgrave go on to state that during a Mardi Gras riot in 2000, officers were fearful of being videotaped battling with black suspects and subsequently held back allowing a young white male to be beaten to death by the black offenders.

Community leaders in Seattle have responded by stating that the police are negligent in their reaction to the public criticism and that the police need to do their job without regard to the criticism they may face. Community leaders stated to the police: “That’s the burden of the job; join the rest of the world” (Tizon & Forgrave, 2001). Ken Saucier, a black sixteen-year veteran of the Seattle Police Department, stated to Tizon and Forgrave that the real problem lies within the black community: “Police are deployed according to crime incidents. The more crime in one neighborhood, the more police. More police means more contacts with the public, and more potential for conflict” (p. 5).

According to officers interviewed by Tizon and Forgrave (2001), the black neighborhood will be affected the most by de-policing. When officers are refusing to stop individuals because they are minorities for routine traffic stops and Terry stops (routine stop and questioning of citizens), officers will miss the opportunity to prevent much of the crime in low-income minority neighborhoods. This could bring crime rates back up in areas that have shown signs of improvement in the form of lower crime rates and increased quality of life. Drug dealers will congregate and practice business if they have an easy target (Tizon & Forgrave, 2001).

The implications for de-policing on a chronic scale could be incredibly devastating to our society as a whole. While it cannot be confirmed in the literature, the law enforcement community has murmured rumors about de-policing under its breath for years. Police profession insiders will state off the record that it is their belief that de-policing is happening at least in isolated cases, despite the fact that little has been researched to document its existence. Black officers interviewed by Tizon and Forgrave (2001) have also stated that they understand why drug dealers cry racism when pulled over on a traffic stop. It works in diverting the attention away from the crime they committed or were about to commit. The officers stated that drug dealers know most police officers are unnerved by accusations of racism and may allow the drug dealer to leave without an arrest.

De-policing appears to be a direct response of the police in avoiding the controversy of being accused of being a racist. The officers who have families and friends in the community do not want to have their names plastered across the newspaper and choose to avoid this at the cost of effectively doing their jobs. The community leaders of Seattle who suggest that the officers should just deal with the controversy and "get over it" appear to be unrealistic in understanding the personal implications to the officer and his or her family when they are accused of being a racist. Is de-policing a sign that in the minds of the police officers they are not being paid enough to place themselves willingly under such scrutiny? Having police officers who will put their lives on the line night after night but will go out of their way to avoid civil litigation in cases of racism implies that the fear officers have against this type of accusation is stronger than their fear for their own physical safety, and it could keep them from effectively doing their jobs. This indicates that the tension is taking on new forms and becoming stronger with each new case.

The literature indicates that little research has been done in the area of de-policing and its implications. De-policing should be further explored because of the potential for societal damage in the form of rising crime rates and further discord between the police and minority populations. The characteristics of the officers engaging in de-policing should also be further explored to determine which officers are most likely to practice de-policing. It would be helpful from a preventative standpoint to understand whether the officers practicing de-policing have prejudicial attitudes or whether the officers are cracking under the threat of public scrutiny. Once we can determine who de-policing affects, training to counter de-policing can be developed and implemented for high-risk officers.

The police appear to be responding to the accusations of racism and prejudice in a number of ways both internally and externally. Overall, the police appear to be responding in a negative manner as is evidenced by de-policing (Tizon & Forgrave, 2001). It could also be argued that the police are justified in their response when they observe the political power of the press and feel the evidence will not be properly examined before they are labeled as prejudice. There is also evidence that police administrations are taking an aggressive stand to show the public that the police as a profession do not support prejudicial attitudes and racial discrimination in the form of policymaking. For the most part, administrators are merely responding to political pressure by writing policy and investigating accusations on a case-by-case basis, instead of looking deeper into the problem by asking such questions as "Are our officers prejudiced and if so why and how do we end or prevent it"? A deeper look must be taken to determine the actual depth of feelings experienced by police officers in order for true strategy to develop, otherwise policy is just rules in a manual easily avoided by the average officer.

Probable Causes of Prejudice by the Police

The question of where prejudice by/of the police originates is a daunting, complex question with no simple answers. Each individual experiences life and forms his or her opinions based on the learning experiences of life. People who have similar experiences, have similar backgrounds, and live through life's experiences together can form similar opinions (Perlmutter, 2000). The police experience their careers in a similar pattern in most areas where there is a minority population and do so with each other for support. Could the police learn prejudicial attitudes

on the job, or does the individual officer bring the prejudicial attitude to the job as part of an internal résumé? The vast majority of literature relating to police prejudice relates to the effects of prejudice and not the origins of prejudice by the police. It appears that the assumption is that the police come on the job having already formed their opinions about mankind, including any prejudicial attitudes he or she may have formed prior to entering police work (Institutional, 2000). For the purposes of this study, very little literature could be located that explored the origins of police prejudicial attitudes toward minorities.

It also becomes apparent from the literature that very little research has been conducted to determine whether the police are more prejudice than other groups within society. According to the August 2000 issue of *Police Magazine*, "There is a need for a survey of police attitudes towards racial minorities; whether the police are any more prejudiced than the ordinary population, whether racial prejudice is inherent in humanity as a whole and whether minorities do suffer from prejudice against other minorities and the majority population" (Institutional, 2000, p. 1).

With so much written and so much media attention on the subject of racism and prejudice in police departments, it appears odd that so little valid research has been conducted on the causes. It may prove to be true that the research has not been conducted on the origins of police prejudice because of an underlying unproven assumption that the police come to the job with prejudice rather than becoming that way while working as police officers. The origins of police prejudice need to be explored in far greater detail before our society can develop a solution.

The police are well known for developing a strong subculture, and in order for an officer to see some success, he or she must join the culture to an extent. It would seem a natural progression that one who enters and embraces a new culture would undergo a transformation of beliefs at least to a small degree. Police officers who contemplate themselves, such as David Perlmutter (2000) who wrote *Policing the Media: Street Cops and Public Perceptions of Law Enforcement*, state that the police develop an "us versus them" mentality, which is reinforced by the wearing of the uniform. Police officers come to see themselves as separate from the rest of society. According to Perlmutter (2000), the police can also see themselves as having minority status—a group of separates who lack the support or understanding of the rest of society. If the police do feel they are separatists, might they also be developing prejudice against certain minority groups as part of their culture and perceived separation ideas? This idea is supported in part by an article on institutional racism for *Police Magazine*, which states that minority groups tend to "differentiate zealously between themselves: i.e., their own group and those different from themselves" (Institutional, 2000). The police may in turn be differentiating between themselves and the rest of society as if they are a minority group, and thus separate themselves from the rest of society. This could cause the police to form a group consensus, such as an "us (the police) against them (society)" attitude.

Another possible cause of police prejudice is the idea that the police form prejudicial attitudes through a series of traumatic experiences with minorities they encounter on the job. The police individually and collectively experience trauma

on the job. The police are faced time and time again with situations involving high levels of stress and emotion. These incidents often involve minorities due to the fact that most traumatic calls occur in the high-crime areas, which are predominately occupied by minority groups (Websdale, 2001). According to Allport (1954), trauma can induce the learning of prejudicial attitudes: "Traumatic learning is, then, a matter of vivid one-time conditioning. It tends to establish an attitude at once, and this attitude over-generalizes to include all members of a class of objects associated with the original stimulus" (p. 354).

Allport goes on to state that, "if over and over again a person has a certain kind of experience with members of a certain group, there is no question of trauma" (p. 315). Officers are exposed again and again to members of minority groups under the stress of high-priority calls. They constantly see individuals at their worst with little interaction that can be called positive. Officers within the subculture then share their experiences and influence each other. If the officer has been exposed under traumatic incidences to members of a minority group who are hostile to the officer, the officer may be developing prejudice, a dislike of a particular minority group, on the job. The officer may have started police work with little or no preconceived prejudicial opinion toward a particular minority group but may have developed that opinion after a certain amount of time spent as an officer. Thus, society could potentially be creating prejudiced officers on the job. If this is a possibility, there exists a means for a cure by prevention. We may not be able to control what officers are told in the home, but we can control what they are given during the early impressionable years as officers, at least during official training. If the officers are armed with the understanding that they will face traumatic events that could cause them to develop racist attitudes and are taught ways to avoid developing such attitudes, part of the cycle could be broken.

One must also take a critical look at the minority groups themselves. If the minority groups are contributing to the formation of prejudiced officers, then long-term societal changes could help to eliminate the cycle of prejudice. If an education campaign was developed and targeted at the public to foster understanding of why the police develop such attitudes, it may be possible to slowly break the cycle. This type of undertaking would certainly prove to be an enormous task; however, societal opinions are proven to change slowly with education. Nation-wide campaigns, such as the one currently being undertaken to eliminate drunk driving, have greatly increased the consciousness of the public. While there are still drunk drivers, many people now choose not to drink and drive. A campaign explaining to the public in simple terms how the police become prejudice may cause citizens to alter their actions or influence others to think about how they treat the police. A "what goes around comes around" approach is often used in training the police on how to deal with the public, meaning that if an officer treats an individual poorly, the next officer to deal with this individual may encounter residual anger from the previous officer's inappropriate behavior. This same type of approach could be used to educate the public.

Discussion and Implications

Police prejudice and discrimination is consistently a headline story in our national news. The most recent is the videotaped beating by the police of a black, 16-year-old boy by officers near Los Angeles in June of 2002. It immediately became

headline news on every news channel and newspaper in the United States. The incident was termed to be a racial incident by the media due to the fact that the officers involved were white and the suspect was black. Another videotaped beating soon surfaced of a black man who was being struck by a white police officer while lying face down and arms extended in a classic stance of surrender. The extent of the media coverage demonstrates the interest our society has in the subject. While much will undoubtedly be written on these cases, will the media or researchers look deeper into the underlying questions and causes? Are the police prejudiced? Are they more prejudiced than the rest of society? Do they learn prejudice on the job, or is it formed before the job begins? These questions deserve further research attention for the purpose of tailoring training programs to reduce the formation of prejudicial attitudes, if they do develop on the job.

Police training institutes could and should focus to a much greater degree on diversity education. Most police officers are still white, middle class, and from blue-collar, nonminority neighborhoods and are fighting crime in neighborhoods that are the alter ego of their upbringing. A new and inexperienced officer should receive some training on the types of emotions he or she will face when confronted again and again with hostility in a dangerous physical environment. If research indicates that this type of emotional trauma does facilitate the formation of prejudicial attitudes, the attitudes could be diverted from forming through the implementation of proper training, while the officer is still at the academy.

The other subject, which deserves further research attention, is that of de-policing. Are the police becoming "gun shy" when it comes to accusations of racism? Have the repeated accusations and media hype developed a phenomenon in which the police refuse to use aggressive crime prevention techniques in order to avoid accusations of being prejudiced? These questions remain unanswered leaving a large gap in what we understand about police prejudice. In order to develop effective plans for reducing police racism, we must know more than the effects, and we must understand the causes. De-policing, if it in fact does exist, could foster a devastating increase in crime rates in minority neighborhoods. If the police are practicing de-policing, the lessons of the 1960s and 1970s, which led to new community policing philosophies and aggressive patrolling tactics, could be completely undermined resulting in giving the streets entirely back to the criminals. Trends in the police community traditionally spread and what is happening in Los Angeles today will happen in Detroit tomorrow; therefore, if de-policing is happening in some areas, it is sure to spread. De-policing will need to be viewed from the officer's standpoint and from the cost to the minority neighborhoods. An aggressive community and national campaign will need to be enacted if de-policing exists and is spreading, or society will pay great costs.

Current training at many police training institutes focuses a minimum amount of time on diversity issues relating to cultural and ethnic differences. The more progressive training programs are using scenario training on a frequent basis. This type of training has proven effective; however, very little is done to reconstruct realistic scenarios in a simulated minority neighborhood, where a hostile relationship exists between the police and citizens. During my experience as a field training sergeant and as a 13-year veteran in a city with a large minority population, I have observed numerous new police officers struggle with cultural diversity, in essence being a "fish out of water" in a minority neighborhood.

These predominately white officers from small communities have never dealt with a group of angry minority individuals who have been offended by or are hostile toward the police. These new officers possess the skills to handle domestic disputes, traffic, officer safety, and basic criminal law but are not prepared in any way for the realities of the emotion and cultural issues they will face within a poor minority neighborhood. Police training institutes need to focus on developing scenario training that could prepare new officers for the types of realistic calls they will face in minority areas, using experienced minority police officers to act as roll players.

In the arena of field training, the best minority and white officers working in minority neighborhoods should be utilized as field training officers focusing on developing communication skills and teaching the diverse laws and language of the streets particular to each neighborhood, which cannot be taught in a simulated controlled environment. The field training sergeant and officers must be able to identify individuals struggling with issues relating to minority interaction. Once this individual has been identified through his or her actions on the job, an effort must be made to tailor a training program around the individual, such as placing the recruit in a minority neighborhood during a busy shift and setting aside time for the recruit to reflect and discuss the calls and behaviors of individuals with a high-functioning minority officer. The issues of diversity should be addressed head on at the beginning of training, utilizing the best field officers as mentors and advisors. The current procedure that allows a new officer to sink or swim and the belief that talking about emotions is a sure sign of weakness leaves an individual with little to help him or her in developing positive feelings about the citizens he or she serves.

Police prejudice will continue to plague our society, damaging the fibers and foundation, until we can effectively prevent it from starting with each new group of police recruits. The damage police prejudice causes society cannot be overstated or overlooked. Until we actively seek real solutions, we are just spinning our wheels with no end in sight and the real possibility of hostilities becoming worse.

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Police Corruption

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“It is the nature of authority to fear purity more than any sort of corruption.”

– Yukio Mishima, *Runaway Horses*

Introduction

The first written account of an act of corruption can be traced back to the Pharaohs of Egypt as early as the twenty-second century B.C. It is likewise obvious that corruption is not something new for law enforcement agencies. “To study the history of police is to study police deviance, corruption, and misconduct” (Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998). One only need peruse the pages of the eleventh report of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (Wickersham Commission) (1931) to get a sense of the historical depth and monumental problem police corruption has posed in America.

Corruption is a long-standing topic of law enforcement communities nationwide and internationally. It is cancerous and has the potential to destroy the efficient functioning of any police organization and diminish the ability of law enforcement to accomplish its mission to provide law and order to the public. It undermines the credibility of police agencies. Nationwide, there are numerous cases in which police executives were afraid to expose corruption in the law enforcement agency because of the fear of a public scandal. This is the most common and traditional mistake of police executives. When scandals surface, not just one police officer, but the whole agency gets the corrupt label. Early detection and prevention of police corruption is the primary strategy for the modern-day law enforcement agency struggling to provide better services to the public and establishing a new image of police in the 21st century.

Public outcry in cases of police corruption is usually strong because law enforcement agencies represent power, government, and justice. Corrupt behavior on the part of officers contradicts public expectations and demands immediate reaction, strong punishment, and organizational decisions for law enforcement executives. At times, it seems that when incidents of corruption occur, it is out of the police chief’s control. Can the chief of police do something about corruption?

By analyzing and learning the fundamentals of corruption and utilizing practical preventative tactics, law enforcement executives should be successful in reducing and controlling officer misconduct in general and corruption, specifically. Corruption is not a lethal but a chronic illness of the national police body.

At the same time, police corruption is a serious problem that could potentially destabilize not only individual law enforcement agencies, but also democratic

institutions in society and law and order in the whole community or state. Numerous studies have demonstrated the extent to which police corruption continues to be an important issue in contemporary national and international criminal justice systems. In Russia, for example, a recent public opinion survey indicated that police officers were the most corrupt representatives of the government (Clean hands, 1999).

The level of corruption is an indicator that law enforcement agencies are functioning poorly; however, research on police corruption has generally failed to develop a clear theoretical and practical perspective of what police corruption is and how its negative implications can be eliminated or controlled.

Definition

Corruption in General

Etymologically, the term *corruption* comes from the Latin verb *corruptus* (to break) and has been transformed through the ages into a term that describes a form of behavior based on broken ethics, morality, tradition, and law.

The classical definitions—those of Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides, and Machiavelli—dealt with the moral paradigm of whole societies and viewed corruption as the use of one’s public position for illegitimate private gains (Johnston, 1994).

The theoretical research on the definition of corruption traditionally focused on its relations to politics and misuse of authority. In the classical study by Robert Brooks (originally published in 1910), *Corruption in American Politics and Life*, corruption was defined as “the intentional misperformance or neglect of a recognized duty, or the unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of gaining some advantage more or less directly personal” (Brooks, 1974).

The most commonly used definition of *corruption* was provided by Senturia (1931), who sees it as the misuse of public power for private gains. Economic theory assumes that the public servant regards the office as his or her business (Heidenheimer, 1989). This concept overlooks the nonmonetary benefits of corruption (e.g., prestige, promises of political support, etc.). Another aspect of the definition of *corruption* is a betrayal of trust resulting directly or indirectly from the subordination of public goals over those of the individual (Gire, 1999). Behavior-focused definitions generally agree that corruption is the abuse of public powers or resources for personal benefit. The scholars fail, however, to explain by what standards (e.g., law, morals, or other impersonal standards) “abuse” is identified. According to the communicative action theory, corruption is a “type of strategic action in which two or more actors undertake an exchange relationship by way of a successful transfer of steering-media (money or power), which sidesteps the legally prescribed procedure to regulate the relationship” (Deflem, 1995). Basically, it describes corruption as an illegal exchange of power or money. The fundamental reason for this exchange is not clear.

With the establishment of the public powers, including different types of law enforcement agencies, the authority of the state became foreign and inflexible for an individual because rules, traditions, taboos, and laws had a tendency to

conserve past social relations. Humans are always struggling for changes that could make the social environment fit their expectations. Taking part in their public decision-making process may include the following: changing the system of power and the decision-making process (i.e., war, revolution, etc.), becoming part of it legally (i.e., elections, inherit, etc.), privatizing (making them suitable for this individual, or for any other actor in the society) part(s) of the authority (different forms of corruption). Corruption is a social phenomenon that involves individualization of public power through its privatization in monetary and nonmonetary forms.

Police Corruption

Most of the popular definitions adopted by international organizations like the Council of Europe and the UN on corruption are not substantially different from the ideas of Greek philosophers of more than 2000 years ago. The main approach is that the authority has been used for private gain (Council of Europe, 2000). Most definitions fail to explain what private gain means, and can we define the act of corrupt use of power for state gain in a case in which the state is acting in the conflict with the law and morals? There are numerous cases of this type of corruption in totalitarian societies (Shelly & Repetskaya, 1999).

Theoretical studies of the criminal justice system in the United States define police corruption as the systematic use of public office for private benefit, putting personal gain ahead of duty, or the misuse of authority by a police officer acting officially to fulfill personal needs (LaGrange, 1998). Police corruption is characterized by three main themes: (1) misuse of authority, (2) misuse of the officer's official capacity, and (3) misuse of personal attainment (Dantzker, 1995).

Some theories are traditionally in usage among law enforcement practitioners like the "rotten apple" concept (Rothlein, 2000). The "rotten apple" theory, however, fails to explain why those law enforcement officers "who themselves engage in no corrupt activities are involved in corruption in the sense that they take no steps to prevent what they know or suspect to be going on" (New York City, 1972).

Occupational socialization or the learning theory explanation avoids the analysis of the roots and reasons for corruption, stating that it came from previous generations of law enforcement officers through intergenerational transmission of values or was learned by observing others (Hauk & Saez, 2002). It is very similar to the "rotten apple" theory. This theory makes the corruption look like a traditional cultural attribute of the profession.

The international police community through the *Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials* outlined that "while a definition for corruption must be subject to national law, it should be understood to encompass the commission or omission of an act in the performance of or in connection with one's duties, in response to gifts, promises, or incentives demanded or accepted, or the wrongful receipt of these once if the act has been committed or omitted" (United Nations, 1979).

Empirical studies of police corruption have described its causes and consequences, indicating motivations of the police officers involved, which are mostly seen as private benefits or money.

In sum, studies of police corruption have focused on the terminology of corruption, descriptions of its causes and social consequences, and detailed tactics designed to prevent and control police corruption. The importance of these studies cannot be denied. They have demonstrated the extent to which police corruption has spread and to what degree the previous efforts in fighting corruption were successful. Research on corruption, however, often becomes too emotional and moralistic, operating with such terminology as “wrongful,” “zero tolerance,” and “immoral.” Definitions are narrowing corruption mostly to individual acts, but it is difficult to ignore that not only individuals, but also groups of police officers, the whole agency, and criminal justice system as a whole can be corrupt. What is needed is a conceptualization of what police corruption means for citizens, states, and the law enforcement community itself.

In modern democratic society, one of the most sufficient factors of corruption for law enforcement leaders is that the society treats power as a commodity. It is legal in a democratic society to convert one’s economic potential (money) into power through the legal mechanism of elections, but it is illegal to use public office to gain personal capital (power). Money is power; power cannot be converted into money.

Police corruption is a complex phenomenon occurring when authority (power) is used by law enforcement officer(s), individual(s), and societal and state entities as a commodity. Police corruption may also include an attempt to privatize, violate the independent right of police to execute their mission under constitutional law, or violate police sovereignty. By “police sovereignty” in its largest sense, we mean prime power—the right and responsibility to police. As used here, it applies to a police agency’s lawful control over its jurisdiction generally to the exclusion of other jurisdictions. Undermining, diminishing, or privatizing the rights and responsibilities of police in the specific jurisdiction not accordingly with the constitutional law will be defined as police corruption.

Any act that makes the public power of a police officer or law enforcement agency manageable by any entity other than a state actor (e.g., private individual; group of people; or any part of the state, political, and economic entities which is not constitutionally in charge of the agency’s mission within its jurisdiction) will be defined as an act of corruption.

To be accessible to a corrupt act, there have to be five major internal-external factors:

1. The internal individual composition of a police officer’s ethical values and principles with which he or she entered the law enforcement agency will remain probably throughout the officer’s career. Because most police officers will join the force in their twenties, there will be a slim chance that they will be changed morally in the course of police training and socialization; however, dark sides of an officer’s personality can be suppressed by discipline, punishments, control, supervision, benefits, and so on.
2. There is an external impact of “soft forms of corruption” in a society in which political players receive donations for electoral funds, fundraising campaigns, political favoritism of political appointments in the government, and so on.

Low moral and ethical standards and double standards of the community enable police to be corrupt.

3. The discretionary and anonymous nature of police officers' activities is providing a niche for corruptive behavior. In many cases, an officer is executing his or her powers alone and is not held accountable by supervisors.
4. The internal impact of the subculture of police camaraderie and brotherhood also can contribute to corruption. Socialization is a substantial part of the developing police professional. Being faced with certain expectations, traditions, habits, and the "way of doing police work" makes corruption difficult to avoid.
5. The legitimization of corruption is one of the most potentially dangerous factors. For some police departments, corruption is legitimate because its rare cases are informally approved by the failure to acknowledge that certain officers are or may be involved in it, on the part of managers and executives.

The subjects of corruptive activities are police officers, private groups, individuals, representatives of legal and illegal business, and political and state entities.

Thus, the objects of the police corruption include practically the entire spectrum of law enforcement relationships.

Forms of Corruption

Category 1. External Corruption Involved in Police Contacts with the Public

Soft Corruption

There are numerous cases in which actions taken by political players, governmental officials, and police officers do not violate any laws or formal rules of the organization, state, or social institution. These actions demonstrate a soft version of privatizing the official powers by individuals, groups of individuals, or private enterprise. Donations to the police department (e.g., cars, equipment, computers, and so on), free samples from law enforcement exhibitions, and discounts in stores and other gratuities are examples of "soft corruption." The police department or individual officers in these cases do not feel strong obligations to do anything in return, but psychologically, they will be bounded with the "contributor." It will increase potential attention from the police department or individual and the possibility of a discretionary decision, which will or can benefit the "contributor." The danger of this form of corruption is in its softness and transparency. Law enforcement agencies are learning to take and to be on the take from these soft forms. Often, the public finds nothing wrong with it. As a result some law enforcement agencies have reinstated their "no acceptance" policy of any type of gratuity or soft forms of corruption (Dantzker, 2000). Ironically, some business owners are frustrated when their gratuities have been rejected and view these actions as poor public relations on the part of police.

Official Corruption

In the cases of “official corruption” when actions taken by the police department or individual officers violate state and federal laws and rules and regulations of the law enforcement agency, they may be exempt from punishment on the basis of the operational necessity of gaining socially approved results in fighting crime and fulfilling the mission of the police department. Going over the speed limit when not in pursuit, allowing undercover agents to be involved in criminal activity, and not arresting criminals in exchange for important information are a few examples of official corruption. The Seattle Police Department’s Drug Abatement Program developed a “tactic” that was called a “buy-bust.” It involved an undercover officer soliciting drugs and buying them with marked money. The undercover cop then leaves the area, and uniformed or plainclothes officers swoop in and arrest the seller (Carter, 1999).

In these cases, police departments and individual officers feel strong obligations to do some favors in return and use their authority to get respect, honor, and benefits to fulfill the mission of the law enforcement agency or the career goals of the officer. These forms of official corruptions became part of *modus operandi*, and modern police agencies could not exist without them. If the goals of corruptive actions are socially valuable, these actions will be approved. Public perceptions find these actions to be dirty tricks, but they are tolerable because they help society to be healthy.

Criminal Corruption

When corrupt acts violate law and regulations and are not permitted by a law enforcement agency, they become acts of criminal corruption. This type of corruption appears in many forms.

Kickbacks refer to police officers making referrals to specific businesses in exchange for some form of reward. Examples include Russian police officers recommending specific photo shops and banks to get pictures and payments for driver’s license issuing. Usually, the reward is in the form of money, but it can also be in the form of goods and services.

Opportunistic theft is the stealing or retaining of any kind of property, money, or drugs obtained during operational activities. In Stavropol City (Russia), 22 police officers organized a criminal ring and sold the following items obtained from crime scenes to regional criminal groups: 15 grenade launchers, 576 firearms, 378 grenades, and more than 20 pounds of explosives (NTV International, 2001).

Shakedown can be defined as accepting bribes for not enforcing the law (Cox, 1996). Probably the most common form of a shakedown is an officer soliciting a bribe not to write a motorist a traffic citation. In 2000, Kazakhstan (former Soviet Union) took a major step towards eliminating police corruption. A new Minister of the Interior, who vowed to clean up the national police force, took an anonymous inspection trip. Dozens of corrupt traffic police and customs officials across Kazakhstan demanded bribes from the wrong driver, their boss (Reuters, 2000).

The protection of illegal activity involves police officers turning a blind eye in exchange for being compensated with cash or material goods and services. The most common illegal activities protected by police include gambling, drugs, and prostitution. When a new Russian car was stolen in May of 1995 in Moscow, several days after a Duma (low chamber of Russian parliament) advisor purchased it, he reported it to the local police. They advocated getting in touch with the criminal elements in his region, suggesting that he could get the car back by paying half of its original purchase price. The police offered to help him contact the Russian Mafia (Von Der Heydt, 1995).

The “fix” refers to police officers accepting money, goods, services, or political favors in exchange for quashing the prosecution of tickets and criminal cases. This may be as simple as an officer asking a coworker to dismiss a traffic ticket; however, sometimes the “fix” is much more elaborate and encompasses several layers of the criminal justice system. In the infamous Greylord case in Chicago, police officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges were all involved in the taking of bribes to fix cases.

Category 2. Internal Corruption, Which Involves Relationships Within the Law Enforcement Agency(s)

Corrupt Network(s)

Internal corruption is often a continuous and organized illegal process involving a number of police officers. A corrupt network is likely to embrace the substantial part of a law enforcement agency. Well known cases of a corrupt network include New York, New York; Cleveland, Ohio; Savannah, Georgia; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Detroit, Michigan and involved five to thirty current and former officers (Dantzker, 2000).

Internal Payoffs

Internal payoffs involve police officers paying their superiors for special treatment or assignments. Examples include paying for assignments to preferred shifts, district assignments, special duties, and coveted overtime details. Operation Greylord in Chicago, which targeted judges and lawyers in the Cook County judicial system, revealed the system of payoffs between lawyers, police officers, and judges suspected of having fixed cases in the past.

Favoritism

During the recruitment, selection, hiring, and promotion processes, it is common for police executives to give preference to some individuals on the basis of political, racial, religious, family, and or other affiliations. A more narrow type of favoritism is nepotism. Nepotism is the appointing of relatives within the third degree of relationship by affinity or consanguinity in the law enforcement agency.

Negative Consequences of Police Corruption

Political

- Undermines the confidence and trust of the public in the law enforcement community, criminal justice system, constitutional rights and liberties, and the ability of the state to govern with justice
- Destabilizes democratic institutions locally and nationwide
- Undermines the prestige of the law enforcement profession
- Isolates the law enforcement community from the public
- Instills public disbelief and cynicism in democratic values
- Helps certain political forces to initiate self-police, establish militant groups, and commit acts of terrorism

Social

- Promotes double standards in moral values and conduct
- Diminishes the value of law and constitutional liberties and promotes the ideology of ruling by force and injustice
- Promotes “us vs. them” attitudes between officers and the public
- Devalues social regulators of human conduct: norms of morals, law, religion, and public opinion
- Discredits the criminal justice system and law as the prime instrument of the government, state, and society
- Develops public perception that people cannot have security in dealing with government and criminal underworld

Institutional

- Creates manageability and integrity
- Discredits the law enforcement officer image
- Displays “double moral standards”: one for law enforcement officers and another for the public
- Results in indifference of law enforcement agents to the state, the citizens, the society, and the laws

Positive Outcomes of Police Corruption

- Receive public attention and additional financing.
- Ask for community support.
- Open dialog with the public on internal problems and quality of personnel.
- Use attention from media to solve external problems of public relations.
- Take opportunities to reform the agency and change policies and procedures.
- Strengthen the internal discipline.

Characteristics of Law Enforcement Corruption

- There is exceptional latency and secrecy concerning officers’ criminal corruption. Police executives are afraid to expose corrupt scandals. According to statistics, law enforcement agencies uncover no more than 1-2% of corruption cases (Organized Crime Watch, 1999).

- Some forms of police corruption are based on tradition and are part of the law enforcement officer subculture.
- Police corruption is mostly unorganized.
- Police corruption results in conscious diminishing of the law enforcement mission and interest and prioritizing private or group interests.
- Corrupt acts develop multilateral responsibilities between corrupt officers and the second and third parties.
- Attempts to camouflage the act of corruption by some legitimate reason.
- Continuous corrupt activities have a tendency to condense power in the hands of the corrupt elite of law enforcement personnel and to embrace the high and low level of the police department.
- Corrupt law enforcement officials have a tendency to build links with corrupt bureaucracy, criminal business, and organized crime.

Roadblocks in Fighting Corruption

Legal Roadblocks

- Lack of provision to extend anticorruption laws
- Lack of possibility to use undercover agents

Political Roadblocks

- Low level of political support in fighting corruption
- Traditional public ignorance to police corruption

Organizational Roadblocks

- Underdeveloped cooperation between local, state, and federal agencies
- Lack of financial resources
- Difficulty in recruiting and retaining professionals
- Lack of technical equipment to carry out internal investigation techniques
- Low-priority internal investigations in comparison to combating other types of crime

Professionalism-Related Roadblocks

- Lack of executives trained in combating corruption
- Lack of moral training for all levels of the law enforcement agency

Information Roadblocks

- Negative effect of mass media during the investigative phase
- Poor information network between law enforcement agencies
- Intense group loyalty of the police officers

Corrupt relations in the law enforcement community could be divided into three large groups:

1. Corrupt relations among representatives of different law enforcement agencies (patrol – investigations, state – local, judge – attorney, and so on)

2. Corrupt relations among representatives of the criminal underworld and corrupt personnel of law enforcement agencies
3. Corrupt relations between businesses and law enforcement agencies

The Control of Police Corruption

Police corruption will not be eliminated in the near future. Before considering the ways in which police corruption can be effectively controlled, it is necessary to keep in mind that police corruption in one form or another cannot be solved once and for all, but it is worth mentioning some recommendations and potential solutions that can help police executives to foresee, prevent, and control corruption. More than a decade ago, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) adopted an anticorruption policy that provides basic approaches on how to prevent and control corruption in a law enforcement agency (National Law Enforcement Policy Center, 1989). The following is a list of recommendations for law enforcement agencies to help prevent and control corruption:

National

- Improve the economic and financial well-being of the law enforcement agencies nationwide.
- Intensify various federally sponsored programs that provide education for police officers (especially in higher education).
- Develop community control over law enforcement agencies through public awareness campaigns (anticorruption vigilantism).
- Promulgate and utilize the standard codes of ethics and conduct for law enforcement officers.
- Develop cooperative agreements between local, state, and federal agencies in fighting police corruption.
- Establish nationwide training courses in preventing, identifying, and combating police corruption.
- Develop a nationwide database on police corruption.
- Develop a federal program to assess existing law enforcement agencies and their anticorruption strategies, policies, measures, and tools.

The Local/County/State/Subnational Level

- There needs to be strong will of the police leadership in order for an anticorruption program to become a reality.
- Assess the nature and extent of corruption within law enforcement institutions, and develop a system of measures against corruption.
- Develop an early warning system to detect possible corruptive behavior.
- Identify and name all forms of police corruption, and deliver this list to law enforcement personnel.
- Increase internal and external auditing frequency and its procedures.
- Conduct a regular financial background check, collecting information on the material conditions of all members of a police officer's family.
- Develop various incentives for meritorious police performance.
- Develop a special executive control of corruption-vulnerable positions in the agency.

- Develop straightforward policies in the department, and make sure that all officers have a copy of these policies (Champion & Rush, 1997).
- Regularly reevaluate a code of ethics in the agency; make it known to the public.
- Increase the volume of moral and ethics training; invite the representatives from the public for ethics training.
- Hire a training consultant to provide training in ethics, use of force, civil litigation, search and seizures, and arrest.
- Increase transparency in police procedures, bureaucracy, and dealing with the public.
- Provide more information to the public on police operations and procedures.
- Develop public awareness programs on combating police corruption.
- Encourage police officers to give presentations at public gatherings, citizen police academies, and radio and TV stations; write articles to newspapers and magazines on police corruption.
- Establish in your jurisdiction one of the models of citizen review (IACP, 2000).
- Educate the public on the departmental policy toward soft corruption and gratuities.
- Educate the public on complaint procedures and opportunities; ensure proper actions upon receiving the complaint, and inform the public on the results of complaints.
- Get information from the public on officers' behavior and morals.
- Simplify police administrative procedures; increase communication between the public and police executives and supervisors.
- Improve control techniques over discretion used by police personnel.
- Remove the atmosphere of secrecy from police activities.
- Encourage the reporting of corruption from law enforcement personnel and other police agencies.
- Develop close and regular contacts with federal law enforcement agencies (i.e., FBI, DEA) in obtaining information of suspicious officers' activities.
- Train internal affairs unit (officer) to foresee the potential problem. Involve the internal affairs unit in preventive anticorruption training. The internal affairs unit has to focus more on educating and training than on investigation and punishment.
- Implement a positive disciplinary system that is more educative than punitive.
- Develop proactive recruitment strategies, cultivating and breeding a new generation of law enforcement personnel through a high level of preservice training and centralized and standardized selection procedures.
- Orient public relations activities to public participation in police activities.
- Develop strategies for frequent police officer rotation of assignments, promotions, and new tasks.
- Improve usage of informants by police executives.
- Develop decertification procedures, and establish a mandatory national registry.

The International Level

International transparency and accountability through . . .

- The establishment of a monitoring mechanism
- The adoption of coherent strategies by the international community to fight corruption through shared experience and information

Conclusion

The powers given by the law and state to the police have always caused concern. Although improvements have been made through the 20th century to control corruption, numerous opportunities exist for deviant and corrupt practices. Police corruption undermines the confidence and trust of the public, the criminal justice system, constitutional rights and liberties, and the ability of the state to govern with justice.

Different control techniques can be useful tools for public safety administrators who are dealing with problematic personnel. The primary goals of the control methods are to determine whether an employee has a corruptive behavior problem and if so, to identify the extent to which it might affect an employee's ability to perform his or her job.

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An Affirmative Action Agency: A Case Study in Organizational Change

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Introduction

Affirmative Action (AA) means taking positive steps to end discrimination, to prevent its recurrence, and to create new opportunities that were previously nonexistent to qualified women and people of color (Kelly & Newman, 2001). Hays and Kearney (2003) write that whatever its original meaning, AA has become virtually synonymous with the use of goals, time tables, and/or quotas by which minorities are seemingly granted preferences. If any issue has caused a strong resistance to change, it has been the topic of AA goals to ensure nondiscriminatory hiring and promotion practices.

For police organizations, the last decade marked an increase in white women and people of color on many of the major police forces. The percentages of minorities and women, however, still do not reflect the police force as representative of the communities in which they serve (Moore, 2001). As a result, police organizations are still struggling to find the right balance of racial, gender, and ethnic diversity.

Methods

The objective of this study was to examine a law enforcement agency's implementation of AA and determine what factors would facilitate and/or impede change. For reasons of confidentiality and anonymity, the law enforcement agency will be referred to only as "the agency."

At the time of this study, the agency had over 2,000 sworn police officers and served a population of one million. The agency had a hierarchical, bureaucratic structure with slightly over 90% white, non-Hispanic, male officers.

In-depth interviews were conducted with employees of the agency. Interviews were conducted with three different levels (top, middle, and street-level) of police practitioners in order to collect data regarding the change programs from different perspectives. The interviews took place over a six-month period. The interviews were conducted in a structured, open-ended format, and a comprehensive protocol was developed to ensure standardization of data collection across police ranks. Although several factors were examined, this study only reports the variables with the greatest impact on AA implementation. The factors examined included pressure, individual attitudes, and communication.

Pressure describes the perceived or real reason for the change. The concept of pressure is noted in the literature as being an important factor in the implementation

of change. Change occurs through the implementation of a policy, program, or procedure (Allen, 1999).

Individual attitude describes the respondents' attitudes toward the underlying issues of the particular change programs (Hall, 1996).

Communication refers to the exchange of information and the transmission of meaning. Communication occurs in three directions: (1) upward, (2) downward, and (3) horizontal; it also includes omission, distortions, and overload of information. Lack of organizational communication or poor communication can result in an unclear purpose of the program and misplacement of program responsibility (Hall, 1996).

Affirmative Action Plan

The agency has maintained a citywide Affirmative Action Plan (AAP) since the early 1980s. Each city department also maintains a separate AAP, which combines to represent the citywide AAP. Each city department submits an annual progress report to the City's Equal Opportunity Department (EOD) for review and approval.

The agency's AAP provides specific objectives to support the continued commitment to AA in employment, training, and business. The agency's AAP consists of three general sections: (1) Plan, Purpose, and Commitment; (2) Employment; and (3) Business. Each section is broken down into specific objectives, and the means of achieving those stated objectives are outlined.

Section I – "Plan, Purpose, and Commitment" details how the department will publish, post, distribute, monitor, and report on their commitment to AA objectives.

Section II – "Employment" explains workforce profiles, workforce utilization analysis, and employment and development objectives for the department.

Section III – "Business" details the department's spending objectives for contracts for which it has discretionary funds, notification of procurement processes, and outreach efforts.

Although the Police Employment Services Department has the primary responsibility for recruiting, hiring, and training all police personnel, the police personnel officer in the Financial Management Department has responsibility for developing and monitoring the AAP for the agency. The two departments work in concert to ensure achievement of AA objectives.

Analysis of Affirmative Action Implementation

Pressure

Interviews with command staff and mid-level agency officers reinforced the notion that the desire to apply for and receive revenue sharing funds from the federal government was the original reason for developing and implementing the

department's AAP. Interviews with civilian staff of the EOD confirmed the receipt of revenue sharing funds as the original reason for developing an AAP.

Interviews with command staff presented the picture that the agency had always wanted to reflect the community's diversity, long before it was popular to do so. Some individuals, however, stated that the reason for AA implementation was that if the agency did not begin to reflect community demographics, then the courts would order them to do so. A court decree was a situation the department wanted to avoid at all cost.

Furthermore, interviews with mid-level and street-level agency officers revealed pressure from the city council and citizens to increase the number of minorities within the department as another factor that intensified the need to implement their AAP. The majority of responses, however, indicated that the major thrust behind implementing the AAP was monetarily related:

- "The Feds' COPS AHEAD Grant was a big influence on how we monitored and achieved AA objectives" (Mid-level manager)
- "Whenever you need to be motivated to do something, just SHOW US THE MONEY!" (Mid-level manager)

Interestingly, the need to become more representative of the community and increasing diversity within the department were only secondary reasons for implementing AA. This fact speaks clearly regarding the need for external pressure to ensure that the police department will strive to reflect the community it serves.

Individual Attitudes

According to street-level officers, AA issues include much more than recruiting and hiring minorities. AA includes the treatment of minorities and women once they join the force and the way in which their consideration for promotion is determined.

"The agency has its share of blacks and Hispanics, but they won't get promoted at the same rate the white cops do. More needs to be done in order to make the system fair." (Minority street-level officer)

Officers of color expressed concern with the lack of minorities in the middle and command staff rank. They believed that hiring more minorities was only half the battle. Once people of color joined the police force, they still have to contend with the promotion process for which usually all white-male review panels make decisions on promotions. It is important to note that the agency uses a competitive promotion process that includes a written and oral exam for most positions. Anyone who passes the test remains on the promotion list for two years.

Several women and minority street-level officers also pointed out that their immediate supervisors conduct the performance appraisals. If women and minorities are not in supervisory positions, then white males within the agency will always control the performance appraisal and merit increases.

In contrast to this opinion, a small number of white male officers reported that they perceived the department as “doing too much to recruit minorities and women” and “promoting based on gender and color,” and they felt that the department “overemphasized the issue of cultural diversity.” Indeed, some white male, street-level officers reported feeling alienated by the additional attention given to the recruitment of minorities and women. These officers expressed their lack of understanding regarding the reason for special recruitment efforts:

“Quality and safety first. You’re sworn as a police officer not a white police officer or a black police officer.” (Street-level officer)

“If women can’t do what men have been doing all along, they don’t belong on the police force.” (Street-level officer)

“Diversity? What does that have to do with police work? We reflect the community in which we serve—good cops represent good people—that’s the way it should be.” (Street-level officer)

As the quotations indicate, some white male police officers resent the department’s aggressiveness towards recruiting minorities and women. These officers, however, were not involved with recruitment efforts nor did they express a desire to become involved.

It appeared that both minority and white officers perceive the other race as receiving too much preferential treatment and as covering up or protecting each other. One officer went so far as to graphically describe an incident in the department in which a black female officer pushed a black sergeant. There were several witnesses to the incident, but when command staff asked the sergeant what happened, he replied, “nothing, nothing at all.” This story serves as an example that deepens some of the white officers’ beliefs that minority officers cover up for one another. The entire concept of perception between races is very interesting. It is clear that AA raises deep-seated concerns regarding race and gender.

Communication

When asked if officers communicated their concerns regarding AA to the higher ranks, all street-level officers responded with a resounding “no.” Although officers felt comfortable talking to other street-level officers (horizontal communication) regarding recruitment issues and appeared to speak openly during the interviews, upward communication was lacking, if not absent. Street-level officers reported that it was difficult to talk to command staff and most mid-rank supervisors because these individuals were the same ones who evaluated and promoted them.

“Oh yeah, right, give the command staff my opinion on AA. You must be crazy! Rank-n-File don’t talk to command staff. When I see a commander or chief in the elevator, I don’t even speak. And anyway, they don’t talk to us—it’s against their rules.” (Street-level officer)

“In order to relay your ideas to a supervisor, you have to jump through hoops. Which division or department is responsible for it? Who’s in charge of it? Where do you go? The answer, don’t know and don’t care.” (Street-level officer)

Communicating AA concerns to mid- and upper-level managers was not seen as beneficial to the street-level officers; therefore, officers no longer attempt to communicate issues. When officers perceive the lack of support and incentive in a change effort, it often reflects negatively in their actions and demeanor. For example, street-level officers who are aware of problems or impediments to implementing AA are no longer compelled to bring these issues to the attention of their supervisors. Additionally, officers who have recommendations to improve the program are reluctant to submit their suggestions because they believe that mid- and top-level management do not care or will take credit for the program improvement.

When mid-level managers were asked if and how they communicated AA plans and responsibilities to the rank-and-file, mid-rank managers currently involved with AA stated that memos and meetings were the best form of communication. Other mid- and top-level managers responded to the same question by stating, . . .

“When appropriate or when the need arises, there is two-way communication. Officers are encouraged to bring concerns to their immediate supervisor. If their questions aren’t answered, or concerns alleviated, then officers can feel free to talk to other supervisors, including command staff.” (Middle manager)

“My door is open to discuss any program concerns of the officer, but I won’t discuss any personnel matters. We do have procedures to follow, you know, the chain of command.” (Command staff)

It is clear that communication flows horizontally and downward with much ease, but it is the upward direction of communication that suffers. Although this was of no surprise, what was revealing was that command staff seemed unaware of the lack of upward communication and officers’ perceptions of what went on in the organization. Street-level officers who commented on communication phrased it best:

“People think because they talk they are communicating, but that’s not the case.” (Street-level officer)

“The higher ups talk, but they don’t listen . . . they think they listen, they think they know what’s going on . . . some of them do, but most of them don’t.” (Street-level officer)

As these quotations begin to suggest, the perspective that command staff “knows best” is met with skepticism. The officers’ skepticism and sometimes hostility extend to external sources, such as the city council and citizens. The council members, according to officers who were interviewed, “only care about their position,” and citizens, “don’t know what really goes on in police work.”

“Everybody’s talking; no one is listening. Everybody wants something, but no one wants to give anything.” (Street-level officer)

The officers' comments about communication reflect their view that their input is not welcomed, so it is not worth trying to give and that no matter what they say, nobody listens. This skepticism and cynicism may extend to the other change initiatives within the department as well.

Conclusion

This study found pressure was one of the strongest facilitating factors when implementing AA in the agency. The impetus for hiring minorities and women usually came from externally imposed sources, such as court orders, lawsuits, and financial incentives (i.e., federal grants) linked to other departmental programs. This finding was consistent with earlier studies of AA (Sass, 1999; Schuck, 2002; Strebel, 1996). It should be noted that while external pressure can ensure that police agencies attempt to increase their minority and female population, it cannot ensure the type of reception under-represented groups will receive from their police agencies once they have been hired.

As was revealed in this case study, white male officers often resent the intrusion of AA implementation and view such actions as unfair. While individual attitudes toward AA implementation were found to be an impediment, these attitudes on AA issues had no bearing on the actual recruitment of women and minorities unless they were directly involved in the recruitment and selection process. Individual attitudes as an impediment to AA implementation played a much larger part once women and minorities were hired, thus affecting promotion and retention.

Communication was also another important factor in the process of implementing AA. Based on the interviews, open dialogue is the first step in accomplishing departmental goals. Communication may take several forms: information meetings, memos, advisory groups, city council meetings, and status reports. While clear communication can assist in implementing change, the lack of communication or distorted information caused a breakdown in AA implementation.

While the descriptive analyses provided an abundance of information concerning the process of AA implementation, it also revealed that police departments are not making major advances in recruiting and hiring women and minorities. Once police organizations have recognized the need for change, understanding the factors that can affect the implementation of change, such as attitudes, communication, and pressure, is the second step. Lastly, finding viable solutions to the impediments will enhance the probability that police departments can make positive changes within their organizations. Police organizations must apply their new knowledge to daily police practices to ensure the successful implementation of change.

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In Search of Better Approaches to Law Enforcement Executive Training

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“Leadership and learning are indispensable to each other.”

– John F. Kennedy

Introduction

For many years, the importance of advanced-level training has been recognized by state and federal law enforcement officials. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973) advocated the training-before-promotion approach. In the 1970s, the California POST Commission launched the System and Training Analysis of Requirements for Criminal Justice Participants (STAR) project, which relied on a systems approach to training and emphasized management by objectives while breaking down police behaviors into specific roles and tasks (Haberfeld, 2002).

For decades, professional associations, such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the American Society for Law Enforcement Trainers (ASLET), have tried to provide standards and guidelines for executive training. In response, many well-recognized law enforcement training institutions (e.g., the FBI National Academy, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the Police Research Executive Forum, the Northwestern Traffic Institute, LEEDS, the National Executive Institute, the Southern Police Institute, and a network of 18 regional FBI command colleges) have developed courses of instruction for top- and mid-level managers. The accessibility of these programs, however, is relatively difficult because of limited financial resources, the restricted capability of the above-mentioned institutions, absence of training requirements, and various uncountable political “reasons.”

This article examines the current status of law enforcement advanced-level training opportunities and their applications in local and state environments with the emphasis on leadership and management training.

Law Enforcement Advanced-Level Training Today

Today, law enforcement executives are trained as patrol officers and expect to perform as leaders and managers. The public’s demands on and expectations of the law enforcement executives are often contradictory. Much can be done to better prepare law enforcement executives for the wide array of tasks they must perform every day, but the most effective way is to train and educate law enforcement administrators.

A problematic area for many law enforcement agencies is executive management and leadership training. There are basically three main groups of executives and

managers in the law enforcement community. According to Swanson, Territo, and Taylor (2001), law enforcement agencies can be divided into three supervisory groups with various levels of leadership and management skills:

1. *Top management* – Chief, deputy chief, and majors; use predominantly conceptual skills, with marginal use of human relations and technical skills
2. *Middle management* – Captains and lieutenants; use a lot of conceptual skills but also human relations and technical skills
3. *First-line supervisors* – Sergeants; make relatively little use of conceptual skills, concentrating instead on an equal mix of human relations and technical skills

Nationwide studies indicated that the average tenure of a police chief is about five years (Swanson et al., 2001). Although limited, this period of time gives enough opportunities for the law enforcement executive to enhance his or her knowledge and skills.

There is a distinct difference in the selection process between police administrators and patrol officers. In most of the cases, the selection pool for administrators is much narrower in comparison to patrol officers. Most law enforcement executives (with the exception of sheriffs) are selected from former patrol officers who were trained to follow not to lead. Leadership and management training for patrol officers is not satisfactory. The focus point of recruit and field training is to follow, not to lead. Patrol officers are learning leadership and management skills on the job with both good and bad examples. Line officers have to receive more leadership and management training to gain a better understanding of the nature and implications of supervision and to be prepared for promotion.

While most patrol officers have to meet certain educational requirements, many executive positions do not require further education. Most administrators are not going through psychological evaluation of their capability to manage people.


Local legislators across the nation require recruit law enforcement training or certification for patrol officer employment. In contrast, developed requirements and certification are seldom required for mid- and senior-level law enforcement training. Many administrators believe that training for supervisory and management positions is unnecessary or too expensive. Law enforcement executives tend to pursue and receive less training than officers and supervisors (Police leadership, 1999). For many of these agencies, the concept of a sufficient amount of experience, which officers could accumulate before the promotion to a management position, satisfies their quality control. Also, training costs become a second or third priority to the more immediate needs of salaries, overtime costs, equipment, and fixed operating expenses (Mahney, 2000).

This results in poor quality management and supervision over patrol officers. Not surprisingly, a 2000 study of law enforcement officers by Stanard and Associates reported that the greatest stressor for police officers is their administration (Fischer, 2003).

The foundation of the difference between recruit training and executive training lies in dominant historically developed groups of law enforcement officers: patrol officers

and supervisors. While patrol officers are in *professional* and *community-oriented* era of policing, supervisors and management are still in the *political model* era of policing. Politics influence every aspect of the law enforcement executive community beginning from the level of first-line supervisor, from employment, to promotion, to appointment, and ending on the level of sheriff with active involvement in elections and politics. Almost all executives occupy their positions with the help of key political leaders in and out of the jurisdiction. When climbing up on the hierarchal structure of the law enforcement agency, professional skills and knowledge become less important, and political skills gradually increase in importance.

Chief
 Captain
 Lieutenant
 Sergeant
 Officer



The dilemma “to be professional or to be loyal” often becomes the turning point in a law enforcement executive’s career. Political awareness, relations, networking, and the “ability for flexibility” become dominant in contrast to the professional side of the law enforcement officer. Supervisory positions demand a completely different spectrum of skills. Training for these skills is not easily available in the training academies. Verbal judo techniques, for example, are not applicable for communicating with your employees.

Not surprisingly, one recent study found that most officers report that their chief does not have the kind of leadership skills needed to implement community-policing programs (Cheurprakobkit, 2001). Another research project demonstrated that a majority of FTOs in the Indianapolis Police Department held negative perceptions of management recognition of good performance (Sun, 2002).

There is no universal model for executive training of law enforcement leaders and managers. Basically, there are two different systems of police training in each state.

Patrol Officer Training

- Minimum statewide selection standards
- Wide and diverse selection pool
- Minimum standards of training
- Mandatory
- Certain educational requirements

- Training is local function

Advanced/Supervisory Training

- No minimum statewide selection standards
- Limited selection pool
- No minimum standards of training
- Volunteer
- Uncertain educational requirements
- Executive training more state-federal function (FBI NA and the chief of police and sheriff associations)

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Patrol Officer Training

- Job-related design of the program
- Universal program for everyone (in most of the states)
- Certification
- Prior employment training, after hiring
- Intensive
- Skills-oriented
- Specialist-oriented
- Training institutions (academies)

Advanced/Supervisory Training

- “Filling the gap”; experience-related design
- No structure
- No certification
- Unplanned training
- Extensive
- Knowledge-oriented
- Generalist-oriented
- Diverse training entities

Present day selection and promotion systems are not pursuing a highly educated pool of candidates, leaving top level managers of the police community in the level of artisanship, not a professional. A limited number of police administrators have completed a college degree. A 1998 Illinois study of municipal police agencies reported that only 32.3% of police executives completed at least four-year degrees (Hazlet, Fischer, York, & Walzer, 1998). A 2001 study of Illinois sheriffs reported that 32.6% of sheriffs have at least a four-year degree (Johnson, Campbell, & Walzer, 2001).

Executive training has been more reactive than proactive in nature. It is delivered in “quantum,” such as racial profiling (2000-2001), terrorism, and homeland security (2001-2002). The selection of the training “hot topics” is more political than professional. Effective training for law enforcement executives is a profound approach and tool that prepares those involved in police management to lead. An investment in training enables the law enforcement agency and decision-making personnel to accelerate the professional level of the forces by improving skills and abilities and enhancing the personal development of the police officer ensuring his or her position inside and outside of the law enforcement system. Executive police training is ready for change, restructuring, standardizing, and institutionalizing.

Policymaking

“In matters of style, swim with the current; in matters of principle, stand like a rock.”

– Thomas Jefferson

Over the years, the ILETSB recommendations and policy-making processes for police executive training at the state level have served their purpose reasonably well; however, as the law enforcement profession has become more complex and demanding in the recent years with overwhelming tasks of maintaining homeland security, the demand for executive training has increased. In most of the cases, it was the law enforcement agency’s responsibility to identify, design, and deliver advanced training to meet their own needs. This approach created some fragmentation and multiple sources of advanced training delivery. This approach has resulted in . . .

- Uncoordinated advanced training for law enforcement agencies.
- Unnecessary duplication of efforts in executive training delivery.
- Statewide programs and courses being run at less than optimum capacity.

At the state level, there is a need for definite strategic direction in advanced-level law enforcement training, which can come about through . . .

- The setting of state policy for advanced training.
- The identification of mandatory advanced training.
- The establishment of common standards.

Advanced training must be driven by a comprehensive human resource strategy. Few law enforcement agencies in Illinois have a strategic direction for executive training. Some law enforcement agencies reject prioritizing the state executive training approach in favor of locally acquired solutions.

At the agency level, policymaking in executive training is the responsibility of the chief or sheriff, who decides which training will be delivered. Each agency has different ways of ensuring that the interests of all levels of managers and supervisors are taken into account. Efficient strategic direction for advanced-level training will require . . .

- Focusing on the achievement of an agency's objectives and improved performance.
- Enhancing evaluation of the advanced training that is provided.
- Producing a three- or five-year plan of executive training.
- Developing an organizational culture that encourages administrators' self-education and development.
- Designing individual training plans for each supervisor and administrator.

At both agency and state levels, the machinery for policymaking in advanced training should be able to translate the interests of stakeholders into policy that produces effective, timely, and efficient law enforcement executive training provisions.

Recommendations

Agency Level

- Describe an advanced training policy that outlines how training needs are identified, how administrators can access training, how standards are set, and how training will be designed and delivered.
- Develop a strategic plan for training (including advanced training) that ensures training is delivered to address the agency's mission and performance needs.
- Develop an evaluation strategy that measures the impact of executive training in the workplace.
- Develop individual executive training plans linked to the agency's mission.

State Level

- Put in place an integrated approach to advanced training that ensures that the training provided to law enforcement administrators contributes toward the achievement of individual agency missions and improved performance.

The Financing of Executive Training

The cost to the ILETSB of executive training is considerable, albeit difficult to quantify with any degree of accuracy. A substantial portion of executive training is financed from the agency budget. According to Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) research conducted in 1997, 8.1% of chiefs and sheriffs are not receiving reimbursement from the employer for executive development programs (PERF, 2002).

Most law enforcement agencies do not accurately calculate how much training is needed in any one financial year. Executive training is not prioritized in the agency's budget. In many cases, the law enforcement agency does not know what executive training needs to be delivered to achieve the department mission because generally, the top managers of the agency do not know what skills the agency requires its executives to possess. Training money for law enforcement executives is spent for courses that are offered by "training providers," but not for courses that are individually needed for the chief or sheriff.

The funding of executive training at the department level is the responsibility of individual chief or sheriff, who determines how much to spend on executive training. There is little evidence of agencies setting strategic expenditure targets or limits in relation to executive training. Most executive training budgets are based on traditional expenditures, with allowances made each year for inflation.

Recommendations

- Executive training expenditures should be related and connected to strategic goals and the agency mission.
- An executive training budget should be proposed only after the identification of all training needs.
- Determine the cost and the amount of individual executive training needed in the law enforcement agency.
- Executive training should be prioritized.

Common Minimum Standards

Common minimum standards of competence are linked to the development of workplace performance and focus on improving managerial and leadership skills. Research has found only a few states that deliver designed advanced training with any common minimum standards.

Law enforcement recruit training in comparison with executive training demonstrates distinct advantages associated with having common minimum standards. Law enforcement executives have not set mandatory, graduated educational standards for promotion. As was stated in recommendations from the IACP Leadership Conference, "promotion, from first line supervision to highest

command levels, is presently based on a combination of tenure (time in grade) and performance on generalized examinations that typically test for knowledge of law, department policies and practices, and situational reasoning ability” (Police leadership, 1999).

There are two types of minimum standards for law enforcement executives: (1) professional (specific mostly for this profession) and (2) educational (semi-specific for the profession and identified by degree or diploma).

There is uncertainty about minimum standards for law enforcement executives, however. Even in the area of educational requirements, there is a wide variety of backgrounds among chiefs and sheriffs. The Police Executive Research Forum conducted a survey of 358 law enforcement agencies with populations of 50,000 or more in 1997. Six among them stated that they do not have a high school degree. The survey suggested that only 15.5% of communities employing chiefs and sheriffs required submission of an annual medical exam; 7.3% required a physical fitness exam; and 0.6% required a psychological evaluation (PERF, 1998).

The immediate benefits of establishing minimum standards for law enforcement executives are as follows:

Benefits for the Agency	Benefits for the Individual
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Enhances departmental performance by improving managerial and leadership skills• Improves the community’s image of the police agency• Demonstrates the humanitarian focus of the agency	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Raises professionalism• Ensures job security• Helps identify future career• Saves personal investments

ILETSB does have experience in the implementation and enhancement of standards in recruit training. The future role of ILETSB should be to embrace cooperation with law enforcement forces and police associations, which will be beneficial to the police community in the implementation of standards for executives.

Recommendations

- Minimum standards for law enforcement executives should be state-wide.
- Administrators and supervisors should be regularly tested on the achievement of those standards.
- State standards should form the basis for recruitment and promotion specifications, and they will be helpful in the identification of recruitment and selection criteria.
- State-wide standards are important for establishing levels for rank competence.

Training Needs

“. . . that is what learning is. You suddenly understand something you’ve understood all your life, but in a new way.”

– Doris Lessing (British writer)

Police executive training should reflect the needs of law enforcement agencies and pursue the functional balance between institutional goals, the agency's current position, and personal expectations.

Roberg, Kuykendall, and Novak (2002) outlined the importance of the content of training programs on supervision and management.

Executive training programs should be based on the mission statement of the department, the description of everyday tasks and functions of law enforcement leadership and management, and the performance evaluations of supervisors conducted by subordinates. Executive training has to fill the gap between the mission of the law enforcement institution and the current position of the agency, taking in account the dynamic nature of external (political and financial factors) and internal (operational and personnel factors) forces and circumstances. Executive training needs extremely dynamic components and should be assessed and evaluated continuously. The filling-of-the-gap approach suggests that executive police training cannot be excluded from the whole field of police training for the agency and should be identified as one police training segment. In other words, when an agency is providing training for patrol officers, it has to arrange subsequent training and follow-up for supervisors and executives. Otherwise, there will be gaps not only between the agency's mission and the level of professionalism of the patrol officers, but also between patrol officers and executives.

Executive police training often does not take in account the scientifically identified needs, which results in training that is too early, or late, or executives were being taught things they "already knew."

One of the first most important steps in executive training development is arranging a *training needs analysis*, which can clear up three main issues: who should be trained, where the training should take place, and what the training should cover.

There are four ways of determining executive training needs:

1. *Organizational analysis*. The main goal of organizational analysis is to identify a variety of internal and external components that may affect the delivery of an executive training program (Goldstein, 1993). Executive training has to match the agency's mission, resources, and obstacles. It is equally important to identify how the executive's employer views the rationale of training and the perceptions of the training results by the agency's personnel in general prior to training. The effectiveness of executive training can be diminished significantly if the chief's employer and the rank-and-file officers view executive training as a waste of time and resources. Not surprisingly, a considerable number of chiefs and sheriffs are not receiving reimbursement from the employer for executive development programs (PERF, 1998).
2. *Job-task analysis*. Job-task analysis is aimed at providing a description of work functions, the conditions of performance, and qualifications.

3. *Cognitive task analysis.* Cognitive task analysis is a set of procedures for understanding the mental processing and mental requirements of job performance (Salas, 2001).
4. *Personal analysis.* Personal analysis identifies specific individual characteristics through psychological evaluation. It can help the executive to recognize some individual needs during training sessions.

It is interesting to note that whereas most police training researchers stressed that executive training needs analysis is the most important phase of training, only job-task analysis has been developed. Executive training needs have to get more attention from the police research community. This would enable researchers to develop statewide and organizational training strategies.

There are three levels at which executive training needs should be identified:

1. The state level
2. The agency level
3. The individual level

At the state level, executive training needs analysis in Illinois involves the ILETSB acting as a sponsor in cooperation with the Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police, the Illinois Association of Sheriffs, and other stakeholders to carry out training needs analysis. Training needs analysis often occurs as a result of political and mass media attention to certain downfalls (e.g., racial profiling), new legislation, and changes in working practices. ILETSB is becoming increasingly proactive in recognizing the training needs through intensifying research efforts, organizing executive forums/series, and evaluating executive management programs.

At the agency level, some police departments have human resource plans and strategies, which can be instrumental in the development of training needs. Clear objectives should be identified at this level. Outside consultants should be hired because most law enforcement administrators do not have the skills to identify training needs. The absence of an accurate system to update training needs often results in . . .

- Poor targeting of advanced training.
- Wasted resources by repeated training.
- Absence of the “total picture” of executive training for the specific agency.

Addressing the individual level of training needs is crucial for the development of executive training. Identification of individual training needs requires the following:

- Executive position performance evaluation
- Current levels of skills measured against required levels of individual performance as an executive
- Changes of functions brought about as a result of promotion
- Individual plan of filling the gaps in skills, knowledge, and experience sectors
- Executive training prioritization plan at individual level

Executive training program analysis may suggest providing instruction on topics that were absent from the curricula, such as political diversity, mediation and conflict resolution, “when things go wrong” management, and others.

Law enforcement executives should be given a fairly sizable training block in political diversity and survival. Knowledge of political information and information about the political makeup of the community will be of great benefit. In the process of this training, law enforcement executives have a good opportunity to develop close links with political forces in the community.

Mediation and conflict resolution skills is one subject that police executives will learn more effectively when they are placed in groups in order to engage in dialogue pertaining to varying approaches to solving a conflict. This section of training needs to include conflict resolution projects that enhance the acquisition of skills and also strengthen the importance of team playing.

“When things go wrong” training is another important topic that can be approached through case studies analysis. The objective of this section of executive training is to allow chiefs and sheriffs to develop their own approaches to solving problems and addressing agencies’ concerns.

Recommendations

- Develop and continuously record the training needs of the administrators.
- Appropriate training should be available to administrators prior to promotions.

Training Design

Model

The model used for executive training design should reflect the concept of the training task that needs to be accomplished. The ILETSB is recognizing the necessity of alternative learning methods and accelerating the research to bring about training strategies that rely less on traditional classroom-based activities. The ILETSB Executive Institute is using several effective models such as the following:

- The Executive Management Program (EMP)
- Executive Forums
- New Chiefs’ Orientation Program
- Special topic summits and programs developed from grant awards for police training (e.g., use of force, racial profiling, dealing with mental health crisis)

Thorough analysis, however, suggests that executive police training exhibits some weaknesses in training design:

- Executive training needs are not appropriately identified.
- Training is reactive and focused on what seems to be needed rather than what is scientifically identified.
- Assessment and evaluation techniques, which would help the ILETSB to measure the effectiveness of training, are underdeveloped.

To minimize the damage of possible new design of executive training, law enforcement agencies have to determine whether some of the elements of executive training already exist in current programs.

On the federal level, there are no mechanisms to assure that specific executive training needs have already been addressed. On the state level, the POST institution, in most cases, provides a role in coordinating and arranging sufficient executive training. There needs to be a more directive role of POST in planning and designing executive training.

There is no standard model for the design of executive training. In most cases, the following elements will be taken into account:

- The learning theory
- The organizational culture
- The resources
- Individual learning needs

Learning Theory

The content of the executive training for law enforcement agencies has a dynamic nature and serves mostly short-term goals and tasks (e.g., recruitment, racial profiling, etc). Contradictory to the content, the learning theory is rather conservative. The strategies through which law enforcement executives learn new knowledge and skills are surprisingly traditional, lecture-type pedagogical approaches. Birzer (2003) found that law enforcement training and education is dominated by militaristic and behavioral environment, which could be effective in teaching technical and procedural skills but will do little to enhance the acquisition of nontechnical competencies such as problem solving, judgment, and leadership. Police executive training is heavily weighted with the technical methods of police work and does not cover important aspects of the executive job as law enforcement administrator. There are few courses/meetings on political training, cultural diversity, problem-solving, conflict resolution, and proper methods of facilitating.

Executive police training should move toward more effective adult learning andragogical strategies. According to Knowles (1970), . . .

Andragogy is premised on at least four crucial assumptions about the characteristics of adult learners that are different from the assumptions about child learners, on which traditional pedagogy is premised. These assumptions are that, as a person matures, (1) his self-concept moves from being a self-directing human being, (2) he accumulates a growing reservoir for experience that becomes an increasing resource for learning, (3) his readiness to learn becomes oriented increasingly to developmental tasks of his social roles, and (4) his time perspective changes from one of postponed application of knowledge to immediacy of application, and accordingly his orientation toward learning shifts from one of subject centeredness to one of problem centeredness.

The concept of andragogy requires significant change in the role of the police executive trainer.

Pedagogical Trainer	Andragogical Trainer
Accumulator of knowledge	Generator of knowledge
Transmitter	Facilitator
Evaluator of trainees	Self-evaluator
Authoritarian	Team player
Manager	Leader
Planner	Improviser
Sharing experience	Solving problems

Andragogical approaches in executive police training can be applied to many of the subjects taught to enhance managerial and leadership skills. Some law enforcement executive training projects launched by ILETSB utilized this approach in designing the executive summits devoted to the most current problems in policing. The trainer is playing the role of facilitator in the effort to generate new possible solutions.

For law enforcement executives to be successful, chiefs and sheriffs have to be self-directed, and when they discover a problem, they will be expected to solve it. Executive training based on the andragogical concept should produce law enforcement managers and leaders who can think rationally and critically and foresee and prevent possible problems.

Training Delivery

“The only good is knowledge and the only evil is ignorance.”

– George Bernard Shaw

There are many ways in which executive training can be delivered. Most of the existing forms rely on traditional methods (i.e., classroom-based training, conferences, paper-exchange education, etc.).

According to Newstrom (1993), 40% of skills learned in training are transferred immediately; 25% remain after six months; and only 15% remain one year later. Roughly 20% of the critical skills needed to do a job are provided by training programs; 80% are learned on the job. Effective mentoring or a job shadowing program for new executives is, therefore, highly important. This type of executive training can be very effective and can quickly provide training for law enforcement administrator within the context of the role or position to be undertaken. Mentoring is useful in helping a newly promoted administrator to acquire practical knowledge.

One of the most progressive areas in which ILETSB is achieving success is in the more widespread use of flexible training delivery methods that move away from traditional executive training solutions and towards research and best practices analysis for the purpose of statewide policy development.

ILETSSB is searching for alternative learning strategies and for a more flexible approach to when training is delivered. This could reduce the amount of centrally provided training, reduce abstraction levels, and save travel budgets. ILETSSB is focused on reducing much of the wasted advanced training and in doing so, reducing the overall cost of training.

Recommendations

- Explore further ways of integrating advanced training, for which training is conducted across ranks and roles.
- Share best practices among different law enforcement agencies, ranks, and roles, especially in leadership and management training.
- Pursue a wide range of different learning strategies to reduce the amount of time spent on classroom-based advanced training.
- Use the opportunities of distance learning and mentoring.

Training Evaluation

“Character is much easier kept than recovered.”

– Thomas Paine

Advanced training programs succeed if the law enforcement administrators can demonstrate that they have mastered the material taught. They should be able to apply the skills learned in the agency, and their performance must improve in a way that benefits the police department.

Training evaluation is a systematic analysis of data that helps law enforcement administrators to make an informed decision on the worth and value of advanced training. The importance of advanced training evaluation is important because there is no state evaluation strategy regarding how much advanced training was delivered. There is no central database that law enforcement agencies can interrogate to determine if any other agency is already conducting evaluation in the area of executive training, thereby reducing duplication of evaluation efforts. The current practice is limited to evaluation of the single training event or presenter and has not resulted in the annual statewide evaluation of advanced training. The current advanced training evaluation strategy is measuring mostly the trainees’ satisfaction levels with the training event. Evaluation should be undertaken in a wider context and must take into account the effectiveness of narrowing the gap between the law enforcement agency mission and the executive’s current status.

Training evaluation should measure the following:

- The effectiveness of advanced training programs
- The degree of fulfillment of the agency’s needs
- How training impacted the agency’s policies and procedures

For accurate evaluation of the advanced training, there should be a strategy to carry out pre- and post-training evaluation. Prior to a law enforcement executive attending an advanced training, the city/county governmental agency or top level

administrator should send out a performance evaluation form. Once the training has taken place, within a period of one to six months, a similar form should be sent to the same agency to evaluate the utilization of skills and knowledge by law enforcement administrators and to assess the impact of the training.

Recommendations

Develop a pre- and post-training evaluation strategy measuring the impact of advanced training on law enforcement administrators.

Conclusion

“If you are planning for one year, grow rice. If you are planning for 20 years, grow trees. If you are planning for centuries, grow people.”

– A Chinese Proverb

The law enforcement community continuously expresses a strong desire to enhance leadership and management levels among their administrators and supervisors; however, not enough has been done in the development of an effective strategy for law enforcement advanced training. The executive tenure of the police chief or sheriff is short, and there is little hope that there will be enough time for law enforcement administrators to learn this extremely complicated profession “on the job” by making endless mistakes and hurting him- or herself and the department. Advanced training is the only panacea that leads to a professionalization of policing. Such an emphasis requires a change to the system that currently exists, with police administrators at all levels taking a greater responsibility for their own training development.

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Training Tactical Teams for Forceful Encounters

Vincent W. Arnone, President, Arnone Consulting

In a heartbeat, it happens. The radio call announces an active shooter at a local high school. Patrol units respond to the scene as the call goes out for SWAT. Sirens echo, and lights flash.

The first unit on the scene reports that it's not a happy scene. Students have been wounded; many can't escape the carnage inside; and the shooter appears to have barricaded himself somewhere in the warren of the school building.

Had this been five years ago, the patrol units responding would have established a perimeter and waited for SWAT. That all changed with Columbine, the now notorious school shooting by Eric Harris and Dylan Kleibold in Colorado. Now, officers know that time is of the essence.

Rapid response training has taught patrol officers the importance of reaching the shooter, ensuring the safety of the students and school staff, and containing, within the complex those who have, this day, chosen to shoot and kill.

Time is a critical factor. At the moment first response teams are entering the building, the wail of ambulance and fire engine sirens sound in the distance. There will be need for medical assistance.

The rapid response team makes their way through the building. They are in the "rapid responder diamond." This is a tactical configuration that allows the team to be covered on all sides while advancing in whatever direction is needed.

As the team moves forward, they observe wounded students, many covered in blood. Some appear to be dead. Secure in the knowledge that medical assistance is on the way and with the goal to prevent further carnage, the team moves forward.

Finally, they reach their goal, a room at the end of the corridor where the active shooter is. The problem is that he has taken hostages. The problem is further compounded by lack of information.

Is there more than one shooter? What kind of weapons does he have? How many rounds of ammunition? How many hostages has he taken? Are any of them injured?

Now is the time for the team to stop and gather intelligence. Acting presumptively can cost more lives. The situation has turned from that of an active shooter to that of a barricaded suspect/hostage taker.

Other teams that have responded are now involved in the arduous task of clearing rooms that had been passed by the first response team. This is a definite change

from the past, when rooms were cleared one-by-one prior to a tactical team proceeding through a building.

All of this action has taken place within a matter of moments. Time is indeed of the essence in an active shooter incident, but time does not equate with recklessness. There are tactics that, through practice and training, will build “muscle memory,” instinctively causing teams to make the correct decisions.

When the first responders, be they patrol officers or SWAT, enter the structure, they head in the direction of the gunfire. Their rapid responder diamond configuration means that four officers are placed in a diamond formation, usually with ballistic shields, and they proceed down hallways in this formation until they engage the threat.

When the team comes to an intersecting corridor (perhaps a T or Y) the officer on either the right or the left will become the lead for the team as they will pivot and move in that direction. This provides full coverage and allows the officer in rear to provide cover.

Now, the job of containment begins. It is helpful if all officers receive basic hostage negotiations instruction (*Basic* because only a fully-trained, fully-qualified hostage negotiator should try to negotiate with the suspect).

At this point, intelligence gathering is a primary concern. If the team cannot immediately put an end to the threat and resolve the situation without harm to the hostage, then a containment perimeter should be established and dialogue begun to ascertain what demands the hostagetaker has.

Since the first team on the scene has obviously responded to a 911 call or to the sound of gunfire, a reasonable assumption can be made that help is on the way. It is the job at this point of secondary response teams to form an outer perimeter and to begin clearing rooms one-by-one. Remember, it is the rapid response teams job to head for the source of the threat and contain, *not* to clear rooms as they go. This is a very major change from the pre-Columbine days.

Within a reasonable amount of time, SWAT units and trained hostage/crisis negotiators should arrive on scene. SWAT will then take over the job of containment as the negotiators begin the task of communicating with the hostagetaker.

A word that has come to the forefront in special operations is *mindset*—a simple enough word but with a complex meaning. If the shooter has the *mindset* to kill, there is little that can be done to deter him or her until containment has taken place.

Tactical teams also have a mindset. Muscle memory, a built-in response to various stimuli (such as learning to draw a weapon in the proper manner without thinking about it), is important. Only training will enable this proven method to serve a tactical officer well.

In the scenario described above, it is clear that swift resolution is important, but, swift resolution that leads to catastrophe is pointless. Contrary to what Hollywood

produces, officers cannot indiscriminately shoot anyone they encounter. Hence, there is a need for negotiation when it is possible.

Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, U.S. Army Ret., is an internationally recognized expert on violence and its aftermath. A former Army Ranger and West Point Professor, Lieutenant Colonel Grossman travels the nation training tactical teams and mental health professionals and has served as an expert witness and consultant in several murder cases. In fact, he testified on the government side in the murder trial of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh.

In his book *Stop Teaching Our Kids to Kill*, co-authored with Gloria DeGaetano, Grossman articulates the point that today's children are learning to kill with deadly accuracy from home computer games. He further points out that these games are almost identical to the versions used to train soldiers for combat and law enforcement officers.

The military, Grossman points out, utilizes the *Multipurpose Arcade Combat Simulator* (MACS), "which is no more than a modified Super Nintendo Game (in fact, it closely resembles the popular game Duck Hunt, except with a plastic M16 firing at typical military targets on a TV screen)."

A device that is used by most law enforcement agencies in this country is the Fire Arms Training Simulator (FATS). This system "is more or less identical to the ultraviolent video arcade game *Time Crisis*," says Grossman. "Both teach the user (or player) to hit a target, both help rehearse the act of killing, and both come complete with guns that have recoil—the slide slams back when the trigger is pulled."

What this teaches is that the mindset and muscle memory that officers face on the street, especially with teenage suspects, is often a result of similar training. That's why special negotiation training is needed when encountering this situation.

During a recent training exercise conducted by the North Reading, Massachusetts Police Department and the Northeast Massachusetts Law Enforcement Council Special Weapons and Tactics Team (NEMLEC SWAT), I had the opportunity of playing the role of an active shooter who then transitioned to the role of hostagetaker.

The scenario was that, as a disgruntled school employee who was having marital problems as well as mental ones, I entered North Reading High School armed with an M-4 semiautomatic weapon and, after firing several rounds, ran through the school shooting and shouting, ultimately taking a female student hostage.

A rapid response team comprised of North Reading police officers, who were in their various vehicles on patrol, responded to the scene of the 911 call. They formed the rapid responder diamond, negotiated the hallways and proceeded to the lab where my captive and I were.

Subsequent entry teams began room clearing, and SWAT was called. Hostage negotiators arrived on the scene and began a dialogue with me. My demands were

made (i.e., my job back, no charges against me for any crimes I had committed, and my wife back), and then the wait began.

Utilizing patient, time-proven techniques, but never really agreeing to very much, the negotiators convinced me to release the hostage. They suggested that I continue my dialogue with them on the special hostage phone that they had provided me with several hours earlier as the female student made her way to them.

Once the hostage had reached safety, the SWAT Team made entry from three points (to include the second floor windows). Their entry was so abrupt and forceful that I never had a chance to fire another of my blank rounds.

The hostagetaker (me) was then flex-cuffed and led outside to a waiting police car. Fire and rescue crews then began their search of the building to be sure that no other injured students were hidden anywhere in the school.

On another occasion, NEMLEC SWAT was receiving training from Mike Odle and George Ryan, two members of the Los Angeles Police Department Special Weapons and Tactics Team (LAPD SWAT) who use their time off to travel the country and train tactical teams.

The two Californians shared their experiences as a full-time team with the men of NEMLEC who, like most SWAT teams in our nation, are a multi-jurisdictional, part-time team. There is *nothing, absolutely nothing*, that can replace training and experience.

During the week of training, Mike and George discussed movement, tactics, intelligence, and a myriad of other topics that are essential to the successful deployment of tactical teams.

The class was then broken up into several individual entry teams who were then deployed to scout locations where they would perform high risk warrant service. Cameras were issued, photos of the locations taken, mission plans drawn, and then the teams deployed dressed in full tactical gear. (It is important that teams train in the clothing and equipment they will use on an actual operation. This builds more muscle memory).

Several tactical officers from other units, as well as myself, played the role of drug dealers. We were situated in a deserted single-family, two-story house, with me in the kitchen. What occurred next was text book action.

Utilizing the knowledge gained from prior observation, photographs, and mission plans, the NEMLEC SWAT team made a silent approach, and as one team performed a "break and rake" on the kitchen windows behind me, another team threw a "flash bang" distraction device just inside of the front door.

Despite the fact that I was expecting something to happen at some time, I was completely overwhelmed by the explosion on one side of me and the breaking glass on the other. I never had a chance to raise my weapon.

Sweat and hard work during lots and lots of training are what make tactical teams good. There is an old military expression that goes, "The more you sweat in training, the less you bleed in combat." All too true!

New techniques are being developed rapidly. Take advantage of them; learn from them; and remember, the place to make mistakes is during training. With proper skills, a tactical officer can survive a forceful encounter, learn from it, and share that knowledge with those who are his brothers in one of the noblest professions on earth.

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While he was in Thailand, he formed his company, Arnone Consulting. Upon return to the United States, he became a security coordinator for a major international hotel chain and has continued his work training SWAT teams as president of Arnone Consulting. He has also been involved in kidnap and rescue operations within Southeast Asia.

He has served as a judge during the annual New England SWAT Challenge and participated in the past seven SWAT Round-Ups, which are held in Orlando, Florida and sponsored by the Florida SWAT Association.

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Tactical Response Issues Within the Plainfield Police Department

John J. Konopek, Jr., Plainfield Police Department

Introduction

As the law enforcement profession enters into the 21st century, law enforcement leaders are faced with the growing concern of dealing with increased levels of actual and perceived threats within their communities. The dangers that police officers face and the types of incidents to which they are responding continue to place an exceedingly heavy burden on police resources. Every day, officers are dealing with offenders who carry weapons equal to, or even superior to, what police have access to. As the criminal element continues to arm itself with sophisticated weaponry and plan the tactics they will employ, the police find it necessary to increase their level of tactical training in order to answer to this increased threat level. Additionally, in some communities, the public is questioning and raising concerns regarding the tactics and techniques their police department is using to address the high-profile increase in school and workplace violence throughout the country.

The types of incidents that are occurring are not limited to the congested larger cities or urban areas. These acts of mass violence and hostilities have found their way into the smaller, less populated communities as well. With this influx of violence into the smaller and medium-sized towns and villages throughout the country, police agencies of all sizes have had to address these concerns. Many areas in Illinois, especially in the Will County area, are growing at an astonishing rate. People are relocating to this geographic area from all parts of the country and even from other parts of the world. Plainfield is no exception to this trend. With the increase in growth, the community has also seen an increase in the types of criminal activity typically associated with urban sprawl, such as drug activity, domestic disputes, and calls involving the mentally and emotionally disturbed. As homes are built closer together, families and individuals lose more and more of their personal space every day and also tend to reduce their level of patience with their neighbors, others, and themselves.

With this potential influx of violent-natured calls, smaller towns and agencies must examine the techniques and tactics they have used in the past and prepare for the types of calls they may see in the future. Larger metropolitan agencies have been responding to these types of incidents for years and usually have the human resources to deal with the situation; however, the rural, or smaller sized agency may have never faced a violent offender scenario and may have little or no resources to safely and efficiently address these types of incidents. Additionally, when the topic of tactical teams or tactical-based training arises, especially within a smaller community, a controversial atmosphere usually emerges. Inevitably, liability issues accompany the controversy along with additional concerns raised by traditionalists of policing or detractors of tactical-based training.

As these concerns are raised, a policing agency must ask and answer several questions before it can proceed with the process of introducing a tactical team or tactical-based training into the community.

Some of the questions to be asked and answered are as follows:

- Is there a need for tactical-based training or a tactical team in my community?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages with this tactical concept?
- When would this training be used?
- What type of liability is attached?

These are only some of the questions that will arise when addressing this issue. As additional questions arise, the administrators of the department must address each one with as much straight-forward information as is possible to quell any fears that the community may have concerning these techniques.

The research in this article will cover the main issues facing smaller communities and the options they may have. Should they decide to implement some type of tactical team or tactical training within their department, the research will also identify the differences between the traditional reactive tactical-based team concept and new proactive rapid response tactical training.

On a local level, the research will specifically address the following question: Is it feasible to implement a tactical team or tactical-based training within the Plainfield Police Department?

With the changes in societal beliefs and philosophies in the community and the policing profession, particularly in and around the Plainfield area, the issues surrounding tactical-based training for police officers must be addressed in order to provide the "street cops" with as many options as possible to deal with the challenges they face on a daily basis.

Literature Review

Societal Need for Tactical-Based Training


The policing profession must continually monitor changes in both a societal make-up and societal beliefs in order to keep up-to-date on potential problems. As they update, they must also keep abreast of the latest techniques and tactics being used in law enforcement. In a fast growing area, such as the Plainfield/Will County area, the two best ways to monitor these changes are population trends and criminal activity.

As the population increases in certain geographic areas, the problems associated with that area also tend to increase. Although specific areas may not foster more problems than others, the mere fact that increasing numbers of people are relocating to particular geographic areas tends to increase both the congestion and the crime rate within this migration. This, in turn, raises the chances that an unusual or critical incident will occur.

The Plainfield/Will County area is currently experiencing a tremendous amount of growth. Several publications and sources including the Northern Illinois Planning Commission lists Will County and Plainfield in the top five locations throughout the state for growth.

Censuses and surveys show the amount of growth over the last five to six years (See Figure 1). In 1995, the population total for the Village of Plainfield was 7,163 residents. Since 1995, the population has continually and steadily increased every year to the point that in the year 2000, the total of residents surpassed the 11,300 population estimate with 13,038. Speculation surrounding the federal census may place the actual figure closer to 14,000-15,000 residents within the village proper. This trend shows no signs of slowing with the conservative projected total of residents in the village in the year 2020 at 30,000.

Figure 1
Plainfield Projected Population (Estimated)



These figures only highlight the growth occurring within the village limits. They do not factor in the additional growth occurring on the outskirts of the village in Joliet, Bolingbrook, Aurora, and Naperville—towns that already boast of populations of at least 50,000 residents and still increasing.

Traditionally, when an area experiences a large increase in population over a short period of time, the region also sees an increase in the types of calls for service. The Plainfield/Will County area is no exception.

The next few examples show the potential trend for violent incidents developing in the Plainfield area associated with this increase in population:

March 26, 1996 – A distraught, possibly suicidal male fires a weapon in the Corvette Collection with his brother present. Upon arrival of police,

the offender leads them on a pursuit to his father's workplace, where he temporarily takes his father hostage. Situation resolved with no injuries and offender in custody (Plainfield Police files, Case # 96-0850).

March 26, 1997 – Unknown offender dressed in black fires weapon at Plainfield Police officer on a rural road within the village. Extensive search of surrounding area fails to locate offender. [Plainfield Police files, Case # 97-2287]

June 1998 – Plainfield Police increase security at high school graduation in response to rumor of potential violence. Rumor generated after a number of weapons, including rifles were stolen in a residential burglary in the area. Graduation proceeds without incident. [Plainfield Police memo]


September 5, 2000 – Plainfield Police with assistance of Joliet Police are able to negotiate with suicidal male into surrendering after holding police at bay with loaded .357 handgun for over two hours in forest preserve. [Plainfield Police files]

These are just a few examples of the growing trend for violent criminal activity in this growing area. Understanding the full significance for an influx of this potentially serious criminal activity requires two sources of input. The research must cover specific incidents as shown above and examine what caused them to happen. Additionally, the research must examine the overall crime trends for the municipality over the course of the last several years. With these two sources of statistical data, the research can portray a clearer picture of potential problem areas and also assist with determining the best course of action to take.

With the increase in the population, the Plainfield Police Department can expect to see an increase in minor or petty crimes. Additionally, as the houses are built closer together, traffic congestion increases on the roadways and people begin to feel the pressures of increased family, work, and financial responsibilities, the potential for violent crime, domestic disturbances, drug offenses, and calls regarding emotionally unstable individuals will also increase.


The research from the last six to seven years in Plainfield shows this increase is occurring. In the category of forcible felonies (e.g., homicide, armed robberies, burglaries, arsons, etc.), 1994 showed the number to be at 17 incidents for the year. The next three to four years showed the number of incidents to remain relatively constant; however, in 1999, the number began to experience an upswing with 19 total incidents. The following year, 2000, the village experienced the largest number of forcible felonies in recorded history with 50 incidents. An increase in one year of 260% (See Figure 2).

Figure 2
Forcible Felonies



This trend carried over to other criminal activity as well. Drug offenses have continued to show an increase every year. In 1994, the total number of drug-related incidents was only seven; however, by the year 2000, that figure had skyrocketed to 155 incidents. This is a six-year increase of almost 2250%! (See Figure 3).


Figure 3
Drug Offenses



Other data shows that the number of domestic type incidents stayed relatively constant from the year 1994 until 1998 with just a slight increase from 33 to 57

respectively. In the years 1999 and 2000, however, this number increased to 98 and 97 respectively—an increase of 170% (See Figure 4).

Figure 4
Domestic Trouble



Although the total number of suicides and suicide attempts has remained relatively low over the course of the six years, the total in the year 1994, two, is significantly lower than the total experienced in the year 2000, seven.

Although the street patrol officer faces the types of crimes just mentioned, over the course of the last two decades, a new type of criminal-based scenario has emerged, active shooter incidents.

Active shooter incidents involve “an offender that is attempting to still actively and physically engage in causing great bodily harm or death” (LAPD, 2000). These types of incidents have been occurring for several decades but have never been as prevalent as they are today. Because of changing societal beliefs and social values, the police are faced with an ever-increasing number of these active shooter incidents. The active shooter has been categorized as “angry, vengeful, heavily-armed, and usually having no plan or intentions of escaping from the location, but rather an intent to die by suicide or police gunfire” (Conley, 2000).

As we entered the 1990s, this phenomenon has been continually monitored by law enforcement officials and the media. As society progressed through the decade, the frequency and intensity of these events began to increase. The media began to give extensive coverage to each of these incidents. As public awareness began to grow, communities throughout the country began to question why these incidents were occurring and how to deal with them.

Beginning in 1991, with the shooting at Luby’s Restaurant in Killeen, Texas (23 dead, 28 wounded) (Conley, 2000), the 1990s produced some type of mass shooting critical incident almost every year. Additionally, as the end of the millennium

neared, society saw an even more remarkable increase in the number of active shooter incidents. Although some of these incidents garnered more media coverage than others, a partial listing in the Appendix shows at least 13 incidents in which an active shooter scenario materialized.

One of the biggest challenges facing the police community is the fact that these shootings are occurring in various sized population areas. They are not occurring exclusively in heavily populated cities and towns, but also in smaller communities and areas throughout the country. Not only are the large metropolitan police departments seeing a need to address these potential incidents, but the smaller or rural police agencies also must institute a plan of action to deal with these types of incidents. Police agencies of all sizes that boast schools, office buildings, churches, or other types of buildings where people tend to congregate within their jurisdictions have been turning to training agencies or companies to teach them the latest techniques to address these critical incidents. Additionally, these police agencies have also rewritten many of their policies and procedures to ensure for the optimal response to an incident of this magnitude.

As just mentioned, the police have begun to concentrate their efforts on addressing violence, specifically high-risk targets like businesses or occupancies. Traditionally, police officers focused their attentions on the residential areas as being the source of most violence-related calls for service, mainly involving domestic issues. With active shooter incidents on the rise, officers must now shift their focus to schools, office buildings, churches, and financial and industrial institutions.

Typically, residential settings have provided a feeling of safety and security for offenders. They have thrived off the comfort level experienced in a familiar setting.

Financial settings normally provide some type of monetary gain for offenders, thereby creating some type of incentive for them.

Industrial, governmental, and educational buildings usually elicit high publicity and media coverage when an unusual incident occurs there. Cases in point are the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 and the mass shooting at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado in 1999. The offenders that target these types of buildings may be trying to utilize the expected media coverage, to achieve their “fifteen minutes of fame” or other macabre agenda (National Tactical Officers Association, 2000).

The Village of Plainfield encompasses all of the aforementioned types of buildings within its jurisdiction.

History of Tactical-Based Training

Throughout history, law enforcement officials have been faced with the task of operating police departments that address the needs of the community they protect. Law enforcement professionals have continually tried to keep updated and abreast of the latest advances in technology and procedures in the fight against crime. The problem that arises is some of these techniques or tactics are viewed as controversial by both the public and other law enforcement professionals. No

topic in law enforcement will cause more open discussions or heated debate than the issues related to tactical teams or tactical-based training within a department. The pro-tactical law enforcement officials contend that . . .

justification for [tactical] teams is found in the daily encounters that occur in this country between law enforcement personnel and subjects, fleeing from crime, mentally disturbed individuals, and those involved in domestic and neighborhood disputes. "Routine" incidents such as these account for more gun battles, and police officer injuries and deaths than the more newsworthy conflicts between police and militant or terrorist groups. (Stevens & MacKenna, 1989)

On the other side of the argument, although tactical teams remain throughout the country, they do not garner as much enthusiasm or support from administrators as they once did: "SWAT teams are a necessary evil and a high liability for a department. Most chiefs of police would turn that responsibility to someone else if they could" (Hudson, 1997).

The concept for the SWAT team, or tactical team, was first created in the turbulent 1960s by former Los Angeles Chief of Police Darryl Gates (Hawkins, 1999). At the time these teams were being formed, the overwhelming issues facing our nation dealt with disturbances associated with the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War. This progressed into the 1970s with the massive increase in the amount of illegal drug usage among the citizens. Because of these issues and relying on the traditional policing philosophy at the time, these tactical teams' dual purpose was to quell these civil uprisings and use their intimidation factor and militaristic style to wipe out the prevalent drug business at the time.

As the policing community progressed into the 1980s and 1990s, the philosophy being used began to change. The police were no longer trying to use the traditional approach to policing, whereby they remained distant from the public. Additionally, they started to remove themselves from the image of an authoritarian or paramilitary group. The policing community began to change over to a new philosophy, community policing.

With community policing, the idea is to interact with the citizens of the community and present an image of police as more approachable and easier to interact with. The goal was to remove the authoritarian image and replace it with a more approachable image. As a result of this change, SWAT teams and tactical teams began to lose the support of both the administrators of the department and the community. Residents in several communities were surveyed, and the results showed that the residents felt police tactical teams could not protect them from crime, solve crime, or prevent crime (Hawkins, 1999).

As community policing continued to evolve, administrators and policymakers made the determination that the concept of a SWAT team presented an image that was too militaristic or unapproachable. This resulted in many departments downsizing or eliminating many of these teams and reducing the amount of tactical-based training to the street patrol officers.

As society progressed through the 1980s and 1990s, the policing community continued to promote community-policing. Tactical teams, although downsized and more diverse, continued to conduct high-risk search warrants, raids on drug houses, and high-profile personnel protection and also continued to respond to calls of a hostage situation or a barricaded offender. These incidents, however, were preplanned in advance of execution or evolved over an extended period of time, thereby affording the teams the luxury of having “time on their side.”

As the policing community entered the 1990s and began to reach the close of the 20th century, an increase in active shooter incidents began to materialize.

At first, the public had little or no reaction to the police response because these critical incidents were few and far between; however, as policing moved closer to the end of the 20th century, these incidents of mass violence became more frequent, violent, and highly publicized through the use of the media. Although tactical teams responded to every incident, the amount of time it took for their arrival to the scene and readiness for action began to result in additional injuries and deaths to civilians. The public began to demand that the law enforcement community adjust their response procedures and philosophy to ensure the best possible resolution to these major incidents.

One incident that highlighted the dangers facing the street patrol officer and the need to reexamine tactical-based training for street patrol officers was the Bank of America shoot-out in Hollywood, California in February 1997. In this incident, two heavily armed offenders in full body armor were able to “outgun” patrol officers with the use of automatic firing rifles. Injured civilians and police officers were unable to receive immediate medical attention due to the lack of a tactical-based rescue plan.

The public outcry continued to build until it culminated at Columbine High School in 1999. As the incident unfolded, tactical teams from several jurisdictions responded to the shooting. As police on the scene awaited their arrival, no formal action was taken on the part of the police because of traditional techniques taught throughout policing history. As police set up a perimeter to contain the offenders, the juveniles continued to injure and kill subjects inside the school.

As a result of these incidents, several pending lawsuits were filed, and police began the arduous task of researching and creating new and potentially controversial procedures for the law enforcement community.

The Bank of America shoot-out resulted in the policing community upgrading the types of weapons they allow the street patrol officers to carry in the patrol squads. Many departments now allow the street officers to carry and qualify with urban assault rifles. This allows the street officer to be on a more level playing surface with the armed offender(s). The shooting at Columbine High School resulted in police agencies and administrators re-examining the techniques and procedures taught to street patrol officers, regarding any tactical-based or critical incident situations they may encounter.

Basic Components of SWAT and Tactical-Based Training Procedures

The tactics employed when SWAT was initially created, and basically still in place today, require the first responding police officers to take a reactive approach when responding to incidents of mass violence or as we call them, critical incidents. Unless the first responding officers can quell the disturbance or situation immediately, they institute a perimeter around the incident and wait for the arrival of the SWAT team.

Once the SWAT team arrives on the scene, they take the command and methodically try to isolate the offender(s). They then either attempt to negotiate with the offender(s) into surrendering or neutralize the threat.

SWAT teams normally operate with a minimum of six officers assigned to each team. In larger incidents, a full team may consist of 15-20 officers or more. The cost to outfit one SWAT member normally runs between \$2,000 and \$6,000. Much of this cost is a one-time expenditure for uniform and training needs.

Additional costs to a department's budget will incur because of the required training. Team training should be conducted at least twice a month with the entire team present. This will cost the department's budget in the way of overtime and human resource costs. Specialty positions on a team (e.g., sniper, negotiator) also require additional monetary considerations for training and equipment.

Within the hierarchy of a SWAT team, various officers fill different command positions. The team leader or commander must understand the limitations of the entire team and ensure that the team is trained to the level the jurisdiction needs. Additional positions of command fill out the team with the members requiring additional training.

Overall, the SWAT team concept must continually rely on the department's budget to facilitate its growth and improvement, yet it does not ensure the team will ever be needed.

As we have just discussed, in recent years, the type of violent criminal activity we have experienced shows that the police do not always have the luxury of waiting for SWAT to arrive.

Because of the Columbine shooting, the policing community needed to examine and research new techniques and procedures to address these active shooting incidents. Representatives from the Los Angeles Police Department's SWAT team and other federal agencies went to the scene of the Columbine shooting to find out first hand about the problems faced by emergency personnel, especially the responding police agencies, on that day. After interviewing victims, witnesses, first arriving police personnel, responding tactical personnel, and various other informational sources, they created a plan to try and deal with these types of incidents.

As this technique was being developed, the architects had to develop a plan that would provide street patrol officers a tactical-based response, yet still fit into the

ideals that the community, as a whole, was trying to express—that of a community policing proactive approach.

The plan developed was the Rapid Deployment Response Plan. The primary focus is to train street patrol officers in the techniques and procedures for initiating building searches while an offender is still actively shooting.

Basic Components of Rapid Deployment Response

As with any new technique or procedure that is put into effect, an accompanying written policy should also be created. This policy not only sets the parameters for the responding officers to follow when implementing the plan, but also acts as a reference base for any potential liability issues. It may also serve as a public relations tool. The public relations aspect may come into play should members of the local governing board or other concerned member of the community question the local police about their response to an active shooter incident.

The basic premise behind the plan is two-fold: (1) contact and (2) rescue. This technique should not be used for situations involving a barricaded subject or an incident in which the location of the offender(s) is unknown. This tactic is used strictly for the active shooter scenario. A SWAT or tactical team handles all other situations.

If patrol officers are dispatched to a critical incident scene where offender(s) are still actively shooting, the patrol officers would easily and rapidly deploy small teams of officers to contact, contain, and/or neutralize the suspect(s) and at the same time begin to initiate victim rescues. Additionally, if the rapid response only isolates the suspect(s) in a certain area, they could still begin the victim rescue phase while awaiting a full SWAT team to end the disturbance. No additional people can be accessed by the offender(s), yet people already injured can be removed to safety and medical attention.

The first responding officers to the scene of an active shooting incident put the rapid deployment plan into effect. Upon the initial response, a small number of officers are assigned to the general perimeter security of the building or area. This is done to prevent the offender(s) from accessing additional buildings or open areas without detection, and it also helps to keep people on the outside from entering the “live fire” area. Once the area is secure, a small team of at least four officers enter the “live fire” area and begin to search for the offender(s). This group, or component, is called the contact team. The contact team is led by a point man at the head of the group, two officers that flank each side of the team, and a rear guard.

The contact team’s mission is to focus on the shooter’s location and attempt to isolate or neutralize him or her. They follow the sound of the gunfire in order to locate the offender(s). The contact team bypasses all obstacles or obstructions, including injured parties, open doors, and explosive devices, in order to isolate the threat. Should the shooting stop, the contact team attempts to gather as much intelligence as possible as to the last location of the offender[s]. If the offender(s) are located, they can either be taken into custody, contained until the arrival of a SWAT team, or in the worst-case scenario, be neutralized.

The second component of the plan is the rescue phase. As the contact team enters the building and begins to clear an area, the rescue team follows behind in the areas already checked and begins victim rescues. They respond to people who are injured or in hiding and begin to remove them from the "live fire" zone to a predetermined location for safety, medical treatment, and accounting of civilians. This group also consists of a point man and a rear guard; however, if additional officers are available, they may be assigned to this team to assist in the labor-intensive work of removing and carrying injured people.

Depending on the human resources available and the size of the incident, several teams for contact and rescue may be operating simultaneously at the scene.

The costs for this training are usually minimal. The main cost associated with rapid deployment entails outfitting the responding officers with urban rifles or shotguns. Although the rifles are the optimal weapon for this plan, the officers can proceed with only the use of their duty weapons. The training associated with this plan is also not as intensive as associated with the SWAT team. Although all members of a department and mutual aid departments should be trained in this technique, it can be taught over the course of two days. The follow-up training should be conducted as often as possible (at a minimum of once a year).

Advantages/Disadvantages

As with any technique or procedure, there are always inherent advantages and disadvantages present. First and foremost on the list of disadvantages is the controversy that usually follows the issues associated with the topic of tactical teams or tactical-based training. This controversy can be generated by either the community or internally within the department.

The concerns raised relating to tactical issues are usually two-fold. When the topic of tactical teams arises, the community usually relies on historical images of full battle dressed teams of police officers conducting military style operations. Although this is the basic premise for SWAT team operations, with community policing, the tactical teams can promote their image through the use of the media or allowing the public to witness some of their techniques or equipment through the use of demonstrations. As the public becomes more informed about the team, they begin to see these teams as professionals doing a necessary job, not a bunch of "Rambos" (ITOA, 1997).

The second area of concern usually resonates from within the department. As previously mentioned, police administrators moved away from the SWAT team concept due to the militaristic image and the growth of community policing. With the increase of the active shooter incidents, however, rapid deployment was developed.

The problem that occurs within a department is that this technique moves away from the traditional reactive approach employed by policing to more of a proactive approach. This philosophical change has caused conflict because historically, law enforcement administrators have been conservative and slightly behind the times of societal change. Consequently, policing has been slow, if not completely resistant to change. Law enforcement is often reluctant to accept innovation and change.

Another disadvantage associated with tactical-based training are the costs involved. Although the cost of a full SWAT team is considerably higher than the cost of the rapid deployment training, both of these options add expenses to a department's budget through human resource needs, equipment requests, and training costs.

Human resource issues are always present, especially in smaller departments. In the smaller departments, tactical teams are usually not an option based on the logistics of creating and maintaining a team; however, rapid deployment is an option available to any department, no matter the number of sworn officers. Should the situation arise whereby rapid deployment will need to be used, data indicates that the most probable time of day for an active shooter incident will be during regular office hours or school hours. This will afford the additional human resources from a department's investigative division, traffic division, commanding personnel, and other entities that normally work regular business hours. Mutual aid from surrounding municipalities will also add to the number of officers able to respond to the incident.

Equipment needs and training costs need to be addressed. As mentioned earlier, urban assault rifles have been in great demand from police agencies throughout the country since the Bank of America shoot-out. Although these weapons are not mandatory for either a tactical team or the rapid deployment concept, they afford a department the best advantage in a critical incident.

Questions concerning liability issues that arise also need to be a concern. No aspect within the law enforcement community is going to raise more questions about its operation than those areas associated with tactical training. Tactical-based training exists as a means to end a violent confrontation with a subject. As a result, the chances of someone becoming injured or losing his or her life greatly increases. When situations arise involving health and wellness of the public, liability concerns are not far behind.

The best way to quell the fears of the community and the police administration and reduce the potential for liability issues to arise is to train and document. Well-maintained training records and documentation of all activities related to the tactical-based training should afford the department a foundation for accountability and stability in the event of a question of legality. One of the first things a lawyer will request when a liability issue arises are the training records and documentation for all tactical-based training officers have received within the department.

Although detractors of tactical-based training will always point out the disadvantages associated with this issue, this concept also has advantages.

Having the availability of a team, or at least the techniques to initiate an immediate response to an incident, can have a great bearing on the final outcome of an incident.

Although the rapid deployment technique was developed for use during active shooting incidents, the tactics and procedures involved can be easily incorporated into other calls for service that the street patrol officer faces every day.

Conclusions/Recommendations

In present-day society, the police must be continually re-evaluating the crime trends, the demographic make-up of the community, and the prevalent issues facing the community.

History shows that the public demands their police force be trained to handle the types of situations or incidents that occur within the community. As seen in Littleton, Colorado, when the community loses faith in the police force or feels they did not use the appropriate response to a situation, liability issues can follow.

A law enforcement administrator must be willing to change with the times, the same way society is constantly shifting. As stated by Scott Cunningham (1994), . . .

In the new millennium, law enforcement administrators must enable a police organization to anticipate and respond to changes as quickly as they occur. To be successful, the law enforcement leader must empower his organization to be innovative, experimental, and willing to take risks, no matter whether those risks fail or succeed. (p. 72)

At the beginning of this research, the following question was asked: Is it feasible to implement a tactical team or tactical-based training within the Plainfield Police Department? The answer to this question should be, "Yes!"

Although, due to budgetary constraints and human resource issues, the researcher does not feel the tactical team approach is the best course of action at this time. The researcher strongly believes that tactical-based training is an issue that should be continually taught to the members of the department. Additionally, within this tactical-based training, the Rapid Deployment Response Plan should be taught to all officers within the department and also to those departments that would immediately send officers to a critical incident within Plainfield.

These are issues that are currently being researched within the department. Several concerns have been raised with this inquiry though. The department is made up of a young core of eager professionals that are willing to answer any call for service that arises and are physically capable of handling the rigors of the profession. The village make-up is basically young urban professionals in a rural-type community, that is also experiencing rapid urban sprawl.

Historically, the village has not had to address the concerns of violence that many of the communities surrounding Plainfield have experienced. This has led to a belief that "it will never happen here." Unfortunately, many of the communities shown in the Appendix also had the same attitude until the violence erupted. This belief handcuffs the police department—unless an absolute need exists for an item or procedure or an incident causes a change to be made, the police administration is hesitant to explore issues with a potential controversial following for fear it may upset the village officials or community.

These are just some of the reasons the Village of Plainfield needs to initiate and maintain a tactical-based training regiment within its police department. The officers of the department receive the required training in community-policing issues and other police-related concerns. Unfortunately, as in many departments, the training necessary to teach the street patrol officers how to deal with violent confrontations on the job are not provided on a regular basis. Additionally, the department needs to compose a plan of action to address the active shooter scenario and also the situation with a hostage or barricaded subject.

As shown in the research, the criminal trend for violence has been on the upswing for the last several years, consistent with the expanse of growth in the area. The police department must be addressing this increase in violence with procedures for response.

The time to create and implement these procedures is now, while the activity is still in its infancy. Once these types of incidents begin to occur on a regular basis, the police department will be in a constant state of "catch-up," attempting to quell the fears of the community and the officers within the department.

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One of his ongoing assignments is working on tactical response issues within the Village of Plainfield.

Appendix

Active Shooter Incidents 1966-1999*

08/01/66, Austin, Texas

Texas Tower incident – Charles Whitman fires at students from tower on the University of Austin campus for over an hour before committing suicide (14 killed, 30 wounded).

07/18/84, San Diego, California

James Huberty enters McDonald's restaurant and begins firing at patrons before SWAT sniper kills him (21 dead, 19 wounded).

08/20/86, Edmond, Oklahoma

Postal worker Patrick Sherrill kills 14 and wounds six coworkers.

12/19/89, University of Montreal, Canada

Mark Lepine enters classrooms at school and over the course of 20 minutes kills 14 and wounds 13 before committing suicide.

10/16/91, Killeen, Texas

George Hennard rams his truck into Luby's Restaurant and opens fire with two pistols (23 killed, 24 wounded).

05/01/92, Olivehurst, California

Eric Houston enters school and kills four people and wounds ten.

02/02/96, Moses Lake, Washington

Barry Loukaitis enters middle school (three killed, one wounded).

02/97, Los Angeles, California

Sixteen police officers and civilians are wounded as two heavily armed subjects wearing full body armor attempt to rob the Bank of America (one suspect killed by police; one suspect commits suicide).

10/01/97, Pearl, Mississippi

Sixteen-year-old student kills mother then enters school (nine wounded, two killed, including mother).

12/01/97, Paducah, Kentucky

Fourteen-year-old enters school (three killed, five wounded).

03/24/98, Jonesboro, Arkansas

Two juveniles, ages 11 and 13, activate a fire alarm and open fire on exiting students (five killed).

05/21/98, Springfield, Oregon

Fifteen-year-old kills parents then enters school with guns (20 wounded, 4 killed, including parents).

04/20/99, Littleton, Colorado

Two teenage boys enter Columbine High School with firearms and homemade bombs. Both subjects commit suicide (13 killed, 20 wounded).

*Not all inclusive of all active shootings during this time period.

Sources: Conley, 2000; Hubbs, 1999

Language and Attitudes About Crime: A Survey of Chinatown Residents

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Introduction

This article examines the relationship between attitudes toward crime and language in the Chinatown and Kalihi areas of downtown Honolulu. Specifically, it addresses the question of whether the language chosen by respondents in answering a survey about crime in their community is related to their responses. Hawaii is a natural laboratory for the study of ethnicity because of its diversity, both in terms of native Hawaiians and the large number of Japanese, Chinese, and other Asian and Pacific Islander groups (Leon, Brown, & Weinstein, 1995). A survey of community residents in a multiethnic neighborhood with a large Chinese American population was conducted as part of a larger project, which included the federally funded Weed and Seed Program. The findings in this study suggest that language used by respondents is an important factor in attitudes about crime in that it is an indicator of important sociodemographic differences in the community, such as place of birth, education, length of time in the United States and in the community. Policy implications for law enforcement agencies are discussed in light of these findings.

Neighborhood Attitudes About Crime

The importance of conducting community surveys by law enforcement agencies has only recently been recognized (Weisel, 1999). This has been especially true when the neighborhood has been inhabited by low-income, minority, and/or recent immigrants. Henderson, Cullen, Cao, Browning, and Kopache (1997) found that a cleavage existed between African Americans and whites in terms of racial injustice and that those perceptions of injustice were strongest among the least affluent African Americans. Left realists argued nearly two decades ago that inner city residents have the most to fear from street crime; these people are often doubly abused, once by members of their own community and then by society in terms of lack of adequate police protection, social services, and employment possibilities (Lea & Young, 1984). Left realists also argue that the views of inner city residents are important and that community members should participate in efforts to reduce crime (Schwartz & DeKeseredy, 1996). Recently, Walker (2001) noted a new community emphasis on crime and crime policies and the importance of local conditions in understanding crime.

While the Uniform Crime Reports and National Victimization Surveys are one method of measuring the level of crime in a particular area, surveying the beliefs and attitudes of neighborhood residents is a viable alternative in gauging crime and its effects, as well as measuring the performance of the police and other government agencies who are responsible for public safety (Weisel, 1999). This is

important, not only because crime is highest in certain neighborhoods, but also because particular residents and commercial establishments suffer from multiple victimization (Skogan, 1996). Hence, researchers and police are beginning to realize the importance of studying neighborhoods and that effective programs must begin at that level (Skogan, 1996). Rosenbaum and Lavrakas (1995) argue that frequent use of surveys and interviews are an appropriate tool for improving evaluations of place-specific crime prevention interventions by police and community groups.

The Asian/Pacific Community

This research focused on crime in Honolulu's Chinatown and an adjacent neighborhood. This is not a homogeneous area; it includes residents from a number of ethnic backgrounds in Asia and the Pacific, plus both recent immigrants and long-term residents. In addition, both residents and business owners are present, especially in Chinatown, during daylight and evening hours. This diversity is important, since it impacts attitudes and beliefs about crime and the police. For instance, recent immigrants often find American law and the criminal justice system a mystery and may find it difficult to cooperate and/or interact fully with law enforcement officers (Shusta, Levine, Harris, & Wong, 1995). Decker (1981) notes that this is not a new phenomenon and that there is a long history of negative experiences between recent immigrants and the police. There has also been a historical "hands-off" policy in many police departments toward the Asian community (Song, 1992). In addition, there has been an extensive history of legal discrimination and discriminatory police practices against Asians (Walker, Spohn, & DeLone, 2000; Shusta et al., 1995). While much less likely to happen in Hawaii because of its large Asian American population and representation in law enforcement agencies (The Honolulu Police Department is approximately 80% Asian/Pacific Islander [Reaves & Hickman, 1999]), the diversity of customs, behaviors, and values of different Asian/Pacific Islander groups is often not easily understood by many law enforcement officers.

Shusta et al. (1995) argue that the key to understanding the most recent Asian/Pacific immigrants and refugee groups' behaviors is that many individuals are in a "surviving" mode. Individuals in this category may have memories from their country of origin of corrupt police officers, who were open to bribes, aligned with a repressive government and the military. This may affect contact and communication with police in that individuals will say and do things to shorten contact with the police out of fear. Another important issue is that many of the crimes within the Asian/Pacific communities are intraracial (Song, 1992). This is often true among immigrant groups. Police often find it difficult to get cooperation from victims, especially in cases of extortion, robbery, theft, and other crimes against the person. There is often a fear that the offender will retaliate if the victim reports the crime to the police or otherwise cooperates with law enforcement. Other potential concerns are the sensitivity or responsiveness of police to the victimization, lack of familiarity and trust with police, prior negative beliefs and images of law enforcement, and a perception that police are ineffective in many situations (Shusta et al., 1995; Song, 1992).

With respect to other Asian/Pacific immigrants (those whose major life experiences were in Asia or the Pacific Islands), Shusta et al. (1995) believe that understanding

their behavior should focus on preserving their “back home” culture as the motivating perspective. Many Asian American business owners and investors in the United States are in this category. They are attempting to preserve many of their traditional values and customs, which may cause intergenerational conflict with their children and/or grandchildren. Members often live in ethnic communities (e.g., Chinatown or Little Saigon) and attempt to minimize their interactions with law enforcement (Song, 1992). Members of second generation and beyond are often more acculturated and are becoming “mainstream” but still try to minimize their contact with police, primarily because of the immigration and other experiences relayed to them by their parents’ or grandparents’ generation. Of course, there are important differences between various Asian American groups, especially the time period when the majority of people arrived in the United States (Song, 1992). For example, the vast majority of Vietnamese arrived in the United States after 1975 and have a higher percentage of recent immigrants than many other Asian American groups. Song (1992) found that Vietnamese residents had a greater fear of crime and higher perception of police prejudice than Chinese residents in the Los Angeles area. There are also important differences within each group related to education, socioeconomic status, and region of country of origin. In addition, the presence of Asian enclaves in many U.S. cities, including Honolulu, serves to both isolate recent immigrants and assist in their adjustment to American society. This may both assist and hinder an understanding of U.S. law and customs. There are also Asian/Pacific nationals living in the United States who may view their sojourn in the United States as a temporary one and hope to return home in one, two, or more years. In sum, one must keep in mind the diversity within the Asian/Pacific group and realize that many individuals have been “American” for generations, while others are recent immigrants. There are also differences in terms of gender roles within the family related to number of generations in the United States, and this often will influence how police should interact with a family. For example, the police arrive at a house to make an arrest, and the best approach may be to have the father suggest to the family member that he or she should go with the police—this approach may lead to a higher degree of cooperation than simply placing the person under arrest without involving family members (Shusta et al., 1995). Very little research has been done on the differences between these subgroups, especially how this impacts attitudes and beliefs about crime and the criminal justice system. Language, however, is one measure of the diversity within a neighborhood and is an indicator of cultural, socioeconomic, and other differences in the community.

Methodology

The Setting

This research was developed and pretested by the Seed Subcommittee of Operation Weed and Seed in Honolulu, which has as its strategy comprehensive community-based neighborhood restoration. The general goals of Operation Weed and Seed are to “weed” out criminal activity in a targeted high-crime community with the help of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies and to “seed” the target area with social service resources and economic development activities to strengthen the community, provide a safer environment, and prevent crime (Dunsworth & Mills, 1999). The purpose of the survey was to involve the Chinatown/Kalihi community in the identification of their needs and problems.

The survey results are being used as part of the overall assessment of needs and problems for future weed and seed activities.

Questionnaire and Sample

The questionnaire was pretested in the community in January 1998 and then translated into Chinese (Cantonese), Ilocano, and Vietnamese by the Immigrant Center in Honolulu. It was then pretested again. Next, four different language cover letters signed by the U.S. Attorney in Honolulu were sent with the questionnaire and a return envelope to a sample of community addresses. The non-English results were translated into English by the Hawaii Language Bank at the Immigrant Center. The mailing list consisted of all resident, business, and post office box addresses in the Chinatown/Kalihi target area. There are approximately 10,515 addresses in this population, and a 33% stratified systematic sample of addresses by street in the target area was developed. The number of questionnaires sent out was 3,257, and the number of returned/completed questionnaires processed was 566—an overall return rate of 17.4%. This was a low but not unexpected response that still provided a survey of a sizeable number of community residents. The demographic characteristics of the sample, however, are similar to 2000 census data from the census tracts (34, 35, and 41-43) that roughly cover the Chinatown/Kalihi community, indicating that the sample is fairly representative of the area. Because of constraints imposed by the Weed and Seed Program, we were not able to include questions on place of birth and race/ethnicity in the survey.

Findings

Demographic Characteristics

Most of the respondents were high-school graduates or had at least some higher education. Approximately 16% of the sample had less than a high-school education; 47% were employed full-time, while 23% were retired. With regard to language, 80% of the returned questionnaires were English and approximately 18% Chinese. The average length of time living in the community was 13 years. Sixty percent of the sample stated that they were resident renters, while 22% were resident owners. Approximately 16% were business owners or managers. The importance of the relationship between selected demographic data and attitudes about crime is discussed below.

The Importance of Language Differences

The specific hypothesis analyzed in this article is whether the language used by respondents in the survey affects responses to questions about crime. When a separate analysis was conducted comparing the Chinese and English language respondents on specific items, a number of differences were noted. For example, 35% of the Chinese-language respondents wanted more neighborhood patrols compared to 57% of the English-language respondents. Forty-eight percent of the Chinese-language respondents considered prostitution a problem compared to 67% of the English-language respondents. Similarly, 27% of the Chinese-language respondents reported that they have seen public drinking of alcoholic beverages, compared to 45% of the English-language respondents. Comparable differences were also found for seeing drug dealers in the community (34% for Chinese-

language respondents to 70% for English-language respondents), and gangs (7% for Chinese-language respondents to 29% for English-language respondents). It is clear that there are important differences between the Chinese-language respondents and the English-language respondents in terms of both awareness and perceptions of the crime problem. There were also differences for marital status, age, education, and gender. The focus here though is on language differences and whether language is an important variable related to both awareness and perception of crime in the Chinatown/Kalihi community.

There were a number of sociodemographic differences between the English-language respondents and the Chinese-language respondents. Respondents who answered the survey in Chinese were less educated, more likely to be married, had lived longer in the community, were more likely to be employed, and were more likely to be middle-aged than respondents who answered in English. The most significant difference was education, which appears to be the variable that best distinguishes the Chinese-language and English-language respondents. The use of the Chinese language in the survey is one indicator of recent immigrants and cultural differences in the community; however, is it still important when controlling for other variables? To determine whether language used in responding to the survey was directly related to attitudes about crime, a number of different statistical measures were utilized. We first used bivariate correlational analyses to examine the relationship between crimes reported and the sociodemographic variables used in this study. The correlations between number of crimes reported and language used, age, and length of time in the community were all significant at the .01 level; however, this relationship is complex when one considers age, length of time in the community, marital status, gender, and education. For example, age is positively related to length of time in the community and negatively related to education, while English respondents were more likely to have a higher education and less likely to be married. Thus, to further examine the relationship between Chinese-language usage and number of crimes reported, we conducted a linear multiple regression (simultaneous entry) analysis with number of crime types reported as the dependent variable. Sociodemographic variables of age, educational level, length of time in the community, gender, marital status, and language usage were entered into the equation as independent variables. The Beta coefficients of only three variables were statistically significant: (1) age, (2) length of time in the community, and (3) language usage. Those who had lived longer in the community tended to report more crime types, while those who answered the questionnaire in Chinese and were older tended to report fewer crime types. This indicates that answering the survey in Chinese contributed to our understanding of perceptions of crime in the community, as well as age and length of time in the community. Thus, we were not able to fully explain the different responses between English-language respondents and Chinese-language respondents with the sociodemographic variable available to us in this study.

Discussion and Policy Implications

Law enforcement and politicians should be sensitive to the cultural and linguistic differences within their communities and always survey neighborhood residents and others in a number of different languages, depending on the nature of that particular city. Since this study was part of the federally funded Weed and Seed Program, researchers were unable to ask community residents either ethnicity or

place of birth. The reason given was that this data was not essential to discovering community residents' attitudes about crime and the police. This is likely not the case, and these characteristics, along with length of residency in the United States, are important considerations for future research. In addition, more research needs to be done that takes into account the number of generations a person's family has lived in the United States and the level of residential segregation in the community. Because large numbers of immigrants now come from Spanish-speaking countries and Asia, it is important to understand their experiences when studying their perceptions of crime and attitudes toward the police.

In sum, there may be important differences not only within a specific ethnic group, but also between racial and ethnic groups. Cultural differences in perception of crime may be influenced by migration from Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, or other countries. Individuals raised in another society and who may also be recent immigrants are likely to have different views on what behavior is "criminal" and what kinds of crime are major problems in a neighborhood. For example, Lee and Ulmer (2000) found that Korean Americans who are less fluent in English and have a shorter residency in the United States were more likely to be afraid of crime victimization. This does not appear to be compatible with our findings. In any respect, language usage seems to be a relevant variable, although in one community in Texas, Spanish-speaking Hispanics were more likely to cooperate with police than English-speaking Hispanics (Cheurprakobkit & Bartsch, 1999). Another factor that needs further research is how the racial composition of a community impacts attitudes about crime (see Chiricos, Hogan, & Gertz, 1997). Obviously, more research is needed in this area.

In conclusion, future studies of community attitudes toward crime and the police need to closely examine the ethnic composition of the neighborhoods and take into account factors, such as language, place of birth, and length of time in the United States, in addition to other sociodemographic characteristics, such as education, age, marital status, relationship to the community, and income.

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Getting to the Point: Data Scrubbing and Cleaning 101

Sean Bair, Program Manager, Crime Mapping & Analysis Program

Introduction

The overwhelming majority of crime analysts begin every day with the same, vital chore: they download data from Records Management Systems (RMS), Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD), and several other sources to get the day's job done. Most then take that data into a Geographic Information System (GIS) application to make points appear on a map, using a process called "geocoding." Those records that do not geocode automatically must then be processed interactively to make certain that they find a place on the map. If the majority of the records are represented on our maps—say 80-90%—we claim, "Good enough for government," and begin the analytical process. Everything that results from our work from this point forward will be limited by the quality and accuracy of this process.

Invariably, this process isn't perfect—and, therefore, our analysis will also be imperfect. This is because the data we begin with will inevitably contain flaws. Data containing flaws that make it unreliable or unusable is called, "Dirty Data."

Nowhere is the quality and accuracy of data more important than in law enforcement. Some of the ways in which dirty data can impact police work include the following:

- *Misrepresenting problematic addresses.* Analysts may calculate the frequency of repeat addresses to determine the most problematic locations in their cities. Patrol assets may then be deployed to focus on this problem.
- *Spatial analysis.* Points may be drawn at the wrong place. This means that the calculations of distance, direction, movement, and density will all be wrong. Many analysts study "Hotspots," but this is impossible with dirty data.
- *Spatial statistics.* An erroneously geocoded point could be associated to a polygon in which it doesn't belong, so choropleth maps (area symbol or multicolored area maps) will be incorrect.
- *Missing points.* Data that fails to geocode at all will also result in failed analysis.
- *Search errors.* The misspelled name of an interviewed suspect may not return when queried in a database.

Data Errors

We're all familiar with the phrase "Garbage in, garbage out." But how much attention do we really pay to this phrase? Is it our analytical creed? If not, why not?

Most analysts first notice their dirty data and gauge how bad it is through the process of geocoding. They rely upon GIS applications to take dirty data and find where it exists on a map. One's geocoding score, called the "hit rate," often gauges the level of success. A score of 80-90% is often thought of as desirable for law enforcement. That is, 80-90% of the data are represented on the map, and only these data will be analyzed. Many agencies consider much lower scores "acceptable."

In my years here at the Crime Mapping & Analysis Program, I've instructed more than 800 analysts and investigators from hundreds of police agencies, and I have seen the data and basemaps they use. Of all the law enforcement data I've encountered over the past ten years, *not one agency has ever had perfectly clean data*—even though a rare minority has actually attained a 100% geocoding hit rate. How can an agency that achieves 100% geocoding accuracy—a perfect score—still have unclean data? After all, aren't the points all on the map? Sure, we can see all the "dots," but how do we know they are where they are supposed to be?

Also, even if data is clean enough to geocode, it may still be too dirty for other analytical purposes. Let's take a look at an example of "perfect" data that still has serious problems:

Below are five CAD records of police calls. The calls all occurred at the same location.

Address

123 E. MAIN ST.

123 E MAIN

123 E. MAIN ST

123 E MAIN ST.

123 E. MAIN ST. #1

All these cases found their mark on our map—that is, we achieved a 100% geocoding hit rate. Since 100% is perfect, this is clearly good enough for us, isn't it? Now, we can begin our analysis. Our first order of business is to create a proportional symbol map—a map whose symbol size increases with the frequency of data. In this case, we should expect to see 123 E MAIN ST have a point representative of *five* occurrences. Unfortunately, it doesn't. In fact, we will have five points on top of each other at that location, each representing *one* unique address. Our data, although 100% geocoded and spatially accurate is fundamentally flawed—it is dirty. Each of these records contains small differences that make it unique and distinguish it from the others. It may be as simple as a punctuation mark, an extra space (which might be overlooked by the reader), or the addition of an apartment number, but they *are* different. When our analysis is performed, the results are only as good and reliable as the underlying data. If the data contains flaws, so does the analysis. We *must* first clean our data.

Certainly, every agency has dirty data, and these problems absolutely must be resolved. The process of correcting data integrity errors is called "data cleaning" or "data scrubbing." Data cleaning (as we will refer to it throughout the article) is the process of taking tabular data and correcting mistakes before being used for analysis. Errors typically originate from keyboard entry, Optical Character

Recognition (OCR) scanning, voice recognition software, ScanTron forms, and field entry devices (palm held devices and global positioning system units).

Data cleaning consists of a series of discrete operations. Each operation eradicates one problem. We just have to make sure we have enough operations in our list of cleaning operations to take care of all our problems. It is also important that our cleaning operations don't result in creating more, different problems. So, what do errors in data look like? Typical data errors include the following:

- Typographical errors
- Punctuation
- Abbreviations
- Blanks and nulls
- Common knowledge
- Generalizations
- Invalid entries
- Redundant data

Typographical errors occur when keystrokes aren't what the operator intends. A common typographical error is transpositions or incorrect characters. For example, instead of "1000 E UNIVERSITY DR," typographical errors might change the text into "UNIVERSTY," "UNVERSITY," or "UNIVESITY."

Punctuation errors occur when punctuation marks are used when they should not be or excluded when they are expected. These include ".", ",", "#", "\", "/", quotation marks, apostrophes, "@", "-", "&", and so forth within the address field. These characters are often used to mark direction (E.), the indication of a suite or apartment number (1 E. MAIN ST. #A101), and the use of placenames ("123 E Main St @ Mall of America"). They also are often the delineation between intersecting streets (E UNIVERSITY DR/S RURAL RD or UNIV&RURAL).

Abbreviations are used to shorten words, thereby decreasing the time and effort necessary to enter them into a data table. This is particularly true in law enforcement RMS and CAD systems, in which dispatchers need to type an address as quickly as possible in order to dispatch an officer to a location. Most often, these abbreviations appear in the form of acronyms or other truncations of the proper full word. For instance, "1234 E. Vista Del Cerro Dr." was almost never seen typed into the Tempe Police Department's RMS system properly. Instead, it was entered "1234 E. VDC," "1234 E. Vista D.," or "1234 E. Vista Del C.," or worst yet, simply "VDC." The latter was because most often the officers knew that "VDC" represented the only apartment complex on that small strip of road.

Blanks or nulls result when necessary data elements are erased or, more likely, not entered in the first place. This often occurs when the person entering the data intentionally or carelessly "skips over" a piece of data that he or she considers useless or extraneous. One common example is street direction. The difference between "1005 W University Dr" and "1005 E University Dr" is more than two miles; however, the clerk entering an address from a crime report may skip over the directional element, because it seems extraneous, resulting in "1005 University Dr." This error can be compounded when street types are excluded as well: "1005 University." All of these addresses will probably geocode—that is, we can usually

make a “dot” appear on our computer map, but will the dot be in the right place? Most GIS software will *guess* at that direction and street type, and they often guess wrong. The result is flawed analysis.

Common knowledge results in the use of names and phrases that make perfect sense to a human being, but are useless to a computer. For example, the “Mall of America” may have an address of “123 E MAIN ST.” If we type in the correct address, “123 E Main St,” our GIS will geocode it correctly. Crime reports, however, are seldom written for computers; they are written for people. The address will probably use the common placename instead of the correct physical address: “Mall,” or, even worse, “MOA.”

Generalizations are data errors that are similar to common placenames; they occur when, instead of recording a specific location, the reporter or data-entry clerk enters a broad location. In law enforcement, by far the most common example of this is the use of “hundred blocks” in address fields (e.g., “1200 BLK W UNIVERSITY DR”). A person reading this will know that the event took place somewhere between 1201 and 1299 W. University Dr., and this may be good enough for most practical purposes. Once again, however, our computers can’t make any sense of this. Even if our computer does somehow convert this into a valid physical location, it will almost certainly be wrong particularly if during the interactive phase of geocoding, the user always selects the first, and lowest, closest address—a common practice. Now, you have assigned all those hundred block addresses to the lowest address on those street segments. That’s not accurate, is it?

Invalid entries look like correct text, but are not valid for the field in which they are. For geocoding purposes involving address data, the most common type of invalid entry is the nonaddress. Nonaddresses are addresses that look and sound like a real physical location but are actually invalid. An example of this error might be “1000 W UNIVERSITY AV.” Although this address is correctly formatted, contains no placenames, nulls, abbreviations, or typos, it is still wrong because there simply is no such place. The 1000 block of west University Avenue begins at 1001. The physical address listed as “1000” just doesn’t exist. Once again, our computer will interpret this as a valid address and draw a dot on our street centerline map layer where it thinks this address should be. In fact, since there really is no such place, the dot is, of course, in the wrong place.

Redundant data errors occur when extra data is entered into a field that should contain only limited data. This often happens in address fields in police records, especially call-for-service dispatch records. Many RMS providers, as a matter of practice, allow a dispatcher to search for an address both by physical address and common placename. A dispatcher may type “123 E. Main St,” which is at the “Mall of America” or he or she may type, “Mall of America.” Either way, the RMS system will verify this location via a CAD geo-reference file and update the address field with the proper address. Often, this “proper” address field will contain the common placename as a “feature” (e.g. “MALL OF AMERICA@123 E. MAIN ST.” or “123 E. MAIN ST@MALL OF AMERICA”).

The other type of redundant data occurs most often when dispatchers type in an address and use the remaining address field space for additional information.

Common redundant data includes suite or apartment information or related data about the call (e.g., 1005 W UNIVERSITY DR 2 X HMA or 1005 W UNIVERSITY DR #1234). All of this data must be cleaned from our address for valid and reliable analysis.

Data Cleaning

So now what? Now that you know what is *wrong*, how can we *fix* these data entry errors? The most obvious method is to prevent them from occurring in the first place, and the best way to do this is through training and policy. By explaining to data-entry personnel, dispatchers, and officers how these errors will affect us (and them!) and implementing policies to support improved data-entry accuracy, we can eliminate a majority of our data-entry errors before they even occur.

Unfortunately, no amount of policy or training can completely eliminate all of these errors. Even the best validation and verification methods still result in some errors. As long as there is human interaction with our data, our data will contain problems. We will need to learn how to eradicate errors once they have occurred. Of course, we have to catch them first!

There are several basic types of operations used in data cleaning. Here are a few of the most common:

String replacement is the most important and common type of scrubbing operation. String replacement operations consist of two elements: (1) the *search* string (the error we're looking for, also called the "fault") and (2) the *replace* string (the correct text to replace the problem with, also called the "fix"). Replacing the string "UNIV" with "University Av." will change the abbreviated address "1005 W UNIV" into the valid, clean address "1005 W University Av."

Wildcard characters can be used in some applications to find strings for which we don't know every character. The three most common wildcard characters are "*", "?", and "#".

The "*" wildcard stands for any combination of characters; therefore, the search string "*ing" would match words like *seeing*, *believing*, *destroying*, etc. It would find all words ending in "-ing." If we added another wildcard character and searched for "*ing*", we would find all the previous results but also words like *singer*, *harbinger*, *Ingersoll/Rand*, etc.

The "?" wildcard is a placeholder for any one text character. This is usually used when the analyst knows how many characters are in the string but not what all the characters are. We could use this, for example, to search for a partial license plate: "?UN15?" would find all 6-letter text containing "UN15" as the middle characters. We could find every zip code in central Arizona by searching our text for "85???", since zip codes have five characters, and those in central Arizona all begin with the prefix 85.

The "#" character is a placeholder for any one numeric digit. We could have used this wildcard to search for zip codes as in the previous example: "85####" would

have also worked. This is often good for searching for house numbers within address strings, telephone numbers, zip codes, or other numeric digit ranges.

Another facet of string replacement involves **deletions and duplicates**. Deletion operations are exactly that – deleting unwanted text. This could be as simple as deleting the period from your address or more complex involving the deletion of duplicate bits of data. There may be instances where a flawed cleaning routine may introduce duplicate data into the address – called Internal Fragments. A simple routine to search for duplicated data (“Dr Dr”) might be all that is needed to fix the problematic address.

Internal fragments typically occur during the cleaning process when you search for and replace a partial word with its whole word. In the previous example, when we replaced “UNIV” with “University Dr,” it properly fixed those addresses that only contained “UNIV” but now dirtied those that were already correct. Now, some of our data contains “University Dersity Dr.” We can avoid an internal fragment by “buffering” our search string. For instance, instead of searching for “UNIV,” we instead search for “ UNIV ” with an extra space before and after the search word. This will avoid the described error; however, it won’t provide us with a solution to a valid error like “UNIV / RURAL RD” where UNIV will need to be fixed. After all, “UNIV” doesn’t contain a space before or after it. We can resolve this by adding an extra blank space before and after each value in our fault field to ensure that every word is delineated by a space before and after it. This process is called “padding.”

Most searching routines continue to clean addresses infinitely, as long as any search strings are detected in the field being fixed. Our new record, “1005 E University Dr,” still contains a Fault; “UNIV” still occurs in the record; therefore, our string replacement operation will implement the fix again, turning “1005 E University Dr” into “1001 E University Dersity Dr.” This string still contains the fault, so a millisecond later, this string will be changed again, into “1001 E University Dersity Dersity Dr.” This will continue infinitely, or depending on the software being used, the field size is exceeded and a catastrophic error results, breaking the program and possibly corrupting your data.

Infinite loops, also called recursive replacement errors as described in the previous example, can often be prevented by using buffered search text (“ UNIV ” instead of “UNIV”). Sometimes, however, it can only be fixed by instructing the data cleaning application not to perform multiple operations on the same record.

Once we have introduced “extra” spaces into our address or cleaning field, we must now remove them. Oftentimes, extra spaces exist without us introducing them. We can use the “trim” function to remove any extra spaces. Up to this point in the article, the functions provided are available from most any software application—from Microsoft *NotePad* to *Excel*, you can search, replace, and perform simple text manipulation right from within the application. Now, however, we must draw upon other functions to perform more difficult tasks. Trim is one of those commands. We could just use a search and replace function to replace two spaces with one; however, what about the address that contains 15 extra spaces? What about the fact that all of our addresses are now padded with a space before and after the text? We can’t replace those with a search and replace function.

Trim is a function within *Excel* and other applications inherent to *Visual Basic for Applications (VBA)* that will remove extraneous spaces from a string except for a single space between words. So a simple command like `TRIM(" University Dr ")` would return "University Dr".

Extraneous data is also a common data-entry problem; many addresses (and other fields) often contain extra data at the beginning, end, or middle of the record. These extra characters must be stripped away before a GIS can read the address and make sense of it. An example of this would be "123 E MAIN ST@MALL OF AMERICA." *MALL OF AMERICA* is not part of the actual address. The process of erasing all text before or after the valid part of the data is called "cutting." Left-handed cutting removes text that occurs before a character delimiter. Right-handed cutting erases text occurring after a delimiter. This is another process that, although not impossible with macros and *VBA*, begins to delve into logical expressions and requires a bit more programming experience. Using commands, such as `RIGHT`, `LEFT`, and `MID`, we can begin to construct logical expressions in order to clean our data. This process involves searching and recovering the location of the delimiter to perform the cut operation. In our case, the "@" is the delineator, and the text we want to cut follows it, but, how do we recover the location of the "@"? There are multitudes of techniques, but typically the use of `INSTR` or `MID` allows us to recover the string position of this character. Once recovered, we can use that position to clean our data. The real trick is allowing for this process to cut both from the beginning and end. That is, what if our addresses could also contain superfluous text at the beginning of an address (e.g., "MALL OF AMERICA@123 E MAIN ST.") as well as at the end. We must now induce logical expressions into our cleaning operations and have the computer make decisions based on other data available. This is often accomplished with a series of "IF-THEN" statements. *IF* this is true or false, *THEN* do this. In our case, we may want to read before or after the "@" character for number characters that may give us an indication that the actual address follows or precedes the common placename. `MID`, `LEFT`, `RIGHT`, `INSTR`, `TRIM`, `IF`, and `THEN` are all commands within *VBA* and other programming languages that will allow us to perform some very powerful cleaning operations on our data. These commands have all been in use since the early days of Microsoft's Basic 1.0 and have since become more prevalent now that *VBA* has been incorporated into so many applications.

Data mapping is the process of taking disparate data and converting it into a common nomenclature. Data mapping is also referred to as "Auto-Recoding," "Recoding," or "Translating" the data. The most obvious example of data mapping is what law enforcement agencies do when they convert their state statutes into the federal *Uniform Crime Report (UCR)* nomenclature. For example, the crime of *assault* (hitting someone) might be classified by states differently. State "A" may title assault "misdemeanor assault," while state "B" classifies assault as "battery." Both states agree upon a common nomenclature—in the case of *UCR*—"misdemeanor assault/hands/fist/feet." Data mapping is the simple process of changing the data from one format into an agreed upon format. This is often done using lookup tables that contain the local nomenclature and the global nomenclature and using those tables to change the data.

Data mapping is becoming more familiar now that many regional data sharing efforts have begun. Each agency within a region will most likely have different

ways of classifying basically the same data. In order for each agency to understand, query, and analyze the data of surrounding agencies, data mapping is often necessary.

Automation

While I was employed as a crime analyst for the Tempe Police Department in Arizona, it was necessary for either me or my partner analyst to spend approximately 60 minutes of each morning cleaning the previous day's calls for service—approximately 500 records. It didn't take me long to begin looking for alternative ways to accomplish this task. One such way that I reduced the time needed to clean the data was simply using a text editor to perform "search and replace" operations. As mentioned earlier, this will only fix some of the problems. I then turned to the software applications, *Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)* and eventually to *Excel*, for their use of macros and syntax routines to further reduce the level of personal interaction needed to clean the data. Ultimately, I turned to my programming experience in *Visual Basic* to create an application that performed all of the processes needed to clean our data. The application itself hadn't taken an inordinate amount of time to write, and since no other cleaning applications were available to me through the private or public sector, weighing the cost and benefit of a prepackaged cleaner wasn't an issue. The cleaning application I created ultimately reduced the time required to clean our CFS data each morning from 60 minutes to seconds. Saving nearly 60 minutes each day in the cleaning process may not seem like much, but that time cumulated over weeks and months added up to a great deal (a City of Tempe budgetary calculation estimated that this automation saved the department approximately \$17,000 per year). Through automation, I had freed 300 hours per year that I could now use for analysis. That was for 500 records per day; imagine the problems faced by an agency recovering more than a million calls per year!

Macros are nothing more than a program recording your keystrokes within an application for later playback. Macros are inherent in most of Microsoft's applications and are becoming more readily available in many others. The process of creating a macro is fairly straightforward. Typically, you begin by recording a macro, perform the functions you want to accomplish, and then stop recording when finished. Macros work fine for many of the cleaning operations described herein but aren't capable of accomplishing many of the complex cleaning operations. Let me briefly describe some of the pros and cons of using Macros in, let's say, *Excel* or *Access*.

Excel is a spreadsheet program, not a database. Hence, many of its data-handling functions are unique to it and unlike those found in *Access*—a true relational database application. *Excel* is good at text manipulation, and, of course, that is much of what data cleaning involves. Unfortunately, *Excel* is limited to 65,536 records and 255 variables. Hence, you most likely will not be cleaning your year's worth of calls for service or even crime data using *Excel*. Also, *Excel* handles date and time data much differently than *Access*; therefore, the conversion of dates and times and calculations against them may not yield the desired results. Finally, *Excel* will record the macro performing the operation against the columns (and cells) you select during the recording process. Once you "play" the macro back against another data set that may be organized slightly differently, it may return

undesirable results. For instance, you may click the *A* column (your “Crime” category) and ask *Excel* to record a search and replace function. If later you play this macro against a similar data set in which the crime variable is now located in column *F*, well, whatever is in column *A* will be what is cleaned. There are ways to instruct the macro to select the “Crime” variable, but now you are delving into modifying the underlying macro code. Microsoft macros are written in *VBA*. *VBA* is a “dumbed down” version of the true programming language—*Visual Basic*. *VBA*, although easier than *Visual Basic*, is often not the most readily understandable language for people without a programming background.

Macros (and modules) in *Access* are almost identical to those found in *Excel*. Some slight differences are in how they are stored and how you would construct the macro. Both are relatively easy to create but difficult to manage, update, or enhance. Finally, trying to decipher or understand someone else’s macro is oftentimes futile. Again, because most folks who construct macros may not have a programming background, they would often fail to document the macro with code remarks, as might a programmer; therefore, unless you read *VBA*, you most likely would not know how to add, fix, or delete something in the macro if needed.

Where manual cleaning is the lowest form of data cleaning and macros are slightly better, applications written specifically for the purpose of data cleaning would be the pinnacle. There are a handful of data cleaning applications available on the market today, some of which are targeted specifically to the law enforcement market. A well-written data cleaning application will provide the user with the ability to clean most, if not all, of the data problems discussed herein. A user should be able to readily change cleaning parameters and clean several different data types and structures, and the process should be thoroughly automated. That way, when you arrive for work each morning, instead of your first task being cleaning the data, your task is verifying the integrity of the data cleaned automatically last night.

A well-written cleaning application, whether created internally or purchased from a vendor, should not have its cleaning parameters “hard-coded” into the application. It should be adaptable and able to remember its functions, procedures, and cleaning parameters. Macros are inflexible and contain hard-coded operations. Applications are typically (and hopefully) far more flexible. There should be no need for the user to know or modify the actual code that performs the cleaning.

Many agencies have created their own data cleaning application, written in programming languages such as *C*, *Visual Basic*, or even using macros. This is often a great solution. Unfortunately, many law enforcement agencies don’t have the personnel or time available to construct a data cleaning application. Even if they do, it is wise to weigh the cost of writing an application in-house against that of purchasing one from a vendor, who may be able to offer future upgrades, enhancements, and technical support.

Summary

This article only scratches the surface of data cleaning. Most often, law enforcement discovers the need to clean data through the use of GIS; however, data cleaning

is necessary not just to achieve a high hit rate, but more importantly, to assure the accuracy and reliability of our data. Nowhere is the accuracy of data more critical than in law enforcement; however, nowhere is the cleanliness of data more problematic than in law enforcement. I have presented several examples of common data problems in this article and offered solutions by which to address them. The use of search and replace processes; functional commands, such as MID, LEFT, RIGHT, IF/THEN, TRIM, INSTR; padding; and buffering can all be helpful in the data-cleaning process.

Ultimately, automation holds the most promise for accurate and reliable data as well as an ability to perform the cleaning without human interaction—thus, freeing up an analyst's time for analysis. An agency must weigh the costs involved when undertaking the creation of an automated application with the time and costs necessary to create and maintain such an application. The cost of simply ignoring the problem is always too high.

New techniques are constantly being developed that allow for artificial intelligence or neural networks to replace the human element in the data cleaning process. These techniques hold promise that one day, manual data cleaning will be a thing of the past. Until then, we must be able to identify data integrity issues and eradicate them thoroughly, so that our analytical products will be as reliable as possible.

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Electronic Surveillance: Its Future in Law Enforcement

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As a result of recent events, many law enforcement agencies at all levels of local, state, and federal offices have been forced (by political mandate or public demand) to reprioritize their focus from domestic criminal investigations to investigations of terrorism and suspected threats to our respective population centers and infrastructure.

Many administrators are now faced with the requirement to balance new mandates against current investigative needs while further stretching, limited personnel and investigative resources. Further complicating these matters are the constriction of economic resources across many sectors of the country resulting in hiring freezes, limited overtime, and restrictions of major purchases of supplies and equipment. The problem now becomes how to best utilize the personnel that are presently employed with the agency, while utilizing new technologies to enhance their performance, secure evidence and intelligence-gathering capabilities, and improve conviction statistics.

Historical Perspective

For 170 years, the mission of law enforcement has been to . . .

- Maintain order.
- Protect life.
- Protect property.

This basic mission has not changed! But the methodology employed and the tools utilized to accomplish it have. We live in a time when criminal enterprises have never been as organized as they are now, with a well-established physical and electronic infrastructure and financial resources unequaled in the past. Today's top echelons of domestic and international organized crime syndicates and terrorist cells are involved in intelligence-gathering activities; counter surveillance; and maintenance of files regarding law enforcement activities, officers, infiltration of law enforcement agencies, and the criminal justice system.

During Al Capone's reign as the head of a vast criminal network, the law enforcement community was never able to convict him of any violent criminal act. The only charge and conviction was that of income tax evasion, in spite of the thousands of hours spent following him and conducting surveillance and numerous investigations.

The late John Gotti, on the other hand, had a vast arsenal of electronic technology and surveillance equipment committed against him, which enabled federal agents to gather the evidence they needed to convict him of numerous criminal counts.

Because of the sophistication of today's criminal networks, whether large or small, and the evidentiary requirements of our court systems, more and more cases are requiring corroborating evidence. This evidence has to come from an independent source that does not sleep, possess predetermined prejudices, or have political motivation. Much of this information has to center around the capabilities of covert electronic surveillance technologies. The strategy to keep our law enforcement mission alive today must keep pace with political mandates, community needs, and expectations.

Regardless of the circumstances relating to criminal activity in your areas of operation, we cannot lose sight of our need to seek out new ways to secure evidence and obtain convictions. We must recognize that the old ways of doing things are no longer the most productive. If we remain stagnant in our methodology dealing with criminal investigations, we may see fewer opportunities to secure evidence against those individuals who have become more technologically proficient in their illegal activities.

A New Generation of Investigative and Surveillance Skills

No matter what your law enforcement position is today, the need for reliable, timely, and accurate information has never been more acute. Because of community expectations, state and federal mandates on law enforcement activities, and the mobility of society as a whole, our operational environment has become very dynamic. The expectation for law enforcement is that it must be proactive in dealing with criminal elements and proficient in the technology it employs to assist in the apprehension of these groups and individuals. This article is not suggesting that electronic technology is a panacea but a tool that can help bridge the chasm between human power constraints and the shear volume of cases that our officers are expected to handle.

Technology provides the opportunity to . . .

- Increase officer safety.
- Reduce the labor intensive nature of many law enforcement activities and improve the organization's effectiveness.
- Enhance organizational efficiency.
- Produce cost beneficial results.

Increase Officer Safety

Technology provides officers with the means to gather and securely transmit investigative data at greater distances from the crime scene. This makes it unnecessary for the officers to have to reenter areas that may expose them to suspicion or identification while allowing them to observe the activities taking place at a safer location.

Reduce the Labor Intensive Nature of Many Law Enforcement Activities and Improve the Organization's Effectiveness

As a result of overtime issues and human power constraints, electronic technology provides officers and administrators with the opportunity to gather information

on a number of cases simultaneously without the officer being present. This acts as a force multiplier with surveillance operations being manned by fewer officers. Technology is no respecter of persons and is unbiased as it collects information. This information is amenable in increasing courtroom convictions and plea agreements.

Enhance Organizational Efficiency

Technology will not reduce overtime or reduce the human element in investigations, but it will allow a department to stretch their investigative resources to cover more cases.

Produce Cost Beneficial Results

If technology is properly utilized, it will assist departments in recovering evidence that is more iron clad, which in turn will stretch your investigative dollar and enhance seizure efforts.

How does one decide how to identify tasks that can be assigned to technology? Some of the criteria include tasks that have the following characteristics:

- Repetitive
- Mundane
- Boring
- Non-decision-making

Covert surveillance technology is adaptable to a vast array of fixed, mobile, day, and low-light investigative environments. Because the reliability of this technology has been proven time and time again, there is hardly a situation in which it cannot be employed.

Whether you're dealing with a fixed location involving drug or gang activity or mobile operations in a park or on the city street, there is technology available to meet the demands of any law enforcement agency.

Technology

The technology currently available to law enforcement personnel is some of the most advanced equipment ever made accessible to the profession. Compared to the days when all officers had at their disposal were binoculars and a 35mm camera with a telephoto lens, we have come a long way. We now have board cameras that have 600 lines of resolution, low power draw, very low light capabilities, and infrared sensitivity. These cameras can be placed in a number of enclosures that can fit into any investigative environment for short- and long-term operations. There are also cameras that operate in color during daylight hours and switch to black and white as the light dims giving additional options in surveillance activities. CCTV cameras have become so sensitive in low-light environments that night vision in many urban settings is becoming obsolete.

When combining the capabilities of the CCTV cameras of today with the advanced optics of the newer lenses available to law enforcement, we now have the ability

to operate in lower light environments that were only accessible to night vision a few years ago.

There are lenses when combined with the right CCTV camera, that can obtain facial identification at two miles and gather intelligence at five to seven miles out. These types of systems allow an officer to observe and not be seen. This entire system can now be moved, set up, and operated by one officer.

Law enforcement agencies now have the ability to record information on a number of mediums to include video, digital tapes, and hard drive systems. This allows agencies to record days at a time without having to re-enter the scene and change out tape or equipment. Other technologies that are of great use to law enforcement include the following:

- Audio systems equipped with sensitive miniature microphones that can detect whispers at 50 feet or more and microphones that can pick up audio through windows or door frames.
- A number of audio filters are available that can reduce repetitive environmental noises thus vastly improving audio recordings for evidentiary purposes.
- Several CCD camera models also have miniature microphones built in them offering additional investigative capabilities.
- Digital body wires have also made a successful emergence into law enforcement, not only as a listening device to improve officer safety and gather evidence, but also with the ability to more securely transmit the data back to multiple listening posts in stereo. The transmission in stereo allows for a greater dynamic range of sound to be recorded and heard.

Tracking devices for automobiles or packages such as the Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) tracking systems can be placed in a concealed area and locate a vehicle to within three meters of its exact location. These devices are seeing continued updates in many features that improve not only the operational times they can be deployed, but also the ability to track and give real time feedback regarding the suspects' location.

There are also a number of new and improved video and audio transmission systems. Some of the basic systems include microwave, which have become smaller in size with greater sensitivity and range, with the ability to encrypt transmissions. As more and more data systems switch to fiber optics, its use will become more available to law enforcement for the transmission of secure data over long distances.

Technology affords law enforcement personnel a great opportunity to enhance investigative capabilities. Some of the benefits of technology include the following:

- Secure evidence that is not otherwise obtainable.
- Assist in the identification of criminal targets and stopping their activities in the most cost-efficient way.
- Reduce investigative and surveillance time.
- Reduce costs of investigative activities.
- Reduce court time.

- Generate more iron clad testimony.
- Increase plea percentages.
- Improve officer safety.
- Make more informed decisions.
- Reduce legal exposure.

If you were involved in a use-of-force case and there is only your word concerning the events of the altercation and the legal jurisdiction is asking what happened, how would you defend yourself? How much would ten seconds of audio and video be worth to you?

Today's Challenges

The ability to gather, examine, and disseminate information and intelligence will continue to be a tedious labor of love. For many departments, large and small, human power constraints, budget restrictions, the sheer volume of caseloads, and the lack of training in the use and deployment of new technologies will further complicate this effort. Law enforcement administrators must train their officers in the use of new technologies and seek new approaches to criminal investigations. If this is accomplished, they will be developing one of the most valuable tools that can be utilized against the criminal element of tomorrow—the tech officer and tech unit! Whether full- or part-time, this resource will become an investigative tool to be reckoned with.

Some types of investigations that can benefit from this include the following:

- Airport security and investigations
- Arson
- Drugs
- Game and fish crimes
- Gangs
- Intelligence
- Ports of entry
- Robbery
- Stalking
- Taggers
- Vice
- Waterways and docks

Many of you may say, “We don’t own any of this technology, and we will probably never see it.” Much of this technology is becoming more affordable; grants are becoming available to purchase these new tools; and government technology transfers can be accessed as well. The best approach is one that encompasses all these areas and involves a three- to five-year plan to purchase and obtain new and different types of technology.

Departments may be allowed to use seizure money for some or all of these purchases. Included at the top of this list should be training! Why? Because without training, you do not know what types of technology are out there. You need to find out what is current, what is out-of-date, and what is cutting-edge. We, in law enforcement, are usually quick to buy the first thing that comes along,

without discovering whether it will work or not. Proper surveillance training will help eliminate some of these issues.

Many criminals are becoming far more sophisticated than we could have imagined even seven years ago. Tomorrow's criminals will be more sophisticated in their ability to engage in illegal activities through the use of technology. It will take a new cadre of law enforcement officers, both seasoned and new, that are trained in the use of electronic surveillance technology and are comfortable in its deployment and use in a broad range of dynamic investigative environments.

The entire basis of this article comes from training information provided by the Institute of Investigative Technology located in Westminster, Maryland.

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Illinois Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1998

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The Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1998 (705 ILCS 405/1-2) drastically changes the way criminal justice agencies deal with juveniles. Imagine this scenario: You're on routine patrol and witness a juvenile committing minor vandalism. You detain the juvenile and ask his parents to meet you at police headquarters. While waiting for his parents' arrival, you decide that criminal charges are not warranted, believing if you scare the juvenile enough maybe he won't get into trouble in the future.

Discussing the event with his parents, you tell them their son will be released to their custody; however, he will be required to abide by several restrictions placed on him by your police department. Believing this may be an isolated incident and never having had contact with the juvenile prior to this time, this is the correct action.

Several weeks later, while at a conference with other law enforcement agencies, you talk about the juvenile activity in your jurisdiction. Officers from other departments tell you of the contact they have had with a juvenile from your jurisdiction for minor vandalism. Asking who the juvenile was, they mentioned the same name as the child you had detained for vandalism. After hearing he had been caught committing the same type of crime in several other areas, you may have decided on a different outcome to your encounter.

Does this scenario sound familiar? Sadly, this is probably all too familiar to most police officers. Historically, Illinois has treated juveniles and their records as "off limits" to anyone other than the police department originating the case. This antiquated practice has changed with the implementation of the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1998. With today's juveniles becoming more violent and more mobile, the need for police agencies to share information is imperative.

The Act states, "... to secure for each minor subject hereto such care and guidance, preferable in his or her own home, as will serve the safety and moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community." Now, to put this in terms we all understand, the Act . . .

- Aims to restore balance in the juvenile justice arena.
- Stresses accountability, competency, and public safety.
- Guides criminal justice professionals in their decisionmaking.

Restoring Balance in the Juvenile Justice Arena

Historically, juveniles have had all the protection and advantages of the law when committing unlawful acts. Police agencies have had no avenue to communicate with each other regarding juvenile matters. This was not balanced, as all advantages were realized by the juvenile. Every department had their juvenile records sealed,

and no one outside of that agency could see those reports. Now, the barrier to sharing these records has been removed.

One of key provisions of the Act is to direct submission of juvenile records to the Illinois State Police, Bureau of Identification—the central repository for Illinois criminal histories. In some instances, the police agency must report certain offenses to the Illinois State Police: Any juvenile 10 years of age or older who has been arrested for Class X, 1, 2, 3, or 4 felonies must be reported to the Illinois State Police. In addition to these required offenses, there are instances in which a juvenile arrest fingerprint card shall be reported. The biggest change that affects all law enforcement agencies within Illinois is the capability to submit station adjustments to the Illinois State Police.

Station adjustments are used to give a child a second chance without filing a juvenile petition with the court. Within the Juvenile Justice Reform Act, there are two types of station adjustments: (1) formal and (2) informal. Formal station adjustments *must* be reported if the act committed by the juvenile is a felony offense. This differs from other provisions since there is no age factor involved. Formal station adjustments are generally completed when there is a serious misdemeanor or felony involved. For a formal station adjustment, the juvenile must admit involvement. Also, there are certain restrictions regarding the total number of formal station adjustments a juvenile may accrue. If the juvenile has the maximum number of formal adjustments allowed, the next incident will exclude them from any other station adjustments. At that point, the juvenile must be referred to the State's Attorney for a juvenile petition.

There is also an informal station adjustment. The informal adjustment is generally used for misdemeanor offenses. Also, the juvenile does not have to admit involvement for an officer to adjust informally. In fact, the child can sit in the station and not say one word. The officer only needs probable cause to believe the juvenile committed the act. A third type of adjustment—a probation adjustment—is done by the probation/court services department.

The reporting of these felony offenses and station adjustments starts a mechanism upon which criminal justice agencies and the judiciary can base important decisions concerning juveniles. All records that are submitted to the Illinois State Police, Bureau of Identification will be made available to criminal justice agencies. The information is available via the Illinois Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (LEADS). A complete rap sheet can be retrieved with all the information that has been submitted—all petitions filed with the court, formal and informal station adjustments, and with probation adjustments.

Accountability, Competency, and Public Safety

This makes juveniles accountable for their actions. Our system has been compromised for many years because it allowed young people to commit minor acts and get away with them with little or no fear of repercussion. The records were sealed, and the parents and attorneys knew that nothing further would become of the events.

The process now allows criminal justice agencies to ascertain whether juveniles have had contact with another agency for similar offenses. If juveniles violate a condition of their station adjustment—whether formal or informal—they are subject to another station adjustment or a juvenile petition filed with the court. The juvenile can be charged with the new offense and also the original, station-adjusted offense. This also holds the parents responsible for the child's actions and ensures that they are competent as parents.

The Act strives to protect a child's moral, emotional, mental, and physical safety along with the best interests of the community. While striving to preserve and strengthen family ties, in some cases, the family tie must be broken in order to preserve public safety and to protect the juvenile. Some people simply lack adequate parenting skills. This act will allow the criminal justice system to remove a child from the parents—a last ditch effort to save the child from a dangerous life ahead.

Public safety must be maintained. The Act allows criminal justice agencies to perform their duties more efficiently. Some of the juveniles with whom law enforcement officers have contact will not take advantage of the choices given to them. In these cases when we can not save the juvenile from his or her own decisions, we must protect the public from the acts the juvenile may commit.

Guiding Criminal Justice Professionals in Their Decisionmaking

We must give law enforcement officers the important decision-making tools they need. The most versatile tool of all is knowledge. Information about a juvenile's past can be critical to criminal justice decisionmaking. An officer may decide on an informal station adjustment, a formal station adjustment, or a juvenile petition with the court.

The State's Attorney has the final decision if a juvenile petition will be filed with the court. Based on a juvenile's criminal history (rap sheet), the prosecutor may decide that a petition may not be the proper avenue in this case. The juvenile may be referred to the probation officer/court services officer, who will, in turn, complete a probation adjustment. The courts, as well as law enforcement and prosecutors, use this information. The judges make important decisions regarding the sentencing of juveniles based upon their past. We may have a juvenile who has had contact with police agencies for certain offenses. If those offenses are not reported to the Illinois State Police, the judiciary can not make an informed decision concerning the welfare and overall future of the juvenile.

Now, the same scenario mentioned earlier with a little different twist. "You're on routine patrol and witness a juvenile committing minor vandalism. In the process of talking to the juvenile, you run a criminal history using your in-car, mobile data computer. The state central repository (Bureau of Identification) responds with a valid response on the individual. The criminal history states the juvenile has several informal and formal station adjustments for vandalism. After transporting the child to your station and talking with him, you believe he will not stop vandalizing and may even escalate to more serious crimes; therefore, you decide to fingerprint the juvenile and request a juvenile petition be filed with the court for prosecution.

The decision to request a juvenile petition was based upon having all the tools to complete the job to the best of the officer's ability. In this case, the officer should feel confident that this decision was best for the public as well as the juvenile. If the child gets a glimpse of what happens in the criminal justice system when arrested, he may not want to commit these crimes in the future.

The Juvenile Justice Reform Act has made considerable steps in allowing the criminal justice community to make informed decisions that affect the safety of the citizens of the State of Illinois but, more importantly, the well-being of the juvenile.

The source material for the document was the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1998 Edition. Published through a grant to the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board from the Illinois Juvenile Justice Commission.

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Alexandria Police Department: Tactical Computer System

James A. Craige, Sergeant, Alexandria, Virginia, Police Department

The Need for Change

Imagine that a detective from the Criminal Investigations Unit carries a case file to the Patrol Division roll call. He gives the officers a brief description of a suspect, then pulls a photo from the file and holds it up for all the officers to see. Once the information has been given, the photo goes back into the file, and the file goes back to the detective's desk. How many officers would recognize the suspect from that brief glimpse or have the information two weeks later? This was one of the many challenges that the Alexandria Police Department faced when attempting to increase efficiency and accuracy through the use of technology.

The Alexandria Police Department has 300 sworn officers and serves a community of 128,000 residents in 16 square miles, the most densely populated city in the Commonwealth of Virginia. In the early 1990s, the Alexandria Police Department had no viable mobile data system. Any request or query by an officer on the street was routed through the communications center by radio. The radio frequencies were becoming increasingly tied up with routine or administrative messages. It was an inefficient method of communications, but of greater concern was the impact on operations and officer safety. Officers routinely encountered suspects or initiated traffic stops without notifying the dispatcher because of the constant radio traffic. The officers would not run these subjects through the FBI National Criminal Information Clearinghouse (NCIC), Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), and local databases because of the time required waiting for a return. Many of these suspects may have been wanted or had suspended driving privileges, but that information was never transmitted to the officers because of the time required to wait for a return (from five to twenty minutes or longer). Citizens who had checks run on them were subjected to these unnecessarily long delays. Officers attempting to declare an emergency on the radio were often delayed because others were using the radio. The volume of calls for service, reports, and information collection and dissemination increased faster than the increase in staff. A data system was desperately needed to clear the radio traffic jam and automate many of the paperwork driven functions.

The first consideration was the infrastructure that the data would flow on. Several transmission options were examined, including 400 MHz radio, 800 MHz radio, spread spectrum, and Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD). The system that was most cost-effective and met the data needs of the police department was CDPD. In 1996, Alexandria became the first law enforcement agency in the United States to implement CDPD as a mobile data communications solution. The police department started with 30 computers equipped with CDPD modems. The officers were able to send basic queries to NCIC and Virginia DMV. This system also included a rudimentary car-to-car messaging system.

Through 1997 and 1998, Alexandria worked with the vendor, HTE, to develop an electronic state accident report. The data was still manually entered by a clerk based on a printed copy. In assisting with the development of this software, Alexandria forged a relationship that built on the technical expertise of the vendor and the real-world experiences of officers. This relationship was the foundation for future development with this and other vendors.

Technology itself seemed to be a moving target; as soon as hardware or software was selected, it was outpaced by the next generation of equipment. Alexandria was swept up in an earlier trend of tablet style pen-based computers, only to find that the hardware failed to live up to expectations, and the software already purchased had not even been developed by the vendor. Alexandria was unable to purchase enough computers for the patrol cars because although enough mounting hardware was purchased, the vendor changed the configuration of the newer computers so they did not fit in the vehicle mounts. The inability to equip the entire fleet resulted in a poor deployment and operational use because the system was not institutionalized.

Alexandria saw that the surrounding jurisdictions were far ahead in their mobile capability. Other agencies were already running license plates and sending car-to-car messages, while Alexandria had a small fleet of tablet-style computers that were regularly left in headquarters because of their deficiencies in hardware and software. The goal of the police department was to create a system with software and hardware capable of consistently providing enhanced data communications. The Tactical Computer System was created to bring the Alexandria Police Department to the forefront of law enforcement technology.

Analysis Techniques

With the goal of saving officers' time, the Alexandria Police Department set out to determine benchmarks for standard queries. Prior to full implementation, test officers alternately ran license plates by radio and by computer and determined that an average, query could be returned 1.5 minutes faster by computer than by radio. Other similar tests were conducted as processes were automated. The result was that each automated task was assigned an accurate amount of time saved versus the traditional manner of completing the task. Monthly statistics were tracked and charted. The amount of data transmissions, in megabytes, was tracked and reported monthly, showing a gradual increase in data transmissions. Radio traffic was also monitored, borne out by the amount of silence on the radio during peak operational times and the discontinuation of an administrative channel.

Using an average Full Time Equivalent (FTE) position of 1820 hours per year, Alexandria is able to compute the number of sworn officers and civilian positions the technology offsets through automation. An example is calculating the difference between the average time for entering an incident report by hand versus the review of an electronic incident report. The use of statistical calculations assists the police department in monitoring the success of the technology and its role in producing the equivalent of over seven sworn officers and five civilian positions annually.

Implementing Solutions

The Alexandria Police Department wanted a system that would encompass a wide range of applications, including Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) functions, incident report writing, accident report writing, and information sharing. Alexandria had to ensure that the officers were equipped with the tools to complete their mission in an increasingly technological environment. An important aspect of this system was that it would not tie the officer to the car. The hardware and software had to be fully capable in or out of the car. Officers would be able to interview a victim or witness and take a report, run queries, look up data, and communicate wirelessly from any location.

In 1999, the Alexandria Police Department began to aggressively plan and pursue a system that contained hardware and software that met the goals of the project and also had the capacity to run multiple applications as the technology progressed.

Hardware Solutions

The Tactical Computer Section (TCS) examined the hardware available and assigned various demonstration models to officers. This process ensured that the final hardware selection met the initial technical specifications as well as the needs of the end users. The hardware that met the technical specifications and had the highest end user rating was the Panasonic CF-27 computer. This computer functions in or out of the car, has a touch screen that is readable in sunlight, has a back lit keyboard, and is made rugged for law enforcement use. It is quite easy to insert into and remove from the car yet secure enough to prevent theft or damage. The Panasonic also contains many needed features of a traditional laptop computer, such as a floppy disk drive, adequate hard drive and RAM capacity, and the familiar clamshell design that had been lacking on tablet style computers. Alexandria purchased incrementally through 2001, reaching a total of 185. Alexandria was one of the first law enforcement agencies to use the Panasonic CF-27 with an integrated CDPD modem. Representatives from Alexandria have served on advisory committees for Panasonic and met with the president of the mobile division, representing all law enforcement users in the pursuit of the best mobile computing hardware.

Software Solutions

Alexandria officials regularly met with the software vendor, HTE, to discuss the development and testing of some of the emerging applications. The Alexandria Police Department volunteered to test various software packages in the field, during routine and emergency situations, in order to give feedback to the vendor. The City of Alexandria recognized that this course of action carried a substantial risk of alienating the officers if too many problems arose. The key to this phase was identifying and selecting a core group of officers from different assignments. These officers, referred to as the "super users," were given special training as each set of software was brought on for testing. They advance-tested all software before it was released department-wide so that they could troubleshoot and give suggestions for improvements. This information was funneled through TCS to the vendor. As software was then brought to the general users, the super users became

the trainers. This approach allowed the most knowledgeable users to teach from experience and eliminated the perception that the administration was dictating the course of development.

At the same time, a multistep process for configuring the computers was developed, and this process continues today. TCS starts with the original laptop software install, then loads each set of software, and tests for conflicts. Although modern computers are designed with powerful customization features, it is critical that the computer performs in the exact same manner and form each time it is used, especially for the officers who are less skilled with computers. In order to ensure this stability, a security program is installed to prevent accidental or deliberate changes in the configuration. Once these steps are completed and all software is loaded, the final configuration is saved using a hard drive imaging software. This creates a clone of the computer, which can then be loaded on all the computers in a fraction of the time it takes to load each program separately.

Report Writing Software

An electronic reporting system can be simple or complex, but to be truly considered successful by Alexandria, it needed to transmit the data from the officer through the supervisor for approval, then to the records management system. From 1999 until April 2001, Alexandria tested and evaluated several components of this workflow until it was finally ready for deployment. Input from the super users was vital in coordinating the various databases, interfaces, and user screens so that the end product was useful as a reporting tool.

Mobile Communications Software

The police department was able to provide software that enabled all patrol officers to run queries independently from using the radio. This means that every officer can stop a car and instantly know the status of the license plate and driver. Also, the officers are able to use data communications for routine administrative messages and receiving their call assignments, along with all details of the call. They can access information files that will display all the units and calls in the city.

Mobile Intranet

The example of the detective showing a photograph, then filing it in his desk, is one of the investigative processes that was used in Alexandria and other police departments across the country. There was a limit to the funds and staff that could be expended for copying photographs and information to distribute to hundreds of officers; and there was no way to create a digital image, attach information to it, and send it to all officers electronically. Once the information has been distributed, equal effort is required in order to update or cancel the lookouts. Through a series of meetings and conferences with the vendor, Alexandria was able to be in on the ground floor of a breathtaking new communications package. This system featured a customizable set of screens, menus, and toolbars. Alexandria tested this software thoroughly, and it was fully deployed by October 2000. Through the use of server-to-mobile, update software, Alexandria developed a set of screens in this software that function as an intranet for the mobile computers. Any type of information, text, or photographs, can be sent to the entire mobile fleet instantly.

In order to fully take advantage of the technology and address several needs for fresh data, Alexandria continues to modify and update this mobile intranet. An additional web server was implemented in the spring of 2002. The primary function of this server was to provide wireless data access to the Records Management System (RMS). Officers were making requests for advanced web-based applications, including wireless alphanumeric paging, database updates, and interfaces to local wanted data. The addition of these functions were at first considered too costly or technical to implement, but the temporary web programmer who had been hired to create the wireless query of the RMS was able to program the existing server to create these new systems. This added several new functions, including an advanced wireless database for beat check reporting. Officers can now complete a routine check on their beat and instantly send their results to a database at headquarters. This significantly reduces the errors and omissions that the paper-based system, used for years, was unable to overcome. With minimal software investment, Alexandria found that existing systems were able to complete these tasks.

Officers routinely carried several binders containing operating procedures, state laws, and other information. The binders were constantly revised with paper inserts, and other daily papers were also distributed to the officers. There was no way to ensure that every officer received every update. Also, most copies of these documents were unused because the officers would leave them in the roll call room or forget to take them to their car. TCS analyzed the various documents that were distributed to the officers and devised a system for automated electronic distribution. The documents are produced and sent electronically by their creators. This eliminates wait times for copying or print shop orders and ensures that officers have the most up-to-date information at all times. Officers can now get to each document through the mobile computer intranet instead of carrying stacks of binders and papers.

Other Software

The laptop computers in the system are fully functional as standard computers. This opens up an entire new range of applications not available in systems that are restricted to only running the "mission" software. Field training officers use specialized software for creating electronic, daily observation reports. Using standard programs available "off the shelf" the Alexandria Police Department has been able to provide word processing, presentation, spreadsheet, database, form completion, and even a calculator. These applications are available to the officers in the field, not just at the police station.

Project Results

Hardware Results

Through the selection process that involved end user input, the best available laptops were obtained. The level of acceptance for the hardware was extremely high, not only because of the overall quality of the product, but because there was a genuine effort to involve the users in the purchasing decision. The first Panasonic computers lasted their projected three-year life with a relatively low failure rate. Due to careful selection of the computer and mounting system, there have

been only an insignificant number of computers damaged. Even if a vehicle is totaled in an accident, the computer and mount can usually be immediately redeployed to another car.

Many agencies only use a small capacity of their hardware capability. The Alexandria Police Department tests the limits of the hardware, using it in or out of the car, docking it for peripheral applications such as printers or external drives, and using card slots for data transmission through the Local Area Network (LAN). One measure of the user satisfaction with the hardware capabilities is the continuing request for peripheral devices. The officers are interested in using the computer to run or interface with other devices such as radar units, media drives, digital cameras, and so on. Many officers will postpone turning in computers for minor repairs because they value the capabilities of the computer, and they are unwilling to work without them. This hardware continues to meet the needs of the Alexandria Police Department; an additional 67 were purchased in 2002.

Also, the police department has actually attained a level of savings through the use of the mobile computers. Since they run many standard applications, there has been no need to purchase standard laptops for giving multimedia presentations or creating documents. Several officers on extended assignments or travel have needed a laptop for communications or presentations and have been able to use their mobile computers for those tasks. In addition, the patrol division, with over 100 officers, has only three desktop computers for use by the patrol officers, and the police station does not have space for any more workstations. This fact has been mitigated by the availability of laptops for all patrol officers.

Alexandria was able to express to the vendor the need to ensure that future hardware is compatible with older accessories. Several hardware vendors rely on input from TCS for developing functionality in future products.

Software Results

The Alexandria Police Department has used tracking tools to demonstrate the savings equivalent to over seven full-time officers and five civilians annually. The time saved is a result of the use of software to replace paper or radio systems. In addition, accident and criminal investigations are assisted through the electronic systems.

Incident and Accident Reporting

The Alexandria Police Department now completes over 75% of the approximately 26,000 annual police reports by computer, and all of the approximately 2,500 accident reports by computer. National Incident Based Reporting (NIBRS) and the Commonwealth of Virginia replaced the *Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR)* and added over 50 new data elements. The Alexandria Police electronic incident reports are NIBRS compliant and also contain all the fields to satisfy Virginia reporting requirements.

Even with the added complexity, the electronic reporting has saved the department time and increased accuracy. The officers can send the reports electronically, rather than driving to meet a supervisor. Similarly, the supervisors can transmit the

report to the station, rather than driving there. An added benefit is that supervisors can review reports as they are completed rather than waiting until the end of the shift. This eliminates the need for officers and supervisors staying late in order to ensure that a report was completed properly.

Prior to the electronic reporting system, report data entry was delayed from four to six months. The electronic report prints automatically, and the data from the report goes directly into the RMS. The records department staff would spend up to 45 minutes per handwritten report on data entry and correction. A records clerk can review and correct about 18 electronic reports in the same 45 minutes. This has significantly reduced the backlog of data entry and allowed the officers and detectives instant access to current information. Electronic field reporting has brought the data-entry time for all reports to 24 hours or less.

Handwriting and spelling once caused data errors and confusion; however, electronic reports virtually eliminate these problems. The typeface allows faster reading with less error, and the narrative section is equipped with a spell-checking feature. The entire report is now available electronically as opposed to searching through paper files. A handwritten narrative was not entered into computer databases; now all electronically completed reports are available either at a computer in the station or wirelessly on a mobile computer. Many detectives have noticed that compared to the handwritten reports, the electronic reports contain more details in the narrative, assisting in criminal investigations.

Mobile Communications

All one needs to do is listen to the silence on the primary police channel compared to the previous constant traffic. The communications section has been able to stop the practice of adding a second dispatch channel for administrative radio traffic. This increased efficiency also translates into officer safety because now the officers are all on one radio channel and can more closely monitor the activity in the city, as opposed to being on a different channel and missing key transmissions. The officers receive all the details of calls on the computer, eliminating the chance of missed information and radio traffic due to repeating the call information. Computer messaging has resulted in an annual reduction of approximately 9,000 hours of radio traffic.

Additional Positive Effects

The system is not just the right set of hardware and software; it is the combination of involvement at all levels of the department with the commitment and dedication of key players—computer technicians, line officers able to test and promote new technologies, and a strong command staff willing to accept the use of technology when it clearly can bring benefits to their units. Officers have realized this and are full of praise for the tools and efficiency the comprehensive system gives them. Almost daily, they make comments such as the following:

“There are no forms to carry, and I don’t have to see my sergeant all day.”

“I got another stolen car last night!”

"The daily information bulletin is read at roll call maybe once a week. I can download and read it every day right on my computer."

"How did we do it before the computers?"

"I can't do my job without it."

Officer Safety

Officer safety is a concept that is hard to quantify, yet it is a key aspect of law enforcement. Each officer has an expectation that danger may be encountered, but it is an agency responsibility to minimize that danger to the extent possible. Some of the features that the Tactical Computer System brings to officer safety are . . .

The ability to push a button and see all the activity throughout the city. Often officers are unable to monitor the radio, whether on a call or in the booking room. It is vital to know where the other officers are and what type of calls they are on, so when help is needed, the response is swift. The Tactical Computer System gives the officers this information instantly.

Knowledge as a tactical advantage. Officers can use the computer to find out about cars or people before stopping them. Also, key information on locations and crime trends is available, allowing officers to patrol with a greater likelihood of preventing crime or apprehending criminals. There are also several maps and diagrams loaded on the computers, so officers can plan their routes and set up perimeters on active calls.

Decreased radio traffic. The cleared administrative transmissions leave the radio channels open for emergency transmissions.

Officer safety lookouts. Officers can have instant updates on people with weapons or other lookouts that affect their safety.

Community Benefits

The community benefits from this technology as well. In the case of an endangered missing child, information and photographs can be sent to all officers in a matter of minutes, rather than hours or not at all. The mobile data system allows officers to learn more about the community they patrol through updates on crime trends and citizen requests. Community events are advertised on the computers, resulting in a greater outreach to the citizens by individual officers. The system has even been used successfully to find a lost dog.

Alexandria's community-based prosecutor, whose office is convenient to many low-income residents, uses the Tactical Computer System. He can discern which officers are on duty and communicate with them directly. He can retrieve reports electronically, rather than waiting for records clerks to locate and fax them. The chief prosecutor for Alexandria, Randolph Sengel, has stated, . . .

The use of mobile wireless computer access to police reporting data has proven invaluable to prosecutors in the field. Alexandria's new community

prosecution program puts a prosecutor working in a neighborhood where his impact and effectiveness is measured in hours on the street rather than behind a desk, and he would be working blind without this critical communication tool.

Criminal Arrests

As the following examples illustrate, the Tactical Computer System is being used daily as a tool to help the officers make criminal arrests:

- An officer was backing up another officer on a traffic stop. He wrote in his report, *"As vehicles passed me on the right, I would look at their license plate and run them through my computer to see if any were stolen . . . A 1982 Ford pickup truck drove by, and I ran its Maryland license plate."* The plate returned as stolen, and the officer stopped the car. He not only arrested the driver for the stolen license plate, but he also found that the driver was wanted in Alexandria for probation violation on a drug charge. This arrest would not have been made without the use of the computer. Prior to the Tactical Computer System, officers might have run two or three license plates during their shift. Now, some officers run two or three hundred license plates during their shift, resulting in more wanted suspects being apprehended and stolen cars being recovered.
- Another officer was dispatched to a subway platform for an armed violent suspect wanted in a felonious assault case. The officer responded to the scene and wrote in the report, *"I was familiar with the name of the subject and consulted a photograph, located on the MDB [mobile computer] . . ."* The officer located the suspect as he was attempting to board a train. He was arrested, and a handgun was recovered because the officer recognized him from the description and photograph on the mobile computer. The suspect was threatening further violence and may have acted on those threats if he had not been captured that day.

Institutionalization

At the onset of the project, one sworn officer staffed the entire mobile system. The command at the Alexandria Police Department recognized that in order to give the project a chance for success, further staffing was required. An additional sworn, full-time officer was assigned, creating the Tactical Computer Section (TCS). The police department also began to add civilian staff to handle the advanced back end systems, such as the RMS and CAD. These positions ensure that the resources exist to support the technology and continue to develop new applications. A bi-weekly troubleshooting and development meeting has been instituted, bringing together technology experts and users of the system.

New policy was implemented for mobile computer use, and existing communications and report-writing policies were revised to include the use of mobile computers. New radio codes were created for discussing computer-related issues on the radio. One of the most telling aspects of the Alexandria Police Department's commitment to the mobile technology is the creation of a budgeted replacement cycle. Funds are set aside each year to ensure that upon the completion of three years, the outdated and worn out computers are replaced with the latest

technology. It was Chief of Police Charles E. Samarra's stated goal to issue a computer to each officer, just like each officer is issued a gun and badge. In October 2002, that goal was realized with the purchase of enough computers through a federal grant to allow the police department to issue a computer to each operational officer. This has resulted in decreased repairs due to greater user accountability and also increased capabilities for the officers.

TCS has developed lesson plans and training guides for the law enforcement software applications. In order to ensure that the officers are able to use the computers, three full days are allocated for training on the Tactical Computer System. This commitment to training ensures that officers complete their work properly and gain the enhanced benefits that the system offers.

TCS has received so many requests for information from other agencies that it holds a monthly mobile technology demonstration. From neighboring Arlington County, Virginia to Berkeley, California and even as far away as St. Petersburg, Russia, agencies have visited and gained information from their peers in Alexandria. Demonstrations include discussions on hardware and software selection and capabilities, training, implementation, and policy. Agencies use policies developed in Alexandria as models for developing policies on their own systems. More than one agency has gone to mobile technology vendors and said, "We want what Alexandria has."

James A. Craig is a sergeant with the Alexandria, Virginia Police Department. He earned his BAS from George Mason University. He began his law enforcement career in 1990, assigned to the patrol division. In 1995, he was assigned as an investigator in the Street Crimes Unit, a tactical drug enforcement unit. He has worked on several technology initiatives, including the National Institute of Justice/Department of Transportation ALERT Project and the National Institute of Justice AGILE Project. He currently is in charge of the Alexandria Police Department's mobile computer section. He is an instructor for the International Association of Chiefs of Police and has given training on the use of technology to law enforcement agencies from across the United States.

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There are virtually no restrictions on subject matter as long as the material pertains, in the opinion of the editor, to law-enforcement-related areas. Manuscripts should be typed and double-spaced. A résumé or vitae from the author(s) must accompany submissions. Book reviews and research notes will be considered for publication. No submission will be published until recommended by referees, who will review blind copies.

Final manuscripts must be submitted on 3.5" microcomputer diskettes readable on Macintosh or IBM (and true compatible) computers. Please specify word processing program used when submitting diskettes (e.g., MacWrite 5.0, WordPerfect 5.1, and so on). Also, an ASCII version would be most helpful. Disks will not be returned. Figures and line drawings must be submitted in camera-ready form.

Send three hard-copy manuscripts, vitae(s), and a diskette to . . .

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Works Published/Produced Through the Illinois Law Enforcement Executive Institute

Emerging Challenges in Illinois Law Enforcement Collective Bargaining, Lewis Bender, Robert Fischer, and Thomas J. Jurkanin, January 2001.

Illinois Law Enforcement Executive Forum Journal, inaugural issue, June 2000.

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Small Town Policing in the New Millennium: Strategies, Options, and Alternate Methods, Robin Johnson, author and researcher; published in cooperation with the Illinois Institute for Rural Affairs, March 2000.

Managing a Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement Program, Inspector Thomas McNamara, through a grant from the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board, March 1999.

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Zero Tolerance, 1994 Illinois Secretary of State Police. (Videotape produced as well as a satellite interactive television program through Educational Broadcasting at Western Illinois University.)

Sexual Assault Investigation Series (three tapes) in cooperation with the Illinois Coalition Against Domestic Violence through a grant from the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, 1996.

1. *Preliminary and In-Depth Interview of the Victim of Adult Sexual Assault*
2. *Evidence Collection*
3. *Suspect Interview*

Domestic Violence Investigations Series (three tapes) in cooperation with the Illinois Coalition Against Domestic Violence and the Illinois Attorney General through a grant from the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, 1997.

1. *Obvious Scenario*
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
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
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